This article argues that Machiavelli’s chapters on the Decemvirate ( D 1.35, 1.40-45) advance an internal critique of the juridical discourse of sovereignty. I first contextualize these chapters in relation to several of Machiavelli’s potential sources, including Livy’s Ab urbe condita, Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s Roman Antiquities, and the antiquarian writings of Andrea Fiocchi and Giulio Pomponio Leto. I then analyze Machiavelli’s claim that the decemvirs held “absolute authority” ( autorità assoluta)—an authority that was unconstrained by either laws or countervailing magistrates. (...) I proceed to argue that Machiavelli’s account of the decemvirs’ election contains a web of allusions to the lex regia, the “royal law” by which the Roman people were thought to have conveyed their sovereign power to an emperor. By modeling the decemvirs’ election on the lex regia, Machiavelli reveals the political limitations of the doctrine of popular sovereignty; moreover, he illustrates that even free and fair elections can easily give rise to tyranny. (shrink)

The author argues that despite appears to the contrary the transcendentalism naturalism dichotomy is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is possible for someone to give a transcendental argument demonstrating that the world must have certain characteristics. If the argument is correct, i.e., if water is necessarily H2O, then science and the naturalist will find water to be H2O in fact. One can therefore be a transcendentalist and naturalist at the same time. The dichotomy is not exhaustive either, since it is (...) possible to develop a philosophy which is descriptive of reality and yet is neither transcendental nor naturalistic. The author illustrates this alternative with a view he calls “Piecemeal Realism.”. (shrink)

By convention epinician poetry claims to be both obligatory and truthful, yet in the intersection of obligation and truth lies a seeming paradox: the poet presents his poetry as commissioned by a patron but also claims to be unbiased enough to convey the truth. In Slater's interpretation Pindar reconciles this paradox by casting his relationship to the patron as one of guest-friendship: when he declares himself a guest-friend of the victor, he agrees to the obligation ‘a) not to be envious (...) of hisxenosand b) to speak well of him. The argumentation is:Xeniaexcludes envy, I am axenos, therefore I am not envious and consequently praise honestly’. Slater observes that envy may foster bias against the patron, but the problem of pro-patron bias remains: does the poet's friendship with and obligation to his patron produce praise at the expense of truth? (shrink)

Interdisciplinarity has been a key term in the ecological debate ever since its advent in the early 1960s. The paper addresses these historical links and how the two terms ‘interdisciplinary’ and ‘ecology’ have influenced each other. The later concept ‘sustainable development’ is also truly interdisciplinary, including physical, biological, socio-economic and cultural, as well as normative, mechanisms, contexts and effects operating at scales ranging from the microscopic to the macroscopic. Policies to promote sustainable development need to be based on the type (...) of interdisciplinary thinking that has been advocated for several decades within the ecological debate. This applies not least to research into the sustainability aspects of urban development, the case discussed in this paper. Despite longstanding requests for interdisciplinarity, the development within the academic world has proceeded in the opposite direction. Many of the most influential metatheoretical perspectives virtually prohibit, or at best strongly discourage, the inclusion of insights about certain parts of reality. Here, critical realism could play a very important role as an underlabourer of interdisciplinarity. (shrink)

Selection within the educational domain breeds a special kind of suspicion. Whether it is the absence of transparency in the selection procedure, the observable outcomes of the selection, or the criteria of selection itself, there is much to corroborate the suspicion many have that selection in practice is unfair. And certainly as it concerns primary and secondary education, the principle of educational equity requires that children not have their educational experiences or opportunities determined by their postcode, their ethnic status, first (...) language, or family wealth. Indeed educational opportunities determined by unearned advantage or disadvantage offend against basic notions of fairness. But are public schools even permitted to select their students, and if so, how can selection procedures used by schools be best structured to achieve equitable ends? In this article we delineate, describe, and defend what we believe are the essential features of selection and also why we need to pay equal attention to both the outcomes and the processes leading to those outcomes. Provided the selection is motivated and guided by the right reasons, as well as appropriately monitored, we argue that selection can be equity promoting. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo pretende mostrar cómo el filósofo danés Søren Kierkegaard, mediante su concepto de conciencia, establece una crítica al escepticismo cartesiano al afirmar la imposibilidad de la duda del mundo exterior, puesto que la misma posibilidad de la duda supone de antemano la existencia de una conciencia que produce y es producida por la relación tricotómica entre idealidad y realidad, o, con otras palabras, mediatez e inmediatez. Para ello se realizará en primer lugar la explicación del planteamiento cartesiano, a (...) saber: la postulación de los tres niveles de duda y el cogito ergo sum; luego se explicará la noción de conciencia y posibilidad ideal de la duda del autor danés, y por último se expondrá cómo, bajo la óptica de esa noción de conciencia, Kierkegaard realiza una fuerte crítica a la duda metódica y al cogito cartesiano como demostración de la existencia.: This article aims at showing how the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, through his concept of conscience, criticizes Cartesian skepticism upon affirming the impossibility of doubting the outside world, since the very possibility of doubt presupposes the existence of a conscience that produces and is produced by the trichotomic relationship between ideality and reality, or, in other words, mediate- ness and immediacy. For this, the Cartesian approach will be explained in the first place, namely: the three levels of doubt and the cogito ergo sum. Then the notion of conscience and ideal possibility of the doubt of the Danish author will be explained, and finally, it will be explained how, in the perspective of this notion of conscience, Kierkegaard makes a strong critique to the methodical doubt and to the cartesian cogito like demonstration of existence. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough nurses are crucial to ensure patients’ peaceful death in hospitals, many nurses experience various ethical conflicts during end-of-life care. Therefore, research on nurses’ entire ethical decision-making process is required to improve nurses’ ethical decision-making in end-of-life care. This study aimed to identify Korean nurses’ ethical decision-making process based on their moral sensitivity to end-of-life patients.MethodsIn total, 171 nurses caring for terminal patients responded to the survey questionnaire. To measure the participants’ moral sensitivity and ethical decision-making process, we used the (...) Korean version of the Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and Nurses’ Ethical Decision-Making around End of Life Care Scale. Finally, multiple linear regression analysis was used to investigate the effect of moral sensitivity on nurses’ ethical decision-making.ResultsThe mean of moral sensitivity was 4.8 ± 0.5 (out of 7), and that of ethical decision-making was 4.6 ± 0.5 (out of 6). Among the sub-dimensions of ethical decision-making, the highest score was in perceived professional accountability (5.2 ± 0.5), and the lowest in moral reasoning and moral agency (3.9 ± 0.6); the score of moral practice was 4.4 ± 0.7. In the multiple linear regression model, moral sensitivity (β = 0.852, p <.001), clinical department (β = − 7.018, p =.035), ethics education (β = 20.450, p <.001), job satisfaction (β = 5.273, p <.001), and ethical conflict (β = − 2.260, p = 0.031) were influential ethical decision-making factors.ConclusionsThis study revealed a gap between nurses’ thoughts and practices through the ethical decision-making process. They failed to lead their thought to moral practice. It also implies that moral sensitivity could positively affect nurses’ ethical decision-making. To make nurses morally sensitive, exposing them to various clinical cases would be helpful. Additionally, ethics education and clinical ethics supporting services are valuable for improving nurses’ ethical decision-making. If nurses improved their ethical decision-making regarding end-of-life care, their patients could experience a better quality of death. (shrink)

The psychological effects of aesthetic education have often been discussed, and major studies such as Michael Parsons’s inquiry into art understanding show that the development of understanding works of visual art is influenced by education.1 His findings show that the way people talk about art can be structured in five stages of development according to the model of Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. He believes that the understanding of art, just like general cognition, is based on mental maturation but (...) that some kind of education is necessary to acquire the different skills of the understanding of art at each stage of development. Parsons’s study does not include educational strategies, but his .. (shrink)

In Ḥanafī legal thought, ta‘ātī (mutual delivery of goods and price) has been seen as a sales contract without the need for an additional legal transaction. This situation raises the question of whether the delivery transaction took place after a void (bāṭil) or invalid (fāsid) sales contract can be considered as a new contract that is revealed through ta‘ātī. In this study, which we aim to answer the aforementioned question, first of all, the issue of what kind of relationship is (...) established between the definition of the sales contract and the legitimacy of the ta‘ātī is discussed. Secondly, the relationship between the principles of “When something is void, what is implicit in that thing is also void.”, “What builds on what is invalid is also invalid” and the delivery transaction that took place after a void or invalid contract is discussed. Thirdly, it has been discussed whether the acceptance of the delivery transaction after a void or invalid contract as a new contract is dependent on the fact that the first contract has been legally terminated. In Ḥanafī thought two approaches have emerged regarding the relationship between ta‘ātī and void or invalid contract. According to Ḥanafī jurists based on the above-mentioned two principles, the delivery transaction that took place after a void or invalid contract is not a new contract. The fact that the delivery transaction becomes a new contract depends on the fact that the first contract was terminated in a legal way. In the approach of Ḥalvānī and Kāsānī, the fact that the delivery transaction that took place after a void or invalid contract gains the quality of a new contract is not dependent on the fact that the first contract is legally terminated. This approach is very important in terms of making it possible for the idea that “Delivery that took place after a void or invalid contract has the quality of a new contract.” to attribute the classical Ḥanafī thought. (shrink)

The main message of the authors is directed to the actualization of the question: is it possible for religious ethics as a deontology of praxis to be adequate to the modern man in the society of "risks and threats". If we compare the socio-economic tendencies towards modernization and globalization and the socio-humanitarian related to the universalization of values, and to identify within the various social projects - liberalism and neo-conservatism - the mechanisms of their interpenetration and mutual determination, then the (...) particularity of the particular ethos and its inadequacy to the challenges of the development of modern technological civilization should be emphasized. (shrink)

The ayn-dayn distinction in Ḥanafī legal thought shapes directly many regulations related to the law of obligations, from the legitimacy conditions of the contracts to the principles of compensation obligation. Three aspects are important in understanding the formative function of this distinction. The first of them is what is the conceptual content of ayn and dayn in Ḥanafī terminology. The second of them is what kind of relationship there is between the qualities of goods and ayn and dayn. The third (...) of them is what kind of differences exist between ayn and dayn in terms of their effects on legal regulations. According to Ḥanafī terminology, in a debt relationship, dayn means goods that have not yet been delivered to the creditor, whether they are in the hands of the debtor or not, in terms of goods (gold, silver and money) that are not suitable for determination by determining. Dayn represents the identical goods that is under the responsibility of the debtor in terms of non-existing identical goods. In terms of existing identical goods, dayn represents the identical goods that exist in clusters but have not yet been determined individually. Non-standard goods are goods that are not suitable for dayn because they are not suitable for abstraction from their material existence. Ayn represents the existing and determined goods in terms of non-standard goods and existing identical goods. Ayn represents the goods received by the creditor in terms of gold, silver, money and identical goods that are in the debtor's obligation from the beginning. What stands out among the differences between ayn and dayn is that although destruction and damage can be considered for ayn, they cannot be considered for dayn. In terms of some legal regulations, establishing a relationship between strict liability and dayn and between fault liability and ayn is a result of this. The other important differences between ayn and dayn are the fact that dayn is only determined by delivery and that postponement and remittance are specific to the dayn. (shrink)

This paper provides ways of responding to critical students when teaching business ethics and corporate social responsibility. A common premise of teaching pedagogy is to approach students from their “zone of proximal development”. To get an understanding of students’ critical prior conceptions, the ideal type of the “liberal communist” is invoked as suggestive of how students might think about business ethics and CSR. Two pedagogical approaches are suggested to address students’ a priori scepticism of business ethics and CSR. First, a (...) framework of political views on CSR is presented. Second, approaching CSR by means of “problem based learning” is discussed. Finally, the paper reflects on the role of the business ethics teacher in light of tendencies towards commodification of education in the global economy. (shrink)

Proponents of large-scale land acquisitions (LaSLA) argue that poor countries could benefit from foreign direct investment in land (World Bank 2011), while opponents argue that LaSLA is nothing more than neo-colonial theft of poor peasants’ livelihoods, i.e., land grabbing (Borras and Franco in Yale Hum Rights Dev L J, 13: 507–523, 2010a). To ensure responsible agricultural investments (RAI), a voluntary “code of conduct” for land acquisitions has been proposed by the World Bank (2011) and the FAO (2012). A critical reaction (...) to the “code of conduct” approach is the proposal for a set of minimum human rights principles, suggested by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, De Schutter (2009). Even more critical of the “code of conduct” approach are Borras and Franco in Yale Hum Rights Dev L J, 13(2): 507–523, 2010a, who propose empowering small-scale farmers by giving them land sovereignty so that they are assured control over their land. This paper is a review of the governance and ethics issues connected to LaSLA. It has four main objectives: First, it offers a critical presentation of three major governance approaches to LaSLA: the “liberal code of conduct” (FAO and the World Bank), the ‘critical liberal human rights’ approach (De Schutter) and the ‘Marxist’ approach (Borras and Franco). Second, it discusses the notion of a human right to land, with reference to John Locke’s theory of appropriating land. Third, it discusses the issue of ensuring an inclusive process in LaSLA. Finally, an argument is made for instituting a (global) obligation to refrain from participating in or benefitting from institutional schemes that facilitate negative land grabbing (Pogge in Politics as usual: what lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric? Polity Press, Cambridge 2010). (shrink)

It is often argued that concerns about the equity of a global climate agreement might appropriately be addressed in the language of human rights. The human rights approach has been promoted by a number of international political actors, including the UN Human Rights Council. As such, human rights are instrumentally applied as a solution to what could be called the “justice problem” in climate negotiations. In order to assess the degree to which human rights could be a useful approach to (...) the justice problem with regard to to climate change, four major issues need to be examined. First, there is the distinction between human rights as protection against climate change versus the right to emit greenhouse gases. Both understandings are found in the debate on climate justice, but they are often not made explicit. Second, the “human rights as protection” approach with a focus on right holders, both presently and in the future, needs to be elucidated, as well as the human rights principles that are at stake, and the duties and duty holders involved. Third, the human right to emit greenhouse gases needs to be clarified in the context of subsistence rights and equal per capita emission rights. Finally, there is the question of whether the cosmopolitan conception of human rights is at odds with the goal of ensuring that individuals assume responsibility for their own carbon-dependent lifestyle. (shrink)

Proponents of using genetically modified (GM) crops and food in the developing world often claim that it is unjust not to use GMOs (genetically modified organisms) to alleviate hunger and malnutrition in developing countries. In reply, the critics of GMOs claim that while GMOs may be useful as a technological means to increase yields and crop quality, stable and efficient institutions are required in order to provide the benefits from GMO technology. In this debate, the GMO proponents tend to rely (...) on a simple utilitarian type of calculus that highlights the benefits of GMOs to the poor, but that overlooks the complex institutional requirements necessary for GMO production. The critics, recognizing the importance of institutional conditions, focus primarily on the negative impacts of institutional deficiencies, thereby overlooking the basically Rawlsian claim that institutions per se may generate claims to justice. This article investigates how GMOs might generate claims to global justice and what type of justice is involved. The paper argues that the debate on GMOs and global justice can be categorized into three views, i.e., the cosmopolitan, the pluralist, and the sceptic. The cosmopolitan holds that GMOs can and should be used for alleviating global hunger, whereas the sceptic rejects this course of action. I will argue here for a moderately cosmopolitan approach, relying on the pluralist view of institutions and the need to exploit the benefits of GMOs. This argument rests on the premise that global cooperation on GMO production provides the relevant basis for assessing the use of GMOs by the standard of global distributive justice. (shrink)

This essay argues that what makes Michel Foucault’s oeuvre not only stand apart but also cohere is an assiduous philosophical practice taking the form of an ongoing yet concrete self-modification in the medium of thought. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects of Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity. Beginning with his famous characterization of philosophy in terms of ascēsis, it moves on to articulate his characterization of philosophical practice as a distinct form of meditation, differing from both Cartesian (...) meditation and Hegelian meditation, as it aims to stand vigil for the day to come and operates as a preface to transgression. Part II begins the articulation of crucial traits left implicit in this understanding of philosophy by turning to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of philosophy in Antiquity during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First, it develops how philosophy here begins to constitute and distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged relationship to truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for the philosopher. Further, it instantiates how Platonism elaborates the need for a sustained ‘auto-ascetic’ ethical non-compliant differentiation as the condition of possibility for accessing and stating truth, and then describes how the assertion of an ethical differentiation and attitude in Cynicism takes the form of an insistent combat for another world in this world. Finally, it underlines how the ethical-practical philosophical work upon oneself in Antiquity is developed in an ongoing critical and political exchange with others. Part III indicates how ethical differentiation according to Foucault remains an essential precondition for the practice of philosophy and is further developed in the modern age. This is particularly perspicuous in Kant’s determination of the Enlightenment, in the attitude of modernity exemplified by Baudelaire, and in the history of revolt since the beginning of early Modernity. On this background, Part IV develops how philosophy as an ongoing meditative practice of self-modification leads to an affirmative critique, confirming the virtuality of this world in order to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, the essay presents Foucault’s philosophical practice as well as an outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet still agenda-setting conception of philosophical practice today. (shrink)

This essay argues that what makes Michel Foucault’s oeuvre not only stand apart but also cohere is an assiduous philosophical practice taking the form of an ongoing yet concrete self-modification in the medium of thought. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects of Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity. Beginning with his famous characterization of philosophy in terms of ascēsis, it moves on to articulate his characterization of philosophical practice as a distinct form of meditation, differing from both Cartesian (...) meditation and Hegelian meditation, as it aims to stand vigil for the day to come and operates as a preface to transgression. Part II begins the articulation of crucial traits left implicit in this understanding of philosophy by turning to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of philosophy in Antiquity during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First, it develops how philosophy here begins to constitute and distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged relationship to truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for the philosopher. Further, it instantiates how Platonism elaborates the need for a sustained ‘auto-ascetic’ ethical non-compliant differentiation as the condition of possibility for accessing and stating truth, and then describes how the assertion of an ethical differentiation and attitude in Cynicism takes the form of an insistent combat for another world in this world. Finally, it underlines how the ethical-practical philosophical work upon oneself in Antiquity is developed in an ongoing critical and political exchange with others. Part III indicates how ethical differentiation according to Foucault remains an essential precondition for the practice of philosophy and is further developed in the modern age. This is particularly perspicuous in Kant’s determination of the Enlightenment, in the attitude of modernity exemplified by Baudelaire, and in the history of revolt since the beginning of early Modernity. On this background, Part IV develops how philosophy as an ongoing meditative practice of self-modification leads to an affirmative critique, confirming the virtuality of this world in order to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, the essay presents Foucault’s philosophical practice as well as an outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet still agenda-setting conception of philosophical practice today. (shrink)

In the final volume of his Homo Sacer series, The use of bodies, Agamben claims that for Foucault ethics never escapes the horizon of governmentality and therefore his conception of ethics is ‘strategic.’ In light of this criticism, motivated by Agamben’s Pauline conception of ‘use,’ we reassess the status and function of ethics in Foucault’s late lectures. We investigate how Foucault’s approach to ethics develops from his treatment of liberal governmentality and also how its methodological foundation is developed in an (...) interpretation of truth-telling in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. Our interpretation emphasizes the ambiguous status of ethics in Foucault’s late work: on the one hand, Agamben is right that Foucault assigns an irreducible strategic function to ethics thereby connecting it intrinsically to governmentality. On the other hand, Agamben overlooks how Foucault’s interpretation of Sophocles implies a conception of governmentality which emphasizes how ethical practices cannot be captured solely in strategic terms. Foucault’s ‘anarcheological’ approach thus articulates a dimension of ethics that remains, using Agamben’s own terms, ‘ungovernable’ and therefore also genuinely creative. Even so, Foucault’s approach to ethics remains in Agamben’s perspective on the deepest level faced with an antinomy that Agamben seeks to mediate with his Pauline conception of ‘inoperativity.’. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

In this article I look at the Buddha's refusal to answer certain questions in light of the dynamics of ancient Indian debate. Doing so foregrounds a dimension of the Buddha's interaction with his interlocutors that is central for understanding the problem of what are known as the Undetermined or Unanswered Questions: namely, the Buddha's knowledge and authority vis-à-vis rival teachers.

Unanswered questions and ethical issues associated with US biodefence medical research over the past five decades are discussed. Objective scientific standards are essential for making policy decisions that can stand the test of time. For decades, scholars have reported that the human anthrax vaccine field trials conducted in the 1950s by Brachman and his colleagues were single-blind rather than double-blind. Nevertheless, in March 2005, Dr Philip S Brachman reported in a letter to the US Food and Drug Administration that (...) his study had been double-blind. It is here argued that, rather, the field trial of a human anthrax vaccine should continue to be deemed as single-blind unless more detailed information is provided to explain exactly how the investigators were kept unaware of which subjects were in the treatment and control groups. Moreover, a number of other questions about the details of this critically important study have remained unanswered and are discussed. More recently, similar concerns have arisen with respect to more contemporary biodefence research, especially with reference to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s allegations that Dr Bruce Ivins, a US government biodefence researcher, was responsible for the anthrax letter attacks of fall 2001. The medical ethics and related issues involved with continuing to base national biodefence and public health policy on unclear, if not contradictory, research are discussed. (shrink)

The Patient Self-Determination Act imposes new requirements on health care providers for informing patients of their rights to make decisions concerning their medical care. The Act is intended to, and is likely to, encourage patients and residents of certain healhtcare facilities to consider their treatment preferences in advance of incapacity and, in particular, to determine the circumstances in which life-sustaining treatment will be provided to them. However, many questions concerning how healthcare providers will implement the Act remain unanswered.

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 91-94.