In [2] A. Wroski proved that there is a strongly finite consequence C which is not finitely based i.e. for every consequence C + determined by a finite set of standard rules C C +. In this paper it will be proved that for every strongly finite consequence C there is a consequence C + determined by a finite set of structural rules such that C(Ø)=C +(Ø) and = (where , are consequences obtained by adding to the rules of C, (...) C + respectively the rule of substitution). Moreover it will be shown that under certain assumptions C=C +. (shrink)

Contents: PART I. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CREATIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS. Krystyna ZAMIARA: The psychological approach to creativity. A critical appraisal. Rick L. FRANKLIN: Creativity and depth in understanding. Zdzis??l??awa PIATEK: Creativity of life and F.W. Nietzsche's idea of Superman. Jaromír JANOUSEK: Dialogue and joint activity: A psychological approach. Krystyna ZAMIARA: Some remarks on Piaget's notion of "consciousness" and its importance for the studies of culture. Anna GA??L??DOWA, and Aleksander NELICKI: Attitudes towards values as a factor determining creativity. PART II. THE ROLE (...) OF CREATIVITY IN THE THEORY-BUILDING. Leszek NOWAK: On creativity in theory-building. Izabella NOWAK: Discovery and correspondence. A contribution to the idealizational approach to science. Jerzy BRZEZI??N??SKI: Research process in psychology in the context of the researcher's methodological consciousness. Andrzej FALKOWSKI: Cognitive similarity in scientific discovery: An ecological approach. PART III: CONSCIOUSNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. Kathleen V. WILKES: Inside insight. Franco DI MARIA, and Gioacchino LAVANCO: History and epistemology of the unconscious. Franco DI MARIA, and Gioacchino LAVANCO: Conscious/unconscious and group-analysis. Banjamin WALLACE, Andrzej KOKOSZKA, and Deanna D. TUROSKY: Historical and contemporary thoughts on consciousness and its altered states. PART IV. BETWEEN EXPRESSION AND PROJECTION. Micha??l?? STASIAKIEWICZ: Creativity and projection: Paradigm opposition and implicit correspondence. Anna BRZEZI??N??SKA: Creative expression versus projection. PART V. THE ROLE OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL COMPONENTS IN EXPLANATION OF PHENOMENA OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CREATIVITY. Mario BUNGE: Explaining creativity. Piotr WOLSKI: Hemispheric asymmetry and consciousness. Is there any relationship? Andrzej KOKOSZKA: A rationale for psychology of consciousness. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CREATIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS. Santo DI NUOVO: Consciousness and attention. Tomasz MARUSZEWSKI: Two looks on consciousness. Is there any interface between philosophy of science and psychology? Marek KOWALCZYK: On the question of the functions of consciousness. Dean Keith SIMONTON: From childhood giftedness to creative genius. Magdalena FAFROWICZ, Tadeusz MAREK, and Czes??l??aw NOWOROL: Effectiveness of innovation as a function of creative style of behavior and type of leadership. Mark A. RUNCO, and Joni RADIO GAYNOR: Creativity and optimal development. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

We propose a new schema for the deduction theorem and prove that the deductive system S of a prepositional logic L fulfills the proposed schema if and only if there exists a finite set A(p, q) of propositional formulae involving only prepositional letters p and q such that A(p, p) L and p, A(p, q) s q.

The problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ arises from the lack of an explanation for why an all-loving God would choose not to make his existence evident. I argue that Kant provides a compelling solution to this problem in an often overlooked passage located near the end of the second Critique. Kant’s suggestion is that God’s revealing himself would preclude the development of virtue because we would lose the experience of conflict between self-interest and the law. I provide a reconstruction and defence (...) of Kant’s argument, and I explain why it is consistent with his overall position in the second Critique. (shrink)

A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal ones are possible worlds, constituting a logical space; minimal ones are logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference (or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown to form (...) a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set algebra of loci is its representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary dimensions only. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to prove the result announced by the title.

The main theorem says that a consequence operator is an effective part of the consequence operator for the classical prepositional calculus iff it is a consequence operator for a logic satisfying the compactness theorem, and in which every finitely axiomatizable theory is decidable.

According to the evaluativist theory of bodily pain, the overall phenomenology of a painful experience is explained by attributing to it two types of representational content—an indicative content that represents bodily damage or disturbance, and an evaluative content that represents that condition as bad for the subject. This paper considers whether evaluativism can offer a suitable explanation of aversive auditory phenomenology—the experience of awful noises—and argues that it can only do so by conceding that auditory evaluative content would be guilty (...) of widespread error. Defending such an error-theory, moreover, comes with several explanatory costs. (shrink)

The paper applies the theory presented in A Formal Ontology of Situations (this journal, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations. Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that theory to the situation semantics of Perry and Barwise is discussed.

Many contemporary epistemologists take rational inference to be a conscious action performed by the thinker (Boghossian 2014; 2018; Valaris 2014; Malmgren 2018). It is tempting to think that rational evaluability requires responsibility, which in turn requires conscious action. In that case, unconscious cognition involves merely associative or otherwise arational processing. This paper argues instead for deep rationalism: unconscious inference often exhibits the same rational status and richly structured logical character as conscious inference. The central case study is rationalization, in which (...) people shift their attitudes in logically structured, reason-responsive ways in response to evidence of their own incompetence or immorality. These attitude shifts are irrational in a way that reflects on the thinker. Thus rationally evaluable inference extends downward into the unconscious. Many take the sole aim of belief to be truth (Velleman 2000) or knowledge (Williamson 2000), but the prevalence of rationalization suggests that belief updating often aims instead at preserving our positive conceptions of ourselves—that is, belief updating is part of a psychological immune system (Gilbert 2006; Mandelbaum 2019). This paper argues that the psychological immune system comprises a suite of distinct cognitive mechanisms, some (ir)rational and some arational, which are united by a common function of avoiding the maladaptive predomination of negative affect and maintaining stable motivation. Other aspects of the psychological immune system include (i) a domain-general positive bias in evaluative attitudes and (ii) “terror management,” i.e., the systematic strengthening of meaning-conferring beliefs to avoid death anxiety. The multiplicity of processes underlying the psychological immune system point toward an irrational but adaptive function of cognition to keep us motivated in a world rife with negativity and death. (shrink)

Probably no intellectual has suffered more distortion and abuse than Spencer. He is continually condemned for things he never said – indeed, he is taken to task for things he explicitly denied. The target of academic criticism is usually the mythical Spencer rather than the real Spencer; and although some critics may derive immense satisfaction from their devastating refutations of a Spencer who never existed, these treatments hinder rather than advance the cause of knowledge.

W.E.B. Du Bois’s elegy for his infant son, “Of the Passing of the First-Born,” in The Souls of Black Folk, has received relatively scant attention from political theorists. Yet it illuminates crucial developments in Du Bois’s political thought. It memorializes a tragedy central to his turn from scientific facts to rhetorical appeals to emotion. Its rhetoric also exemplifies a broader tension in his writings, between masculinist and elitist commitments and more insurrectionary impulses. In its normalizing rhetorical mode, which dominates, the (...) elegy depicts an idealized patriarchal bourgeois household—potentially eliciting white readers’ sympathetic identification, but failing to displace the gendered and classed logic of racial exclusion. Its moments of transgressive rhetoric complicate or refuse such identification, celebrating Burghardt’s racial impurity and invoking a lineage of black maternal ambivalence. Though each is vexed and ephemeral, these moments of transgressive rhetoric reveal countervailing impulses that Du Bois would articulate in later writings. (shrink)

This paper deals with Boolean algebras supplied with an additional binary operation, calledB-algebras for short.The aim of the paper is to generalize some theorems concerning topological Boolean algebras to more comprehensive classes ofB-algebras, to formulate fundamental properties ofB-algebras, and to find more important relationships of these algebras to other known algebras.

In classes of algebras such as lattices, groups, and rings, there are finite algebras which individually generate quasivarieties which are not finitely axiomatizable (see [2], [3], [8]). We show here that this kind of algebras also exist in Heyting algebras as well as in topological Boolean algebras. Moreover, we show that the lattice join of two finitely axiomatizable quasivarieties, each generated by a finite Heyting or topological Boolean algebra, respectively, need not be finitely axiomatizable. Finally, we solve problem 4 asked (...) in Rautenberg [10]. (shrink)

The ever-increasing dominance of English within analytic philosophy is an aspect of linguistic globalisation. To assess it, I first address fundamental issues in the philosophy of language. Steering a middle course between linguistic universalism and linguistic relativism, I deny that some languages might be philosophically superior to others, notably by capturing the essential categories of reality. On this background I next consider both the pros and cons of the Anglicisation of philosophy. I shall defend the value of English as a (...) lingua franca, while denying both the feasibility and the desirability of English as the sole universal language of philosophy. Finally I turn to the linguistic inequality in contemporary analytic philosophy. While it does not per se amount to an injustice, there is a need to level the playing field. But the remedy does not lie in linguistic academic sectarianism. Instead, what might be called for are piecemeal measures to reduce explicit and implicit biases against analytic philosophers on the geographic fringes, biases that are only partly connected to the predominance of English. (shrink)

Let q(K) denote the least quasivariety containing a given class K of algebraic structures. Mal'cev [3] has proved that q(K) = ISP r(K)(1). Another description of q(K) is given in Grätzer and Lakser [2], that is, q(K) = ISPP u(K)2. We give here other proofs of these results. The method which enables us to do that is borrowed from prepositional logics (cf. [1]).