Results for 'adverbialism'

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  1.  15
    Beyond adverbialism: A new non‐relational theory of perceptual experience.Laura Gow - 2021 - Mind and Language 38 (1):2-19.
    All non-relational views of perceptual experience face Jackson's famous many-property problem. I argue that the original problem, and the existing responses to it, have focused too closely on the controversial terminology for which adverbialism is best known. We can also direct Jackson's many-property problem explicitly onto the adverbialist's metaphysics, generating a new challenge. The responses contemporary adverbialists and non-relationalists have made to the original objection are not successful against this challenge. We need a new non-relational account. I sketch an (...)
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  2.  82
    An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain.Greg Janzen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.
    Adverbialism, broadly construed, is the thesis that pains (and other sensations) are modes of awareness, and objectualism, broadly construed, is the thesis that pains are objects of awareness. Why are we inclined to say that pains are modes of awareness and yet also inclined to say that they are objects of awareness? Each inclination leads to an account of pain that seems to be incompatible with the other. If adverbialism is correct, it would seem that objectualism is mistaken (...)
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  3. A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.
    In this paper, I develop and defend a new adverbial theory of perception. I first present a semantics for direct-object perceptual reports that treats their object positions as supplying adverbial modifiers, and I show how this semantics definitively solves the many-property problem for adverbialism. My solution is distinctive in that it articulates adverbialism from within a well-established formal semantic framework and ties adverbialism to a plausible semantics for perceptual reports in English. I then go on to present (...)
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  4.  37
    Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski.Casey Woodling - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):312-324.
    A serious problem for adverbialism about intentionality is the many-property problem, one major aspect of which is the claim that natural inferences between thought contents are blocked if adverbia...
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  5.  99
    The Needlessness of Adverbialism, Attributeism and its Compatibilty with Cognitive Science.Hilla Jacobson & Hilary Putnam - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):555-570.
    Although adverbialism is not given much attention in current discussions of phenomenal states, it remains of interest to philosophers who reject the representationalist view of such states, in suggesting an alternative to a problematic ‘act-property’ conception. We discuss adverbialism and the formalization Tye once offered for it, and criticize the semantics he proposed for this formalization. Our central claim is that Tye’s ontological purposes could have been met by a more minimal view, which we dub “attributeism”. We then (...)
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  6. Gilbert Ryle’s adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.
    Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present (...)
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  7.  14
    Rhythm ’n’ Dewey: an adverbialist ontology of art.Carlos Vara Sánchez - 2020 - Rivista di Estetica 73:79-95.
    The aim of this paper is to present a process-based ontology of art following John Dewey’s concepts of experience and rhythm. I will adopt a pragmatist and embodied point of view within an adverbialist framework. I will defend the idea of an artistic way of experiencing – a subtype of aesthetic experience – as something which allows us to assign the ontological category of art to an object or event. The adverbial features of this artistic way of experiencing will be (...)
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  8.  83
    The Limits of Adverbialism about Intentionality.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):488-512.
    Kriegel has recently developed an adverbial account of intentionality, in part to solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues of adverbialism (...)
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  9.  22
    Information-Theoretic Adverbialism.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):696-715.
    ABSTRACT Adverbialism is the view that to have a conscious perceptual experience is to be consciously experiencing in a certain way, and that this way is not to be understood in relational or representational terms. We might compare what it is for a conscious being to be experiencing in a certain way with what it is for a string to be vibrating in a certain way. This paper makes a new case for adverbialism by appealing to the fact (...)
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  10.  45
    Information-Theoretic Adverbialism.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):696-715.
    Adverbialism is the view that to have a conscious perceptual experience is to be consciously experiencing in a certain way, and that this way is not to be understood in relational or representational terms. We might compare what it is for a conscious being to be experiencing in a certain way with what it is for a string to be vibrating in a certain way. This paper makes a new case for adverbialism by appealing to the fact that (...)
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  11.  86
    How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):661-686.
    Kriegel has revived adverbialism as a theory of consciousness. But recent attacks have shed doubt on the viability of the theory. To save adverbialism, I propose that the adverbialist take a stance on the nature of adverbial modification. On one leading theory, adverbial modification turns on the instantiation by a substance of a psychological type. But the resulting formulation of adverbialism turns out to be a mere notational variant on the relationalist approaches against which Kriegel dialectically situates (...)
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  12.  28
    Adverbialism and objects.Joshua Gert - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):699-710.
    Justin D’Ambrosio and I have recently and independently defended perceptual adverbialism from Frank Jackson’s well-known Many-Properties Problem. Both of us make use of a similar strategy: characterizing ways of perceiving by using the language of objects, and not just of properties. But while D’Ambrosio’s view does indeed validate the inferences that Jackson’s challenge highlights, it does so at the price of validating additional, invalid inferences, such as the inference from the claim that a small child hallucinates a bottle of (...)
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  13. Realism, Relativism, Adverbialism: How Different are they? Comments on Mazviita Chirimuuta's Outside Color.Mohan Matthen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):236-243.
    Mazviita Chirimuuta proposes a new “adverbialist” ontology of color. I argue that ontological disputes in the philosophy of color are uniformly terminological. Chirimuuta's proposal too is a terminological variant on others, though it has some hortatory value in directing attention to aspects of color science that have hitherto been neglected. On a side note, I also take issue with Chirimuuta's laudatory take on early modern theories of color.
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  14. What is Attention? Adverbialist Theories.Christopher Mole & Aaron Henry - 2023 - WIREs Cognitive Science 14 (1).
    This article presents theories of attention that attempt to derive their answer to the question of what attention is from their answers to the question of what it is for some activity to be done attentively. Such theories provide a distinctive account of the difficulties that are faced by the attempt to locate processes in the brain by which the phenomena of attention can be explained. Their account does not share the pessimism of theories suggesting that the concept of attention (...)
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  15. The determinable–determinate relation can’t save adverbialism.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):45-52.
    Adverbialist theories of thought such as those advanced by Hare and Sellars promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a variety of intentional states, but such theories have been largely abandoned due to the ‘many-property problem’. In an attempt to revitalize this otherwise attractive theory, in a series of papers as well as his recent book, Uriah Kriegel has offered a novel reply to the ‘many-property problem’ and on its basis he argues that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’. (...)
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  16. Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error.M. D. Conduct - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that (...)
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  17. The Many-Relations Problem for Adverbialism.Alexander Dinges - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):231-237.
    Adverbialists propose to analyse sentences of the form ‘Jane has a blue afterimage’ as ‘Jane afterimages blue-ly’. One commonly raised objection to adverbialism is the many-property problem, the problem of accounting for sentences that seem to ascribe more than one property to an afterimage . Plausible responses to this objection may be on offer. In this note, however, I will argue that the many-property problem resurfaces at the level of relations and that, at this level, no solution for the (...)
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  18. How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  19. The Structure of Perceptual Experience: A New Look at Adverbialism.Frances Egan - forthcoming - In Deflating Mental Representation (The 2021 Jean Nicod Lectures).
    In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external sortalism, contents are construed as a (...)
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  20.  25
    Demystifying the myth of sensation: Wilfrid Sellars’ adverbialism reconsidered.Luca Corti - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.
    This paper reconstructs and defends a Sellarsian approach to “sensation” that allows us to avoid mythological conceptions of it. Part I reconstructs and isolates Sellars’s argument for “sensation,” situating his adverbial interpretation of the notion within his broader theory of perception. Part II positions Sellars’s views vis-à-vis current conversations on adverbalism. In particular, it focuses on the Many Property Problem, which is traditionally considered the main obstacle to adverbialism. After reconstructing Sellars’s response to this problem, I demonstrate that his (...)
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  21.  19
    M. Chirimuuta's Adverbialism about Color.Anil Gupta - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):229-235.
    M. Chirimuuta's Outside Color is a rich and lovely book. I enjoyed reading it and benefitted from reflecting on its provocative ideas. I begin by briefly placing the book's principal thesis in its historical context, and I go on to reflect on two objections that might be lodged against this thesis.
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  22.  5
    Contemporary Art and the Problem of Indiscernibles: An Adverbialist Approach.Tomáš Koblížek - forthcoming - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 60 (1):19-35.
    This paper addresses Arthur Danto’s claim that contemporary artworks, such as Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box, do not differ perceptually from ordinary objects, and that in order to see contemporary artworks as art the viewer has to move from mere experience to a meaning expressed by the work. I propose to supplement Danto’s thesis. I argue that, while some contemporary artworks may indeed be perceptually indistinguishable from ordinary objects, these works are distinguishable not only by means of meaning but also by (...)
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  23.  10
    Attention and Attentiveness: A defence of the argument for adverbialism.Christopher Mole - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In recent philosophical work on attention, several authors have employed versions of an argument purporting to show that attention is not identical to any cognitive process. Others have criticised this argument. The present article addresses their various criticisms, and shows the original argument to be a valid one. It also shows that this argument cannot be resisted by taking attention to be a disjunction of several processes, by taking it be a genus of process that is composed of various species, (...)
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  24. Pragmatism in cognitive science: from the pragmatic turn to Deweyan adverbialism.Pierre Steiner - 2017 - Pragmatism Today 8 (1):9-27.
  25.  11
    The Meaning of Names and Verbs: Aristotle's Adverbialism in De Interpretatione 2-3.Luca0 Gili - unknown
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  26. The many-property problem is your problem, too.Justin D’Ambrosio - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):811-832.
    The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to (...)
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  27.  99
    Thinking sadly: In favor of an adverbial theory of emotions.Anja Berninger - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812.
    Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.
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  28. The Metaphysics of Attention.Christopher Mole - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 60-77.
    This paper gives a brief presentation of adverbialism about attention, and explains some of the reasons why it gives an appealing account of attention's metaphysics.
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  29. Is the experience of pain transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other (...)
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  30. A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 239-266.
    [This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of a satisfied experiential-desire (...)
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  31. The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
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  32. There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter.Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249-278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family (...)
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  33. The Problem of Change Restored.Martin Pickup - 2021 - In Benedickt Göcke & Ralph Weir (eds.), From Existentialism to Metaphysics: The Philosophy of Stephen Priest. Berlin: Peter Lang. pp. 203 - 222.
    Many philosophers have found change puzzling. How can it be that something changes in its properties and yet remains the same thing? How can one and the same thing have these different properties? Questions of this sort, about the persistence of things through change, have been an ongoing feature of philosophical discussion since the beginning of the discipline. I think that there is something puzzling here, and that investigating change can be a fruitful way of trying to understand a nest (...)
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  34.  20
    Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies.Harold Langsam - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):74-85.
    The sensory colors that figure in visual perceptual experience are either properties of the object of consciousness (naïve realism, sense-data theory), or properties of the subject of consciousness (adverbialism) (Section 1). I consider an argument suggested by the work of A. D. Smith that the existence of certain kinds of perceptual constancies shows that adverbialism is correct, for only adverbialism can account for such constancies (Section 3). I respond on behalf of the naïve realist that naïve realism (...)
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  35. The Significance of the Many Property Problem.Tim Crane & Alex Grzankowski - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):170.
    One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. (...)
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  36. The Subject is Qualia.Robert F. Allen - manuscript
    Things strike me in a variety ways. F and F# sound slightly different, ripe and unripe tomatoes neither look nor taste nor smell the same, and silk feels smoother than corduroy. In each case, I distinguish an experience of something on the basis of what it is like to be its subject. That is to say, in philosophical parlance, if not quite the vernacular, its “quale,” leads me to categorize it and, thus, respond appropriately to its stimulus. The function of (...)
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  37. What is a pain in a body part?Murat Aydede - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):143–158.
    The IASP definition of 'pain' defines pain as a subjective experience. The Note accompanying the definition emphasizes that as such pains are not to be identified with objective conditions of body parts (such as actual or potential tissue damage). Nevertheless, it goes on to state that a pain "is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience." This generates a puzzle that philosophers have been well (...)
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  38. The 'of' of intentionality and the 'of' of acquaintance.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the acquaintance relation (...)
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  39. Indexical Reference and the Ontology of Belief.Michael J. Pendlebury - 1982 - South African Journal of Philosophy 1:65-74.
    According to the propositional view of belief, a belief situation involves a believer’s standing in the relation of belief to a proposition. It is argued that the propositional view has unacceptable implications concerning the identity conditions of belief situations involving beliefs with indexical contents, especially where such beliefs are held over a period of time during which background circumstances change. After a critical discussion of Perry’s alternative to the propositional view, a version of the adverbial theory of belief, which accounts (...)
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  40. Moore's refutation of idealism.C. J. Ducasse - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court. pp. 232-3.
  41. The philosophy of G. E. Moore.Paul Arthur Schilpp - 1942 - New York,: Tudor Pub. Co.. Edited by G. E. Moore.
    --Moore's autobiography.--Descriptive and critical essays on the philosophy of G. E. Moore.--The philosopher replies.--Bibliography of the writings of G. E. Moore (to July, 1952) compiled by Emerson Buchanan and G. E. Moore (p. [689]-699).
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  42.  84
    Sartre, consciousness, and intentionality.Mark Rowlands - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):521-536.
  43.  40
    Content and phenomenology in The unity of perception.Nico Orlandi - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (2):227-234.
    Susanna Schellenberg's book is an ambitious project, providing a view of perception that makes sense of its content, its phenomenology, and its epistemic role. In these comments, I focus on her capacitist view and raise questions concerning this view's ability to offer an adequate account of the content and phenomenology of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences.
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  44.  20
    Consciousness and Attention in the Bhagavad Gita.Keya Maitra - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):191-207.
    Consciousness is a central topic in Hindu philosophy. This is because this philosophy understands reality in terms of brahman or atman (typically translated as the self), and consciousness is conceived as the essential marker of self. The prominent Hindu text Bhagavad Gita offers an exception. Self is conceived in the Gita not in terms of its essential identity with pure or transcendental consciousness. But the question remains, does the Gita still offer us a theory of consciousness? The goal of my (...)
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  45.  25
    Gefühle und Gedanken. Entwurf einer adverbialen Emotionstheorie.Anja Berninger - 2017 - Münster: Mentis.
  46. Serious Copula-Tensing.Daisuke Kachi - 2012 - Interdisciplinary Ontology 5:67-73.
    M. Johnston proposed an adverbialist solution to the problem of intrinsic change of enduring things. D. Lewis interpreted it as a way of tensing the copula. In his view, it has the defect of replacing having a property simpliciter by standing in a triadic relation to a property and a time, and so is threatened by Bradley’s Regress. I agree with Lewis on requiring having a property to be non-relational, while I disagree with him on restricting it to having simpliciter. (...)
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  47. The Manifestability of Attention.Christopher Mole - 2007 - Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society:111-130.
    This essay focuses on three features of attention: (1) that it can be manifested in behaviour; (2) that it improves one’s epistemic position vis-à-vis one’s activities; and (3) that attentive performance is experienced as single-minded concentration. I show that views according to which there is a particular process of attention struggle to accommodate all three of these features, and that the most natural alternative to these process-based views is a view that treats attention as an adverbial phenomenon analogous to unison.
     
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  48.  1
    Perception.Barry Maund - 2003 - Chesham, Bucks: Routledge.
    The philosophical issues raised by perception make it one of the central topics in the philosophical tradition. Debate about the nature of perceptual knowledge and the objects of perception comprises a thread that runs through the history of philosophy. In some historical periods the major issues have been predominantly epistemological and related to scepticism, but an adequate understanding of perception is important more widely, especially for metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. For this reason Barry Maund provides an account of (...)
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  49. The location problem for color subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
    According to color subjectivism, colors are mental properties, processes, or events of visual experiences of color. I first lay out an argument for subjectivism founded on claims from visual science and show that it also relies on a philosophical assumption. I then argue that subjectivism is untenable because this view cannot provide a plausible account of color perception. I describe three versions of subjectivism, each of which combines subjectivism with a theory of perception, namely sense datum theory, adverbialism, and (...)
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  50. Attention is cognitive unison: an essay in philosophical psychology.Christopher Mole - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Highlights of a difficult history -- The preliminary identification of our topic -- Approaches -- Bradley's protest -- James's disjunctive theory -- The source of Bradley's dissatisfaction -- Behaviourism and after -- Heirs of Bradley in the twentieth century -- The underlying metaphysical issue -- Explanatory tactics -- The basic distinction -- Metaphysical categories and taxonomies -- Adverbialism, multiple realizability, and natural kinds -- Adverbialism and levels of explanation -- Taxonomies and supervenience relations -- Rejecting the process : (...)
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