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Zoltan Jakab
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences
  1. Reflectance Physicalism About Color: The Story Continues.Zoltan Jakab - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):463-488.
    A stubborn problem for reflectance physicalism about color is to account for individual differences in normal trichromat color perception. The identification of determinate colors with physical properties of visible surfaces in a universal, perceiver-independent way is challenged by the observation that the same surfaces in identical viewing conditions often look different in color to different human subjects with normal color vision. Recently, leading representatives of reflectance physicalism have offered some arguments to defend their view against the individual differences challenge. In (...)
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  2. Phenomenal Qualities and the Development of Perceptual Integration.Mariann Hudak, Zoltan Jakab & Ilona Kovacs - 2013 - In Liliana Albertazzi (ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology; Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this chapter, data concerning the development of principal aspects of vision is reviewed. First, the development of colour vision and luminance perception is discussed. Relevant data accumulated so far indicates that perception of colour and luminance is present by 6-9 months of age. The presence of typical color illusions at this age suggests that the phenomenal character of color experience is comparable to that of adults well before the first birthday. Thus it seems plausible that color perception develops on (...)
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  3.  52
    Why Not Color Physicalism Without Color Absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.
    We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.
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  4. Metameric Surfaces: The Ultimate Case Against Color Physicalism and Representational Theories of Phenomenal Consciousness.Zoltan Jakab - manuscript
    In this paper I argue that there are problems with the foundations of the current version of physicalism about color. In some sources laying the foundations of physicalism, types of surface reflectance corresponding to (veridical) color perceptions are characterized by making reference to properties of the observer. This means that these surface attributes are not objective (i.e. observer-independent). This problem casts doubt on the possibility of identifying colors with types of surface reflectance. If this identification cannot be maintained, that in (...)
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  5. Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - manuscript
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from (...)
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  6.  69
    Ineffability of Qualia: A Straightforward Naturalistic Explanation.Zoltán Jakab - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):329-351.
    In this paper I offer an explanation of the ineffability (linguistic inexpressibility) of sensory experiences. My explanation is put in terms of computational functionalism and standard externalist theories of representational content. As I will argue, many or most sensory experiences are representational states without constituent structure. This property determines both the representational function these states can serve and the information that can be extracted from them when they are processed. Sensory experiences can indicate the presence of certain external states of (...)
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  7.  30
    The Sensory Basis of the Epistemic Gap: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124.
    The phenomenal character of conscious experience has long been regarded as the major problem for physicalist accounts of consciousness. In recent years, defenders of physicalism have typically been relying on the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy to avoid dualism. In this paper, we argue with PCS that cognitive-physicalistic explanations can account for the peculiarities of phenomenal character. However, we think that the conceptual features PCS investigates are not the genuine causes of the special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness but only symptoms, which (...)
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  8. Color Experience: Empirical Evidence Against Representational Externalism.Zoltan Jakab - 2001 - Dissertation, Carleton University (Canada)
    Contrary to some well-known views in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, in general it is not the case that the felt character of sensory experiences is determined by the information that these experiences pick up, or represent, about the world. In this dissertation I shall focus on a particular sensory modality, namely color vision, to support this thesis. ;Recently there has arisen a strong and popular view of phenomenal consciousness according to which the two fundamental problems about the (...)
     
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  9.  36
    Phenomenal Projection.Zoltan Jakab - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    In this paper I shall defend a projectivist view of sensory experience. The case I shall focus on is that of color experience. Projectivism has recently been criticized by some authors who claim that it is unintelligible, or at least implausible, and that it makes a severe category mistake. I shall argue that despite some prima facie impressions of implausibility, projectivism can be made intelligible, and plausible, if its details are spelled out in a reasonable way. In addition, projectivism is (...)
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  10. Revelation and Normativity in Visual Experience.Zoltán Jakab - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):25-56.
    A traditional explanation that dates back to Aristotle is that we access color in one perceptual modality only, whereas shape we perceive via two different modalities: visual and tactile. Two independent modalities make possible a verification of our percepts which is not possible for qualities accessed in one modality only.
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  11.  31
    Opponent Processing, Linear Models, and the Veridicality of Color Perception.Zoltán Jakab - 2005 - In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 336--378.
  12.  56
    How to Improve on Quinian Bootstrapping – a Response to Nativist Objections.Zoltan Jakab - 2013 - Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    Quinian bootstrapping is Susan Carey's solution to Fodor’s paradox of concept learning. Carey claims that contrary to Fodor’s view, not all learning amounts to hypothesis testing, and that there are ways in which even primitive concepts can be learned. Recently Georges Rey has argued that Carey’s attempt to refute radical concept nativism is unsuccessful. First it cannot explain how the expressive power of mental representational systems could increase due to learning. Second, both Fodorian circularity charges and Goodmanian problems of indeterminacy (...)
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  13.  28
    Language, Ecological Structure, and Across-Population Sharing.Alexa Bódog, gábor P. háden, Zoltán Jakab & Zsolt Palatinus - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):490-491.
    We propose a way to achieve across-population sharing within the authors' model in a way that is plausibly in accordance with human evolution, and also a simple way to capture ecological structure. Finally, we briefly reflect on the model's scope and limits in modeling linguistic communication.
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  14.  23
    Reply to Thomas Metzinger and Bettina Walde.Zoltán Jakab - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):363-369.
  15.  21
    Commentary on P. W. Ross: The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism.Zoltán Jakab - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):133-139.
  16.  11
    Reflectance Physicalism About Color.Zoltan Jakab - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):463-488.
    A stubborn problem for reflectance physicalism about color is to account for individual differences in normal trichromat color perception. The identification of determinate colors with physical properties of visible surfaces in a universal, perceiver-independent way is challenged by the observation that the same surfaces in identical viewing conditions often look different in color to different human subjects with normal color vision. Recently, leading representatives of reflectance physicalism have offered some arguments to defend their view against the individual differences challenge. In (...)
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  17.  1
    Revelation and Normativity in Visual Experience.Zoltán Jakab - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):25-56.
    A traditional explanation that dates back to Aristotle is that we access color in one perceptual modality only, whereas shape we perceive via two different modalities: visual and tactile. Two independent modalities make possible a verification of our percepts which is not possible for qualities accessed in one modality only.
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