The aim of my article is to analyze the concepts and phenomena of diagnosis and recognition, often considered to be semantically identical. While in psychiatric practice such an identity does not necessarily have adverse effects, in the anthropological and cultural domains identification of diagnosis and recognition may cause stigmatization, or other undesirable consequences. The article attempts to justify this thesis.

In his life and work, Leszek Kołakowski traversed many paths, some more and some less well-known. The main focus here is on Kołakowski’s involvement in what one may call an anthropological variant of philosophy of culture. Anthropological philosophy of culture bases on the following assumptions:1. Human conduct is determined by culture. There is neither humanity without culture nor culture without humans.2. Human conduct is by nature referential, in other words, the factual alone is not enough for humans who tend to (...) reach beyond it in their search for the most elemental and ultimate truths.3. Culture is a dynamic phenomenon and a challenge on the path to self-awareness.4. Axiological sensitivity.5. The culture philosopher is immersed in the culture he studies and, by revealing that which it conceals, is a source of reflection on this culture. All these assumptions lie at the core of the philosophy of Leszek Kołakowski. (shrink)

The introduction to Leopold Blaustein’s (1905–1944) two essays in this issue of Estetika contains a general biographical note about the author and his philosophical affiliations, as well as a brief description of his particular interests within philosophical aesthetics. Blaustein’s method of philosophical inquiry is described as analytical phenomenology. Three interconnected fields of aesthetics in Blaustein’s works are emphasized: the theory of aesthetic perception, the theory of attitudes (towards the imaginary world and the reproduced one) and the theory of representation, especially (...) the imaginary representation crucial for aesthetic perception. Blaustein’s theory of perception and aesthetic experience is discussed in greater detail in the introduction as well as represented by the essay ‘The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience’. His theory of imaginary representation is exemplified by a selection from his important book Przedstawienia imaginatywne (Imaginary representations, 1930). The introduction ends with an account of the idea of ‘experiential unity of a higher order’, which for Blaustein serves as the condition for the possibility of aesthetic experience and constitutes an important background for an understanding of Blaustein’s aesthetics. (shrink)

The introduction to Leopold Blaustein’s two essays in this issue of Estetika contains a general biographical note about the author and his philosophical affiliations, as well as a brief description of his particular interests within philosophical aesthetics. Blaustein’s method of philosophical inquiry is described as analytical phenomenology. Three interconnected fields of aesthetics in Blaustein’s works are emphasized: the theory of aesthetic perception, the theory of attitudes and the theory of representation, especially the imaginary representation crucial for aesthetic perception. Blaustein’s theory (...) of perception and aesthetic experience is discussed in greater detail in the introduction as well as represented by the essay ‘The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Experience’. His theory of imaginary representation is exemplified by a selection from his important book Przedstawienia imaginatywne . The introduction ends with an account of the idea of ‘experiential unity of a higher order’, which for Blaustein serves as the condition for the possibility of aesthetic experience and constitutes an important background for an understanding of Blaustein’s aesthetics. (shrink)

I can’t say that I resent the Germans, nor that I expect or demand anything from them. I would only like them to know what they have done to me. They have destroyed my childhood and ruined my eight-year-old imagination, leaving only a pile of rubble, heap of corpses, great cesspool—gigantic hole filled with black blood. (K 53).

In this essay I present culture as a realm constituted by a circular movement where progress is constantly confronted by different forms of reversions. By progress I mean specifically oriented changes we observe in culture. Many of them are rooted in the development of technology and science, or stem from demographical changes and intercultural influences. Reactions to these changes frequently involve returning to certain forms of behavior or responses that were common in the past but have been later abandoned. I (...) intend to present examples of this phenomenon observed in culture. (shrink)

The aim of my article is to analyze the concepts and phenomena of diagnosis and recognition, often considered to be semantically identical. While in psychiatric practice such an identity does not necessarily have adverse effects, in the anthropological and cultural domains identification of diagnosis and recognition may cause stigmatization, or other undesirable consequences. The article attempts to justify this thesis.

The paper describes the model shape of fanaticism. It defines fanaticism as a willing enslavement of personality and analysed the following features of it: intentionality, missionary attitude, being in love, intolerance, ability to satisfy ambivalent desires for objectivization and for subjectivization, and ability to evoke ambivalent feelings: moral condemnation and the feeling of admiration.

Preview: Where should we look for an answer to the question whether a psychiatrist is an expert? In analyses of the concept of “expert”? In sociological studies? Or perhaps in opinions formulated by psychiatrists themselves? The subject is not as simple as it might first seem and the answer cannot be obvious. Certainly, psychiatrists are considered to be experts when they are called in by the court to act as expert witnesses. They are also deemed experts when they make a (...) diagnosis, prescribe medication, or write out a sick note – similarly to other doctors. We typically trust that, just like other healthcare professionals, they will help us to recover or at least that they can alleviate our suffering. (shrink)