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  1.  28
    Analogy and Diagonal Argument.Zbigniew Tworak - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (1):39-66.
    In this paper, I try to accomplish two goals. The first is to provide a general characterization of a method of proofs called — in mathematics — the diagonal argument. The second is to establish that analogical thinking plays an important role also in mathematical creativity. Namely, mathematical research make use of analogies regarding general strategies of proof. Some of mathematicians, for example George Polya, argued that deductions is impotent without analogy. What I want to show is that there exists (...)
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  2. Fallibilizm a logika.Zbigniew Tworak - 1994 - Nowa Krytyka 5.
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  3. Kłamstwo Kłamcy I Zbiór Zbiorów: O Problemie Antynomii.Zbigniew Tworak - 2004 - Wydawn. Nauk. Uam.
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  4. Logika przekonań warunkowych.Zbigniew Tworak - 2014 - Filozofia Nauki 22 (2):37-54.
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  5. Logika wobec myślenia.Zbigniew Tworak - 1996 - Nowa Krytyka 7.
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  6. O pojęciu prawdy w intuicjonizmie matematycznym.Zbigniew Tworak - 2010 - Filozofia Nauki 18 (4).
    The basic philosophical idea of intuitionism is that mathematical entities exist only as mental constructions and that the notion of truth of a proposition should be equated with its verification or the existence of proof. However different intuitionists explained the existence of a proof in fundamentally different ways. There seem to be two main alternatives: the actual and potential existence of a proof. The second pro-posal is also understood in two alternative ways: as knowledge of a method of con-struction of (...)
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  7. On the Notion of Truth in Mathematical Intuitionism.Zbigniew Tworak - 2010 - Filozofia Nauki 18 (4):49.
     
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  8.  8
    Paradoksy.Zbigniew Tworak - forthcoming - Filozofia.
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  9. Paradoks znawcy (The Knower Paradox).Zbigniew Tworak - 2011 - Filozofia Nauki 19 (3).
    The Knower Paradox is an element of the class of paradoxes of self-reference. It demonstrates that any theory Ó which (1) extends Robinson arithmetic Q, (2) includes a unary knowledge predicate K, and (3) contains certain elementary epistemic principles involving K is inconsistent. In this paper I present different versions of the Knower Paradox (both in the framework of the first-order arithmetic and in the modal logic). There are several solutions of the paradox. Some of them I discuss in detail, (...)
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  10. Samoodniesienie a zagadnienie powstawania antynomii.Zbigniew Tworak - 2008 - Filozofia Nauki 2.
    In this paper, I try to give an account of situations in which self-reference is likely to occur. Generally, self-reference or circularity is relation in which something refers to itself (directly or via another, intermediate, objects). Self-referential objects sometimes lead to antinomies (inconsistencies) and sometimes do not. We can distinguish between vicious and innocuous self-referential objects. There is controversy whether all antinomies essentially involve some form of self-reference (S. Yablo has given an ingenious liar-style antinomy that, he claims, avoids self-reference). (...)
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  11.  17
    Wczesny Leśniewski i antynomia kłamcy.Zbigniew Tworak - 2013 - Filo-Sofija 13 (20).
    Zbigniew Tworak The early Leśniewski and the Liar AntinomyIn his early, prelogistic article „Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle” (1913) Stanislaw Leśniewski presents a certain solution to the Liar Antinomy. He argues that the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle is false but he defends the so-called Principle of Contradictory Sentences (the weaker version of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle) and the Logical Principle of Contradiction. The paper discusses this solution. Leśniewski’s solution to the Liar antinomy differs from (...)
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  12. Zapomniana antynomia Russella.Zbigniew Tworak - 2003 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 48 (4):93-107.
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