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Xingming Hu
NanJing University
  1.  50
    On Evidence in Philosophy.Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Analysis.
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  2. In What Sense is Understanding an Intellectual Virtue?Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Synthese:1-13.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two senses of “understanding”: understanding as an epistemic good and understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind. I argue that understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind is an intellectual virtue while understanding as an epistemic good is not. Finally, I show how the distinction can help us better appreciate Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtue.
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  3.  10
    On Evidence in Philosophy By William Lycan.Xingming Hu - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):401-403.
    _ On Evidence in Philosophy _ By LycanWilliamOxford University Press, 2019. ix + 160 pp.
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  4.  92
    Is Knowledge of Causes Sufficient for Understanding?Xingming Hu - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):291-313.
    ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. (...)
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  5. A Critical Survey of Some Recent Philosophical Research in China.Xingming Hu - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):971-998.
    In this paper, I survey some recent literature produced by the established Chinese philosophers who regularly publish in Chinese philosophy journals and work in Mainland China. Specifically, I review the recent research of these philosophers in two areas: Chinese Philosophy and epistemology. In each area, I focus on two topics that have caught the attention of a lot of Chinese philosophers. I argue that the Chinese philosophers’ research on these topics has two prevalent problems: (i) a lot of arguments they (...)
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  6.  67
    The Epistemic Account of Faultless Disagreement.Xingming Hu - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2613-2630.
    There seem to be cases where A believes p, and B believes not-p, but neither makes a mistake. This is known as faultless disagreement. According to the epistemic account, in at least some cases of faultless disagreement either A or B must believe something false, and the disagreement is faultless in the sense that each follows the epistemic norm. Recently, philosophers have raised various objections to this account. In this paper, I propose a new version of the epistemic account and (...)
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  7.  54
    Review of What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy BY Maddy Penelope. [REVIEW]Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    It is worth noting that Maddy oversimplifies the history of Gettierology, for a lot of epistemologists who work on the Gettier Problem do not engage in analysing the concept of knowledge.
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  8.  36
    What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy.Xingming Hu - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):862-864.
    What do Philosophers do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. By Maddy Penelope.
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  9.  85
    Why Do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value?Xingming Hu - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):255-269.
    Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and defend my response against (...)
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  10.  69
    A Few Puzzles About William James' Theory of Truth.Xingming Hu - 2016 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 57 (135):803-821.
    William James makes several major claims about truth: (i) truth means agreement with reality independently of the knower, (ii) truth is made by human beings, (iii) truth can be verified, and (iv) truth is necessarily good. These claims give rise to a few puzzles: (i) and (ii) seem to contradict each other, and each of (ii), (iii), and (iv) has counter-intuitive implications. I argue that Richard Gale's interpretation of James' theory of truth is inadequate in dealing with these puzzles. I (...)
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  11.  46
    Must a Successful Argument Convert an Ideal Audience?Xingming Hu - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (1):165-177.
    Peter van Inwagen defines a successful argument in philosophy as one that can be used to convert an audience of ideal agnostics in an ideal debate. Sarah McGrath and Thomas Kelly recently argue that van Inwagen’s definition cannot be correct since the idea of ideal agnostics is incoherent with regard to an absolute paradigm of a successful philosophical argument. This paper defends van Inwagen’s definition against McGrath and Kelly’s objection.
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  12.  43
    Is Epistemology a Kind of Inquiry?Xingming Hu - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:483-488.
    There are three widely held beliefs among epistemologists: (1) the goal of inquiry is truth or something that entails truth; (2) epistemology aims for a reflectively stable theory via reflective equilibrium; (3) epistemology is a kind of inquiry. I argue that accepting (1) and (2) entails denying (3). This is a problem especially for the philosophers (e.g. Duncan Pritchard and Alvin Goldman) who accept both (1) and (2), for in order to be consistent, they must reject (3). The tension is (...)
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  13.  31
    Why Be Moral? Learning From the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers by Yong Huang.Xingming Hu - 2016 - Philosophy East and West 66 (3):1032-1035.
    Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers, by Yong Huang, is a book written for Western philosophers. Professor Huang claims that there are two ways of introducing a Chinese philosopher to Western audiences: first, by showing them that the Chinese philosopher’s ideas are ridiculous or inferior compared to the corresponding Western ideas, and second, by showing them that the Chinese philosopher has better answers to some Western philosophical questions than great Western philosophers. Huang thinks the first way is (...)
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  14.  31
    Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life NEERA K. BADHWAR Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; 264 Pp.; £41.99. [REVIEW]Xingming Hu - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1).
  15.  20
    An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies. By Steve Coutinho.Xingming Hu - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):463-465.
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