In his essay, ‘Heidegger's Categories in Sein und Zeit’, Robert Brandom argues that Heidegger, particularly in the notion of Zuhandenheit, anticipates his own normatively pragmatist conception of intentionality. He attempts to demonstrate this by marshalling short passages from right across the relevant sections of Sein und Zeit in such a way that they do seem to say what Brandom claims. But does one reach the same conclusion when one examines, more or less in sentence‐by‐sentence fashion, the large slab of (...) text in which Heidegger introduces the notion of Zuhandenheit? I believe not. First, however, let us look at how Brandom reads Heidegger, in particular, how he interprets the notion of Zuhandenheit, which, in contrast both to Macquarrie and Robinson and to Brandom, I shall translate as ready‐to‐handedness.1. (shrink)

In his essay, ‘Heidegger's Categories in Sein und Zeit’, Robert Brandom argues that Heidegger, particularly in the notion of Zuhandenheit, anticipates his own normatively pragmatist conception of intentionality. He attempts to demonstrate this by marshalling short passages from right across the relevant sections of Sein und Zeit in such a way that they do seem to say what Brandom claims. But does one reach the same conclusion when one examines, more or less in sentence‐by‐sentence fashion, the large slab of (...) text in which Heidegger introduces the notion of Zuhandenheit? I believe not. First, however, let us look at how Brandom reads Heidegger, in particular, how he interprets the notion of Zuhandenheit, which, in contrast both to Macquarrie and Robinson and to Brandom, I shall translate as ready‐to‐handedness.1. (shrink)

This paper makes an effort to interpret the relationship between the concepts "Zuhandenheit" (readiness-to-hand) and "Vorhandenheit" (presence-at-hand), as they are analysed in §§ 15-16 of Heidegger's "Being and Time". These concepts are two modes of existence of the beings met in our surrounding world. So, they don't concern different things. Heidegger doesn't give the title "things" to the beings ready-to-hand; he names them "equipments" (Zeug). It's a concept relative to the Aristotelian "organon", which Aristotle exemplifies with the human hand (...) as a primary equipment. But Zuhandenheit isn't a quality of the things; the term has to do with the secret character of the equipments as the maining way of their disclosure. It's the Being-in-itself of the equipments, as long as they are useful. This Being-in-itself has nothing common with the Kantian Ding an sich, which is based on the presupposition of a cognitive relationship between subject and object. I posit also the question, whether Zuhandenheit can rendet the secretness and familiarity of our immediate approach to the environment, and my answer to this question is negative. (shrink)

Resumo O presente artigo trata do conceito heideggeriano In-der-Welt-Sein. O objetivo, por sua vez, é o esclarecimento do significado e da função do artigo “der” que encontramos na referida expressão. Para tanto, o artigo foca predominantemente nos modos-de-ser dos entes intramundanos e no fenômeno da Weltanschauung, tomando-os como os elementos fundamentais para uma compreensão satisfatória e global do evento do In-der-Welt-Sein, enquanto sinônimo geral da existência do Dasein. Desta forma, tanto os modos-de-ser dos entes intramundanos como a estrutura da Weltanschauung (...) são tomados como aqueles fenômenos que, representados na expressão In-der-Welt-Sein pelo artigo “der”, singularizam “mundo” enquanto sentido do ser desvelado para a compreensão do Dasein – inapelavelmente manifestado em alguma especificidade concreta. Palavras-chave : In-der-Welt-Sein, Mundo, Weltanschauung, Ente intramundano, Vorhandenheit. ZuhandenheitThe present article treats of the heideggerian concept In-der-Welt-Sein. The goal, in turn, is the clarification of the meaning and function of the article “der” we find in the expression. To this end, the article focus predominantly on the manners-of-being of the intraworldly beings and in the phenomenon of the Weltanschauung, taking them as the fundamental elements for a satisfactory and global understanding of the event of the In-der-Welt-Sein, while general synonym of the existence of Dasein. Thus, manners-of-being of the intraworldly beings and the structure of the Weltanschauung is taken as those phenomena that, represented in the expression In-der-Welt-Sein for the article “der”, they make single “world” while sense of being watched for the understanding of Dasein – unappealably manifested in some concrete specificity. Keywords : In-der-Welt-Sein, Intraworldly beings, Vorhandenheit. Weltanschauung, World, Zuhandenheit. (shrink)

This thesis articulates a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s explication of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs) in §15 of his masterwork Being and Time (1927/2006) and develops and applies the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature and articulate a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. Since §15 of BT explicates the being of gear, Part 1 expounds Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of beings (Seienden) and two issues raised in the ‘preliminary methodological (...) remark’ in §15 of BT regarding explicating being. §1.1 interprets the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a region (Region), district (Bezirk), or subject-area (Sachgebiet) – a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities. Although Heidegger posits two components of the being of a being, viz. material-content (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and mode-of-being (Seinsart) or way-of-being (Seinsweise, Weise des Seins, Weise zu sein) (1927/1975, 321), the unclarity of this distinction means that it does not figure prominently herein. §1.2 addresses Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations and his notion of ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten, Zugangsweisen). Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. §2.1 analyses Heidegger’s two necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and three core basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of these conditions and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Heidegger explicates the being of gear through content of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective intentional states. I term such states ‘mundane concern’, which is almost synonymous with Hubert Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’ (1991, 69). Heidegger’s explication highlights around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as the peculiar species of property figuring in mundanely concernful intentional content. §2.2 clarifies Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense: two of Heidegger’s most widely discussed concepts. I reject Kris McDaniel’s recent reading of Heidegger as affirming that nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously (McDaniel 2012). Part 3 develops and applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern. §3.1 explains the phenomena of situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. §3.2 undertakes the metaphysical accommodation of around-for references, which §3.1 posited as featuring prominently within mundanely concernful intentional content. This thesis thus contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship, but also to contemporary debates within the philosophy of action and cognitive science. (shrink)

Straipsnio tikslas – atskleisti įrankio (Zeug) ir technikos (Technik) skirtumą M. Heideggerio technikos filosofijoje. Analizuojami skirtumai nurodo pasaulio konstitucijos problematiką. Dasein santykį su įrankiu M. Heideggeris pristatė kaip parankų (Zuhandenheit), o štai santykį su technika įvardijo priešingai. Technika, kylanti iš gamtos mokslų, susaistytų machinacija (Machenschaft), filosofo pristatoma kaip Dasein kūrybines galias nuostatyne (Gestell) slopinanti terpė. Straipsnyje atskleidžiama dvejopa problematika. Pirma, parodomi įrankio ir technikos ontologiniai skirtumai. Antra, atskleidžiamas nuostatyno ontologijos ambivalentiškumas. Nuostatynas M. Heideggeriui nėra tik techniškai orientuoto pasaulio užvaldymo (...) mechanizmas, bet ir „gelbstintis“ pradas. (shrink)

Ce travail ambitionne inaugurer la thématisation d'une phénoménologie de la perception chez Heidegger. En prenant le contre-pied de bien des interprétations récentes concernant de questions cruciales de l'ontologie heideggerienne, notamment celles de l'articulation temporelle du présent et de la distinction entre Zuhandenheit et Vorhandenheit, il défend la thèse inattendue que la temporalité de la perception sert de fil conducteur de l'ontologie heideggerienne du temps, dans la mesure où elle impose la scission de la temporalité en modes authentiques et modes (...) inauthentiques. Notre commentaire serré sur les textes de l'époque de Marbourg fera apparaître que l'opposition entre la temporalité authentique de la perception `naturelle', identifiée positivement à la circonspection, et la temporalité inauthentique de la perception `théorique' ne résume pas simplement la critique heideggerienne de Husserl, mais contribue, avant tout, à ouvrir un espace critique dans la problématique phénoménologique de la perception dans son évolution de Husserl jusqu'à Merleau-Ponty. This book claims to inaugurate the thematization of a phenomenology of perception in Heidegger. Running counter to many recent interpretations concerning crucial questions of Heideggerian ontology (particularly the temporal articulation of present and the distinction between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit), it defends the unexpected thesis that the temporality of perception serves as a conductor of the Heideggerian ontology of time, by splitting temporality into authentic and unauthentic modes. Concise commentary on the texts of the Marburg period show that the opposition between the authentic temporality of `natural' perception (positively identified as circumspection) and the unauthentic temporality of `theoretical' perception does not merely summarize the entire Heideggerian critique of Husserl but, above all, helps to open a decisive path in the phenomenological account of perception in its evolution from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

Dasein is an entity that can be understood as being-in-the-world, in which the "world" refers to the referential context of meanings. In this context are the environments where the human being as historically constituted relates to other entities, among them the entity called "book" which can mean more than a mere instrument in its instrumentality (Zuhandenheit), but be this entity "the book of my childhood", "of adolescence", etc., unveiling his deliverance in the "for what it is read". The book (...) speaks because the one who wrote it, the Dasein-author, is possessed of language just as the Dasein-reader who relates to the work. Calvin states that the book, as an author’s self-portrait, presents a written world, whose source is the unwritten world, that is, the reality that is more surprising and frightening than what is in the book. The relationship of literature with the philosophy that once belonged to opponents has changed with the writers' attempt to reconcile both movements, including one more element in a triple relationship - Science - Philosophy - Literature. Like the human being, the book has undergone significant changes, such as the rise of digital books. The purpose of the article is to understand these aspects and philosophically interpret some excerpts from world-known works. (shrink)

En el siguiente artículo se busca plantear la problemática de los modos de ser a partir del fenómeno del tiempo. Se presenta la exposición de los distintos problemas acerca de los modo de ser en la temática de la ontología fundamental. El primer problema se refiere a la modalidad primaria de presentación del Dasein como «punto de partida» en torno a los modos de ser en general. El segundo problema de la modalización consiste en la caracterización de los distintos modos (...) de ser sobre la base del fenómeno del mundo: el mundo es el ámbito que hace posible la manifestación de los distintos modos de ser. El tercer problema fundamental de la modalización, de la que parte la propuesta del presente ensayo, se refiere al carácter temporal de los modos de ser, en este caso, tanto de los comportamientos referidos a estos modos, como de la propia comprensión del sentido de ser llevada a cabo en cada uno de ellos. El proyecto de la ontología fundamental consiste precisamente en una tematización que intenta acceder y comprender el sentido de ser a partir del horizonte del tiempo y así exponer las modalidades de ser del ente a partir de su carácter temporal. La investigación se centra en los modos de ser de la existencia (Existenz) del Dasein, el modo de ser de lo a la mano (Zuhandenheit) y lo que está ahí (Vorhandenheit). Se requiere una doble interpretación, propuesta por Heidegger: temporal y temporaria. La propuesta es sostener que, en la etapa de la ontología fundamental, Heidegger ha hecho del tiempo «lo más anterior a todo», esto es, el horizonte desde el cual se comprende toda modalidad del ente y aquello a partir de lo cual la ontología es posible como ciencia. (shrink)

Any attention paid to the positioning of telecommunications installations in natural landscapes usually relates to the aesthetic impact. However, such paraphernalia, particularly when contrasted with “natural” surroundings, invites us to think beyond the visible. Through Heidegger’s accounts of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, as well as his later articulations on Nature as it is subjected to the ordering principles of Gestell, this paper aims to highlight the overlaps of the natural and the technological worlds inhabited by communications structures, considering the relationship (...) between the human and the natural realms, through the uncertain electromagnetic phenomena that envelops the two. The essay is underpinned by the extended phenomenological description of an encounter with such technology that includes, following Anthony J. Steinbock’s outline of a phenomenological approach that might begin with the facts of the everyday sciences, some reference to the basic concepts of physics involved in transmissions technology. (shrink)

As a contribution towards clearing the ground for a new phenomenological evaluation of the essence of science, in this paper I present a critique of Heidegger''s argument in Being and Time for the priority of Zuhandenheit to Vorhandenheit. I argue that Heidegger''s notion of presence-at-hand is incoherent, conflating Husserl and Descartes, and that this general analysis has serious phenomenological flaws. Contrary to Heidegger, I maintain that there is a form of exploratory, theoretical activity including causal inquiry which is prior (...) to the type of practical activity entailed by readiness-to-hand. Consideration of this exploratory activity points us in the direction of an alternate conception of the genesis and essence of theory. (shrink)