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Yuval Avnur
Claremont College
  1.  67
    Closure Reconsidered.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that (...)
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  2.  85
    Excuses for Hume's Skepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.
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  3.  40
    How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott‐Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.
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  4. In Defense of Secular Belief.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 4.
  5.  93
    No Closure On Skepticism.Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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  6.  5
    Annalisa Coliva, Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock : Hinge Epistemology . vi + 278, price €70.00 pb.Yuval Avnur - 2018 - Philosophical Investigations 41 (3):366-370.
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  7. Hawthorne on the Deeply Contingent A Priori1.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):174-183.
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  8. Mere Faith and Entitlement.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) (...)
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  9. An Old Problem for the New Rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
  10.  51
    On an Irrelevant Regress.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Theoria 82 (1):81-88.
    In a recent article, Wilson argues that Cartesian Scepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopped by rejecting Cartesian Scepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy's enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Scepticism. This is evident once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished.
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  11.  6
    On What Does Rationality Hinge?Yuval Avnur - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):246-257.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 246 - 257 The two main components of Coliva’s view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable assumptions (...)
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