Results for 'agent-centered morality'

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  1. Agent-Centered Morality an Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism.George W. Harris - 1999 - University of California Press.
    What kinds of persons do we aspire to be, and how do our aspirations fit with our ideas of rationality? In _Agent-Centered Morality_, George Harris argues that most of us aspire to a certain sort of integrity: We wish to be respectful of and sympathetic to others, and to be loving parents, friends, and members of our communities. Against a prevailing Kantian consensus, Harris offers an Aristotelian view of the problems presented by practical reason, problems of integrating all our (...)
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  2. Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. [REVIEW]Lara Denis - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):849-851.
    In Agent-Centered Morality, George W. Harris constructs a broadly Aristotelian conception of morality and argues for its superiority over Kantian conceptions. Harris approaches morality through human practical reason. He is committed to articulating a plausible account of how human beings think, value, and choose based on their conceptions of their own good. Harris’s ethics is “agent-centered” in that it takes moral obligations to be grounded in what makes life meaningful from the agent’s (...)
     
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    Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism.Robert C. Roberts - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):730-733.
    Harris develops a neo-Aristotelian account of practical and moral reasoning that does account for such decisions of good people. On this account moral reasoning is part of a larger practice of practical reasoning and is viable only if it integrates smoothly into this larger practice. Good people, on Harris’s view of them, have a number of kinds of concerns that are integrated in their practical reasoning dispositions. Persons with “integrity in the thick sense” care about their family members, their friends, (...)
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  4. Agent-Centered Morality.George W. Harris & G. Felicitas Munzel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):261-264.
    13. The Normative Thoughts of Neighborly Love, Part 1.
     
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  5.  43
    Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism George W. Harris Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999, Xi + 434 Pp., $60.00. [REVIEW]Lara Denis - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):849-.
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    Agent-Centered Morality. An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. [REVIEW]Alejandra Carrasco - 2000 - Review of Metaphysics 54 (2):434-435.
    In this book Harris intends to construct an agent-centered conception of morality grounded on a naturalistic understanding of practical reason. In order to achieve this goal, he contrasts his Aristotelian revisionist perspective with the traditional and internalist Kantian proposals, focusing on two specific matters: the opposition between agent-centered and agent-neutral norms, and the newer and very interesting discussion of symmetrical versus asymmetrical regulative norms. The first topic will be especially relevant for the rejection of (...)
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  7. Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. By George W. Harris.B. Kaldis - 2004 - The European Legacy 9:400-401.
     
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    Agent-Centered Morality.Felicitas Munzel - 2003 - International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):282-284.
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    Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism (Review).Daniel E. Palmer - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (3):449-451.
  10. Taking Seriously the Challenges of Agent-Centered Morality.Hye-Ryoung Kang - 2011 - JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL WONKWANG CULTURE 2 (1):43-56.
    Agent-centered morality has been a serious challenge to ethical theories based on agent-neutral morality in defining what is the moral point of view. In this paper, my concern is to examine whether arguments for agent-centered morality, in particular, arguments for agent-centered option, can be justified. -/- After critically examining three main arguments for agent-centered morality, I will contend that although there is a ring of truth in the (...)
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    Book ReviewsGeorge W. Harris, AgentCentered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism.Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Pp. Xi+434. $60.00. [REVIEW]David H. Calhoun - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):834-838.
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  12. HARRIS, GW-Agent-Centered Morality.J. Driver - 2001 - Philosophical Books 42 (3):217-219.
     
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    Harris, George W. Agent-Centered Morality. An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism.Alejandra Carrasco - 2000 - Review of Metaphysics 54 (2):434-435.
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  14. Agent-Centered Eudaimonism and the Virtues: Some Groundwork for a Neoaristotelian Metaphysics of Morals.Stephen Mark Gardiner - 1998 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The dissertation puts forwards the theoretical foundations for an alternative to the traditional egoist interpretation of eudaimonism, the ethical theory associated with ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle. The first section builds a case for looking for such an alternative by arguing that the connection between egoism and eudaimonism posited by the traditional view is more complex than usually thought, and so requires more defense than usually thought. The second section suggests a way of generating a nonegoistic account. Characteristic claims (...)
     
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  15.  85
    Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):579-609.
    Deontologists have long been upbraided for lacking an account of justified decision- making under risk and uncertainty. One response is to develop a deontological decision theory—a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an act’s being permissible given an agent’s imperfect information. In this article, I show that deontologists can make more use of regular decision theory than some might have thought, but that we must adapt decision theory to accommodate agent- centered options—permissions to favor or sacrifice (...)
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  16.  34
    An Agent-Centered Account of Rightness: The Importance of a Good Attitude.Elizabeth Foreman - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):941-954.
    This paper provides a sketch of an agent-centered way of understanding and answering the question, “What’s wrong with that?” On this view, what lies at the bottom of judgments of wrongness is a bad attitude; when someone does something wrong, she does something that expresses a bad, or inappropriate, attitude . In order to motivate this account, a general Kantian agent-centered ethics is discussed, as well as Michael Slote’s agent-based ethics, in light of analysis of (...)
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  17. Position‐Relative Consequentialism, AgentCentered Options, and Supererogation.Douglas W. Portmore - 2003 - Ethics 113 (2):303-332.
    In this paper, I argue that maximizing act-consequentialism (MAC)—the theory that holds that agents ought always to act so as to produce the best available state of affairs—can accommodate both agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. Thus I will show that MAC can accommodate the view that agents often have the moral option of either pursuing their own personal interests or sacrificing those interests for the sake of the impersonal good. And I will show that MAC can accommodate the (...)
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  18.  15
    Teaching Ethics to Scientists and Engineers: Moral Agents and Moral Problems. [REVIEW]Dr Caroline Whitbeck - 1995 - Science and Engineering Ethics 1 (3):299-308.
    In this paper I outline an “agent-centered” approach to learning ethics. The approach is “agent-centered” in that its central aim is to prepare students toact wisely and responsibly when faced with moral problems. The methods characteristic of this approach are suitable for integrating material on professional and research ethics into technical courses, as well as for free-standing ethics courses.The analogy I draw between ethical problems and design problems clarifies the character of ethical problems as they are (...)
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  19. Teaching Ethics to Scientists and Engineers: Moral Agents and Moral Problems.Caroline Whitbeck - 1995 - Science and Engineering Ethics 1 (3):299-308.
    In this paper I outline an “agent-centered” approach to learning ethics. The approach is “agent-centered” in that its central aim is to prepare students toact wisely and responsibly when faced with moral problems. The methods characteristic of this approach are suitable for integrating material on professional and research ethics into technical courses, as well as for free-standing ethics courses. The analogy I draw between ethical problems and design problems clarifies the character of ethical problems as they (...)
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  20. Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.
    In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that (...)
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  21.  41
    Classes of Agent and the Moral Logic of the Pali Canon.Martin T. Adam - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (1):115-124.
    This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. (...)
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  22. Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology.Steven D. Hales - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):431 - 447.
    I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal (...)
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  23.  44
    The Global Poor as Agents of Justice.Monique Deveaux - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):125-150.
    Agent-centered” approaches to global poverty insist that effective arguments for poverty reduction must specify the concrete duties of particular duty-bearers. This article takes up a recent, influential, version of this view, Thomas Pogge’s human rights-based argument for global economic reforms to reduce chronic deprivation. While signaling a welcome shift from the diffuse allocation of responsibilities common to much philosophical writing on poverty, I argue that Pogge’s approach too readily assigns to powerful institutions in the global North the role (...)
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    The Global Poor as Agents of Justice.Monique Deveaux - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4).
    Agent-centered” approaches to global poverty insist that effective arguments for poverty reduction must specify the concrete duties of particular duty-bearers. This article takes up a recent, influential, version of this view, Thomas Pogge’s human rights-based argument for global economic reforms to reduce chronic deprivation. While signaling a welcome shift from the diffuse allocation of responsibilities common to much philosophical writing on poverty, I argue that Pogge’s approach too readily assigns to powerful institutions in the global North the role (...)
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  25. Consequentialism and the Agent's Point of View.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Ethics.
    I propose and defend a novel view called ‘de se consequentialism’, which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it demonstrates — contra Doug Portmore, Mark Schroeder, Campbell Brown, and Michael Smith, among others — that a consequentialist theory employing agent-neutral value is logically consistent with agent-centered constraints. Second, de se consequentialism clarifies both the nature of agent-centered constraints and why philosophers have found them puzzling, thereby meriting attention from even dedicated non-consequentialists. Scrutiny reveals that moral (...)
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  26. Two Portraits of the Humean Moral Agent.Kate Abramson - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):301–334.
    Among contemporary ethicists, Hume is perhaps best known for his views about morality’s practical import and his spectator-centered account of moral evaluation. Yet according to the so-called “spectator complaint”, these two aspects of Hume’s moral theory cannot be reconciled with one another. I argue that the answer to the spectator complaint lies in Hume’s account of “goodness” and “greatness of mind”. Through a discussion of these two virtues, Hume makes clear the connection between his views about moral motivation (...)
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  27. Consequentialism, Integrity, and Ordinary Morality.Alex Rajczi - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):377-392.
    According to the moral standards most of us accept and live by, morality generally permits us to refrain from promoting the good of others and instead engage in non-harmful projects of our own choice. This aspect of so-called ‘ordinary morality’ has turned out to be very difficult to justify. Recently, though, various authors, including Bernard Williams and Samuel Scheffler, have proposed “Integrity Theories” that would vindicate this aspect of ordinary morality, at least in part. They are generated (...)
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  28. Uncertainty, Indeterminacy, and Agent-Centred Constraints.Douglas W. Portmore - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):284-298.
    Common-sense morality includes various agent-centred constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily and breaking a promise. However, it's not always clear whether, had an agent ϕ-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her ϕ-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory to say about whether it would have been permissible for (...)
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  29. Moral Judgment and Deontology: Empirical Developments.Joshua May - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):745-755.
    A traditional idea is that moral judgment involves more than calculating the consequences of actions; it also requires an assessment of the agent's intentions, the act's nature, and whether the agent uses another person as a means to her ends. I survey experimental developments suggesting that ordinary people often tacitly reason in terms of such deontological rules. It's now unclear whether we should posit a traditional form of the doctrine of double effect. However, further research suggests that a (...)
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    Agent-Relative Restrictions and Agent-Relative Value.Stephen Emet - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (3):1-14.
    In this article I pose a challenge for attempts to ground all reasons in considerations of value. Some believe that all reasons for action are grounded in considerations of value. Some also believe that there are agent-relative restrictions, which provide us with agent-relative reasons against bringing about the best state of affairs, on an impartial ranking of states of affairs. Some would like to hold both of these beliefs. That is, they would like to hold that such (...)-relative restrictions are compatible with a teleological theory, one that grounds all reasons for action in considerations of value. This is what I will argue is problematic. I will argue that agent-centered restrictions will not fit into a teleological theory. If the correct moral theory is a teleological one, then there are no agent-relative restrictions. If there are agent-relative restrictions, then teleology is false. My argument challenges a particular project, of showing that all ethical theories are broadly consequentialist. The attraction of this project is that it promises to preserve what is thought to be compelling about consequentialism—its teleology and maximizing—while also preserving elements of commonsense morality—such as agent-relative restrictions—that have typically been thought of as distinctly non-consequentialist in nature. If my argument is correct, then this promise cannot be fulfilled. (shrink)
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    How We Hope: A Moral Psychology.Adrienne Martin - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
    What exactly is hope and how does it influence our decisions? In How We Hope, Adrienne Martin presents a novel account of hope, the motivational resources it presupposes, and its function in our practical lives. She contends that hoping for an outcome means treating certain feelings, plans, and imaginings as justified, and that hope thereby involves sophisticated reflective and conceptual capacities. Martin develops this original perspective on hope--what she calls the "incorporation analysis"--in contrast to the two dominant philosophical conceptions of (...)
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  32. All Reasons Are Moral.Daniel Muñoz - manuscript
    Morality doesn't always require our best. Prudent acts and heroic sacrifices are optional, not obligatory. To explain this, some philosophers claim that reasons of self-interest must have a special "non-moral" significance. A better explanation, I argue, is that we have prerogatives based in rights.
     
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  33.  99
    The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics.Christopher Toner - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (4):595-618.
    Aristotelian virtue ethics is often charged with counseling a self-centred approach to the moral life. Reviewing some influential responses made by defenders of virtue ethics, I argue that none of them goes far enough. I begin my own response by evaluating two common targets of the objection, Aristotle and Aquinas, and based on my findings sketch the outlines of a clearly non-self-centred version of virtue ethics, according to which the ‘center’ is instead located in the agent’s right relation to (...)
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  34.  23
    Human-Centered or Ecocentric Environmental Ethics?John Howie - 1995 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 2 (3):1-7.
    Are ethical principles that guide human behavior suitable for the array of complex new environmental problems? Justice, nonmaleficence, noninterference, and fidelity seem by extension to apply. Conflicts between the principles of humanistic ethics and environmental ethics may perhaps be resolved, as Paul W. Taylor indicates, through the application of such “priority principles” as “self-defense,” “proportionality,” “minimum wrong,” and “restitutive justice.” Taylor suggests that these principles would forbid moral agents from perpetrating harm through direct killing, habitat destruction, environmental contamination, and pollution.
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  35. Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This is Chapter 5 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I argue that those who wish to accommodate typical instances of supererogation and agent-centered options must deny that moral reasons are morally overriding and accept both that the reason that agents have to promote their own self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this reason can, and sometimes does, prevent the moral reason that they have to sacrifice their self-interest so as to (...)
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    Moral Obstacles: An Alternative to the Doctrine of Double Effect.Gerhard Øverland - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):481-506.
    The constraint against harming people in order to save yourself and others seems stronger than the constraint against harming people as a consequence of saving yourself and others. The reduced constraint against acting in one type of case is often justified with reference to the intentions of the agent or to the fact that she does not use the people she harms as a means. In this article I offer a victim-centered account. I argue that the circumstances in (...)
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  37.  1
    Self-Determination and the Moral Act: A Study of the Contributions of Odon Lottin, O.S.B.Mary Jo Iozzio - 1995 - Peeters.
    Odon Lottin, O.S.B. was an historian and a moral theologian. As an historian, he studied the scholastic attention to human psychology and morality. As a theologian, he studied the roles that thought and action play in the development of the moral agent. His influence in historical and moral theology has been significant. Nonetheless, moralists and medievalists independently have appropriated his insights. No one has yet studied the relationship between his historical investigations and his moral theology. This work accomplishes (...)
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  38.  39
    Nyāya's Self as Agent and Knower.Matthew R. Dasti - 2014 - In Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 112.
    Much of classical Hindu thought has centered on the question of self: what is it, how does it relate to various features of the world, and how may we benefit by realizing its depths? Attempting to gain a conceptual foothold on selfhood, Hindu thinkers commonly suggest that its distinctive feature is consciousness (caitanya). Well-worn metaphors compare the self to light as its awareness illumines the world of knowable objects. Consciousness becomes a touchstone to recognize the presence of a self. (...)
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  39. Kant, Buddhism, and Self-Centered Vice.Bradford Cokelet - 2018 - In Philip J. Ivanhoe, Owen Flanagan, Victoria S. Harrison, Hagop Sarkissian & Eric Schwitzgebel (eds.), The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self. New York, USA: Columbia University Press. pp. 169-191.
    This article discusses the vice of self-centeredness, argues that it inhibits our ability to treat humanity as an end in itself, and that Kantian moral theory cannot account for this fact. After in this way arguing that Kantian theory fails to provide a fully adequate account of agents who live up to the formula of humanity, I discuss Buddhist resources for developing a better account.
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  40. Agent-Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out.Stephen Darwall - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (3):291 - 319.
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  41. Chaos and Constraints.Howard Nye - 2014 - In David Boersema (ed.), Dimensions of Moral Agency. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 14-29.
    Agent-centered constraints on harming hold that some harmful upshots of our conduct cannot be justified by its generating equal or somewhat greater benefits. In this paper I argue that all plausible theories of agent-centered constraints on harming are undermined by the likelihood that our actions will have butterfly effects, or cause cascades of changes that make the world dramatically different than it would have been. Theories that impose constraints against only intended harming or proximally caused harm (...)
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  42.  18
    Evolutionary Ethics and Moral Theory.Michael Stingl - 1996 - Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (4):531-545.
    This example, like the others, demands further discussion. My conclusion must therefore remain modest: an agent-neutral theory of our moral competence is not biologically implausible. Agent-centered rules like tit-for-tat, prerogatives, special obligations, and duties not to harm others might be best regarded as belonging to the theory of moral performance rather than the theory of moral competence. For biologists who may think otherwise, the general argument of this essay is that any claims to the contrary must be (...)
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  43.  71
    Generality and Moral Justification.Don Loeb - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):79-96.
    Demands for generality sometimes exert a powerful influence on our thinking, pressing us to treat more general moral positions, such as consequentialism, as superior to more specific ones, like those which incorporate agent-centered restrictions or prerogatives. I articulate both foundationalist and coherentist versions of the demands for generality and argue that we can best understand these demands in terms of a certain underlying metaphysical commitment. I consider and reject various arguments which might be offered in support of this (...)
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    Generality in Moral Reflection.Don Loeb - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler and Shelly Kagan demand a general justification for certain agent-centered features of morality. I argue, however, that these demands are often unjustified. My aim is to level the playing field between our more specific and our more general moral convictions, allowing neither to win by default. ;I begin by distinguishing generality from universality and consistency, and go on to identify several common motivations for generality in (...)
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  45.  53
    Agent-Centered Restrictions: Clearing the Air of Paradox.Paul Hurley - 1997 - Ethics 108 (1):120-146.
  46.  57
    Confucius and Act-Centered Morality.Act-Centered Morality - 2000 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27:331-344.
  47.  58
    Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality.Tim Willenken - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):545-561.
    A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate “deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A than C. Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense morality generates deontic cycling. This matters for two reasons. First, it creates a problem for the widely held view that agent-centered rankings can square consequentialism with commonsense morality. Second, it forces a choice between some deeply plausible (...)
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    Generality and Moral Justification.Don Loeb - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):79-96.
    In recent years it has become fashionable to criticize a family of approaches to moral thinking, loosely collected under the heading, “moral theory.” Unfortunately, these criticisms have often lacked a sharp focus. To do better, we will have to sort out the various elements of moral theory, and carefully consider them one at a time. One element which has heretofore received too little attention is generality. Demands for generality have become so central to the way many philosophers do ethics that (...)
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    Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms.Michael Huemer - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 17.
    Agent-centered epistemic norms direct thinkers to attach different significance to their own epistemically relevant states than they attach to the similar states of others. Thus, if S and T both know, for certain, that S has the intuition that P, this might justify S in believing that P, yet fail to justify T in believing that P. I defend agent-centeredness and explain how an agent-centered theory can accommodate intuitions that seem to favor agent-neutrality.
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  50.  68
    Responsibility and the Demands of Morality.Stephen J. White - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (3).
    _ Source: _Page Count 24 Is it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured in terms of what it requires us to take responsibility for. I argue that this is distinct from what we may be (...)
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