We show that large fragments of MM, e. g. the tree property and stationary reflection, are preserved by strongly -game-closed forcings. PFA can be destroyed by a strongly -game-closed forcing but not by an ω2-closed.

We show that for any infinite cardinal κ, every strongly $(\kappa + 1)-strategically$ closed poset is strongly $\kappa^+-strategically$ closed if and only if $AP_\kappa$ (the approachability property) holds, answering the question asked in [5]. We also give a complete classification of strengths of strategic closure properties and that of strong strategic closure properties respectively.

In this paper we show that the Proper Forcing Axiom is preserved under forcing over any poset PP with the following property: In the generalized Banach–Mazur game over PP of length , Player II has a winning strategy which depends only on the current position and the ordinal indicating the number of moves made so far. By the current position we mean: The move just made by Player I for a successor stage, or the infimum of all the moves made (...) so far for a limit stage. As a consequence of this theorem, we introduce a weak form of the square principle and show that it is consistent with PFA. (shrink)

We introduce properties of Boolean algebras which are closely related to the existence of winning strategies in the Banach‐Mazur Boolean game. A σ‐short Boolean algebra is a Boolean algebra that has a dense subset in which every strictly descending sequence of length ω does not have a nonzero lower bound. We give a characterization of σ‐short Boolean algebras and study properties of σ‐short Boolean algebras. (© 2003 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim).

We introduce properties of Boolean algebras which are closely related to the existence of winning strategies in the Banach-Mazur Boolean game. A σ-short Boolean algebra is a Boolean algebra that has a dense subset in which every strictly descending sequence of length ω does not have a nonzero lower bound. We give a characterization of σ-short Boolean algebras and study properties of σ-short Boolean algebras.

We show that strongly compact cardinals and MM are sensitive to $\lambda$-closed forcings for arbitrarily large $\lambda$. This is done by adding ‘regressive' $\lambda$-Kurepa trees in either case. We argue that the destruction of regressive Kurepa trees requires a non-standard application of MM. As a corollary, we find a consistent example of an $\omega_2$-closed poset that is not forcing equivalent to any $\omega_2$-directed-closed poset.

Humans are always interested in distinguishing natural and artificial entities although there is no sharp demarcation between the two categories. Surprisingly, things do not improve when the second type of entities is restricted to the arguably more constrained realm of physical technical artifacts. This paper helps to clarify the relationship between natural entities and technical artifacts by developing a conceptual landscape within which to analyze these notions. The framework is developed by studying three definitions of technical artifact which arise from (...) different perspectives. All these perspectives share two intuitions: that technical artifacts are physical objects that exist by human intervention; and that technical artifacts are entities to be contrasted to natural entities. Yet the perspectives are different in the way they spell out these intuitions: the relevant human intervention may range from intentional selection to intentional production; and the contrast between technical artifacts and natural entities may be introduced by a constitution relation or by defining properties that set technical artifacts apart. The three perspectives are compared and their similarities and dissimilarities are explored with the help of ontological analysis. (shrink)

‘Substance’ (substantia, zelfstandigheid) is a key term of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like almost all of Spinoza’s philosophical vocabulary, Spinoza did not invent this term, which has a long history that can be traced back at least to Aristotle. Yet, Spinoza radicalized the traditional notion of substance and made a very powerful use of it by demonstrating – or at least attempting to demonstrate -- that there is only one, unique substance -- God (or Nature) -- and that all other things are (...) merely modes or states of God. Some of Spinoza’s readers understood these claims as committing him to the view that only God truly exists, and while this interpretation is not groundless, we will later see that this enticing and bold reading of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ comes at the expense of another audacious claim Spinoza advances, i.e., that God/Nature is absolutely and actually infinite. But before we reach this last conclusion, we have a long way to go. So, let me first provide an overview of our plan. In the first section of this paper we will examine Spinoza’s definitions of ‘substance’ and ‘God’ at the opening of his magnum opus, the Ethics. Following a preliminary clarification of these two terms and their relations to the other key terms defined at the beginning of the Ethics, we will briefly address the Aristotelian and Cartesian background of Spinoza’s discussion of substance. In the second section, we will study the properties of the fundamental binary relations pertaining to Spinoza’s substance: inherence, conception, and causation. The third section will be dedicated to a clarification of Spinoza’s claim that God, the unique substance, is absolutely infinite. This essential feature of Spinoza’s substance has been largely neglected in recent Anglo-American scholarship, a neglect which has brought about an unfortunate tendency to domesticate Spinoza’s metaphysics to more contemporary views. The fourth section will study the nature of Spinoza’s monism. It will discuss and criticize the interesting yet controversial views of the eminent Spinoza scholar, Martial Gueroult, about the plurality of substances in the beginning of the Ethics; address Spinoza’s claim in Letter 50 that, strictly speaking, it is improper to describe God as “one”; and, finally, evaluate Spinoza’s kind of monism against the distinction between existence and priority monism recently introduced into the contemporary philosophical literature. The fifth and final section will explain the nature, reality, and manner of existence of modes. We therefore have an ambitious plan; let’s get down to business. (shrink)

"El amor en su singularidad erótica es tratado en esta obra desde el auspicio de la poesía y la filosofía, las cuales nos llevan de la mano a los desolados parajes del mundo biológico-psíquico para retener aquello de lo que "no se puede decir nada". Aun así, no es éste un intento de explicar fenomenológicamente el amor, sino una modesta evocación de los momentos y comportamientos humanos en su tránsito hacia el Eros y la experiencia que de ellos se ha (...) obtenido."-- Cubierta trasera. (shrink)

Planteamiento de la naturaleza, de la filosof a y de su raz n hist rica, al contemplar panor micamente la totalidad de su pasado e intentar reconstruir el dram tico suceso de su origen.

Maquiavelo y su tiempo.--Reacción de algunos escritores españoles de los siglos XVII y XVIII ante la doctrina de Maquiavelo.--El maquiavelismo y las prácticas de gobierno.

明治大学文学部は、2018年4月に哲学専攻を新設した。いま、なぜ、哲学なのか?アジアにとって、哲学とは何か?理論とプラクティスが、西洋と東洋がクロスする新しい場から5名の創設メンバーが贈る“知”のスタ ーティングガイド。.

DICTIONARY OF SPANISH VERBS WITH THEIR ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS AND MODELS OF CONJUGATION/DICCIONARIO CON LOS VERBOS EN ESPAÑOL, SU TRADUCCIÓN AL INGLÉS Y CONJUGACIONES.

1. Escritos doctrinales -- 2. Escritos histórico-filosóficos.