The book presents a thoroughly elaborated logical theory of generalized truth-values understood as subsets of some established set of truth values. After elucidating the importance of the very notion of a truth value in logic and philosophy, we examine some possible ways of generalizing this notion. The useful four-valued logic of first-degree entailment by Nuel Belnap and the notion of a bilattice constitute the basis for further generalizations. By doing so we elaborate the idea of a multilattice, and most notably, (...) a trilattice of truth values â a specific algebraic structure with information ordering and two distinct logical orderings, one for truth and another for falsity. Each logical order not only induces its own logical vocabulary, but determines also its own entailment relation. We consider both semantic and syntactic ways of formalizing these relations and construct various logical calculi. (shrink)
In Belnap's useful 4-valued logic, the set 2 = {T, F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4 = í ”íČ«(2) = {Ă, {T}, {F}, {T, F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16 = á” (4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOURâ with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEENâ with an (...) information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity ordering. Interestingly, the logics generated separately by the algebraic operations under the truth order and under the falsity order in SIXTEENâ coincide with the logic of FOURâ, namely first degree entailment. This observation may be taken as a further indication of the significance of first degree entailment. In the present setting, however, it becomes rather natural to consider also logical systems in the language obtained by combining the vocabulary of the logic of the truth order and the falsity order. We semantically define the logics of the two orderings in the extended language and in both cases axiomatize a certain fragment comprising three unary operations: a negation, an involution, and their combination. We also suggest two other definitions of logics in the full language, including a bi-consequence system. In other words, in addition to presenting first degree entailment as a useful 16-valued logic, we define further useful 16-valued logics for reasoning about truth and (non-)falsity. We expect these logics to be an interesting and useful instrument in information processing, especially when we deal with a net of hierarchically interconnected computers. We also briefly discuss Arieli's and Avron's notion of a logical bilattice and state a number of open problems for future research. (shrink)
We consider a logic which is semantically dual (in some precise sense of the term) to intuitionistic. This logic can be labeled as âfalsification logicâ: it embodies the Popperian methodology of scientific discovery. Whereas intuitionistic logic deals with constructive truth and non-constructive falsity, and Nelson's logic takes both truth and falsity as constructive notions, in the falsification logic truth is essentially non-constructive as opposed to falsity that is conceived constructively. We also briefly clarify the relationships of our falsification logic to (...) some other logical systems. (shrink)
According to Suszko's Thesis, there are but two logical values, true and false. In this paper, R. Suszko's, G. Malinowski's, and M. Tsuji's analyses of logical two-valuedness are critically discussed. Another analysis is presented, which favors a notion of a logical system as encompassing possibly more than one consequence relation.
In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of ârevenge Liarâ arguments, also higher-order combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hyper-contradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest's treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinized and compared with another strategy of generalizing the set of classical truth values and defining an entailment relation on the resulting sets of (...) higher-order values. This method is based on the concept of a multilattice. If the method is applied to the set of truth values of Belnap's âuseful four-valued logicâ, one obtains a trilattice, and, more generally, structures here called Belnap-trilattices. As in Priest's case, it is shown that the generalized truth values motivated by hyper-contradictions have no effect on the logic. Whereas Priest's construction in terms of designated truth values always results in his Logic of Paradox, the present construction in terms of truth and falsity orderings always results in First Degree Entailment. However, it is observed that applying the multilattice-approach to Priest's initial set of truth values leads to an interesting algebraic structure of a âbi-and-a-halfâ lattice which determines seven-valued logics different from Priest's Logic of Paradox. (shrink)
In this paper we present a solution of the axiomatization problem for the Fmla-Fmla versions of the Pietz and Rivieccio exactly true logic and the non-falsity logic dual to it. To prove the completeness of the corresponding binary consequence systems we introduce a specific proof-theoretic formalism, which allows us to deal simultaneously with two consequence relations within one logical system. These relations are hierarchically organized, so that one of them is treated as the basic for the resulting logic, and the (...) other is introduced as an extension of this basic relation. The proposed bi-consequences systems allow for a standard Henkin-style canonical model used in the completeness proof. The deductive equivalence of these bi-consequence systems to the corresponding binary consequence systems is proved. We also outline a family of the bi-consequence systems generated on the basis of the first-degree entailment logic up to the classic consequence. (shrink)
In this paper we present a solution of the axiomatization problem for the Fmla-Fmla versions of the Pietz and Rivieccio exactly true logic and the non-falsity logic dual to it. To prove the completeness of the corresponding binary consequence systems we introduce a specific proof-theoretic formalism, which allows us to deal simultaneously with two consequence relations within one logical system. These relations are hierarchically organized, so that one of them is treated as the basic for the resulting logic, and the (...) other is introduced as an extension of this basic relation. The proposed bi-consequences systems allow for a standard Henkin-style canonical model used in the completeness proof. The deductive equivalence of these bi-consequence systems to the corresponding binary consequence systems is proved. We also outline a family of the bi-consequence systems generated on the basis of the first-degree entailment logic up to the classic consequence. (shrink)
We consider a family of logical systems for representing entailment relations of various kinds. This family has its root in the logic of first-degree entailment formulated as a binary consequence system, i.e. a proof system dealing with the expressions of the form \, where both \ and \ are single formulas. We generalize this approach by constructing consequence systems that allow manipulating with sets of formulas, either to the right or left of the turnstile. In this way, it is possible (...) to capture proof-theoretically not only the entailment relation of the standard four-valued Belnapâs logic, but also its dual version, as well as some of their interesting extensions. The proof systems we propose are, in a sense, of a hybrid HilbertâGentzen nature. We examine some important properties of these systems and establish their completeness with respect to the corresponding entailment relations. (shrink)
A modal extension of multilattice logic, called modal multilattice logic, is introduced as a Gentzen-type sequent calculus \. Theorems for embedding \ into a Gentzen-type sequent calculus S4C and vice versa are proved. The cut-elimination theorem for \ is shown. A Kripke semantics for \ is introduced, and the completeness theorem with respect to this semantics is proved. Moreover, the duality principle is proved as a characteristic property of \.
In this paper, bi-intuitionistic multilattice logic, which is a combination of multilattice logic and the bi-intuitionistic logic also known as HeytingâBrouwer logic, is introduced as a Gentzen-type sequent calculus. A Kripke semantics is developed for this logic, and the completeness theorem with respect to this semantics is proved via theorems for embedding this logic into bi-intuitionistic logic. The logic proposed is an extension of first-degree entailment logic and can be regarded as a bi-intuitionistic variant of the original classical multilattice logic (...) determined by the algebraic structure of multilattices. Similar completeness and embedding results are also shown for another logic called bi-intuitionistic connexive multilattice logic, obtained by replacing the connectives of intuitionistic implication and co-implication with their connexive variants. (shrink)
The famous âslingshot argumentâ developed by Church, Gödel, Quine and Davidson is often considered to be a formally strict proof of the Fregean conception that all true sentences, as well as all false ones, have one and the same denotation, namely their corresponding truth value: the true or the false . In this paper we examine the analysis of the slingshot argument by means of a non-Fregean logic undertaken recently by A.WĂłitowicz and put to the test her claim that the (...) slingshot argument is in fact circular and presupposes what it intends to prove. We show that this claim is untenable. Nevertheless, the language of non-Fregean logic can serve as a useful tool for representing the slingshot argument, and several versions of the slingshot argument in non-Fregean logics are presented. In particular, a new version of the slingshot argument is presented, which can be circumvented neither by an appeal to a Russellian theory of definite descriptions nor by resorting to an analogous âRussellianâ theory of λâterms. (shrink)
We explore a possibility of generalization of classical truth values by distinguishing between their ontological and epistemic aspects and combining these aspects within a joint semantical framework. The outcome is four generalized classical truth values implemented by Cartesian product of two sets of classical truth values, where each generalized value comprises both ontological and epistemic components. This allows one to define two unary twin connectives that can be called âsemi-classical negationsâ. Each of these negations deals only with one of the (...) above mentioned components, and they may be of use for a logical reconstruction of argumentative reasoning. (shrink)
The goal of this paper is to explain the nature of philosophy as a distinct science with its own subject-matter. This is achieved through a comparative analysis of mathematical and philosophical knowledge that reveals a profound similarity between mathematics and philosophy as mutually complementary sciences exploring the field of abstract entities that can be comprehended only by purely a priori theoretical inquiry. By considering this complementarity, a general definition of philosophy can be obtained by dualizing the traditional Aristotelian definition of (...) mathematics as the âscience of quantityâ. Philosophy should thus be interpreted as an a priori science of the pure qualitative attributes of being. (shrink)
In this paper I reject the normative interpretation of logic and give reasons for a realistic account based on the ontological treatment of logical values.
I highlight the importance of the notion of falsity for a semantical consideration of intuitionistic logic. One can find two principal (and non-equivalent) versions of such a notion in the literature, namely, falsity as non-truth and falsity as truth of a negative proposition. I argue in favor of the first version as the genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity.
The famous âslingshot argumentâ developed by Church, Gödel, Quine and Davidson is often considered to be a formally strict proof of the Fregean conception that all true sentences, as well as all false ones, have one and the same denotation, namely their corresponding truth value: the true or the false. In this paper we examine the analysis of the slingshot argument by means of a non-Fregean logic undertaken recently by A.WĂłitowicz and put to the test her claim that the slingshot (...) argument is in fact circular and presupposes what it intends to prove. We show that this claim is untenable. Nevertheless, the language of non-Fregean logic can serve as a useful tool for representing the slingshot argument, and several versions of the slingshot argument in non-Fregean logics are presented. In particular, a new version of the slingshot argument is presented, which can be circumvented neither by an appeal to a Russellian theory of definite descriptions nor by resorting to an analogous âRussellianâ theory of λâterms. (shrink)
Structural reasoning is simply reasoning that is governed exclusively by structural rules. In this context a proof system can be said to be structural if all of its inference rules are structural. A logic is considered to be structuralizable if it can be equipped with a sound and complete structural proof system. This paper provides a general formulation of the problem of structuralizability of a given logic, giving specific consideration to a family of logics that are based on the DunnâBelnap (...) four-valued semantics. It is shown how sound and complete structural proof systems can be constructed for a spectrum of logics within different logical frameworks. (shrink)
In the paper a theory of relevant properties is developed. The theory permits us to distinguish between properties that are relevant to an object and the properties that are irrelevant to it. Predication is meaningful only if a property is relevant to an object. On the base of introducing a special negative type of predication as opposed to usual sentential negation, a new notion of generalization for properties is defined. Context-free, as weIl as context-depended relevance of properties are considered.
The paper discusses interpretations of Aristotleâs modal notions by modern commentators. It is shown that the semantics of modal notions which the above mentioned authors attribute to Aristotle is based on the algebraic idea of multiplier.
In the paper a theory of relevant properties is developed. The theory permits us to distinguish between properties that are relevant to an object and the properties that are irrelevant to it. Predication is meaningful only if a property is relevant to an object. On the base of introducing a special negative type of predication as opposed to usual sentential negation, a new notion of generalization for properties is defined. Context-free, as weIl as context-depended relevance of properties are considered.
Logiker wĂŒrden doch nur Tautologien und TrivialitĂ€ten produzieren. Mit dieser Kritik werden Logiker an philosophischen Instituten oft konfrontiert. Es wird ebenfalls eingewendet, daĂ mathematische Methoden in der Philosophie unangemessen seien, daĂ man durch die Verwendung dieser Methoden auf eine bestimmte philosophische Position festgelegt sei und daĂ der philosophische Gewinn den mit einem logischen Apparat verbundenen Aufwand nicht rechtfertige. In der Arbeit wird dargelegt, inwieweit diese vier VorwĂŒrfe berechtigt sind und inwieweit sie auf MiĂver- stĂ€ndnissen beruhen. Dazu werden folgende Fragen beantwortet: (...) Was sind formale Sprachen und formale Systeme? Was ist die Aufgabe logischer Untersuchungen in der Philosophie? Sollten philosophische Texte formalisiert werden? Inwieweit ist Logik nĂŒtzlich? Gibt es Beispiele fĂŒr philosophisch fruchtbare logische Resultate? Legt Logik auf eine bestimmte Philosophie fest? Logik, so wird gezeigt, dient der ĂberprĂŒfung philosophischer Argumente und als Medium zum Philosophieren. (shrink)
In this paper we elaborate a conception of entailment based on what we call the Ackermann principle, which explicates valid entailment through a logical connection between sentences depending on their informational content. We reconstruct Dunnâs informational semantics for entailment on the basis of Restallâs approach, with assertion and denial as two independent speech acts, by introducing the notion of a âposition descriptionâ. We show how the machinery of position descriptions can effectively be used to define the positive and the negative (...) information carried by sentences of a given language and to present a formalized version of the Ackermann principle as an inclusion relationship between the informational contents of the conclusions and the premises of a valid entailment. Being so interpreted, the entailment relation exhibits certain properties, including the property of transitivity. Whereas properties such as Anderson and Belnapâs variable sharing property or Parryâs proscriptive principle are normally presented as imposing a relevance requirement on valid entailment, the suggested formalization of the Ackermann principle supports all of Gentzenâs structural rules, including weakening, a rule that is normally given up in sequent-style proof systems for relevance logics. In this way we propose an Ackermann-inspired explication of the nature of entailment as a relation between the informational contents of sentences. (shrink)
The paper discusses interpretations of Aristotleâs modal notions by modern commentators. It is shown that the semantics of modal notions which the above mentioned authors attribute to Aristotle is based on the algebraic idea of multiplier.