Results for 'agent causation'

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  1. Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.
    My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, (...)
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  2. Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383 - 398.
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability (...)
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  3.  82
    Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”.Randolph Clarke - forthcoming - Noûs.
    A growing number of philosophers now hold that agent causation is required for agency, or free will, or moral responsibility. To clarify what is at issue, this paper begins with a distinction between agent causation that is ontologically fundamental and agent causation that is reducible to or realized in causation by events or states. It is widely accepted that agency presents us with the latter; the view in question claims a need for the (...)
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  4. A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation.Ned Markosian - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
    The problem of freedom and determinism has vexed philosophers for several millennia, and continues to be a topic of lively debate today. One of the proposed solutions to the problem that has received a great deal of attention is the Theory of Agent Causation. While the theory has enjoyed its share of advocates, and perhaps more than its share of critics, the theory’s advocates and critics have always agreed on one thing: the Theory of Agent Causation (...)
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  5. Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
    Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.
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  6. The Feeling of Doing – Nietzsche on Agent Causation.Manuel Dries - 2013 - Nietzscheforschung 20 (1):235-247.
    This article examines Nietzsche’s analysis of the phenomenology of agent causation. Sense of agent causation, our sense of self-efficacy, is tenacious because it originates, according to Nietzsche’s hypothesis, in the embodied and situated experience of effort in overcoming resistances. It arises at the level of the organism and is sustained by higher-order cognitive functions. Based on this hypothesis, Nietzsche regards the sense of self as emerging from a homeostatic system of drives and affects that unify such (...)
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  7.  49
    Rejecting Pereboom’s Empirical Objection to Agent-Causation.Jordan Baker - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3085-3100.
    In this paper I argue that Pereboom’s empirical objection to agent causation fails to undermine the most plausible version of agent-causal libertarianism. This is significant because Pereboom concedes that such libertarianism is conceptually coherent and only falls to empirical considerations. To substantiate these claims I outline Pereboom’s taxonomy of agent-causal views, develop the strongest version of his empirical objections, and then show that this objection fails to undermine what I consider the most plausible view of (...)-causal libertarianism, namely, reconciliatory integrationist agent-causalism. I then strengthen my criticism of Pereboom by responding to three objections to my view. I show that these objections, though initially challenging, fail to undermine my argument. I therefore conclude that, to this extent, agent-causal views remain a viable option in the contemporary free will debate. (shrink)
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  8.  88
    Agent Causation Before and After the Ontological Turn.von Wachter Daniel - 2003 - In Edmund Runggaldier, Christian Kanzian & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbvhpt.
    Chisholm's theory of agent causation is criticised. An alternative theory of agent causation is proposed.
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  9. Agent Causation, Functional Explanation, and Epiphenomenal Engines: Can Conscious Mental Events Be Causally Efficacious?Stuart Silvers - 2003 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.
    Agent causation presupposes that actions are behaviors under the causal control of the agent’s mental states, its beliefs and desires. Here the idea of conscious causation in causal explanations of actions is examined, specifically, actions said to be the result of conscious efforts. Causal–functionalist theories of consciousness purport to be naturalistic accounts of the causal efficacy of consciousness. Flanagan argues that his causal–functionalist theory of consciousness satisfies naturalistic constraints on causation and that his causal efficacy (...)
     
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  10.  53
    Luck and Agent-Causation: A Response to Franklin.Neil Levy - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):779-784.
    Christopher Franklin argues that the hard luck view, which I have recently defended, is misnamed: the arguments turn on absence of control and not on luck. He also argues that my objections to agent-causal libertarianism depend on a demand, for a contrastive explanation that guarantees the choice the agent makes, which would be question-begging in the dialectical context. In response to the first objection, I argue that though Franklin may be right that it is absence of control that (...)
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  11. Event Causation and Agent Causation.E. J. Lowe - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):1-20.
     
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  12.  70
    Agent-Causation and Control.David Widerker - 2005 - Faith and Philosophy 22 (1):87-98.
  13.  45
    Agent Causation, Chance, and Determinism.R. D. Ellis - 1983 - Philosophical Inquiry 5 (1):29-42.
  14. Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect's Causation of Intelligibles.Therese Scarpelli Cory - 2015 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 82:1-60.
    This article examines two medieval thinkers—Averroes and Aquinas—on the kind of causation exercised by the agent intellect in “abstracting” or producing intelligibles from images in the imagination. It argues that abstraction in these thinkers should be interpreted in causal terms, as an act whereby images in the imagination, through the power of the agent intellect, educe their intelligible likeness in a receptive intellect. This Averroan-Thomistic causal approach to abstraction offers an intriguing alternative to the usual approach to (...)
     
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  15. Agent Causation.Timothy O'Connor - 1995 - In Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 61-79.
    In what follows, I will contend that the commonsense view of ourselves as fundamental causal agents - for which some have used the term “unmoved movers" but which I think might more accurately be expressed as “not wholly moved movers” - is theoretically understandable, internally consistent, and consistent with what we have thus far come to know about the nature and workings of the natural world. In the section that follows, I try to show how the concept of ‘agent (...)
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  16. Ricoeur and Agent Causation.B. P. Dauenhauer - 2013 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (6):523-537.
    It is common today to find in philosophical and scientific works the idea of agent causation dismissed as unintelligible. This article is meant to challenge that view. It argues that the conception of agent causation that Paul Ricoeur has defended is by no means unintelligible. Indeed there are compelling, even if not definitive, reasons for acknowledging the existence of such causation. The point of departure for this argument is Ricoeur’s reflection on the discursive character of (...)
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  17. Agent Causation and the Alleged Impossibility of Rational Free Action.Chris Tucker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):17 - 27.
    Galen Strawson has claimed that "the impossibility of free will and ultimate moral responsibility can be proved with complete certainty." Strawson, I take it, thinks that this conclusion can be established by one argument which he has developed. In this argument, he claims that rational free actions would require an infinite regress of rational choices, which is, of course, impossible for human beings. In my paper, I argue that agent causation theorists need not be worried by Strawson's argument. (...)
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  18.  25
    Agent Causation and Compatibilism Reconsidered The Evolutionary and Developmental Emergence of Self-Determining Persons.Jack Martin - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.
    The central argument of this paper is that compatibilist theories that understand human agent causation as self-determination are consistent with, and can accommodate, important insights from evolutionary and developmental psychology. Agent causation is nothing more than the non-mysterious self-determining capability of persons, understood as embodied, emergent ontological entities whose nature is not fixed due to their uniquely evolved and developed capabilities of language use, cultural construction, self-consciousness and self-understanding, and moral concern. Relevant arguments of Dennett and (...)
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  19.  68
    Can Agent-Causation Be Rendered Intelligible?: An Essay on the Etiology of Free Action.Andrei A. Buckareff - 1999 - Dissertation, Texas A&M University
    The doctrine of agent-causation has been suggested by many interested in defending libertarian theories of free action to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary to make the notion of incompatibility freedom intelligible. In the present essay the conceptual viability of the doctrine of agent-causation will be assessed. It will be argued that agent-causation is, insofar as it is irreducible to event-causation, mysterious at best, totally unintelligible at worst. First, the arguments for agent-causation (...)
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  20. A Compatibilist Version Of The Theory Of Agent Causation.Ned Markosian - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
    The Theory of Agent Causation has always been formulated as an incompatibilist view, but I think that this has been a mistake. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what agent causation theorists and their opponents have always believed, the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is actually a compatibilist version of that theory. I formulate the traditional version of the Theory of Agent Causation, and (...)
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  21. Agent-Causation and Agential Control.Markus E. Schlosser - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.
    According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the (...)
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  22. Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
    : On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view (...)
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  23.  53
    Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.
    I offer a brief review of, and critical response to, Neil Levy’s fascinating recent book Hard Luck, where he argues that no one is ever free or morally responsible not because of determinism or indeterminism, but because of luck. Two of Levy’s central arguments in defending his free will nihilism concern the nature and role of explanation in a theory of moral responsibility and the nature of akrasia. With respect to explanation, Levy argues that an adequate theory of moral responsibility (...)
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    Agent Causation in a Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics.Jonathan D. Jacobs & Timothy O'Connor - 2013 - In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    Freedom and moral responsibility have one foot in the practical realm of human affairs and the other in the esoteric realm of fundamental metaphysics—or so we believe. This has been denied, especially in the metaphysics-bashing era occupying the first two-thirds or so of the twentieth century, traces of which linger in the present day. But the reasons for this denial seem to us quite implausible. Certainly, the argument for the general bankruptcy of metaphysics has been soundly discredited. Arguments from Strawson (...)
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  25. Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent?Derk Pereboom - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):275-286.
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  26.  44
    Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
    The Agent-Causal Theory of Action claims that an event counts as an action when, and only when, it is caused by an agent. The central difference between the Causal Theory of Action (CTA) and the Agent-Causal view comes down to a disagreement about what sort of item (or items) occupies the left-hand position in the causal relation. For CTA, the left-hand position is occupied by mental items within the agent, typically construed in terms of mental events (...)
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  27.  6
    Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist’s Problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.
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  28. Agent Causation and Ultimate Responsibility.Robert F. Allen - manuscript
    Positions taken in the current debate over free will can be seen as responses to the following conditional: If every action is caused solely by another event and a cause necessitates its effect, then there is no action to which there is an alternative. The Libertarian, who believes that alternatives are a requirement of free will, responds by denying the right conjunct of C’s antecedent, maintaining that some actions are caused, either mediately or immediately, by events whose effects could be (...)
     
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  29.  9
    Robust Activity, Event-Causation, and Agent-Causation.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 1998 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 271--294.
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  30. Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action.Randolph Clarke - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
  31. Agent-Causation and Paradigms for God’s Knowledge.Christina Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):35--54.
    The article aims at formulating a philosophical framework and by this giving some means at hand to save human libertarian freedom, God’s omniscience and God’s ”eternity’. This threefold aim is achieved by 1) conceiving of an agent as having different possibilities to act, 2) regarding God’s knowledge -- with respect to agents -- not only as being ”propositional’ in character but also as being ”experiential’: God knows an agent also from the ”first person perspective’, as the agent (...)
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  32. Agent-Causation.John D. Bishop - 1983 - Mind 92 (January):61-79.
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  33. Review of James Swindal, Action and Existence: A Case for Agent Causation[REVIEW]Paul Van Rooy - 2013 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (7):717-722.
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  34. Why Agent Causation?Timothy O'Connor - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):143-158.
    I Introduction The question of this paper is, what would it be to act with freedom of the will? What kind of control is inchoately in view when we speak, pretheoretically, of being ‘self- determining’ beings, of ‘freely making choices in view of consciously considered reasons’ (pro and con) - of its being ‘up to us’ how we shall act? My question here is not whether we have (or have any reason to think we have) such freedom, or what is (...)
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  35.  12
    Responsibility and Agent-Causation.John Martin Fischer - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
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  36.  26
    Agent Causation: Before and After the Ontological Turn.Wachter Daniel von - unknown
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  37.  81
    Determinism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation.Laurence BonJour - 1976 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):145-56.
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  38.  63
    Agent Causation and Responsibility.Michael Bergmann - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.
  39.  41
    Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.
  40.  22
    Critical Notice Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21).
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  41.  38
    Responsibility, Agent-Causation, and Freedom: An Eighteenth-Century View.William L. Rowe - 1991 - Ethics 101 (2):237-257.
  42. Agent Causation.E. J. Lowe - 2006 - In D. M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd Edition). Macmillan.
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  43. Responsibility and Agent-Causation.William Rowe - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 235.
     
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  44.  49
    Conscious Will and Agent Causation.G. E. Zuriff - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):678-679.
    Wegner (2002) fails to (1) distinguish conscious will and voluntariness; (2) account for everyday willed acts; and (3) individuate thoughts and acts. Wegner incorrectly implies that (4) we experience acts as willed only when they are caused by unwilled thoughts; (5) thoughts are never true causes of actions; and (6) we experience ourselves as first performing mental acts which then cause our intentional actions.
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    The Case for Agent-Causation.Uwe Meixner - 2014 - In Marek Rosiak & Miroslaw Szatkowski (eds.), Substantiality and Causality. De Gruyter. pp. 113-128.
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  46.  9
    A Bergsonian View of Agent-Causation.Sigrid Sarnoff - 1985 - International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2):185-196.
  47.  9
    Alternate Possibilities and Reid's Theory of Agent-Causation.William L. Rowe - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 219.
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    Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action.Randolph Clarke - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
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  49.  1
    Determlinism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation.Laurence A. Bonjour - 1976 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):145-156.
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    The Metaphysics of Freedom: Reid’s Theory of Agent Causation.William Rowe - 2000 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):425-446.
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