The standard view of academicfreedom and free speech is that they play complementary roles in universities. Academicfreedom protects academic discourse, while other public discourse in universities is protected by free speech. Here I challenge this view, broadly, on the grounds that free speech in universities sometimes undermines academic practices. One defense of the standard view, in the face of this worry, says that campus free speech actually furthers the university’s academic aims. (...) Another says that universities have a secondary democratic function, which cannot be fulfilled without free speech on campus. I identify shortcomings in both types of arguments. (shrink)
Universities can and have existed without academicfreedom and academic tenure. But academicfreedom is necessary for a university dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in a democratic society. Both academicfreedom and academic tenure are not only rights but also carry with them moral obligations. Furthermore academic tenure is the best defense of academicfreedom that American universities have found. Academic tenure can be successfully defended from the (...) many contemporary attacks to which it is being subjected only insofar as it is necessary to defend academicfreedom, and only if all involved in the system of tenure observe the ethical requirements that the system demands. (shrink)
Recently academicfreedom and academic tenure have been in the media spotlight because of concerns that academicfreedom is being misused and that academic tenure provides job security to a select few. First, this paper provides a brief history of these two institutions and follow with an analysis using Stone’s (2002) policy analysis format. Second, this paper examines the university through two lenses: (a) an economic market lens; and (b) a community lens. These two (...) lenses offer contrasting views of the university and help explain the different views of academicfreedom and tenure. The authors suggest that faculty make use of the economic model to increase their chances of maintaining tenure in a university atmosphere frequently characterized by a business approach rather than a collegial one. Recommendations for future research are also provided. (shrink)
The quality of the educational experience for students may be at risk if they are not taught in ways that are effective and pertinent. While educational institutions (administrators, faculty senates or a combination) may try to compel faculty members to gain knowledge of and utilize up-to-date learning and instructional design strategies, these faculty members may baulk at this mandate, citing academicfreedom as their right to design their courses in any way they see fit. Following is a discussion (...) exploring the issue, suggesting that regardless of how academicfreedom is interpreted, faculty members have an ethical obligation to deliver instruction in ways that do not violate students' rights to learn. Consequently, institutions have a right as well as a duty to compel their faculty members to follow through with this obligation. (shrink)
Discussions about freedom of speech and academicfreedom today are about the limits to those freedoms. However, these discussions take place mostly in the higher education trade press and do not receive any serious attention from academics and educationalists. In this paper several key arguments for limiting academicfreedom are identified, examined and placed in an historical context. That contextualisation shows that with the disappearance of social and political struggles to extend freedom in society (...) there has come a narrowing of academic life and a new and impoverished concept of 'academicfreedom' for a diminished idea of the human subject, of humanity and of human potential. (shrink)
In the U.S.A., advocates of academicfreedom—the ability to pursue research unencumbered by government controls—have long found sparring partners in government officials who regulate technology trade. From concern over classified research in the 1950s, to the expansion of export controls to cover trade in information in the 1970s, to current debates over emerging technologies and global innovation, the academic community and the government have each sought opportunities to demarcate the sphere of their respective authority and autonomy and (...) assert themselves in that sphere. In this paper, we explore these opportunities, showing how the Social Contract for Science set the terms for the debate, and how the controversy turned to the proper interpretation of this compact. In particular, we analyze how the 1985 presidential directive excluding fundamental research from export controls created a boundary object that successfully demarcated science and the state, but only for a Cold War world that would soon come to an end. Significant changes have occurred since then in the governance structures of science and in the technical and political environment within which both universities and the state sit. Even though there have been significant and persistent calls for reassessing the Cold War demarcation, a new institutionalization of how to balance the concerns of national security and academicfreedom is still only in its nascent stages. We explore the value of moving from a boundary object to a boundary organization, as represented in a proposed new governance body, the Science and Security Commission. (shrink)
Using a specific case as an example, the article argues that the Internet allows dissemination of academic ideas to the general public in ways that can sometimes pose a threat to academicfreedom. Since academicfreedom is a fundamental element of academia and since it benefits society at large, it is important to safeguard it. Among measures that can be taken in order to achieve this goal, the publication of anonymous research seems to be a (...) good option. (shrink)
Academicfreedom can be defined as immunity against adverse reactions from the general public, designed to keep scholars unintimidated and productive even after they have published controversial ideas. Francesca Minerva claims that this notion of strict instrumental academicfreedom is supported by Ronald Dworkin, and that anonymity would effectively defend the sphere of immunity implied by it. Against this, I argue that the idea defended by Minerva finds no support in the work by Dworkin referred to; (...) that anonymity would not in most cases effectively protect the kind of immunity sought after; and that in some cases it would not even be desirable to protect scholars from public reactions to their controversial claims. (shrink)
This paper examines the compliance of universities in the European Union with the UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher–Education Teaching Personnel, which deals primarily with protection for academicfreedom. The paper briefly surveys the European genesis of the modern research university and academicfreedom, before evaluating compliance with the UNESCO recommendation on institutional autonomy, academicfreedom, university governance and tenure. Following from this, the paper examines the reasons for the generally low level of (...) compliance with the UNESCO Recommendation within the EU states, and considers how such compliance could be improved. (shrink)
The university is promoted as 'a place from where to speak'. Academicfreedom is examined as a crucial value in an increasingly uncertain age which resonates with Barnett's concern to encourage students to overcome their 'fear of freedom'. My concern is that the putative university space of freedom and autonomy may well become constricted by those who would limit not just our freedom to speak but also our freedoms to be and to do. Without (...) class='Hi'>academicfreedom students and teachers, who might be able to fly, will not be permitted to fly. I review issues of academicfreedom and free speech raised especially by Berlin, Voltaire, von Humboldt, Mill, Milton and Rorty. I discuss problems raised when free speech is heard by others as harmful and offensive to their beliefs and values. I offer a set of suggestions to ensure that the university may envision itself as a space of freedom, pluralism and tolerance. Finally, I reflect that the university, of all democratic institutions, should be the one which best serves its society as 'a place from where to speak'. (shrink)
The classical conception of academicfreedom associated with Wilhelm von Humboldt and the rise of the modern university has a quite specific cultural foundation that centres on the controversial mental faculty of 'judgement'. This article traces the roots of 'judgement' back to the Protestant Reformation, through its heyday as the signature feature of German idealism, and to its gradual loss of salience as both a philosophical and a psychological concept. This trajectory has been accompanied by a general shrinking (...) in the scope of academicfreedom from the promulgation of world-views to the offering of expert opinion. (shrink)
Academicfreedom does not refer to freedom to engage in any speech act, but to freedom to hold any belief and espouse it in an appropriately academic manner. This freedom belongs to certain institutions, rather than to individuals, because of their academic nature. Academicfreedom should be absolute, regardless of any offence it may on occasion cause.
The article distinguishes between the various arguments traditionally offered as justifications for the principle of academicfreedom. Four main arguments are identified, three consequentialist in nature, and one nonconsequentialist. The article also concentrates on the specific form these arguments must take in order to establish academicfreedom as a principle distinct from the more general principles of freedom of expression and intellectual freedom.
The behavioral sciences have come under attack for writings and speech that affront sensitivities. At such times, academicfreedom and tenure are invoked to forestall efforts to censure and terminate jobs. We review the history and controversy surrounding academicfreedom and tenure, and explore their meaning across different fields, at different institutions, and at different ranks. In a multifactoral experimental survey, 1,004 randomly selected faculty members from top-ranked institutions were asked how colleagues would typically respond when (...) confronted with dilemmas concerning teaching, research, and wrong-doing. Full professors were perceived as being more likely to insist on having the academicfreedom to teach unpopular courses, research controversial topics, and whistle-blow wrong-doing than were lower-ranked professors (even associate professors with tenure). Everyone thought that others were more likely to exercise academicfreedom than they themselves were, and that promotion to full professor was a better predictor of who would exercise academicfreedom than was the awarding of tenure. Few differences emerged related either to gender or type of institution, and behavioral scientists' beliefs were similar to scholars from other fields. In addition, no support was found for glib celebrations of tenure's sanctification of broadly defined academic freedoms. These findings challenge the assumption that tenure can be justified on the basis of fostering academicfreedom, suggesting the need for a re-examination of the philosophical foundation and practical implications of tenure in today's academy. (Published Online February 8 2007) Key Words: academia; academicfreedom; ethical issues; faculty beliefs; professoriate; promotion; scientific misconduct; tenure; whistle-blowing. (shrink)
This paper explores the relationship between the principle of academicfreedom and religiously-affiliated higher education. The arguments advanced are based on a general theory concerning the role of universities in a democratic society, and as such they are intended to apply to any such society, irrespective of the particulars of religious higher education in a specific national context. The article looks at three classes of arguments advanced against a “secular” standard of academicfreedom: arguments on the (...) nature of academic disciplines in religious colleges; arguments concerning the relationship between the institutional mission of religious universities and academicfreedom; and arguments from democracy and religious freedom. The paper concludes that none of these arguments are successful in claiming a different standard of academicfreedom for religiously-affiliated universities; and that, further, a “secular” standard leaves such institutions adequate room to express their religious dimension. (shrink)
The current situation in medicine has been described as a crisis of credibility, as the profit motive of industry has taken control of clinical trials and the dissemination of data. Pharmaceutical companies maintain a stranglehold over the content of medical journals in three ways: (1) by ghostwriting articles that bias the results of clinical trials, (2) by the sheer economic power they exert on journals due to the purchase of drug advertisements and journal reprints, and (3) by the threat of (...) legal action against those researchers who seek to correct the misrepresentation of study results. This paper argues that Karl Popper's critical rationalism provides a corrective to the failure of academicfreedom in biomedical research. (shrink)
Academicfreedom is an important good, but it comes with several responsibilities. In this commentary we seek to do two things. First, we argue against Francesca Minerva's view of academicfreedom as presented in her article ‘New threats to academicfreedom’ on a number of grounds. We reject the nature of the absolutist moral claim to free speech for academics implicit in the article; we reject the elitist role for academics as truth-seekers explicit in (...) her view; and we reject a possible more moderate re-construction of her view based on the harm/offence distinction. Second, we identify some of the responsibilities of applied ethicists, and illustrate how they recommend against allowing for anonymous publication of research. Such a proposal points to the wider perils of a public discourse which eschews the calm and careful discussion of ideas. (shrink)
It is argued that university education has a moral and social function in society. Its purpose is to provide a liberal education , the development of new knowledge and the provision of trustworthy, disinterested research. To serve society in this way safeguards are necessary: a separation from the state, giving institutional autonomy and academicfreedom in teaching and research. With the rise of extreme free market capitalism and the "knowledge society", these safeguards are being eroded: national governments, partly (...) through the ramifications of the Bologna convergence... process, are in the process of moulding universities to the needs of the market, and now see the accommodation of students to the workplace as the principal, or indeed only, objective for a university education. Example of the consequences of these changes are discussed, including the corruption of research integrity and erosion of individual liberties. (shrink)
In my commentary on Francesca Minerva's article ‘New Threats to AcademicFreedom’, I agree with her contention that the existence of the Internet has given rise to new and very serious threats to academicfreedom. I think that it is crucial that we confront those threats, and find ways to eliminate them, which I believe can be done. The threats in question involve both authors and editors. In the case of authors, I argue that the best (...) solution is not anonymous publication, but publication using pseudonyms, and I describe how that would work. In the case of editors, my proposal is a website that a number of journals would have access to, where papers that editors judge to be clearly worthy of publication, but whose publication seems likely to set off a firestorm of public and media protest, could be published without any indication of the journal that had accepted the paper for publication. (shrink)
In a recent article, J. Angelo Corlett criticises what he takes to be the ‘offensiphobic’ practices characteristic of many universities. The ‘offensiphobe’, according to Corlett, believes that offensive speech ought to be censured precisely because it offends. We argue that there are three serious problems with Corlett’s discussion. First, his criticism of ‘offensiphobia’ misrepresents the kinds of censorship practiced by universities; many universities may in some way censure speech which they regard as offensive, but this is seldom if ever a (...) manifestation of ‘offensiphobia’. Second, we attempt to reconstruct Corlett’s criticism of ‘offensiphobia’ as a criticism of the practice of censuring hate speech, and show that this argument is unsuccessful. Third, we offer some brief reflections on how labelling universities as ‘offensiphobic’ is especially problematic in light of the current climate of political interference in university research and teaching. (shrink)
This article analyses, from a bioethics journal editor's perspective, the threats to academicfreedom and freedom of expression that academic bioethicists and academic bioethics journals are subjected to by political activists applying pressure from outside of the academy. I defend bioethicists’ academicfreedom to reach and defend conclusions many find offensive and ‘wrong’. However, I also support the view that academics arguing controversial matters such as, for instance, the moral legitimacy of infanticide should (...) take clear responsibility for the views they defend and should not try to hide behind analytical philosophers’ rationales such as wanting to test an argument for the sake of testing an argument. This article proposes that bioethics journals establish higher-quality requirements and more stringent mechanisms of peer review than usual for iconoclastic articles. (shrink)
Through an extended discussion of the German higher education system in comparison with other European countries and the US, this paper suggests that academicfreedom is not simply a consequence of institutional arrangements. It is a consequence of looking at what one is doing, at one's own professional responsibility. Academicfreedom must be sustained and protected not only by the state or institutional arrangements of universities, but must also be protected by every academician. If professors do (...) not resist intrusion on their freedom in either collective or individual ways, academicfreedom is in danger. If, for example, a faculty of medicine were to allow conflicts of interest to develop between the freedom of research and the commercial interest of cooperating enterprises, if it does not collectively sense that there may be an intrusion on academicfreedom resulting from the influence on their research from pharmaceutical corporations, for example, academicfreedom will be in endangered from within the university. In a society where professors act this way, simply granting academicfreedom may be a fine thing, but it does not really fulfill freedom's promise. (shrink)
This paper explores the conceptual history of academicfreedom and its emergence as a substantive right that pertains to either the academic or the university. It is suggested that historical reconceptualisations necessitated by contingent circumstance may have led to academicfreedom being seen as a form of protection for those working within universities whose national legislation recognises the right to teach and research without external interference, rather than as a responsibility to the wider society or (...) to peers in other parts of the world, who do not enjoy the privilege of that right. I explore the value of academicfreedom as both right and responsibility, particularly taking into consideration the ethical implications for both at the international level in higher education. (shrink)
: Commercial academic-industry relationships (AIRs) are widespread in biotechnology and have resulted in a wide array of restrictions on academic research. Objections to such restrictions have centered on the charge that they violate academicfreedom. I argue that these objections are almost invariably unsuccessful. On a consequentialist understanding of the value of academicfreedom, they rely on unfounded empirical claims about the overall effects that AIRs have on academic research. And on a rights-based (...) understanding of the value of academicfreedom, they rely on excessively lavish assumptions about the kinds of activities that academicfreedom protects. (shrink)
The central thesis of this article is that academicfreedom has indeed become a "canonical value" of American higher education, though not for the reasons that conventional wisdom might posit. As recently as a half century ago, few university administrators or governing boards felt constrained in dismissing or refusing to hire outspoken professors. The quite remote risk of potential legal liability for such adverse action posed a minor deterrent. The Supreme Court's first recognition of academicfreedom (...) came only in the late 1950s, and matured only in the ensuing decade. Apart from judicial endorsement of this doctrine, some credit must be given to faculty organizations such as the American Association of University Professors, and to the gradual spread of collective bargaining in public higher education. Yet the soundest explanation for the "canonization" of academicfreedom is a slightly different one - that respecting and protecting faculty rights became an increasingly critical element in the intense competition to attract and retain the most eminent scholars. Quite simply, no reputable institution of higher learning could risk a valid charge of disparaging or disrespecting the expressive rights of its professors. (shrink)
In this essay, Liviu Andreescu examines the question of whether a certain category of aprofessional acts by academics deserves protection against academic sanctions under the principle of academicfreedom. Andreescu discusses two alternative views of academicfreedom providing different answers to the question. He then examines some of the arguments advanced by the proponents of the more recent, restrictive theory of academicfreedom against the broader, traditional theory, which in recent times has been (...) on the defensive. Andreescu ultimately suggests that the choice between the two definitions of academicfreedom is a question of sound policy in specific institutional contexts, rather than a matter of conceptual consistency. (shrink)
Historically, academicfreedom is a concept aimed at resolving conflicts about the relationship between power and knowledge, politics and truth, action and thought by positing a sharp distinction between them, a distinction that has been difficult to maintain. This paper analyzes those tensions by looking at early statements of the founders of the American Association of University Professors , by exploring the paradoxes of disciplinary authority which at once guarantees and limits professorial autonomy, and by examining several cases (...) in which the question of the meaning of academic responsibility was in dispute. It argues that because the tensions are not susceptible to final resolution, the principle of academicfreedom must be preserved in order to mediate them. (shrink)
This paper focuses our attention on a few principles that guide great universities. I want to suggest that the United States has not distinguished itself particularly well in preventing episodes of repression and attempts to silence dissent at universities, nor has it produced an extraordinary number of courageous leaders over the past seventy-five years who have come forward to defend the principles of academicfreedom. While the US has never reached the level of repression that Germany felt in (...) the 1930s, nor that which was felt by Soviet geneticists at roughly the same time during the Lysenko years, we have nonetheless done significant damage to our system of higher learning because we have failed to understand fully the role that academicfreedom and free inquiry play in creating the knowledge that societies depend on for their social and economic, as well as humanistic, progress. (shrink)
Why are U.S. academics, even after tenure and promotion, so timid in their exercise of academicfreedom? Part of the problem is institutional – academics are subject to a long probationary period under tight collegial control – but part of the problem is ideological. A hybrid of seventeenth-century British and nineteenth-century German ideals, U.S. academia – and the nation more generally – remains ambivalent toward the value of academicfreedom, ultimately inhibiting an unequivocal endorsement. (Published Online (...) February 8 2007). (shrink)
A subcommittee of the American Association of University Professors has published a report, “Research on Human Subjects: AcademicFreedom and the Institutional Review Board” , which argues that institutional review board oversight may pose a threat to academicfreedom, and that a different oversight model based on departmental review would both maintain subject protection and eliminate the threat. But the report does not demonstrate that IRBs pose a threat to academicfreedom, and using departmental (...) oversight may not sufficiently protect human subjects of research, could introduce other problems, and would itself pose threats to academicfreedom. Instead, some alternative methods of streamlining IRB oversight for certain types of research would better address the practical problems currently encountered. (shrink)
This article notes that while there is a large literature lamenting increasing assaults on academicfreedom, there is little literature to address ways in which it might be preserved. Sampling that writing, it finds some concern with protecting academicfreedom in extreme scenarios, via discrete programmes, and generalised dissidence, but no discussion of determinate action applicable to all Arts and Humanities research. Defining academicfreedom via the UK’s legal framework and elaboration in Judith Butler’s (...) writing, the article inventorises significant assaults in recent times, noting the roles of government and the market in such. Following the literature review, it proposes a new, interventionist tactic for preserving academicfreedom, suggesting that undue constraints should be annotated when research is written up, and that this space should also be used to suggest constructive alternatives. This strategy is demonstrated as the article acknowledges some of the constraints on its own production and suggests redress. (shrink)
In our target article, we took the position that tenure conveys many important benefits but that its original justification – fostering academicfreedom – is not one of them. Here we respond to various criticisms of our study as well as to proposals to remedy the current state of affairs. Undoubtedly, more research is needed to confirm and extend our findings, but the most reasonable conclusion remains the one we offered – that the original rationale for tenure is (...) poorly served by the current system as practiced at top-ranked colleges and universities. (Published Online February 8 2007). (shrink)
The original purpose of tenure has become clouded by the process by which it is granted. In New Zealand, tenure and academicfreedom are separate, with academicfreedom protected by legislation. Clearly, tenure is neither necessary nor sufficient to protect academicfreedom. Individuals and universities must do more to guard academicfreedom in order to encourage, nurture, and protect it. (Published Online February 8 2007).
This paper suggests that the time for free inquiry and academicfreedom at European universities has rarely been better than at present, that debates and results arising from independent scientific discourse have rarely had better chances of blossoming and evoking a response than in the time in which we now live, and that the basic rules of university and scholarly work in general are, by no means, seriously threatened in Europe, in comparison to many other regions of the (...) world. What I see is that universities now, more than ever, have the chance and the obligation to discharge their duties at the centre of society. Universities are needed and respected - and with them the principles of the university that this paper describes and elaborates. These principles are recognized by society as a whole as the prerequisites for a successful response. This is the age of the universities - now, more than ever. (shrink)
The aim of this article is to establish that current thought about the point of a publicly funded university faces a dilemma. On the one hand, influential and attractive ‘macro’-level principles about how state resources ought to be accountably used entail that academicfreedom should be utilised solely for the sake of social justice or some other concrete public good. Standard theories of public morality entail that an academic’s responsibility is entirely to be ‘responsive’ or ‘relevant’ to (...) her social context in the way she teaches and researches. On the other hand, ‘micro’-level self-conceptions of teachers and researchers include the idea that it can be proper to use academicfreedom in order to discover and impart knowledge that is unlikely to foster social justice, however construed. Probably most academics accept the idea that ‘knowledge for its own sake’ can often merit pursuit and transmission. In this article, I use the most space to defend the second horn of the dilemma, the micro-level perspective, by indicating just how counterintuitive the macro one is. As a foil I critically discuss a recent report by the South African Council on Higher Education, which occasions awareness of the position that the right to academicfreedom is exhausted by a duty to benefit society. However, I conclude by noting prima facie defences of the first horn, pointing out that dominant accounts of institutional ethics forbid scholars from seeking knowledge for its own sake, and hence indicating the need to resolve an antinomy about the proper final ends of a state university. (shrink)
Academicfreedom has become the enemy of the individual professors working in colleges and universities across the United States. Despite its historical (and maybe even essential) roots in the First Amendment, contemporary case law has consistently shown that professors, unlike most members of society, have no rights to free speech on their respective campuses. (Ironically, this is especially true on our State campuses.) Outlined is the dramatic change in the history of the courts from recognizing “academic (...) class='Hi'>freedom” as a construct needed to protect professors from the status quo, to the abuse of “academicfreedom” appropriated to protect the institution from “undesirable” professorial actions such as politically incorrect speech or research. Klein warns all those in the academy to become familiar with this pernicious 180-degree turn in the use of the “academicfreedom” construct. (shrink)
The fact that a right is unlikely to be exercised by most members of a group does not mean it has lost its social and justice-defending utility. Current attitudes can be revealed by a questionnaire, but the value of a tradition must be assessed in the light of history. Historically, academicfreedom and tenure are inseparable and mutually reinforcing. (Published Online February 8 2007).
Although the job security afforded by tenure is one important factor in deciding whether or how to exercise academicfreedom, professors must weigh a number of other important career goals that constrain their choices. This multiplicity of goals, combined with concerns about career mobility, may help to explain the differences Ceci et al. observe between professors at different ranks. (Published Online February 8 2007).
On the verge of the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the American Association of University Professors, we examine the organization’s focus on academicfreedom, shared governance, and the challenges the AAUP faced during its early years. The history is a fairly uncontested one: higher education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States was the context for the struggle over academicfreedom and shared governance. Dismissed professors, resignations by colleagues, and (...) the struggle of professionalization characterize the period.1 A century later, we wonder about the state of academicfreedom and shared governance. We argue that higher education is currently so.. (shrink)
Tenure is designed to protect the academicfreedom of faculty members by insulating them from arbitrary dismissal by administrative authorities external to their community of scholars. Therefore, the target article's focus on constraints that derive from peer pressures and academic politics is misplaced, rendering the results of the survey irrelevant to the issue of the value of tenure. (Published Online February 8 2007).
This article contrasts a secular definition of “academicfreedom” with a Catholic model, where freedom of discussion and investigation is one component of a wider process that leads to the Church’s judgment about a particular teaching. Three questions arise about academicfreedom: (1) its purpose and goal, (2) its limits, and (3) its relationship to the Church. While there is sometimes tension between some people and the teaching office, fruitful doctrinal development usually takes place within (...) the—sometimes heated—world of theological discussion. A postscript describes the mandatum as a concrete expression of the intrinsic role that the magisterium has in Catholic theology and the role of the university and faculty in relation to the wider church. (shrink)
Academicfreedom is thus a complex ideal, and I have argued that in many respects it has a more limited application than some of its protagonists seem to believe. Many of the arguments for it, moreover, are not peculiar to academics and universities. We would therefore be well advised to take seriously Eric James' injunction “to think less of universities as having rights to additional and peculiar liberties, and to regard them more as places where the essential liberties (...) of a civilised state find strongest champions, champions, moreover, who by reason of the intellectual strength which they possess, and the intellectual integrity which they defend, have a particular responsibility”.36 But it is beyond rational doubt that the continuation of civilised states as civilised depends on the maintenance of, among other things, academicfreedom, and particularly of what I have called scholarly freedom. (shrink)
Recent events in the United Kingdom have focused attention on the protection at law of academicfreedom. Institutional academicfreedom may be defined as the freedom of a university to determine its scholarly agenda and system of governance, notwithstanding dependence on external support. Individual academicfreedom may be similarly defined as the freedom of individual university members to determine their own scholarly agenda, including how to pursue and present their research, notwithstanding dependence (...) on institutional support. While such freedoms sit in tension, they share a basis in the liberal ideal of the pursuit of truth through teaching, discussion and scholarly research. (shrink)