The summativists generally analyze group belief in terms of belief of the majority. The non-summativists counterargue that it is possible for a group to believe that p even if “none” of its members believes that p. In doing so, they usually appeal to hypothetical cases in which groups are “structured” groups like committees, research groups, governments, as opposed to “collective” groups like Finns, America, Catholic Church. In this paper, I raise the objection that non-summativist cases involve summativism. While most contemporary (...) objections to non-summativism tend to be rejectionists, i.e., showing that non-summativist cases involve group acceptance rather than group belief, my objection is newfangled in that it grants non-summativist cases group belief but shows that group belief in such cases is majority belief. (shrink)

The problem of destructive change comprises two interrelated questions: (1) is there destructive change? (2) If there is, what underlies it? Classical hylomorphists argue that there is destructive change, understood as the change of primary substances, and that what underlies it is prime matter. Insofar as there is destructive change, I agree with classical hylomorphists. But there are reasons to doubt that prime matter is the underlying substratum, so I disagree with them with respect to (2). Alternatively, I propose a (...) new version of classical hylomorphism, according to which what underlies destructive change, understood as the change of what I term “rigid-kooky” objects, is primary substance. My proposal has at least two perks. Compared to the classical account, it is relatively tolerant because it denies the historically contentious and ambiguous notion of prime matter. It is also economical because, unlike the classical account, which admits two constituency levels—one pertaining to primary substances and one to kooky objects—it admits only one constituency level, pertaining to kooky objects. (shrink)