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Zeno G. Swijtink [11]Zeno Gerhard Swijtink [1]
  1.  22
    Eliminability in a cardinal.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1976 - Studia Logica 35 (1):71 - 89.
  2.  20
    A Bayesian Argument in Favor of Randomization.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:159-168.
    Randomization is a generally accepted principle of sound experimental design and common practice among working scientists. But Bayesian statisticians reject it, most often because of decision theoretic argument against randomization. I trace it back to Abraham Wald's Theory of Inductive Behavior and argue that Bayesians should concur with Ronald Fisher 's criticism of Wald's analysis of randomization. The paper ends with a Bayesian argument in favor of randomization: randomization can lead to an increase in expected utility.
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  3.  49
    A plea for Popperian significance testing.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):220-221.
    Even in a theory corroboration context, attention to effect size is called for if significance testing is to be of any value. I sketch a Popperian construal of significance tests that better fits into scientific inference as a whole. Because of its many errors Chow's book cannot be recommended to the novice.
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  4.  33
    D'Alembert and the Maturity of Chances.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1986 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (3):327.
  5.  17
    Theory of the Apparatus and Theory of the Phenomena: The Case of Low Dose Electron Microscopy.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:573 - 584.
    In this paper I give a Bayesian criterion for when an experiment is a test of the theory of the apparatus, rather than a test of the theory of the phenomena, and describe strategies used to ensure that tests of the theory of the phenomena are possible. I extend this framework to low dose electron microscopy which has a stochastic instrument theory and which provides an exception to a thesis by Robert Ackermann on the independence between theory and instrumentation.
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  6.  4
    Theory of the Apparatus and Theory of the Phenomena: The Case of Low Dose Electron Microscopy.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):573-584.
    Electron microscopy, and in particular low dose electron microscopy, offers interesting cases of experimental techniques where the theory of the phenomena studied and the theory of the apparatus used, are intertwined. A single primary exposure usually does not give an interpretable image, and computerized image enhancement techniques are used to create from multiple exposures a single, visually meaningful image. Some of the enhancement programs start from informed guesses at the structure of the specimen and use the primary exposures in a (...)
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  7.  43
    Two suggestions for Ramsey-reducts of infinite theories.Zeno G. Swijtink - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (4):575-577.
  8.  13
    Review of Robert John Ackermann: Data, Instruments, and Theory: A Dialectical Approach to Understanding Science[REVIEW]Zeno G. Swijtink - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):399-404.
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  9.  28
    Reviews. [REVIEW]Zeno G. Swijtink - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):392-396.
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  10.  15
    Review of Nicholas Rescher: The Limits Of Science (The Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the Philosophy and History of Science)[REVIEW]Zeno G. Swijtink - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):392-396.