In his historical novel from 1835, Prince Otto of Denmark and his Time, the poet Bernhard Severin Ingemann established the unknown, yet historical character, Prince Otto of Denmark as the hero of the novel. This choice has puzzled critics ever since, due to the fact that Prince Otto seems less a potential king than his brother Valdemar IV who actually became a king of Denmark. Georg Brandes claimed that Otto mirrored Ingemann’s persona as weak and feminine, a “monk” not suited (...) for kingship. In his ridicule of Prince Otto and Ingemann, Brandes reveals his ideas about gender, masculinity and femininity, but as this article seeks to show, such ideas are tied to time and place. Read from the distance of 2019, Ingemann’s feminine medieval hero might seem more modern and progressive than Brandes would have him. In this sense, the article is a piece of “queer medievalism”. (shrink)

Resumo O fundamento teórico deste artigo compreende uma análise teológica, com especial interesse pelo diálogo com a sociologia e com a antropologia. Investiga as relações de dominação, com enfoque específico nas relações de gênero que se engendram a partir dos ritos religiosos ou profanos, Objetiva-se verificar a importância dos ritos para a construção da realidade social, sobretudo das noções de gênero e das relações que delas advêm; expor com embasamento antropológico e sociológico esta premissa, visando contribuir para a discussão da (...) função social da religiosidade como construtora da realidade social; oferecer uma compreensão dos ritos enquanto espaços nos quais podem surgir relações mais igualitárias entre homens e mulheres. Através da pesquisa bibliográfica, procurar-se-á na sociologia de Pierre Bourdieu conceituar o poder simbólico e compreender de que maneira ele é elemento que constrói noções de gênero; posteriormente, serão averiguados em obras da área da antropologia, conceitos de rito, estabelecendo sua ligação com o poder simbólico e seu possível potencial construtor da realidade social e das noções de gênero que orientam as relações entre mulheres e homens. A conclusão buscará apontar de que maneira podem os ritos se tornar espaços para a articulação de um novo modo de relações de gênero. Palavras-chave: Ritos, Sociedade, Gênero.The theoretical basis of this article consists of a theological analysis, with emphasis on a dialogue with sociology and anthropology. It investigates dominance relationships, focusing particularly on gender relationships engendered by religious or profane rites. The objective is to verify the importance of rites for the construction of social reality, above all of gender notions and the relationships that result from them; to expose this premise on an anthropological and sociological basis, seeking to contribute to the discussion of the social function of religiosity as builder of social reality; and to provide an understanding of rites as spaces where more egalitarian relationships between men and women can take place. Through bibliographical research, especially into Pierre Bourdieu's sociology, the text tries to describe symbolic power and to understand how this element builds gender notions. Then, it verifies concepts of rite in anthropological texts, establishing its connection with symbolic power and its potential to construct social reality and gender notions that guide the relationships between women and men. The conclusion tries to indicate how rites can become spaces for the articulation of a new mode of gender relationships. Key words: Rites, Society, Gender. (shrink)

Faced with troubling professional decisions in his long and successful career as a psychiatrist, M. O'C. Drury turned for direction to the philosophical work of his teacher and friend, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Of particular concern to Drury were the situations in which psychiatrists were expected to differentiate between instances of madness that were religious in form and instances of genuine religious experience that, for their oddity, landed believers in psychiatric consulting rooms. In this essay we consider the special orientation Wittgenstein's philosophy (...) gave Drury, for example the way in which Drury came to understand how even his search for a principle of differentiation between madness and religion was misleading and contrary to his own practice—how it involved ‘sitting back in a cool hour and attempting to solve this problem as a pure piece of theory. To be the detached, wise, external critic’ and not see himself and his own manner of life ‘as intimately involved in the settlement of this question.’. (shrink)

This paper defends what the philosopher Merleau Ponty coins ‘the imaginary texture of the real’. It is suggested that the imagination is at work in the everyday world which we perceive, the world as it is for us. In defending this view a concept of the imagination is invoked which has both similarities with and differences from, our everyday notion. The everyday notion contrasts the imaginary and the real. The imaginary is tied to the fictional or the illusory. Here it (...) will be suggested, following both Kant and Strawson, that there is a more fundamental working of the imagination, present in both perception and the constructions of fictions. What Kant and Strawson failed to make clear, however, was that the workings of the imagination within the perceived world, gives that world, an affective logic. The domain of affect is that of emotions, feelings and desire, and to claim such an affective logic in the world we experience, is to point out that it has salience and significance for us. Such salience suggests and demands the desiring and sometimes fearful responses we make to it; the shape of the perceived world echoed in the shapes our bodies take within it. (shrink)

The word ‘freedom’ leads a double life. As a rallying cry in the mouths of politicians and publicists, it features in speech acts which inspire men to brave endeavours. Freedom or death are the proffered alternatives, and they are generally linked with fatiguing dispositions such as vigilance. As a philosophical concept , on the other hand, freedom is a territory in which battles are fought about such issues as positivity and negativity, virtue, determinism and the character of the will. There (...) is remarkably little connection between these two lives. Philosophers do not seem to take much interest in courage, and politicians do not tarry to specify whether it is negative or positive liberty they are talking about. (shrink)

I expect every reader knows the hackneyed old joke: ‘What is matter? Never mind. What is mind? No matter.’ Antique as this joke is, it none the less points to an interesting question. For the so-called mind–body dichotomy, which has been raised to almost canonical status in post-Cartesian philosophy, is not in fact at all easy to draw or to defend. This of course means that ‘the mind–body problem’ is difficult both to describe and to solve—or rather, as I would (...) prefer, to dissolve. (shrink)