Il libro scava nel profondo dell' umanitā per mostrare la pericolositā della paura, i notevoli rischi e le sofferenze che la paura individuale e la paura collettiva comportano, senza dimenticare il rapporto fra potere e paura.

This book is a highly original and provocative contribution to democratic theory.

Analyzing different works and in particular Habermas' reflection on Kant, the author reconstructs, first, his approach to international law and his political and legal cosmopolitanism. Second, he presents some critical observations on Habermas' cosmopolitanism in the context of his more general discursive theory of law and state. In this perspective, he discusses the problems of peace and of the role of the United Nations, the strategy of protection of human rights, and the question of world citizenship. He argues that Habermas' (...) cosmopolitanism is a radicalization of Kantian tradition based on a centralization of international power and a cosmopolitan law. Finally, he develops realist arguments in favour of a non‐globalistic conception of international law. (shrink)

Analyzing Apel's proposal for positive tolerance in multicultural society, the author develops critical observations concerning, first, the distinction between negative and positive tolerance, second, the ethical foundation of positive tolerance and, finally, the semantic content of the notion.

According to the article, Neurath's reflexive epistemology—expressed by the metaphor of the ship in need of reconstruction on the open sea—represents a philosophical alternative to the classical and contemporary forms of scientific realism and ethical cognitivism, including Popper's falsificationism. Against Quine's reductive interpretation of Neurath's boat argument as the basis for a 'naturalized epistemology,' the article maintains that the metaphor suggests the idea of an insuperable situation of linguistic and conceptual circularity. This prevents any attempt at self-foundation in scientific knowledge, (...) as well as in ethics and politics, and rules out any 'constructive philosophy' aiming to break circularity in pursuit of some methodological beginning. (shrink)

El artículo presenta una arqueología conceptual y al mismo tiempo una crítica de lo que el autor llama el "globalismo jurídico". El autor se refiere a la línea de pensamiento filosófico y teórico jurídico que se podría remontar a la obra Zum ewigen Frieden de Kant. Esta línea se desarrolló en nuestro siglo, primero, en la construcción teórico-jurídica de Hans Kelsen y después, en Italia, en el "pacifismo jurídico" de Norberto Bobbio. Esta posición está también presente en la cultura angloamericana (...) contemporánea (los Western globalists) y es defendida, en la cultura alemana, por Jürgen Habermas. La crítica del autor se concentra en dos aspectos del "globalismo jurídico": en primen lugar, se crítica la concepción racionalista y normativista del derecho a la que el iusglobalismo nos remite y que atribuye al derecho una eficacia regulativa de los fenómenos sociales que éste en la realidad no alcanza a garantizar; en segundo lugar, se denuncia el prejuicio etnocéntrico de una cultura jurídica que, al mismo tiempo que elabora un proyecto de unificación del mundo, se muestra indiferente respecto a tradiciones culturales, políticas y jurídicas distintas de la occidental. (shrink)

The author argues that Bobbio’s philosophy of international relations is inspired by a highly positive conception of pacificism. Bobbio strongly rejects the Catholic notion of “just war” and claims that in the nuclear era war is the antithesis of the right, being as uncontrolled and uncontrollable as an earthquake or a tempest. Nonetheless, according to the author, Bobbio’s “juridical pacifism” still leaves a number of important political and theoretical problems in obscurity. First of all, there is room for doubt as (...) to whether the so-called “domestic analogy,” to which Bobbio expressly alludes, is capable of furnishing the appropriate conceptual means for constructing a theory of international relations. Secondly, it is by no means certain that the concentration of supreme international authority in the hands of a global organization is the best way to construct a more secure international order. Finally, according to the author, we may well doubt whether the United Nations does derive from a universal pact or agreement and is ultimately inspired by democratic principles. (shrink)

L’autore si occupa di aspetti distinti del recente fenomeno dell’uso della forza internazionale mo¬tivato dall’impellente esigenza di tutelare i diritti dell’uomo. Nel primo paragrafo tratta i pre¬supposti storico-politici del fenomeno, riferendosi in particolare alla stra¬tegia del new world order, elaborata dagli Stati Uniti nei primi anni novanta del Novecento. Nel secondo paragrafo af¬fronta gli aspetti giuridici dell’uso della forza internazionale per ragioni umanitarie, esa¬mi¬nando sia il caso in cui tale uso sia stato autorizzato del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Uni¬te, (...) sia il caso in cui non sia stato autorizzato. Nel terzo paragrafo si occupa del rapporto fra la prospettiva universalistica implicita nell’‘interventismo umanitario’ e l’attuale ordinamento in¬ternazionale, che ha come presupposto la sovranità degli Stati nazionali e il principio della non-ingerenza nella loro domestic jurisdiction.The author deals with distinct aspects of a recent phenomenon, i.e. the use of international force grounded on the urgency to enforce human rights. In the first section he discusses the historical and political bases of this phenomenon, by referring in particular to the strategy of ‘new world order’, worked out by the United States in the early 1990s. In the second section the author treats the legal aspects of the use of international force for humanitarian reasons, both authorised and unauthorised by the United Nations Security Council. Finally he addresses the relationship between the universalistic perspective im¬plied by ‘humanitarian interventionism’ and the present international order, based on nation states sovereignty and non-interference within their domestic jurisdiction. (shrink)

La explosiva fecundidad de Luhmann no puede explicarse sin referencia a un extraordinario método de trabajo, selectivo y combinatorio a la vez, basado en el automatismo interactivo de un elaboradísimo fichero por materias. ¿Será precisamente la estructura laberíntica del fichero y de la obra de Luhmann la clave interpretativa de la consideración excepcional, persistente y creciente que ha merecido en el círculo de la cultura italiana de los setenta-ochenta? La primera recepción de Luhmann en Italia es realizada por (y coincide (...) con el clima de fragmentación de) las tradicionales subculturas italianas del marxismo y el catolicismo, que se sienten "irresistiblemente provocadas', especialmente por la concepción luhmanniana del Estado de Derecho. La recepción de los años ochenta, sin embargo, está caracterizada por un incontenible splitting, que amenaza la propia identidad del autor, y por el auténtico "agujero negro" de la teoría de la autopoiesis en su doble cualidad de teoría biológica y teoría epistemológica. Difícil que, con estos dos obstáculos, el nuevo programa de investigación de Luhmann produzca resultados apreciables. (shrink)

Perché il terrorismo è oggi così diffuso e potente? Perché è riuscito a organizzarsi in forme così capillari ed efficaci al punto da essere considerato una minaccia per il mondo intero? Più in profondità: che cos’è esattamente il terrorismo? Qual è la sua "filosofia", quali le sue radici culturali e le sue motivazioni politiche? È possibile sconfiggerlo? O dobbiamo invece accettare di convivere con il terrorismo e considerare la sicurezza e la pace nel mondo come aspettative illusorie di retori, profeti (...) e visionari? Si tratta di questioni cruciali per capire il mondo in cui viviamo. E tuttavia non c’è alcuna possibilità di dare risposte definitive e condivise a questi interrogativi, anzitutto perché manca un consenso sulla nozione stessa di terrorismo. (shrink)

Perché il terrorismo è oggi così diffuso e potente? Perché è riuscito a organizzarsi in forme così capillari ed efficaci al punto da essere considerato una minaccia per il mondo intero? Più in profondità: che cos’è esattamente il terrorismo? Qual è la sua "filosofia", quali le sue radici culturali e le sue motivazioni politiche? È possibile sconfiggerlo? O dobbiamo invece accettare di convivere con il terrorismo e considerare la sicurezza e la pace nel mondo come aspettative illusorie di retori, profeti (...) e visionari? Si tratta di questioni cruciali per capire il mondo in cui viviamo. E tuttavia non c’è alcuna possibilità di dare risposte definitive e condivise a questi interrogativi, anzitutto perché manca un consenso sulla nozione stessa di terrorismo. (shrink)

El autor parte del reconocimiento del miedo como elemento constante en la historia del hombre, para ilustrar los mecanismos que para su reducción ha creado el ser humano. Entre ellos, el sistema político —y en particular el Estado moderno— se ha mostrado como el instrumento más eficaz en la reducción del miedo y de garantía de la seguridad. En este sentido, el Estado social ha significado el nivel más alto alcanzado en Occidente por un sistema político en el intento de (...) regular y reducir el miedo, al reducir los riesgos para el ser humano provenientes del funcionamiento de la economía de mercado. Sin embargo, el artículo muestra como la crisis del Estado social en el contexto de la globalización ha provocado, entre otras cosas, un drástico paso desde una concepción de la seguridad entendida como reconocimiento de la identidad de las personas y de su participación en la vida social, a una concepción de la seguridad entendida simplemente como defensa de los individuos de los posibles actos de agresión y como represión y castigo severo de los comportamientos desviados, es decir, el paso del Estado social al Estado penal. Finalmente, el autor defiende la necesidad, especialmente para el pensamiento de la izquierda, de recuperar el sentido positivo tanto de la seguridad como de la libertad, asumiendo que la seguridad y la libertad no pueden sobrevivir fuera de estructuras políticas que no se sostengan al mismo tiempo tanto en la autonomía individual como en la solidaridad social. (shrink)

The death penalty is so deeply rooted in the history of humanity that it will not be possible to abolish it any time soon, together with its ancestral models, such as lynching, stoning and torture. There is little use in appealing to absolute ethical values or to juridical principles held to be universal. A realistic approach suggests a careful consideration of the function the death penalty performed – and still performs – in the structures of political power and in the (...) hierarchical and repressive logic of religions, be they transcendent or nontranscendent. The struggle against the death penalty cannot but coincide with a wide-ranging political and cultural battle against the philosophies and ideologies that venerate “temporal idols” and demand an absolute faith tirelessly decreeing absolute punishments. The supreme punishment has always been a “religious penalty.” The supreme and definitive punishment is founded on a supreme and definitive certainty. The dogmatic certainty of the supreme judge knows no compassion – knows not the feeling of humanity’s common suffering and unhappiness; such certainty makes no provision for the misery, fragility and vulnerability of the human condition. Capital judgment upsets the only indisputable human solidarity – our solidarity against death. (shrink)

The question considered is whether it is possible to trace a theoretical strategy for a criminal policy on the basis of Marx's work. The answer offered is that Marxian political and economic analysis does not supply any general theory of criminality and that any attempt to formulate such a theory (as in Lenin, Paukanis or Gramsci) necessarily leads to authoritarian and regressive conceptions of crime and punishment. Nevertheless the authors maintain that it is possible to trace three theoretical suggestions within (...) Marxian thought which allow of a fruitful approach to the criminal question. The first suggestion relates to the economic roots of many aspects of modern criminality; the second regards the Christian and bourgeois superstition of moral liberty and individual culpability; the third suggestion deals with the lack of a guaranteed social space as the prime root of crime. These theoretical suggestions permit clarification of the social character of penal responsibility and this character points to the need for the socialization (but not deregulation) of criminal treatment. (shrink)