Results for 'Yeong-Gi So'

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  1.  25
    Formation of Tsai-Type 1/1 Approximants in In-Pd-RE Alloys.Yeong-Gi So, Fukuaki Saruhashi, Koji Kimoto, Ryuji Tamura & Keiichi Edagawa - 2014 - Philosophical Magazine 94 (26):2980-2991.
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  2.  13
    Internal Friction of an Al–Cu–Fe Icosahedral Quasicrystal and its Crystal Approximant.Yeong-Gi So, Shun Sato, Keiichi Edagawa & Ryuji Tamura - 2011 - Philosophical Magazine 91 (19-21):2820-2827.
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  3. Hyegang Chʻoe Han-Gi Ŭi Segye Insik.Uk-su Sŏ - 2005 - Sogang.
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  4.  9
    Experimental Evaluation of Phonon–Phason Coupling in Icosahedral Quasicrystals.K. Edagawa & Y. Gi So - 2007 - Philosophical Magazine 87 (1):77-95.
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  5. Segye Sok Ŭi Hanʼguk Yupʻung.Chŏng-gi Sŏ - 2006 - HanʼGuk Haksul Chŏngbo.
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  6. Segye Sok Ŭi Hanʼguk Yejŏl.Chŏng-gi Sŏ - 2004 - Sallimtʻŏ.
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  7. Todŏkhak Ŭi Kŭnwŏn T'amsaek.Chŏng-gi Sŏ - 2009 - Han'guk Haksul Chŏngbo.
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  8. Yugyo Wa Insaeng.Chŏng-gi Sŏ - 2010 - Han'guk Haksul Chŏngbo.
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  9.  7
    Filosofi I Norge I Fremtiden: Gi Opp Dyrehagemodellen Og Bruk Alle Ressurser På Ekspertisegrupper.Herman Cappelen - 2015 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 50 (3):119-128.
    I argue that philosophy department should be reorganised: they should be built up around strong research groups in restricted fields. Another way to think of this: departments should model themselves on research centres. Members of such research centres / departments would teach outside their area of competency. At the BA level teaching can remain as it is, but those teaching classes will often be teaching outside the area of expertise. That is not a problem. PhD supervision would be within the (...)
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  10.  60
    The Semantics and Proof Theory of Linear Logic.Arnon Avron - 1988 - Theoretical Computer Science 57:161-184.
    Linear logic is a new logic which was recently developed by Girard in order to provide a logical basis for the study of parallelism. It is described and investigated in Gi]. Girard's presentation of his logic is not so standard. In this paper we shall provide more standard proof systems and semantics. We shall also extend part of Girard's results by investigating the consequence relations associated with Linear Logic and by proving corresponding str ong completeness theorems. Finally, we shall investigate (...)
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  11. Unprovability Threshold for the Planar Graph Minor Theorem.Andrey Bovykin - 2010 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 162 (3):175-181.
    This note is part of the implementation of a programme in foundations of mathematics to find exact threshold versions of all mathematical unprovability results known so far, a programme initiated by Weiermann. Here we find the exact versions of unprovability of the finite graph minor theorem with growth rate condition restricted to planar graphs, connected planar graphs and graphs embeddable into a given surface, assuming an unproved conjecture : ‘there is a number a>0 such that for all k≥3, and all (...))
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  12.  89
    De la logique combinatoire des 'Generales Inquisitiones' aux calculs combinatoires contemporains.Lorenzo Peña - 1991 - Theoria 6 (1/2):129-159.
    In his 1686 essay GI Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof with conceptual analysis. Within limits Leibniz’s logical calculus provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However it yields the disastrous result that, whenever A is possible and so is B, there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was in the GI the forerunner (...)
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  13.  3
    Bereft of Interiority: Motifs of Vegetal Transformation, Escape and Fecundity in Luce Irigaray's Plant Philosophy and Han Kang's The Vegetarian.Magdalena Zolkos - 2019 - Substance 48 (2):102-118.
    Han Kang's 2007 novel The Vegetarian, published in English translation in 2015, tells a story of one woman's refusal to eat meat. Yeong-hye's refusal comes from her desire to eschew the intersecting violence of patriarchy and carnism, which gradually reveals an underlying psychosis and drive towards self-attrition. Because of the central motifs of bodily transgression and self-abnegation in the novel, critics have compered Han Kang's Yeong-hye to Frantz Kafka's Gregor Samsa or the hunger artist. Just as the hunger artist seeks (...)
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  14.  13
    De la logique combinatoire des ‘Generales Inquisitiones’ aux calculs combinatoires contemporains.Lorenzo Peña - 1991 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 6 (1-2):129-159.
    In his 1686 essay GI Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof with conceptual analysis. Within limits Leibniz’s logical calculus provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However it yields the disastrous result that, whenever A is possible and so is B, there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was in the GI the forerunner (...)
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  15.  36
    Aristotle's 'So-Called Elements'.Timothy Crowley - 2008 - Phronesis 53 (3):223-242.
    Aristotle's use of the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεȋα is usually taken as evidence that he does not really think that the things to which this phrase refers, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, are genuine elements. In this paper I question the linguistic and textual grounds for taking the phrase τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεȋα in this way. I offer a detailed examination of the significance of the phrase, and in particular I compare Aristotle's general use of the Greek participle καλούμενος (-η, (...)
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  16.  38
    Responsibility and the Problem of So-Called Marginal Agents.Larisa Svirsky - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    Philosophical views of responsibility often identify responsible agency with capacities like rationality and self-control. Yet in ordinary life, we frequently hold individuals responsible who are deficient in these capacities, such as children or people with mental illness. The existing literature that addresses these cases has suggested that we merely pretend to hold these agents responsible, or that they are responsible to a diminished degree. In this paper, I demonstrate that neither of these approaches is satisfactory, and offer an alternative focused (...)
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  17. What’s So Bad About Overdetermination? [REVIEW]Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):719 - 726.
    The intimate relationship between X and Y consists in the existence of (metaphysically) necessary truths correlating their occurrences/existences/instantiations. E would be in some sense “overdetermined” if caused by both X and Y.2 Some philosophers say this would be bad, that this cannot or does not happen, that we should construct theories ruling it out, at least in certain cases.3 But why? Given the necessary truths correlating objects and their parts, objects and events concerning those objects, physical and supervenient mental properties, (...)
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  18.  2
    Is the Conceptual Eurocentrism So Much Frightening?Nataliya A. Kanaeva - 2019 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62 (6):70-87.
    The article is a response to the criticism of “conceptual Eurocentrism” expressed in the paper by A.A. Krushinsky at the Round Table on the Geography of Rationality on April 25, 2019. It deals with the main thesis of A.A. Krushinsky that in cross-cultural philosophical studies the Western conceptual matrix currently defines a single conceptual space for all participants, the language of Western philosophy acts as a trans-civilizational language in the world philosophy. The author of the article agrees with the main (...)
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  19.  87
    So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
    According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect, there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been (...)
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  20. Why Epistemologists Are so Down on Their Luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.
    It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from (...)
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  21. Vague, So Untrue.David Braun & Theodore Sider - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):133 - 156.
    According to an old and attractive view, vagueness must be eliminated before semantic notions — truth, implication, and so on — may be applied. This view was accepted by Frege, but is rarely defended nowadays.1 This..
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  22. So How Does the Mind Work?Steven Pinker - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):1-38.
    In my book How the Mind Works, I defended the theory that the human mind is a naturally selected system of organs of computation. Jerry Fodor claims that 'the mind doesn't work that way'(in a book with that title) because (1) Turing Machines cannot duplicate humans' ability to perform abduction (inference to the best explanation); (2) though a massively modular system could succeed at abduction, such a system is implausible on other grounds; and (3) evolution adds nothing to our understanding (...)
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  23.  21
    That’s Just So-and-So Being So-and-So.Rob Lovering - 2019 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 25 (1):61-73.
    When it comes to explaining someone’s puzzling, objectionable, or otherwise problematic behavior, one type of explanation occasionally employed in the service of doing so is as follows: “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” But what, exactly, do explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so” mean? More specifically, in what way, if any, is it meaningful or informative to say such things? And what is the precise function of such explanations of someone’s behavior? Is it merely to present what one (...)
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  24.  58
    What Does the so-Called False Belief Task Actually Check?Hanoch Ben-Yami, Maya Ben-Yami & Yotham Ben-Yami - manuscript
    There is currently a theoretical tension between young children’s failure in False Belief Tasks (FBTs) and their success in a variety of other tasks that also seem to require the ability to ascribe false beliefs to agents. We try to explain this tension by the hypothesis that in the FBT, children think they are asked what the agent should do in the circumstances and not what the agent will do. We explain why this hypothesis is plausible. We examined the hypothesis (...)
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  25. What's So Bad About Blackface?Christy Mag Uidhir - 2013 - In Dan Flory & Mary Bloodsworth-Lugo (eds.), Race, Philosophy, and Film. Routledge. pp. 51-68.
    I argue that what’s so bad (qua film fiction) about the cinematic practice of actor-character race-mismatching—be it the historically infamous and intuitively repugnant practice of blackface or one of its more contemporary kin—is that the extent to which film-fictions employ such practices is typically the extent to which such film-fictions unrealistically depict facts about race. More precisely, I claim that race-mismatching film fictions—understood as a species of unrealistic fiction—are prima facie inconsistent fictions with the capacity to mislead their audiences about (...)
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  26.  55
    Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, What's so Special About Shareholders?John R. Boatright - 1994 - Business Ethics Quarterly 4 (4):393-407.
    The claim that managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to run the corporation in their interests is generally supported by two arguments: that shareholders are owners of a corporation and that they have a contract or agency relation with management. The latter argument is used by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, who rejects a multi-fiduciary, stakeholder approach on the grounds that the shareholder-management relation is “ethically different” because of its fiduciary character. Both of these arguments provide an inadequate basis for the (...)
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  27.  78
    Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, What's so Special About Shareholders?John R. Boatright - 1994 - Business Ethics Quarterly 4 (4):393-407.
    The claim that managers have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to run the corporation in their interests is generally supported by two arguments: that shareholders are owners of a corporation and that they have a contract or agency relation with management. The latter argument is used by Kenneth E. Goodpaster, who rejects a multi-fiduciary, stakeholder approach on the grounds that the shareholder-management relation is “ethically different” because of its fiduciary character. Both of these arguments provide an inadequate basis for the (...)
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  28. ‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All.Alex King - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):637-661.
    Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails (...)
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  29. The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What?Kristin M. Mickelson - manuscript
    In “The Zygote Argument Is Invalid—Now What?” (Mickelson 2015), I argue that Alfred Mele’s original Zygote Argument is invalid: its explanatory conclusion does not follow from its two non-explanatory premises. In a recent essay, Gabriel De Marco (2016) grants that Mele's original argument is invalid, but describes two purportedly new ways to rescue the Zygote Argument my critique. Unfortunately, both of De Marco’s proposed solutions are non-starters. In his "initial solution," De Marco rejects the traditional definition of the term "incompatibilism" (...)
     
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  30. It Ain’T Necessarily So: An Essay Review of Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives*Robert T. Pennock , Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , Xx + 805 Pp., $45.00. [REVIEW]George Nakhnikian - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):593-604.
    Nature exhibits a rich variety of adaptations. Cells contain complex biomolecular structures, such as proteins, that are exquisitely adapted to perform specific biological functions. Evolutionary biology explains how biomolecular structures evolve. Intelligent design creationists reject evolutionary explanations. They want to believe that all adaptations in nature are the handiwork of God. Their critics aver that “it ain't necessarily so.” The anthology under review is an excellent display of the issues between intelligent design creationists and their critics. I agree with the (...)
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  31.  83
    The Role of Logic "Commonly So Called" in Hegel's Science of Logic.Paul Redding - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):281-301.
    This paper examines Hegel’s accounts of the nature of judgements and inferences in the ‘subjective logic’ of the Science of Logic, and does so in light of the history of the tradition of formal logic to his time. It is argued that, contrary to the attitude often displayed by interpreters of Hegel’s logic, it is important to understand the positive role played by formal logic, ‘logic commonly so called’, in Hegel’s own conception of logic. It is argued that Hegel’s own (...)
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  32.  46
    What's So Egalitarian About Luck Egalitarianism?Shlomi Segall - 2015 - Ratio 28 (3):349-368.
    Luck egalitarians typically hold that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. In this paper I want to address two complaints against standard luck egalitarianism that do not question responsibility-sensitivity. The first objection says that equality itself lacks inherent non-instrumental value, and so the luckist component ought to be attached to a different pattern, say prioritarianism. The second objection also endorses luckism but worries that luck egalitarianism as conventionally (...)
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  33. I Could Not Have Done Otherwise-So What?Daniel C. Dennett - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):553-565.
    Peter van Inwagen notes: "... almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act." Perhaps van Inwagen is right; perhaps most philosophers agree on this. If so, this shared assumption, which I will call CDO (for "could have done otherwise"), is a good candidate for denial, especially since there turns out to be so little to be said in support of it, (...)
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  34.  63
    ‘“What’s So Great About Science?” Feyerabend on the Ideological Use and Abuse of Science.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - In Elena Aronova & Simone Turchetti (eds.), Science Studies during the Cold War and Beyond. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 55-76.
    It is very well known that from the late-1960s onwards Feyerabend began to radically challenge some deeply-held ideas about the history and methodology of the sciences. It is equally well known that, from around the same period, he also began to radically challenge wider claims about the value and place of the sciences within modern societies, for instance by calling for the separation of science and the state and by questioning the idea that the sciences served to liberate and ameliorate (...)
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  35. Different Voices or Perfect Storm: Why Are There So Few Women in Philosophy?Louise Antony - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):227-255.
  36.  25
    So-Called "Clinical Equipoise" and the Argument From Design.Fred Gifford - 2007 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32 (2):135 – 150.
    In this article, I review and expand upon arguments showing that Freedman's so-called "clinical equipoise" criterion cannot serve as an appropriate guide and justification for the moral legitimacy of carrying out randomized clinical trials. At the same time, I try to explain why this approach has been given so much credence despite compelling arguments against it, including the fact that Freedman's original discussion framed the issues in a misleading way, making certain things invisible: Clinical equipoise is conflated with community equipoise, (...)
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  37.  64
    Why so Negative? Evidence Aggregation and Armchair Philosophy.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3865-3896.
    This paper aims to clarify a debate on philosophical method, and to give a probabilistic argument vindicating armchair philosophy under a wide range of plausible assumptions. The use of intuitions by so-called armchair philosophers has been criticized on empirical grounds. The debate between armchair philosophers and their empirical critics would benefit from greater clarity and precision in our understanding of what it takes for intuition-based approaches to philosophy to make sense. This paper discusses a set of rigorous, probability-based tools for (...)
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  38.  17
    Three Hypotheses for Explaining the So-Called Oppression of Men.Peter Higgins - 2019 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2).
    Are men oppressed as men? The evidence given in support of affirmative responses to this question usually consists in examples of harms, limitations, or requirements masculinity imposes on men: men are expected to pay on dates, men must be breadwinners for their families, men can be drafted for war, and so forth. This article explicates three hypotheses that account for the harms, limitations, and requirements masculinity imposes on men and, drawing on the work of Alison Jaggar, seeks to show that (...)
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  39. Are Moral Judgements Adaptations? Three Reasons Why It Is so Difficult to Tell.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):425-439.
    An increasing number of scholars argue that moral judgements are adaptations, i.e., that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness of moral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis that moral judgements are adaptations (...)
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  40.  60
    The Meaning of Too, Enough, and So... That.Cécile Meier - 2003 - Natural Language Semantics 11 (1):69-107.
    In this paper, I provide a compositional semantics for sentences with enough and too followed by a to-infinitive clause and for resultative constructions with so... that within the framework of possible world semantics. It is proposed that the sentential complement of these constructions denotes an incomplete conditional and is explicitly or implicitly modalized, as if it were the consequent of a complete conditional. Enough, too, and so are quantifiers that relate an extent predicate and the incomplete conditional (expressed by the (...)
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  41.  20
    Not-So-Minimal Models: Between Isolation and Imagination.L. Casini - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (5):646-672.
    What can we learn from “minimal” economic models? I argue that learning from such models is not limited to conceptual explorations—which show how something could be the case—but may extend to explanations of real economic phenomena—which show how something is the case. A model may be minimal qua certain world-linking properties, and yet “not-so-minimal” qua learning, provided it is externally valid. This, in turn, depends on using the right principles for model building and not necessarily “isolating” principles. My argument is (...)
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  42.  66
    Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson’s "Do So As Well!".Michael Ridge - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):563-574.
    Meta-ethical non-cognitivism makes two claims—a negative one and a positive one. The negative claim is that moral utterances do not express beliefs which provide the truth-conditions for those utterances. The positive claim is that the primary function of such utterances is to express certain of the speaker’s desire-like states of mind. Non-cognitivism is officially a theory about the meanings of moral words, but non-cognitivists also maintain that moral states of mind are themselves at least partially constituted by desire-like states to (...)
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  43.  30
    A Not-So-Beautiful Game.Graham McFee - 2015 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 9 (2):166-181.
    Although football is often referred to as ‘the beautiful game’, to take that idea very seriously — by aestheticizing the target of spectating — is to misunderstand a purposive sport such as football. Yet such a view seems required by Stephen Mumford’s endorsement of the purist spectator, in contrast to the partisan, as attending to ‘… only aesthetic aspects of sport’. But, first, not all non-purposive appreciation is thereby aesthetic appreciation, as Mumford assumes. And, second, while a technical understanding of (...)
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  44. Against the So-Called ‘Standard Account of Method’.Rod Thomas - 2014 - Philosophy of Management 13 (1):43-72.
    Explains why the debate initiated by Stephen Lloyd Smith’s plea to jettison the so-called ‘Standard Account of Method’ ––the conventional wisdom of how research philosophy and methodology ought to be taught to management students––is of the utmost importance to the teaching of management studies in British universities. Identifies a fully-developed presentation of the SAM framework in a well-considered and widely-used textbook––‘Research Methods for Managers’ by John Gill and Phil Johnson––and demonstrates that the book’s argument is both logically and scholarly defective. (...)
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  45. Why Are the Laws of Nature so Important to Science?Marc Lange - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):625-652.
    Why should science be so interested in discovering whether p is a law over and above whether p is true? The answer may involve the laws' relation to counterfactuals: p is a law iff p would still have obtained under any counterfactual supposition that is consistent with the laws. But unless we already understand why science is especially concerned with the laws, we cannot explain why science is especially interested in what would have happened under those counterfactual suppositions consistent with (...)
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  46.  27
    The Future's So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades.James J. Gross - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (3):212-216.
    In this article I consider the future of the field of emotion. My conclusion—borrowing the title of a little-remembered song from the 1980s—is that “the future’s so bright, I gotta wear shades.” I begin this article by considering some of the many daunting conceptual and empirical challenges here; this is clearly not a field for the faint of heart. I then turn to some of the incredible conceptual and empirical opportunities here; there are so many it’s easy to feel dizzy. (...)
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  47.  17
    Neurohistory Is Bunk?: The Not-So-Deep History of the Postclassical Mind.Max Stadler - 2014 - Isis 105 (1):133-144.
    The proliferation of late of disciplines beginning in “neuro”—neuroeconomics, neuroaesthetics, neuro–literary criticism, and so on—while welcomed in some quarters, has drawn a great deal of critical commentary as well. It is perhaps natural that scholars in the humanities, especially, tend to find these “neuro”-prefixes irritating. But by no means all of them: there are those humanists who discern in this trend a healthy development that has the potential of “revitalizing” the notoriously bookish humanities. Neurohistory is a case in point, typically (...)
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  48.  59
    Philosophy Makes No Progress, So What Is the Point of It?John Shand - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):284-295.
    Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well-established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. (...)
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  49. What's so Moral About the Moral Hazard?Benjamin Hale - 2009 - Public Affairs Quarterly 23 (1):1-26.
    A "moral hazard" is a market failure most commonly associated with insurance, but also associated by extension with a wide variety of public policy scenarios, from environmental disaster relief, to corporate bailouts, to natural resource policy, to health insurance. Specifically, the term "moral hazard" describes the danger that, in the face of insurance, an agent will increase her exposure to risk. If not immediately clear, such terminology invokes a moral notion, suggesting that changing one's exposure to risk after becoming insured (...)
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  50. Health Care Resource Prioritization and Rationing: Why is It so Difficult?Dan W. Brock - 2007 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 74 (1):125-148.
    Rationing is the allocation of a good under conditions of scarcity, which necessarily implies that some who want and could be benefitted by that good will not receive it. One reflection of our ambivalence towards health care rationing is reflected in our resistance to having it distributed in a market like most other goods—most Americans reject ability to pay as the basis for distributing health care. They do not view health care as just another commodity to be distributed by markets. (...)
     
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