Results for 'anti-realism'

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  1. Ontological Anti-Realism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    The basic question of ontology is “What exists?”. The basic question of metaontology is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and ontological anti-realists say no. (Compare: The basic question of ethics is “What is right?”. The basic question of metaethics is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ethics? Here moral realists say yes, and moral anti-realists say no.) For example, the ontologist may ask: Do numbers exist? (...)
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  2. Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal.Neil Tennant - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Anti-realism is a doctrine about logic, language, and meaning that is based on the work of Wittgenstein and Frege. In this book, Professor Tennant clarifies and develops Dummett's arguments for anti-realism and ultimately advocates a radical reform of our logical practices.
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  3. Moral Anti-Realism.Richardn D. Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that (...)
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  4.  31
    Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):53-82.
    Many metaethicists agree that as ordinary people experience morality as a realm of objective truths, we have a prima facie reason to believe that it actually is such a realm. Recently, worries have been raised about the validity of the extant psychological research on this argument’s empirical hypothesis. Our aim is to advance this research, taking these worries into account. First, we propose a new experimental design for measuring folk intuitions about moral objectivity that may serve as an inspiration for (...)
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  5.  32
    Medicine, Anti-Realism and Ideology: Variation in Medical Genetics Does Not Show That Race is Biologically Real.Phila Mfundo Msimang - 2020 - SATS 20 (2):117-140.
    Lee McIntyre’s Respecting Truth chronicles the contemporary challenges regarding the relationship amongst evidence, belief formation and ideology. The discussion in his book focusses on the ‘politicisation of knowledge’ and the purportedly growing public tendency to choose to believe what is determined by prior ideological commitments rather than what is determined by evidence-based reasoning. In considering these issues, McIntyre posits that the claim “race is a myth” is founded on a political ideology rather than on support from scientific evidence. He contrasts (...)
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  6. Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new (...)
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  7.  73
    An Anti-Realist Account of the Application of Mathematics.Otávio Bueno - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2591-2604.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the (...)
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  8.  7
    Moral Anti-Realism.Richard Joyce - 2016 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
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  9. Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding.John McDowell - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding. W. De Gruyter. pp. 225--248.
     
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  10. What Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics Must Offer.Feng Ye - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach (...)
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  11.  94
    Theological Anti-Realism.John A. Keller - 2014 - Journal of Analytic Theology 2:13-42.
    An "overview article" that (a) clarifies the nature of theological anti-realism and how that thesis should be formulated, and (b) negatively assesses some of the most common arguments for being a theological anti-realist.
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  12.  72
    Anti-Realist Aporias.N. Tennant - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):825--854.
    Using a quantified propositional logic involving the operators it is known that and it is possible to know that, we formalize various interesting philosophical claims involved in the realism debate. We set out inferential rules for the epistemic modalities, ranging from ones that are obviously analytic, to ones that are epistemologically more substantive or even controversial. Then we investigate various aporias for the realism debate. These are constructively inconsistent triads of claims from our list: a claim expressing some (...)
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  13. Radical Anti-Realism, Wittgenstein and the Length of Proofs.Mathieu Marion - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):419 - 432.
    After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.
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  14.  25
    Anti-Realism and Logic.Michael Luntley - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):361.
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  15.  91
    Should Anti-Realists Be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism?Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):233-258.
    On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful (...)
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  16.  89
    A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity.Heinrich Wansing - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):93-100.
    Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what is (...)
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  17.  52
    Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition.Gabriele Usberti - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):37-45.
    I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the (...)
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  18. Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist Be a Stanfordite?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2019 - Synthese 196:535-551.
    Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific version of this view, based on the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, Stanford’s challenge cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism, namely: superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and superseded theories that were not the result of (...)
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  19.  13
    Anti-Realism.Marian David - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):173-185.
    According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial (...)
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  20.  33
    The Anti-Realist Argument for Underdetermination.Igor Douven - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):371-375.
    Typically, anti-realists argue for the underdetermination of theory by the data on the basis of the claim that each theory has empirically equivalent rivals. Leplin has recently sought to show that, whatever the truth-value of this latter claim, it cannot play any positive role in an argument for underdetermination. I argue that Leplin’s attempt fails.
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  21.  87
    Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility.Jim Edwards - 1996 - Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. (...)
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  22.  60
    Anti-Realist Semantics.Wolfram Hinzen - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (3):281-311.
    I argue that the implementation of theDummettian program of an ``anti-realist'' semanticsrequires quite different conceptions of the technicalmeaning-theoretic terms used than those presupposed byDummett. Starting from obvious incoherences in anattempt to conceive truth conditions as assertibilityconditions, I argue that for anti-realist purposesnon-epistemic semantic notions are more usefully kept apart from epistemic ones rather than beingreduced to them. Embedding an anti-realist theory ofmeaning in Martin-Löf's Intuitionistic Type Theory(ITT) takes care, however, of many notorious problemsthat have arisen in trying (...)
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  23.  18
    Global Anti-Realism.James-O. Young - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47:641-647.
    DUMMETT HAS BEEN CONCERNED WITH SHOWING HOW ONE MIGHT GIVE\nAN ANTI-REALIST ACCOUNT OF RESTRICTED CLASSES OF SENTENCES.\nTHIS PAPER ARGUES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO GIVE AN\nANTI-REALIST ACCOUNT OF ALL CLASSES OF SENTENCES. THAT IS,\nIN THE CASE OF NO CLASSES OF SENTENCES DOES TRUTH TRANSCEND\nWHAT CAN BE WARRANTED. THE KEY TO GLOBAL ANTI-REALISM IS\nREPLACING DUMMETT'S EMPIRICISM WITH A COHERENTIST ACCOUNT\nOF WARRANT. THE AUTHOR POINTS OUT THAT COLIN McGINN'S\nARGUMENT AGAINST GLOBAL ANTI-REALISM FAILS.
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  24.  29
    Anti-Realism and Logic. Truth as Eternal.W. D. Hart & Neil Tennant - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1485.
  25. Realism/Anti-Realism.Michael Devitt - 2008 - In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 224--235.
  26. Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166.
    Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of verification-transcendent truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called realist semantics, which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have (...)
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  27.  36
    Against Social Kind Anti-Realism.Rebecca Mason - 2020 - Metaphysics 3 (1):55-67.
    The view that social kinds (e.g., money, migrant, marriage) are mind-dependent is a prominent one in the social ontology literature. However, in addition to the claim that social kinds are mind-dependent, it is often asserted that social kinds are not real because they are mind-dependent. Call this view social kind anti-realism. To defend their view, social kind anti-realists must accomplish two tasks. First, they must identify a dependence relation that obtains between social kinds and our mental states. (...)
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  28.  12
    Anti-Realism and Logic.A. J. Dale - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):213-217.
  29.  42
    Modern Anti-Realism and Manufactured Truth.Gerald Vision - 1988 - Routledge.
    I INTRODUCTION - THE TOPIC EXPLAINED 1 GENERAL DIFFERENCES From its inception to the present, philosophy may be viewed as a series of struggles between ...
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  30. Anti-Realism Untouched.Joseph Melia - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):341-342.
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  31.  57
    Anti-Realist Classical Logic and Realist Mathematics.Greg Restall - unknown
    I sketch an application of a semantically anti-realist understanding of the classical sequent calculus to the topic of mathematics. The result is a semantically anti-realist defence of a kind of mathematical realism. In the paper, I begin the development of the view and compare it to orthodox positions in the philosophy of mathematics.
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  32.  12
    Anti-Realism or Pro-Something Else? Response to Deichsel.Tony Lawson - 2011 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 4 (1):53-66.
    In those parts of his paper that have the clearest bearing upon mycontributions, Simon Deichsel 1) elaborates various conceptions ofrealism; 2) declares himself an anti-realist of a specific sort; 3) seeks toidentify and criticise pragmatic aspects of my justification for adoptinga realist orientation; and 4) argues that his anti-realist perspective ispreferable to realism.An immediate problem with Deichsel’s project, if intended as acritique of my own realist orientation, is that the sort of realism againstwhich his anti- (...) is oppositionally defined is not the versionof realism I maintain. In fact the only one of Deichsel’s formulationsthat I unambiguously accept as a version of realism is ontological realism. Realism as I understand the term is about existence.It is ontological in nature. At its most basic, it posits the existence of an‘external’ reality.1So understood, realism is not a theory of knowledge, or of language,or even of truth. Indeed so formulated it says nothing about knowledgeor truth.2In particular it does not commit anyone to the correspondencetheory of truth, or indeed to any other theory or conception of truth.In fact it is not a semantic theory at all. (shrink)
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  33.  26
    Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community.William Seager - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:181-187.
    Bas van Fraassen has presented a most vigorous argument in support of an anti-realist interpretation of science. In defence of his view he revives the seemingly moribund 'observable-unobservable' distinction, and employs it in the attempt to show that science provides no grounds for accepting, as real, entities which it itself classifies as unobservable. Traditional arguments against the observable-unobservable distinction can be reinterpreted as arguments for the reality of what is unobservable to humans. The argument is quite straightforward. We could (...)
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  34.  93
    Why Anti-Realists and Classical Mathematicians Cannot Get Along.Stewart Shapiro - 2001 - Topoi 20 (1):53-63.
    Famously, Michael Dummett argues that considerations concerning the role of language in communication lead to the rejection of classical logic in favor of intuitionistic logic. Potentially, this results in massive revisions of established mathematics. Recently, Neil Tennant (“The law of excluded middle is synthetic a priori, if valid”, Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 205-229) suggested that a Dummettian anti-realist can accept the law of excluded middle as a synthetic, a priori principle grounded on a metaphysical principle of determinacy. This article (...)
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  35.  92
    Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Probability: Bruno de Finetti's Subjectivism. [REVIEW]Maria Carla Galavotti - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261.
    Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either.
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  36. Dummett's Anti-Realism.Michael Devitt - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):73-99.
    Devitt (1983) "Dummett's Anti-Realism".
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  37. Continental Anti-Realism: A Critique.Richard Sebold - 2014 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    Sebold provides a critique of the arguments for anti-realism in Continental philosophy, engaging specifically with Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl. Utilizing resources from both the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, it provides realist ways of reading those aspects of Continental anti-realism that are found to be problematic.
     
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  38.  56
    Anti-Realist Semantics: The Role of Criteria.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 13:225-248.
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  39.  49
    Global Anti-Realism.James O. Young - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):641-647.
  40. Realism and Anti-Realism.Stuart Brock & Edwin Mares - 2006 - Routledge.
    There are a bewildering variety of ways the terms "realism" and "anti-realism" have been used in philosophy and furthermore the different uses of these terms are only loosely connected with one another. Rather than give a piecemeal map of this very diverse landscape, the authors focus on what they see as the core concept: realism about a particular domain is the view that there are facts or entities distinctive of that domain, and their existence and nature (...)
     
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  41. An Anti-Realist Critique of Dialetheism.Neil Tennant - 2004 - In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press.
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  42. Species Pluralism and Anti-Realism.Marc Ereshefsky - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):103-120.
    Species pluralism gives us reason to doubt the existence of the species category. The problem is not that species concepts are chosen according to our interests or that pluralism and the desire for hierarchical classifications are incompatible. The problem is that the various taxa we call 'species' lack a common unifying feature.
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  43.  93
    Deconstruction, AntiRealism and Philosophy of Science—an Interview with Christopher Norris.Christopher Norris & Marianna Papastephanou - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 36 (2):265–289.
    In this interview, Christopher Norris discusses a wide range of issues having to do with postmodernism, deconstruction and other controversial topics of debate within present-day philosophy and critical theory. More specifically he challenges the view of deconstruction as just another offshoot of the broader postmodernist trend in cultural studies and the social sciences. Norris puts the case for deconstruction as continuing the 'unfinished project of modernity' and—in particular—for Derrida's work as sustaining the values of enlightened critical reason in various spheres (...)
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  44.  37
    Radical Anti-Realism and Substructural Logics.Jacques Dubucs & Mathieu Marion - 2003 - In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 235--249.
  45. What Generates the Realism/Anti-Realism Dichotomy?Jesse M. Mulder - 2012 - Philosophica 84 (1):53-84.
    The most basic divide amongst analytic metaphysicians separates realists from anti-realists. By examining certain characteristic and problematic features of these two families of views, we uncover their underlying metametaphysicalorientations, which turn out to coincide. This shared philosophical picture that underlies both the realist and the anti-realist project we call the Modern Picture. It rests on a crucial distinction between reality as it is for us and reality as it is in itself. It is argued that this distinction indeed (...)
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  46. The Anti-Realist Epistemology of van Fraasen's "The Scientific Image".Paul M. Churchland - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (3):226.
  47. Realism and Anti-Realism.Michael Dummett - 1993 - In ¸ Itedummett:Sl. pp. 462--78.
    In this article the contemporary debate between realism and anti-realism in analytical philosophy is analyzed and discussed. It is claimed that the nature of the reference relation which holds between language and the world is central in this discussion which has both logical, semantical, and epistemological aspects. In a firstpart, A Tarski's (semantic) theory of truth is explained and it is shown how, amongst several theories of truth, Tarski's may be called a realist one. However, a Tarski-style (...)
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  48.  97
    And Not Anti-Realism Either.Arthur Fine - 1984 - Noûs 18 (1):51-65.
    This paper develops lines of criticism directed at two currently popular versions of anti-realism: the putnam-rorty-kuhn version that is centered on an acceptance theory of truth, and the van fraassen version that is centered on empiricist strictures over warranted beliefs. the paper continues by elaborating and extending a stance, called "the natural ontological attitude", that is neither realist nor anti-realist.
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  49.  64
    Coherence, Anti-Realism and the Vienna Circle.James O. Young - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):467 - 482.
    Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted in believing. If so, truth cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are (...)
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  50.  14
    The Anti-Realist Argument for Underdetermination.Igor Douven - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):371-375.
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