See also
Zanja Yudell
California State University, Chico
  1. Lange’s Challenge: Accounting for Meta-Laws.Zanja Yudell - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):347-369.
    Lange issues a novel challenge to philosophical accounts of laws of nature. He notes that the laws of nature seem to be themselves governed by laws analogous to the way that the laws govern particular facts. These higher order laws are the meta-laws of nature. He claims that if a philosophical account of laws aims to accurately characterize the laws, it should be able to account for these meta-laws. To generalize this challenge, I introduce the notion of roles played by (...)
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    A Normative Account of the Need for Explanation.Zanja Yudell & Wai-Hung Wong - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2863-2885.
    Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science, there is an important issue concerning explanation that has not been discussed much, namely, why some phenomena need an explanation while some do not. In this paper we first explain why this is an important issue, and then discuss two accounts of the need for explanation that can be gathered from the literature. We argue that both accounts are inadequate. The main purpose of the paper is, however, to offer (...)
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    How Fallacious is the Consequence Fallacy?Wai-Hung Wong & Zanja Yudell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):221-227.
    Timothy Williamson argues against the tactic of criticizing confidence in a theory by identifying a logical consequence of the theory whose probability is not raised by the evidence. He dubs it “the consequence fallacy”. In this paper, we will show that Williamson’s formulation of the tactic in question is ambiguous. On one reading of Williamson’s formulation, the tactic is indeed a fallacy, but it is not a commonly used tactic; on another reading, it is a commonly used tactic (or at (...)
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    Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays.Matthew H. Slater & Zanja Yudell (eds.) - 2017 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This volume of new essays, written by leading philosophers of science, explores a broadly methodological question: what role should metaphysics play in our philosophizing about science? The essays address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and by more general methodological investigations.
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    Melia and Saatsi on Structural Realism.Zanja Yudell - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):241-253.
    Newman’s objection is sometimes taken to be a fatal objection to structural realism (SR). However, ambiguity in the definition of “structure” allows for versions that do not succumb to Newman’s objection. In this paper, I consider some versions of SR that maintain an abstract notion of structure yet avoid Newman’s objection. In particular, I consider versions suggested by Melia and Saatsi. They reject a solution that restricts the domain of the second-order quantifiers, and argue in favor of buttressing the language (...)
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    Matteo Morganti Combining Science and Metaphysics: Contemporary Physics, Conceptual Revision, and Common Sense.Zanja Yudell - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):657-661.
  7. Structuralism and the New Way of Worlds: A Sellarsian Argument for Necessitarianism About Laws.Zanja Yudell - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):678-695.
    This article presents and argues for modal structuralism, which is loosely derived from a position described by Wilfrid Sellars. Modal structuralism holds that a fundamental property is identified by the role it plays in the structure of possibilities. It implies necessitarianism about laws, which holds that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. The argument for these positions derives from the following assumptions: the principle of the identity of indiscernible properties and a modest antiquidditism. These assumptions are weaker (...)
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    Understanding Inconsistent Science. [REVIEW]Zanja Yudell - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):876-878.