17 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Zachary Ernst [16]Zachary J. Ernst [1]
  1. Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action.Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):549-573.
    Writers on collective action are in broad agreement that in order for a group of agents to form a collective intention, the members of that group must have beliefs about the beliefs of the other members. But in spite of the fact that this so-called "interactive knowledge" is central to virtually every account of collective intention, writers on this subject have not offered a detailed account of the nature of interactive knowledge. In this paper, we argue that such an account (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  2.  69
    Group Intentions as Equilibria.Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):95 - 109.
    In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  3.  3
    What Fitness Can’T Be.André Ariew & Zachary Ernst - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):289-301.
    Recently advocates of the propensity interpretation of fitness have turned critics. To accommodate examples from the population genetics literature they conclude that fitness is better defined broadly as a family of propensities rather than the propensity to contribute descendants to some future generation. We argue that the propensity theorists have misunderstood the deeper ramifications of the examples they cite. These examples demonstrate why there are factors outside of propensities that determine fitness. We go on to argue for the more general (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  4.  69
    Collective Action as Individual Choice.Zachary Ernst & Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):415-434.
    We argue that conceptual analyses of collective action should be informed by game-theoretic analyses of collective action. In particular, we argue that Ariel Rubenstein’s so-called ‘Electronic Mail Game’ provides a useful model of collective action, and of the formation of collective intentions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  78
    Explaining the Social Contract.Zachary Ernst - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-24.
    Brian Skyrms has argued that the evolution of the social contract may be explained using the tools of evolutionary game theory. I show in the first half of this paper that the evolutionary game-theoretic models are often highly sensitive to the specific processes that they are intended to simulate. This sensitivity represents an important robustness failure that complicates Skyrms's project. But I go on to make the positive proposal that we may none the less obtain robust results by simulating the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6.  27
    Philosophical Issues Arising From Experimental Economics.Zachary Ernst - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):497–507.
    Human beings are highly irrational, at least if we hold to an economic standard of ‘rationality’. Experimental economics studies the irrational behavior of human beings, with the aim of understanding exactly how our behavior deviates from the Homo economicus, as ‘rational man’ has been called. Insofar as philosophical theories depend upon rationality assumptions, experimental economics is the source of both problems and (at least potential) solutions to several philosophical issues. This article offers a programmatic and highly biased survey of some (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  30
    Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory.Zachary Ernst - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1187-1196.
    A variety of robustness objections have been made against evolutionary game theory. One of these objections alleges that the games used in the underlying model are too arbitrary and oversimplified to generate a robust model of interesting prosocial behaviors. In this paper, I argue that the robustness objection can be met. However, in order to do so, we must attend to important conceptual issues regarding the nature of fairness, justice, and other moral concepts. Specifically, we must better understand the relationship (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  14
    The Liberationists' Attack on Moral Intuitions.Zachary Ernst - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):129 - 142.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  62
    What Is Common Knowledge?Zachary Ernst - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):209-226.
    Common knowledge is usually defined as a state in which everyone knows that p, everyone knows that everyone knows that p, and so on, ad infinitum. This definition is usually attributed to David Lewis, despite the fact that his own formulation bears no resemblance to common knowledge as it is usually understood. In this paper, I argue that this concept of common knowledge requires revision. Contrary to usual practice, it turns out to be difficult to model formally because existing models (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  23
    Shortest Axiomatizations of Implicational S4 and S.Zachary Ernst, Branden Fitelson, Kenneth Harris & Larry Wos - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):169-179.
    Shortest possible axiomatizations for the implicational fragments of the modal logics S4 and S5 are reported. Among these axiomatizations is included a shortest single axiom for implicational S4—which to our knowledge is the first reported single axiom for that system—and several new shortest single axioms for implicational S5. A variety of automated reasoning strategies were essential to our discoveries.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  7
    A Plea for Asymetric Games.Zachary Ernst - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):109 - 125.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  15
    A Concise Axiomatization of RM→.Zachary Ernst, Branden Fitelson, Kenneth Harris & Larry Wos - 2001 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 30 (4):191-194.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  9
    Completions From TV-> to H->.Zachary Ernst - 2002 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 31 (1):7-14.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  2
    Index of MIND Vol. 117 Nos 1–4, 2008.Hans-Johan Glock, Judith Baker, Eliza Block, Sarah Buss, Sara Rachel Chant, Zachary Ernst, Gopal Sreenivasan & Sungho Choi - 2008 - Mind 117:468.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. An Incomplete Rough Draft of a Paper on Using Automata to Describe Infinite Countermodels for Propositional Calculi (and Maybe Algebras, Too).Zachary Ernst - manuscript
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Evolutionary Game Theory and the Origins of Fairness Norms.Zachary J. Ernst - 2002 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    In numerous studies, experimental economists have documented the fact that people tend to propose that divisible goods be divided equally. It has often been proposed, most notably by the sociobiologists, that this tendency may have a biological basis, and might be the product of evolution and natural selection. ;My dissertation addresses methodological and philosophical problems that arise in the course of establishing this naturalistic claim. Specifically, the focus of this dissertation is on the project of using evolutionary game theory to (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Game Theory in Evolutionary Biology.Zachary Ernst - 2007 - In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press.