15 found
Order:
See also
Yuval Avnur
Claremont College
  1.  49
    Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - forthcoming - Synthese 1:1-20.
    The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises whose conclusion is that we lack justification for perceptual beliefs. Typically, this conclusion is deemed unacceptable, so a theory is offered that posits conditions for justification on which some premise is false. The theory defended here is more general, and explains why the paradox arises in the first place. Like Strawson’s (Introduction to logical theory, Wiley, New York, 1952) “ordinary language” approach to induction, the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  23
    What’s Wrong with the Online Echo Chamber: A Motivated Reasoning Account.Yuval Avnur - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  59
    How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4.  80
    Closure Reconsidered.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5. In Defense of Secular Belief.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 4.
  6.  97
    Excuses for Hume's Skepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.
  7.  63
    On an Irrelevant Regress.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Theoria 82 (1):81-88.
    In a recent article, Wilson argues that Cartesian Scepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopped by rejecting Cartesian Scepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy's enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Scepticism. This is evident once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. No Closure On Skepticism.Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. An Old Problem for the New Rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
    A well known skeptical paradox rests on the claim that we lack warrant to believe that we are not brains in a vat. The argument for that claim is the apparent impossibility of any evidence or argument that we are not BIVs. Many contemporary philosophers resist this argument by insisting that we have a sort of warrant for believing that we are not BIVs that does not require having any evidence or argument. I call this view ‘New Rationalism’. I argue (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10.  19
    Unicorn Agnosticism.Yuval Avnur - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    ABSTRACTAtheists and agnostics have a vexed relationship. Atheists often regard agnostics as timid, or perhaps as disguised apologists. Agnostics often regard atheists as dogmatic hypocrites: they...
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Hawthorne on the Deeply Contingent A Priori1.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):174-183.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Mere Faith and Entitlement.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  15
    The Nature and Limits of Skeptical Criticism.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):183-205.
    Is there something wrong with the way we form beliefs about our surroundings? Most people assume not. But there is a character, the skeptic, who disagrees. What, exactly, is this skeptic claiming, and why should this concern us? We are, after all, just humans doing what humans do: forming beliefs on the basis of our faculties. In what sense could this be wrong, and how could it matter if it is? By considering the way in which the notions of vice (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  18
    Annalisa Coliva, Danièle Moyal‐Sharrock : Hinge Epistemology . vi + 278, price €70.00 pb.Yuval Avnur - 2018 - Philosophical Investigations 41 (3):366-370.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  17
    On What Does Rationality Hinge?Yuval Avnur - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):246-257.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 246 - 257 The two main components of Coliva’s view are Moderatism and Extended Rationality. According to Moderatism, a belief about specific material objects is perceptually justified iff, absent defeaters, one has the appropriate course of experience and it is assumed that there is an external world. I grant Moderatism and instead focus on Extended Rationality, according to which it is epistemically rational to believe evidentially warranted propositions and to accept those unwarrantable assumptions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark