In this paper the relations between the almost unknown Spanish mathematician Ventura Reyes Prósper (1863-1922) with Charles S. Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin are described. Two brief papers from Reyes Prósper published in El Progreso Matemático 12 (20 December 1891), pp. 297-300, and 18 (15 June 1892) pp. 170-173 on Ladd-Franklin, and on Peirce and Mitchell, respectively, are translated for first time into English and included at the end of the paper.
An important part of making philosophy as a discipline gender equal is to ensure that female authors are not simply wiped out of the history of philosophy. This has implications for teaching as well as research. In this context, I reflect on my experience of teaching a text by medieval philosopher Christine de Pizan as part of an introductory history of philosophy course taught to Turkish students in law, political science, and international relations. I describe the challenges I encountered, (...) the ways in which I dealt with them, and draw some conclusions based on my observations and feedback obtained at the end of the course. (shrink)
In The City of Ladies and Bell in Campo, Christine de Pizan and Margaret Cavendish imagine women’s participation to war as a metaphor of the sexual conflict that they must fight in order to conquer their visibility in history. While Pizan rewrites history from women’s stand point and acknowledges the universal value of sexual difference for the plan of salvation, Cavendish moves within a modern frame and thinks history as the result of human action. In both cases, the tale (...) of women’s participation to war allows criticizing the moral and normative implications of «nature». (shrink)
To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, these studies prove (...) less relevant than originally expected because the data obtained admit competing interpretations – such as people seeking fairness versus people seeking revenge. However, this mitigated conclusion does not preclude the possibility of more fruitful research in the area in the future. Throughout our analysis, we provide hints for the direction of future research on the question. (shrink)
Kantian ethics has struggled terribly with the challenge of incorporating non-human animals as beings to which we can owe obligations. Christine Korsgaard’s Fellow Creatures is a bold, substantial attempt to meet that challenge. In this essay review, I set the scene for the book’s core argument, offer a reconstruction of that argument, and reflect on its strengths and limitations, arguing that it is ultimately unconvincing.
Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this paper, (...) I propose a virtue ethics which does not suffer from the problem. Traits are not virtues because their cultivation and manifestation promote a value such as agent flourishing. They are virtues in so far as they are habits of appropriate response to various relevant values. This means that there is a direct connection between the rationale of a virtue and what makes an action virtuous or right. (shrink)
In her Why Have Children?, Christine Overall takes issue with my anti-natalist arguments that it is better never to come into existence. She provides three criticisms of my arguments and then, in a fourth criticism, suggests that my conclusions are bad for women. I respond to her criticisms, arguing that they fail.
Christine Korsgaard’s 1996 book, The Sources of Normativity, attracted a great deal of attention. And rightly so. It is a highly engaging attempt to answer what she calls the normative question, which is the question of what could justify morality’s demands. Korsgaard’s latest book, Self-Constitution, develops and defends the broadly Kantian account of action and agency that hovers in the background of Sources, drawing out its implications for the normative question. In this review, we present the main lines of (...) argument in Self-Constitution, raising objections to both Korsgaard’s account of action and agency and her most recent attempt to address the normative question. (shrink)
In a celebrated passage in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, Hume tells us that those readers who prefer Bunyan's writings to Addison's are merely ‘pretended critics’ whose judgment is ‘absurd and ridiculous’; this is ‘no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean’. Hume shows a decisiveness and vehemence in his judgment against Bunyan that has greater significance than that of being a mere reflection (...) of his aesthetic principles. Hume does, after all, wish to make ‘durable admiration’ the foundation of his standard of taste, and both the number of eighteenth-century reprints of The Pilgrim's Progress and Johnson's comment that this work has as ‘the best evidence of its merit, the general and continued approbation of mankind’ testify to the lasting popularity of Bunyan's work. Hume's critical judgment on Bunyan is not merely a consequence of a mechanical application of his standard of taste, but is rather a reflection of what I will term Hume's ‘epistemology of ease’. (shrink)
Une œuvre majeure de Christine de Pizan vient de faire l'objet d'une édition : Le Livre de l'Advision Christine dont Liliane Dulac et Christine Reno ont établi le texte, précédé d'une longue et précieuse introduction. Événement éditorial de premier ordre, l'édition antérieure (en 1932) ne pouvant satisfaire aux exigences des médiévistes et plus largement de ceux qui s'intéressent à la voix des femmes au Moyen Âge. Dans le parcours de l'écrivaine, l'Advision, œuvre de maturité, associe ..
Having established her pluralistic account as an influential position within contemporary virtue ethics, in this work Christine Swanton offers a virtue-ethical reading of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche with the aim of showing how they can further the development of virtue ethics beyond the Aristotelian and ancient eudaemonist traditions. Readers of Swanton’s other major work, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, may recall that many of its philosophical resources were drawn from Nietzsche and, to a lesser extent, from Hume. This (...) new study can be seen as offering a fuller and more historically grounded reading of the work of both thinkers. Swanton has also published on... (shrink)
The prevailing view about procreation, Christine Overall observes, is that “having children is the default position; not having children is what requires explanation and justification” (p. 3). These assumptions, she says, “are the opposite of what they ought to be” and that the “burden of proof … should rest primarily on those who choose to have children” (ibid). The ostensible goal of Why Have Children? is to discuss when this burden is and is not met.Professor Overall’s conclusions are much (...) less radical than one would expect from somebody reversing the ordinary assumptions about procreation. Indeed, her conclusions about procreation are remarkably permissive.She begins her argument with a discussion (in Chapter 2) of reproductive rights, which she says are necessary but not sufficient for evaluating reproductive decisions (p. 21). Her focus is on moral rather than legal rights, and she distinguishes between a right to reproduce—in both a positive and a negative sense—from a right not. (shrink)
In this paper, I juxtapose the work of two contemporary feminist philosophers: Christine Battersby and Adriana Cavarero – both working within the Continental tradition – to show how they go well beyond feminist critique to produce different images of self-identity and conceptions of the political. Both reject traditional positions on selfhood but also stress the materiality of bodies and provide alternatives to the work of post-structuralists, such as Judith Butler. My aim is to draw out some of the politico-legal (...) implications of their differing images of selfhood. In the final section I then apply both their approaches to the concept of self to ask how their respective arguments can inform contemporary political questions regarding privacy and dissensus. (shrink)
The work of Quilligan, Kelley, Gardner and others is alluded to in an effort to argue that Christine de Pisan’s Book of the City of Ladies is an early example of a philosophically feminist view. The importance of allegory as a literary construct is discussed, and it is concluded that Christine stands midway between the preceding medievals and the women thinkers of the seventeenth century. In addition, it is concluded that the importance of de Pisan’s work as a (...) bridge between the two eras cannot be overlooked, and that only recently has substantive scholarship on her begun to emerge that would point a clear way to her standing. (shrink)
In Emotions, Values, and Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.
The aims of this chapter are threefold. The first is to outline the importance of the tradition of virtue ethics for the origins of feminist thought. The second is to suggest a fertile avenue for the philosophical exploration of the works of late medieval and early modern women writers by considering the works of Christine de Pizan. The last aim of this chapter is to contribute to the emerging field of the history of women’s ideas in which female philosophers (...) are read not as mere appendages to the male thinkers of their period, but rather as having contributed to a distinctive strand in the history of ideas. (shrink)
Simonet, Emanuel Nicolas Cortes Christine Bryden is a survivor of dementia and has been a passionate advocate for persons with dementia for more than 20 years. She has written 4 books. Her latest 2 books - Before I Forget and Nothing About Us, Without us! - give an insider's perspective into the lived experience of a person with dementia. This article provides a review of these 2 books which detail Christine Bryden's life story, and in doing so, highlight (...) some of the key messages expressed by the author. These key messages include examining the various misconceptions about persons with dementia, the required care for persons with dementia, as well as the need for building a dementia-friendly society. (shrink)
The interconnections between Nietzsche and phenomenology constitute an area that is surprisingly underexplored. Besides Nietzsche’s well-known influence on Heidegger, and Heidegger’s Nietzsche sitting on the throne of metaphysics, there is very little written about the topic. This is a strange lacuna, one likely explanation for which is the difficulty of such comparative work. For, as the editors of Nietzsche and Phenomenology, Élodie Boublil and Christine Daigle, state in their introduction, “there is not one Nietzsche confronting one phenomenology” . The (...) multifarious corpus of Nietzsche poses enough interpretive difficulties; however, the phenomenological movement to which Nietzsche is compared is itself .. (shrink)
Un Siècle d'antiféminisme est l'un des premiers travaux universitaires s'attachant à définir l'antiféminisme et à en retracer l'historique en France au cours des cent dernières années. Son intérêt repose sur l'éventail et la variété des contributions réunies par Christine Bard autour de trois axes : « De la fin du XIXe siècle aux années folles », « Des années 1930 au baby boom » et « Du MLF à nos jours ». Il rend compte non seulement de la véritable (...) bataille contre les droits politique.. (shrink)
Christine Bard, avec Les Garçonnes, propose un fougueux antidote à la remarquable capacité du patriarcat à convertir la rébellion féminine en un reflet de son propre désir ou anxiété. Dans une analyse extrêmement précise de la garçonne, l'auteur montre combien cette figure est essentiellement une métaphore de la dissolution des mœurs. La garçonne rejette la féminité traditionnelle, s'attirant la colère de ceux qu'inquiète la dépopulation. Son corps échappe aux bornes érigées par les co..
Judith Butler, Joan Tronto, and Stephen King all hinge human experience on shared ontological vulnerability, but whereas Butler and Tronto use vulnerability to build ethical commitments, King exploits aging, disability, and death to frighten us. King's horror genre is provocative for the imaginative landscape of feminist theory precisely because he uses vulnerability to magnify the anxieties of mass culture. In Christine, the characters' shared susceptibility to psychic and physical injury blurs the boundary between care and violence. Like Butler, King (...) depicts our social worlds encrusted with normative violence: the mundane ways that norms police gender, race, class, and disability identities. And like Butler, King makes undecidability a key feature of human identity: the idea that needs and identities are uncertain. Normative violence and undecidability trouble the starting point of Tronto's care theory—attentiveness to needs—because both concepts invest interdependency with ambiguity and conflict. But like Tronto, King recognizes that care-actors must act, even amid ambiguity and even when their actions make care and aggression converge. Christine's supernatural plot details the psychic possession of an American teenager, but the novel's more terrifying story is about interdependency and how normative violence is not the antithesis of care, but its dark underbelly. (shrink)
Christine Overall’s book, Why Have Children?: The Ethical Debate, begins with what would seem like an obvious point—that there are better and worse reasons to have a child. Given that that the well-being of a vulnerable and dependent creature hangs on the choice, it surely requires justification. And yet, as she illustrates, philosophers have been comparatively silent about what that justification could or should look like. In this lucid and comprehensive book, Overall sets out to remedy that situation and (...) offer what in the end is a moral justification for having (no more than two) children.The overarching aim of the book is to explore the moral landscape around the choice to have children. Quite reasonably .. (shrink)
L'étude de Christine Hivet concerne deux romancières, la mère et la fille, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) et Mary Godwin Shelley (1797-1851), situées à la jonction des XVIII et XIXe siècles. Hivet examine la première dans le contexte du modèle féminin esquissé par quelques romancières de seconde zone, émules ou adversaires de notre aïeule féministe. En parallèle et en contrepoint, elle étudie la seconde, Mary Shelley. Celle-ci s'exprime dans des œuvres de science-fiction (Frankenstein..
Christine Swanton’s Virtue Ethics is a welcome addition to the newly flourishing field of virtue ethics. Swanton defends a rich and multifaceted virtue ethical theory that differs in interesting ways from the current paradigm, Aristotelian virtue ethics. The richness of her theory is, in part, dictated by her methodology: wide reflective equilibrium. Taking this methodology seriously, she draws on a wide range of scholarship not just in philosophy but also in psychiatry, psychology, sociology, and education.
Kaum ein Arbeitsgebiet der frühchristlichen und der byzantinischen Kunstgeschichte hat in moderner Zeit an einer so großen Differenz zwischen Erkenntnispotential und tatsächlicher Erkundung gekrankt wie die Denkmälerlandschaft im Nordsyrischen Kalksteinmassiv: Die dort erhaltenen spätantiken Siedlungen und Sakralbauten sind in ihrer instruktiven Präsenz einzigartig und müßten demnach von ganzen Heerscharen engagierter Feldforscher studiert werden, doch sind es in Wirklichkeit unsäglich wenige, die sich jenen Denkmälern zuwenden. Wer das sehr überschaubare Schrifttum, beginnend mit Melchior DE VOGÜÉ über die amerikanischen Expeditionsergebnisse des angebrochenen (...) 20. Jh.s bis hin zur Gegenwart studiert und auch selbst jene Stätten aufsucht, dem wird obendrein rasch klar, wie erbarmungslos die Zerstörung der für die ganze Menschheit unersetzlichen Monumente fortgeschritten ist und fortschreitet. Um ein Vielfaches müßten die Schutzmaßnahmen und die wissenschaftlichen Aktivitäten an diesem einzigartigen Erbe gesteigert werden. Vorbildlich sind da die Bemühungen von Christine Strube , deren neuestes einschlägiges Buch hier zu kommentieren ist. (shrink)
Ernst Cassirer n’aura cessé de s’intéresser à Descartes et à la philosophie classique, depuis sa dissertation de Marbpourg , qui traite de la critique cartésienne de la connaissance physico-mathématique, en passant par la monographie qu’il consacre à Leibniz en 1902, jusqu’au premier volume de l’Erkenntnisproblem ou de la philosophie des formes symboliques.Les études réunies ici proposent, à travers l’analyse des figures singulières de Corneille et de Christine de Suède, une remarquable situation de la pensée cartésienne à l’âge classique.
This paper argues that modern virtue ethics provides a useful background against which to read the philosophical import of Christine de Pizan’s works. By recognizing the origins of much of her thought in the Medieval tradition of virtue ethics, the paper brings out the continuity between her writing and a rich stream of contemporary ethical debate. It shows how Christine’s strand of feminism was deeply indebted to Medieval virtue ethics; both as found in Boethius and in contemporary compilations (...) on the virtues, on which Christine drew. At the same time, this tradition was subtly transformed by Christine, in order to elevate the status of women, as well as the traditional practical and worldly activities of women. Indeed, Christine’s feminism can be read as a direct application of her meditation on virtue and the good life. The paper concludes with a brief sketch of the way in which, during the three centuries subsequent to Christine, the nature of virtue and the virtues continued to provide a central focus in women’s philosophical writings. (shrink)
Christine Delphy is a major architect of materialist feminism, a radical feminist perspective which she developed in the context of the French women's movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. She has always been controversial and continues to make original and challenging contributions to current feminist debates. This informative volume profiles Delphy and discusses topics including her opposition to the idea that femininity and masculinity are natural phenomena. Her insistence that women and men are social categories, defined by (...) the hierarchical relationship between them rather than by biology, typifies the materialist school within French feminism. In this lucid introduction to Delphy's work, Stevi Jackson recounts the events in Delphy's life as a feminist activist and the social and political context of her work. This text is essential reading for anyone with an interest in feminism or cultural history, this is a readable and accessible introduction to a key thinker in the modern women's movement. (shrink)
This book has a noble aim: to free virtue ethics from the grip of the neo- Aristotelianism that limits its scope in contemporary Anglophone philosophy. Just as there are deontological views that are not Kant’s or even Kantian, just as there are consequentialist views that are not Bentham’s or even utilitarian, so, Swanton contends, there are viable virtue ethical views that are not Aristotle’s or even Aristotelian. Indeed, the history of both Eastern and Western philosophy suggests that the majority of (...) normative ethics has focused primarily on under- standing and explaining the nature and development of virtue and vice. There are other alternatives to Aristotle (Mengzi springs to mind), but it’s not unreasonable to start with Hume and Nietzsche, as has already been demonstrated by Erin Frykholm (“A Humean Particularist Virtue Ethic,” Philosophical Studies 172 : 2171–91) and myself (Mark Alfano, “The Most Agreeable of All Vices,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 : 767–90). (shrink)