Abstract Bo?kovi?'s explanatory procedure and his concept of explanation represents a certain departure from Newton's causal theory and his theory of explanation. Apart from particular elements of causal explanation, Bo?kovi? developed an alternative, non?causal explanatory strategy. In this paper two different elements of this strategy are discussed: (i) the micro?reductive explanatory strategy based on Bo?kovi?'s idea of determination, and (ii) a type of explanation of a theory by means of a more general law, through a thought?experiment. In addition, an outline (...) of the proposed (iii) ?argument theory? of explanation in his mature period is made. These aspects are considered with respect to the realist and anti?realist elements in Bo?kovi?'s epistemology. (shrink)
There are parallels between the Japanese philosopher Shūzō Kuki and the European philosophers Heidegger and Derrida with regard to their philosophical discourses on the idea of style and their respective elaboration of this notion as a playful quantity that needs to be seized by equally playful philosophical approaches.
The emphasis on the organization of entities and their activities and interactions has been labeled one of the most distinct contributions of mechanistic philosophy. In this paper I discuss the manner in which the organization of entities and their activities and interactions participates in bringing about phenomena. I present a well-known example from molecular biology—the functioning of the genetic switch in phage lambda—and discuss Marco J. Nathan’s notion of causation by concentration. Nathan introduces causation by concentration to account for the (...) irreducible causal role that the concentration ratio between two kinds of proteins possesses in the genetic switch mechanism in phage lambda. I discuss what the irreducibility of this causal role amounts to and provide a mechanistic interpretation of Nathan’s causation by concentration; that is, I explain this irreducible causal role as one organizational feature of this mechanism. The paper concludes that biological mechanisms need a causal pluralist framework [similar to Glennan’s account in, and but slightly modified] where organizational features such as the concentration ratio have a causally relevant role, yet all the causally productive relations occur at the level of entities or individuals. (shrink)
Abstract A number is the number of a class which is an objective, nonactual, mathematical object. The concept of class is analyzed and it is concluded that a number is the number of a pure founded class. A tempting strategy of explaining numbers away is rejected. Some well?known definitions of numbers are analyzed and it is concluded that this analysis purports the thesis that the unique notion of number does not exist. Numbers are conventional. Nevertheless, an argument is offered purporting (...) the thesis that von Neumann's ordinal numbers are the ordinal numbers. Accordingly, the corresponding von Neumann's cardinal numbers are the numbers. (shrink)
Contrary to the received view, I argue that Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge as justified true belief failed, because the justification condition and especially truth condition for knowledge in these cases are not unambiguously fulfilled. For the propositions believed are semantically ambiguous and cannot be clearly said to be either true or false and, therefore, to be the objects of justified true beliefs. This is due to the puzzling semantic role played by a definite description and an (...) exclusive disjunction. Therefore, neither of Gettier’s alleged counterexamples does in fact refute the tripartite analysis as such, but only an interpretation of it. Gettier’s cases can be at best construed as demanding a modification and improvement of the traditional analysis and not as demanding its replacement. Some other Gettier-like cases, e.g. those proposed by Lehrer and Feldman, can be treated in an analogous manner. (shrink)
Suprotno općeprihvaćenom mišljenju, argumentiram da Gettierovi protuprimjeri za trodijelnu analizu znanja kao opravdanoga istinitog vjerovanja nisu uspjeli zato što uvjet opravdanja, a pogotovo uvjet istinitosti za znanje u tim slučajevima nisu jednoznačno ispunjeni. Jer sudovi u koje se vjeruje jesu semantički ambivalentni te se za njih ne može jasno reći jesu ili istiniti ili neistiniti, pa stoga ni jesu li predmeti opravdanih istinitih vjerovanja. To je zbog zbunjujuće semantičke uloge koju igra odreðeni opis i ekskluzivna disjunkcija . Stoga nijedan od (...) Gettierovih navodnih protuprimjera zapravo ne opovrgava trodijelnu analizu kao takvu, nego samo jednu njezinu interpretaciju. Gettierovi se slučajevi mogu u najboljem slučaju protumačiti kao oni koji zahtijevaju modifikaciju i poboljšanje tradicionalne analize, a ne kao oni koji zahtijevaju njezino zamjenjivanje. Neki se drugi gettierovski slučajevi, npr. oni koje su iznijeli Lehrer i Feldman, mogu razmatrati na analogan način.Contrary to the received view, I argue that Gettier’s counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge as justified true belief failed, because the justification condition and especially truth condition for knowledge in these cases are not unambiguously fulfilled. For the propositions believed are semantically ambiguous and cannot be clearly said to be either true or false and, therefore, to be the objects of justified true beliefs. This is due to the puzzling semantic role played by a definite description and an exclusive disjunction . Therefore, neither of Gettier’s alleged counterexamples does in fact refute the tripartite analysis as such, but only an interpretation of it. Gettier’s cases can be at best construed as demanding a modification and improvement of the traditional analysis and not as demanding its replacement. Some other Gettier-like cases, e.g. those proposed by Lehrer and Feldman, can be treated in an analogous manner. (shrink)
Bošković's explanatory procedure and his concept of explanation represents a certain departure from Newton's causal theory and his theory of explanation. Apart from particular elements of causal explanation, Bošković developed an alternative, non‐causal explanatory strategy. In this paper two different elements of this strategy are discussed: (i) the micro‐reductive explanatory strategy based on Bošković's idea of determination, and (ii) a type of explanation of a theory by means of a more general law, through a thought‐experiment. In addition, an outline of (...) the proposed (iii) ‘argument theory’ of explanation in his mature period is made. These aspects are considered with respect to the realist and anti‐realist elements in Bošković's epistemology. (shrink)
We prove a characterization theorem for filters, proper filters and ultrafilters which is a kind of converse of Łoś's theorem. It is more natural than the usual intuition of these terms as large sets of coordinates, which is actually unconvincing in the case of ultrafilters. As a bonus, we get a very simple proof of Łoś's theorem.
Gentzen’s singular sequential system of first-order logic was an alternative notation for his system of natural deductions. His multiple sequential system was his symmetric generalization that was more appropriate to classical logic. Beth’s tableaus system was a system that was derived directly from the semantic analysis of connectives and quantifiers. It was soon realized that the Beth’s system and the Gentzen’s multiple system were only notational variants of each other. Kneale’s system of multiple natural deductions was a generalization of Gentzen’s (...) system of natural deductions. We prove that Kneale’s natural deductions are also a notational variant of Beth’s tableaus. (shrink)
The idea that probability is a degree of rational belief seemed too vague for a foundation of a mathematical theory. It was certainly not obvious that degrees of rational belief had to be governed by the probability axioms as used by Laplace and other prestatistical probabilityst. The axioms seemed arbitrary in their interpretation. To eliminate the arbitrariness, the stat- isticians of the early 20th century drastically restricted the possible applications of the probability theory, by insisting that probabilities had to be (...) interpreted as relative frequencies, which obviously satisfied the probability axioms, and so the arbitrariness was removed. But the frequentist approach turned more subjective than the prestatistical approach, because the identifications of outcome spaces, the choices of test statistics, the declarations of what rejection regions are, the choices of null-hypothesis among alternatives, the contradictory choices between sizes and powers etc., depend on thoughts or even whims of the experimenter. Frequentists thus failed to solve the problems that motivated their approach, they even exacerbated them. The subjective Bayesianism of Ramsey and de Finetti did not solve the problems either. Finally Cox provided the missing foundation for probability as a degree of rational belief, which makes the Bayesian probability theory (which is based on this foundation) the best theory of probable inference we have. Hence, it is quite unbelievable that it is not even mentioned in recent philosophy textbooks devoted to the probable inference. The reason could be that it requires fairly sophisticated mathematics. But not even to mention it? We explain the history and prove Cox theorem in a novel way. (shrink)
ABSTRACTIki is the key word of Shūzō Kuki’s The Structure of Iki, and it became one of the most widely recognized Japanese aesthetic categories mainly due to this work. However, in The Problems of Contingency, which is Kuki’s most important philosophical work, there is no discussion of iki again, and consequently, most commentators of Kuki fail to see the correlation between his theories of iki and contingency. This article, by contrast, intends to provide a new interpretation of iki in the (...) light of Kuki’s theory of contingency. The specific thesis of this paper is that aesthetic phenomena categorized as subject to the principles of iki are positively evaluated in Japanese culture just because the consciousness of iki is just one form of the consciousness of contingency, in which the awareness of alternatives to the actual situation could produce considerable spiritual entertainment for aesthetic subjects. (shrink)
The aim of this paper is to focus on Arne Nass’s phenomenological method and some of its anthropological and cosmological implications. Nass’s Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, in fact, can be fruitfully read as an example of phenomenological inquiry, in which the notion of “spontaneous experience” plays a fundamental role. This method leads Nass to develop a “relational ontology,” in which the “ecological self” is seen as a “relational junction within the total field.” In addition, I show how Tymieniecka’s philosophical thought (...) can offer us the proper eco-phenomenological perspective to better understand Nass’s Ecosophy T. (shrink)
Kripke argues that the existence of a priori contingent truths shows the falsity of the traditional idea that the notions of necessity and a priority are coextensional. In this paper, I maintain that the traditional coexistensionality thesis is defendable. I contend that the propositions that are alleged to be a priori contingent truths by Kripke are propositions that express contingent facts and, at the same time, are necessarily true. That they are necessarily true is not because of their metaphysical aspects (...) but in virtue of their epistemological properties. In regard to a priority, following Donnellan, I argue that Kripke’s fault can be explained by an appeal to the distinction between knowing that a certain sentence expresses a truth and knowing the truth of what is expressed by the sentence. (shrink)
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