Politics, public discourse, and legislation restricting abortion has settled on a moderate orthodoxy: restrict abortion, but leave exceptions for pregnancies that result from rape and incest. I challenge that consensus and suggest it may be much harder to defend than those who support the compromise think. From both Pro-Life and Pro-Choice perspectives, there are good reasons to treat all abortions as equal.

This book introduces readers to the many arguments and controversies concerning abortion. While it argues for ethical and legal positions on the issues, it focuses on how to think about the issues, not just what to think about them. It is an ideal resource to improve your understanding of what people think, why they think that and whether their (and your) arguments are good or bad, and why. It's ideal for classroom use, discussion groups, organizational learning, and personal reading. -/- (...) From the Preface -/- To many people, abortion is an issue for which discussions and debates are frustrating and fruitless: it seems like no progress will ever be made towards any understanding, much less resolution or even compromise. -/- Judgments like these, however, are premature because some basic techniques from critical thinking, such as carefully defining words and testing definitions, stating the full structure of arguments so each step of the reasoning can be examined, and comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different explanations can help us make progress towards these goals. -/- When emotions run high, we sometimes need to step back and use a passion for calm, cool, critical thinking. This helps us better understand the positions and arguments of people who see things differently from us, as well as our own positions and arguments. And we can use critical thinking skills help to try to figure out which positions are best, in terms of being supported by good arguments: after all, we might have much to learn from other people, sometimes that our own views should change, for the better. -/- Here we use basic critical thinking skills to argue that abortion is typically not morally wrong. We begin with less morally-controversial claims: adults, children and babies are wrong to kill and wrong to kill, fundamentally, because they, we, are conscious, aware and have feelings. We argue that since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most abortions are done early in pregnancy, before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus. -/- Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body—which she has the right to—and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body. This further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal: it is an injustice to criminalizing actions that are not wrong. -/- In the course of arguing for these claims, we: 1. discuss how to best define abortion; 2. dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusions, instead of giving genuine reasons for them; 3. refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion, on all sides; explain why the most influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful; 4. provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong; 5. briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more. -/- This essay is not a “how to win an argument” piece or a tract or any kind of apologetics. It is not designed to help anyone “win” debates: everybody “wins” on this issue when we calmly and respectfully engage arguments with care, charity, honesty and humility. This book is merely a reasoned, systematic introduction to the issues that we hope models these skills and virtues. Its discussion should not be taken as absolute “proof” of anything: much more needs to be understood and carefully discussed—always. (shrink)

Late-term abortions are an issue of immense debate in India, where the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 permits abortions only up to 20 weeks of gestation. In special situations, such as pregnancy arising out of rape especially in the case of minors and the late diagnosis of congenital anomalies, there are no clear guidelines on the legal protocol that is to be followed, often resulting in a lack of consistency in terms of legal decision-making, as well as (...) undue prolongation of legal procedures. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act prohibits late-term abortions on the basis of personhood and viability of the foetus, to reduce sex-selective abortions and as it considers such abortions to be unsafe. However, a legal prohibition of late-term abortions does not prevent them, and this has led to a surge in the number of illegal, unsafe abortions that are detrimental to the health of women. There is also physical, mental and financial distress to women who are forced to continue their pregnancy, coupled with a lack of governmental support for the same. In comparison of India’s abortion laws with Singapore’s, which are more liberal, and Philippines, which are more restrictive, liberalisation of abortion laws appears to have a better outcome in reducing the incidence of unsafe abortions. This paper argues that the way forward is to liberalise the laws in terms of not only extending the gestational limit to at least 24 weeks but also making exceptions allowing no gestational limit in special cases that warrant them, such as rape victims and late foetal anomalies. The laws, drafted and implemented in consultation with medical professionals in the field, must also be lucid and not leave any room for misinterpretation by courts and health care providers. (shrink)

In a sex selective abortion, a woman aborts a fetus simply on account of the fetus’ sex. Her motivation or underlying reason for doing so may very well be sexist. She could be disposed to thinking that a female child is inferior to a male one. In a hate crime, an individual commits a crime on account of a victim’s sex, race, sexual orientation or the like. The individual may be sexist or racist in picking his victim. He or she (...) could be disposed to thinking that one race or sex is inferior to another. I argue that while a prohibition on sex selective abortions is anomalous in a liberal, criminal legal framework, hate crime legislation may not be. The former but not the latter constitutes a thought crime. I define a thought crime as one where an agent’s motivation is not just relevant but sufficient to take an act from the domain of the non-punishable to the domain of the punishable. Ignoring a woman’s sexist motivation in procuring an abortion suddenly renders her act of abortion legal. On the other hand, discounting an agent’s bias in committing a hate motivated assault or murder does not transform the act from a punishable one to a non-punishable one. Assaulting or murdering is already a crime. (shrink)

Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and probably all abortions, should be legal. -/- I begin by observing that people sometimes respond to the issue by describing the circumstances of abortion, not offering reasons for their views about those circumstances; I (...) then dismiss “question-begging” arguments about abortion that merely assume the conclusions they are given to support; most importantly, I evaluate many arguments: both common, often-heard arguments and arguments developed by philosophers. -/- My defense of abortion is based on facts about early fetuses’ not yet possessing consciousness or any mental life, awareness or feeling, as well as concerns about rights to one’s own body. (shrink)

The legitimacy of the refusal of South Australian nurses to care for second trimester abortion patients on grounds of conscience is examined as a test case for a theory of permissible limits on the autonomy of health care professionals. In cases of health care professional (HCP) conscientious refusal, it is argued that a balance be struck between the HCPs' claims to autonomous action and the consequences to them of having their autonomous action restricted, and the entitlement of patients to care (...) and the consequences for them of being refused such care. Conscientious action that results in the disruption or termination of health care services, however, is always impermissible on two grounds. Firstly, because it is at this point that the action '... invades a patient's autonomy, puts a patient at serious risk ... [and] treats a patient unjustly' (1) Secondly, because the consequences of such refusals turn them into political acts--acts of civil disobedience. It is arguable that in order for acts of civil disobedience to be legitimate, certain obligations are required of the dissenter by the community. It is concluded that the actions of the South Australian nurses, which have over the last few years both terminated and disrupted second trimester services, are morally impermissible. (shrink)

This article tries to show that commonplace economic, ethico-religious, anti-racist,and logical-consistency objections to public funding of abortions and abortion counseling for poor women are quite weak. By contrast, arguments appealing to basic human rights to freedom of speech, informed consent, protection from great harm, justice and equal protection under the law, strongly support public funding. Thus, refusing to provide abortions at public expense for women who cannot afford them is morally unacceptable and rationally unjustifiable, despite the opinions of (...) former Presidents Reagan and Bush, the more conservative members of the Supreme Court of the United States, the current Congress, and the majority of the American people. (shrink)

One common objection to fetal tissue transplantation (FTT) is that, if it were to become a standard form of treatment, it would encourage or entrench the practice of abortion. This claim is at least factually plausible, although it cannot be definitively established. However, even if true, it does not constitute a compelling ethical argument against FTT. The harm allegedly brought about by FTT, when assessed by widely accepted non-consequentialist criteria, has limited moral significance. Even if FTT would cause more (...) class='Hi'>abortions to be performed, and abortion is taken to be a serious moral wrong, this is not sufficient in itself to make FTT wrong. (shrink)

This article considers the methods used to estimate the number of abortions before the 1967 Abortion Act came into operation. It suggests that the registration of legal abortions has enabled a new method to be used to calculate the number of illegal operations. The article concludes that the major effect of the Act was to transfer abortions from the illegal to the legal sector and, using the new method of calculation, estimates a total number of abortions (...) immediately before the Act of just over 100,000 a year. (shrink)

Die Zulässigkeit später Schwangerschaftsabbrüche nach Pränataldiagnostik wirft die Frage auf, ob die deutsche Rechtspraxis nicht widersprüchlich ist, die einerseits Ärzte dazu verpflichtet, zu früh und behindert geborene Kind zu behandeln, andererseits bei einer vorgeburtlich diagnostizierten Behinderung des Kindes aber den Abbruch einer Schwangerschaft bis zur Geburt zulässt. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, ob die Unterschiede, die im gesetzlichen Schutz des Lebens einerseits von ungeborenen und neugeborenen Kindern und anderseits von behinderten und nichtbehinderten Föten gemacht werden, aus ethischer Sicht verteidigt (...) werden können. Hierzu werden zunächst weltanschaulich liberale, konservative und vermittelnde Positionen in der Bioethik zum moralischen Status menschlicher Wesen diskutiert. Abschließend wird ein eigener Vorschlag vorgestellt, der von weiten Sorgepflichten der Schwangeren gegenüber ihrem ungeborenen Kind ausgeht und die außergewöhnliche Beziehung zwischen Frau und Kind in der Schwangerschaft berücksichtigt. Diese Argumentation zeigt, dass eine liberale Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs mit einer allgemeinen medizinischen Behandlungspflicht zu früh oder behindert geborener Kinder aus ethischer Sicht vereinbar ist. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Zulässigkeit später Schwangerschaftsabbrüche nach Pränataldiagnostik wirft die Frage auf, ob die deutsche Rechtspraxis nicht widersprüchlich ist, die einerseits Ärzte dazu verpflichtet, zu früh und behindert geborene Kind zu behandeln, andererseits bei einer vorgeburtlich diagnostizierten Behinderung des Kindes aber den Abbruch einer Schwangerschaft bis zur Geburt zulässt. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, ob die Unterschiede, die im gesetzlichen Schutz des Lebens einerseits von ungeborenen und neugeborenen Kindern und anderseits von behinderten und nichtbehinderten Föten gemacht werden, aus ethischer Sicht verteidigt (...) werden können. Hierzu werden zunächst weltanschaulich liberale, konservative und vermittelnde Positionen in der Bioethik zum moralischen Status menschlicher Wesen diskutiert. Abschließend wird ein eigener Vorschlag vorgestellt, der von weiten Sorgepflichten der Schwangeren gegenüber ihrem ungeborenen Kind ausgeht und die außergewöhnliche Beziehung zwischen Frau und Kind in der Schwangerschaft berücksichtigt. Diese Argumentation zeigt, dass eine liberale Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs mit einer allgemeinen medizinischen Behandlungspflicht zu früh oder behindert geborener Kinder aus ethischer Sicht vereinbar ist. (shrink)

In Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Michigan v. Engler ), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that § 400.109 of the Social Welfare Act of Michigan ) impermissibly conflicts with the Medicaid Act ) as modified by the 1994 Hyde Amendment ), insofar as the § 400.109 only provides state funding for abortions necessary to save the life of a mother, and not for abortions resulting from rape or incest. The court held that the (...) Hyde Amendment defines medically necessary abortions that must be funded by states participating in the federal Medicaid program, and that the amendment is not merely a federal appropriations bill. (shrink)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has followed the prevailing view in the federal courts by holding that state Medicaid funds must cover the same kinds of abortions as provided for under the 1994 Hyde Amendment. On July 25, 1995, the court held that a Pennsylvania law was preempted to the extent that it restricted Medicaid funding for abortions beyond the limits set by federal law ) by imposing additional procedures not prescribed by the (...) Hyde Amendment.Particularly, the court held that the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Acts ), whch requires victims of rape and incest to report the crime to law enforcement officials before Medicaid abortion funding is made available, exceeded the reporting requirements set by the Hyde Amendment, which provides a waiver for patients who are physically or mentally unable to comply with the reporting requirement. (shrink)

Unsafe abortion is one of the leading causes in developing countries where the rate of obtaining an abortion is high due to financial issues and the desire of a male child. This paper is extracted from a study about roles of midwives in unsafe and induced abortions in the urban slums of Karachi city. The objective of this paper is to discuss the causes of induced abortions and to explore the experiences of women having induced abortions. The (...) study was conducted through interviewing schedule based upon open and close ended questions. The interview guide included questions about the causes of abortions, problems faced by women during the process, and effects on their social and economic aspects of their lives. Results show that the major reason of induced abortion is poverty, including others like large family size and family pressure due to economic burden, male child preference, social stigmas and sometimes due to partner choice. Findings of the study suggest that abortion is a traumatic experience which involved intentional death of an unborn child. It has also been discovered that women experience abortion, felt grief, shame, sorrow, and depression. The study concludes that induced abortion is used as a contraceptive method by poor women. As they are performed in unhygienic and illegal methods, they become a health risk which affects women lives socially, economically, physically and psychologically. The findings of the study will help in understanding the problems faced by women having induced abortions. Additionally, it would also assist in developing gender based reproductive health programs in developing countries. (shrink)

There is a fundamental inconsistency in Western society’s treatment of non-human animals on the one hand, and of human foetuses on the other. While most Western countries allow the butchering of animals and their use in experimentation, this must occur under carefully controlled conditions that are intended to minimize their pain and suffering as much as possible. At the same time, most Western countries permit various abortion methods without similar concerns for the developing fetus. The only criteria for deciding which (...) abortion method is used centre in the stage of the pregnancy, the size of the fetus, the health of the pregnant woman and the physician’s preference. This is out of step with the underlying ethos of animal cruelty legislation, cannot be justified ethically and should be rectified by adjusting abortion methods to the capacity of the fetus to experience nociception and/or pain. (shrink)

Among the various proposed ultrasound laws, a few have provisions that either provide the option for the pregnant woman to hear the heartbeat or require that the heartbeat be played and merely give the woman the option to somehow avert her ears. I will argue that these heartbeat provisions actually belie the argument that these laws are intended to assist autonomous choosing. Since the information could be provided just as easily through a factual statement , it cannot be justified to (...) involve emotions in a way that the pregnant woman did not autonomously choose for herself. (shrink)

Two chapters -- "Common Arguments about Abortion" and "Better (Philosophical) Arguments About Abortion" -- in one file, from the open access textbook "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource" edited by Noah Levin. -/- Adults, children and babies are arguably wrong to kill, fundamentally, because we are conscious, aware and have feelings. Since early fetuses entirely lack these characteristics, we argue that they are not inherently wrong to kill and so most abortions are not morally wrong, since most (...) class='Hi'>abortions are done early in pregnancy before consciousness and feeling develop in the fetus. Furthermore, since the right to life is not the right to someone else’s body, fetuses might not have the right to the pregnant woman’s body, and so she has the right to not allow the fetus use of her body; this further justifies abortion, at least, until technology allows for the removal of fetuses to other wombs. Since morally permissible actions should be legal, abortions should be legal. -/- In the course of arguing for these claims, we: -/- discuss how to best define abortion; dismiss many common “question-begging” arguments that merely assume their conclusion, instead of giving genuine reasons for them; refute some often-heard “everyday arguments” about abortion; explain why some influential philosophical arguments against abortion are unsuccessful; provide some positive arguments that at least early abortions are not wrong; briefly discuss the ethics and legality of later abortions, and more. -/- Little of this discussion should be taken as absolute “proof” of anything, as this is merely a reasoned introduction to the issues: much more needs to be discussed, always. (shrink)

Abortions are legally permitted in most Western societies if there is a reasonable expectation that the child, if born, would be physically or mentally disabled. Even late-term abortions, which would not be allowed in the case of healthy fetuses, are accepted on the basis of foreseen disability.

Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. _The Ethics of Abortion_ critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also infanticide. It also provides several justifications for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book also critiques the view that abortion is not wrong even (...) if the human fetus is a person. _The Ethics of Abortion_ examines hard cases for those who are prolife, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother’s life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being “personally opposed” but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artificial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justification for the view that all intentional abortions are morally wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences. (shrink)

Giubilini and Minerva argue that the permissibility of abortion entails the permissibility of infanticide. Proponents of what we refer to as the Birth Strategy claim that there is a morally significant difference brought about at birth that accounts for our strong intuition that killing newborns is morally impermissible. We argue that strategy does not account for the moral intuition that late-term, non-therapeutic abortions are morally impermissible. Advocates of the Birth Strategy must either judge non-therapeutic abortions as impermissible in (...) the later stages of pregnancy or conclude that they are permissible on the basis of premises that are far less intuitively plausible than the opposite conclusion and its supporting premises. (shrink)

Opposition to induced abortion rests on the belief that fetuses have a moral status comparable to beings like us, and that the loss of such a life is tragic. Antiabortion, or pro-life, theorists argue that it is wrong to induce abortion and it is wrong to allow others to perform induced abortion. However, evidence suggests that spontaneous abortion kills far more fetuses than induced abortion, and critics argue that most pro-life theorists neglect the threat of spontaneous abortion and ought to (...) do more to prevent it. Friberg-Fernros contends such an obligation would be implausibly strong, arguing that induced abortions are far worse than spontaneous abortions because while both involve the tragedy of the death of the fetus, induced abortion involves a second tragedy—one person killing another. I argue this two tragedies argument fails to explain what is morally relevant about induced abortion. (shrink)

The Israeli law of abortions (1977) legally authorises hospital committees to decide upon women's requests for selective abortion. One of the law's clauses determines that abortions can be approved in cases of an embryopathy. However, the law does not provide any clear definitions of those fetal ‘physical or mental defects’ in terms of severity and/or likelihood, which remain open to interpretation by the committee members. This paper aimed to determine which ethical methodologies are used by committee members and (...) advisors as they face the dilemma of abortion approval due to mild to moderate possible embryopathy. Twenty interviews demonstrated that they use mainly a combination of deontology and a contextual–relational model. Their ethical considerations are both contextual such as the family's/woman's relational network and are influenced by the ethical principles of autonomy and in cases of late abortions the value of life. The findings reveal a paradoxical picture: on the one hand, committee members hold liberal perceptions and in practice abortion requests are very seldom rejected. On the other hand, the Israeli abortion law and practice of abortion committees is still problematical from liberal and feminist rights perspectives. This paradox is discussed further by reflecting upon the relevant theory as well as the Israeli context. The paper concludes by suggesting that within the specific Israeli sociopolitical climate the requirement for committee approval of what should be a private decision might be necessary in order to placate religious or other opposition to abortion. (shrink)

Although nearly 99% of abortions in New Zealand are permitted in order to prevent danger or injury to a woman’s mental health (the ‘mental health exception’), the reasons why mental health considerations should effectively control access to abortion are not altogether clear. This article analyses abortion case law, statutes and debates from New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to attempt to explain the legal connection between mental health considerations and access to abortion. The article argues that (...) the mental health exception evolved in response to a change in the predominant construction of women seeking abortion from ‘selfish’ to ‘desperate’, coinciding with increasing societal subscription to an expanded view of psychological harm. By conceptually accommodating both constructions of women seeking abortion, the article argues that the mental health exception usefully enabled society generally to proscribe the practice of abortion on the basis that it was unnatural and irrational, while nevertheless permitting it in cases considered to be deserving. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the conscience clause around abortion provision in England, Scotland and Wales is inadequate for two reasons. First, the patient and doctor are differently situated with respect to social power. Doctors occupy a position of significant moral and epistemic authority with respect to their patients, who are vulnerable and relatively disempowered. Doctors are rightly required to disclose their conscientious objection, but given the positioning of the patient and doctor, the act of doing so exploits the (...) authority of the medical establishment in asserting the legitimacy of a particular moral view. Second, the conscientious objector plays an unusual and self-defeating moral role. Since she must immediately refer the patient on to another doctor who does not hold a conscientious objection, she becomes complicit, via her necessary causal role, in the implementation of the procedure. This means that doctors are not able to prevent abortions, rather, they are required to ensure that they... (shrink)

Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. This _Second Edition_ of _The Ethics of Abortion _critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also post-birth abortion. It also provides several justifications for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book also critiques the view that (...) abortion is not wrong even if the human fetus is a person. _The Ethics of Abortion _examines hard cases for those who are prolife, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother’s life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being "personally opposed" but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artificial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justification for the view that all intentional abortions are ethically wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences. Updates and Revisions to the Second Edition include: -A response to Alberto Giubilini’s and Francesca Minerva’s now famous 2012 article, "After-Birth Abortion" in the _Journal of Medical Ethics _ -Responses to new defenses of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument -The addition of a new chapter on gradualist views of fetal moral worth, including Jeff McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest Account -The addition of a new chapter on the conscience protection for health care workers who are opposed to abortion -Responses to many critiques of the first edition, including those made by Donald Marquis, David DeGrazia, and William E. May. (shrink)

Most opposition to abortion turns on the claim that human fetuses are full moral agents from conception. Critics argue that antiabortion theorists act hypocritically when they neglect spontaneous abortions—valuing some fetal lives and not others. Many philosophers draw a distinction between killing and letting die, with the former being morally impermissible and latter acceptable. Henrick Friberg-Fernros appeals to this distinction with his Two Tragedies Argument, contending that anti-abortion theorists are justified in prioritising preventing induced abortions over spontaneous ones, (...) as the former involves two tragedies—a death and a killing. However, induced abortion can involve either killing or letting die, and thus this view is incompatible with the traditional anti-abortion view. Furthermore, Friberg-Fernros appears to value preventing killing attempts more than preventing actual deaths. (shrink)

Access to abortion services in the United States continues to decline. It does so not because of significant changes in legislation or court rulings but because fewer and fewer physicians wish to perform abortions and because most states now have "conscientious objection" legislation that makes it easy for physicians to refuse to do so. We argue in this paper that physicians have an obligation to perform all socially sanctioned medical services, including abortions, and thus that the burden of (...) justification lies upon those who wish to be excused from that obligation. That is, such persons should have to show how requiring them to perform abortions would represent a serious threat to their fundamental moral or religious beliefs. We use current California law as an example of legislation that does not take physicians' obligations into account and thus allows them too easily to declare conscientious objection. (shrink)

Perry Hendricks’ original ‘impairment argument’ against abortion relied on ‘the impairment principle’ : ‘if it is immoral to impair an organism O to the nth degree, then, ceteris paribus, it is immoral to impair O to the n+1 degree.’ Since death is a bigger impairment than fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks reasons that, by TIP, if causing FAS is immoral, then, ceteris paribus, abortion is immoral. Several authors have argued that this conclusion is uninteresting, since the ceteris paribus clause is not (...) satisfied in actual cases of abortion: women have reasons for wanting abortions which do not apply to drinking during pregnancy, so all else is not equal, and the conclusion is irrelevant to the morality of actual abortions. In a recent article in this journal, Hendricks and Bruce Blackshaw try to evade this criticism by replacing TIP with the ‘modified impairment principle’ : ‘if it is immoral to impair an organism O to the nth degree for reason R, then, provided R continues to hold, it is immoral to impair O to the n+1 degree.’ MIP allows us to derive the ultima facie wrongness of abortion because MIP lacks a ceteris paribus clause. But I argue that this lack also renders MIP false: MIP faces counterexamples and implausibly produces genuine moral dilemmas. Since the moral principle on which it relies is false, the modified impairment argument fails. I close by considering what a principle would need to do for the impairment argument to succeed. (shrink)

Abortions are legally permitted in most Western societies if there is a reasonable expectation that the child, if born, would be physically or mentally disabled. Even late-term abortions, which would not be allowed in the case of healthy fetuses, are accepted on the basis of foreseen disability.

Unsafe abortions remain a considerable public health problem and continue to be a leading cause of maternal morbidity and mortality throughout the world. This study assessed whether women’s choice of type of health care facility for abortion in India varied by their socio-demographic and economic characteristics, and aimed to determine the significant predictors of choice of health care facility. Data were taken from the 2015–16 Indian National Family and Health Survey. The study sample included women aged 15–49 years, irrespective (...) of their marital status, who had terminated their last pregnancy by induced abortion in the five years before the survey. A bivariate analysis was carried out to assess the pattern in the choice of health care facility type for an abortion, and a multinomial logistic regression model was fitted to assess the predictors affecting the choice of health care facility type for an abortion. The results showed that, at the time of the 2015–16 survey, women in India went to private facilities more than public facilities for abortion care, irrespective of their age, distance to facility and financial constraints. The probability of visiting a private facility increased with women’s age, gestational age and the wealth quintile. A wide variation in choice of health facility for abortion care by socioeconomic characteristics was observed. (shrink)