Results for 'anti-realism'

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  1.  11
    John Skorupski.I. On'anti-Realism - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 151.
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  2. Anti-realism and logic: truth as eternal.Neil Tennant - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Anti-realism is a doctrine about logic, language, and meaning that is based on the work of Wittgenstein and Frege. In this book, Professor Tennant clarifies and develops Dummett's arguments for anti-realism and ultimately advocates a radical reform of our logical practices.
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  3.  91
    Anti-realist Semantics: the Role of Criteria.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 13:225-248.
    §I. Anti-realism of the sort which Michael Dummett has expounded takes issue with the traditional idea that an understanding of any statement is philosophically correctly analysed as involving grasp of conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Many kinds of statement to which, as we ordinarily think, we attach a clear sense would have to be represented, according to this tradition, as possessing verification-transcendent truth-conditions; if true that is to say, they would be so in virtue of circumstances (...)
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  4. Anti-Realism in Metaphysics.Vera Flocke - 2019 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 358—366.
    Metaphysical anti-realism is a large and heterogeneous group of views that do not share a common thesis but only share a certain family resemblance. Views as different as mathematical nominalism—the view that numbers do not exist—, ontological relativism—the view that what exists depends on a perspective—, and modal conventionalism—-the view that modal facts are conventional—all are versions of metaphysical anti-realism. As the latter two examples suggest, relativist ideas play a starring role in many versions of metaphysical (...)
     
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  5.  14
    Semantic Anti-Realism in Kant’s Antinomy Chapter.Kristoffer Willert - 2022 - Open Philosophy 5 (1):737-757.
    By considering the semantic footings of the so-called antinomies of pure reason, this article contributes to the debate about whether Kant was committed to semantic realism or anti-realism. That is, whether verification-transcendent judgements are truth-apt (realism) or not (anti-realism). Against the (empiricist) semantic principle that Strawson, and others, have ascribed to Kant as the “principle of significance,” the bedrock of my article is what I call Kant’s Real Principle of Significance: an extension-based and normative (...)
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  6. Theological Anti-Realism.John A. Keller - 2014 - Journal of Analytic Theology 2:13-42.
    An "overview article" that (a) clarifies the nature of theological anti-realism and how that thesis should be formulated, and (b) negatively assesses some of the most common arguments for being a theological anti-realist.
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  7.  6
    Continental Anti-Realism: A Critique.Richard Sebold - 2014 - New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.
    Sebold provides a critique of the arguments for anti-realism in Continental philosophy, engaging specifically with Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Husserl. Utilizing resources from both the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, it provides realist ways of reading those aspects of Continental anti-realism that are found to be problematic.
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  8.  99
    Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):53-82.
    Many metaethicists agree that as ordinary people experience morality as a realm of objective truths, we have a prima facie reason to believe that it actually is such a realm. Recently, worries have been raised about the validity of the extant psychological research on this argument’s empirical hypothesis. Our aim is to advance this research, taking these worries into account. First, we propose a new experimental design for measuring folk intuitions about moral objectivity that may serve as an inspiration for (...)
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  9. Moral anti-realism.Richardn D. Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that (...)
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  10.  51
    The anti-realist argument for underdetermination.Igor Douven - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):371-375.
    Typically, anti-realists argue for the underdetermination of theory by the data on the basis of the claim that each theory has empirically equivalent rivals. Leplin has recently sought to show that, whatever the truth-value of this latter claim, it cannot play any positive role in an argument for underdetermination. I argue that Leplin’s attempt fails.
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  11. Anti-realist truth and concepts of superassertibility.Jim Edwards - 1996 - Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. (...)
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  12.  28
    Anti-Realism.Marian David - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):173-185.
    According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial (...)
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  13. A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity.Heinrich Wansing - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):93-100.
    Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what is (...)
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  14. Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Mind.Carolyn G. Hartz - 1985 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    My purpose is to examine the realism/anti-realism issue in the philosophy of mind and to lay the foundation for its resolution. To that end I formulate the issue in terms of Dummett's semantic criterion of bivalence, and the question becomes one of whether or not statements about the mind are determinately either true or false. I shall signify this formulation by capitalizing: Realism or anti-Realism. One of the virtues of this approach is that it (...)
     
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  15.  50
    Anti-Realism and Objectivity in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics.Pïeranna Garavaso - 1991 - Philosophica 48.
    In the first section, I characterize realism and illustrate the sense in which Wittgenstein's account of mathematics is anti-realist. In the second section, I spell out the above notion of objectivity and show how and anti-realist account of truth, namely, Putnam's idealized rational acceptability, preserves objectivity. In the third section, I discuss the "majority argument" and illustrate how Wittgenstein's anti-realism can also account for the objectivity of mathematics. What Putnam's and Wittgenstein's anti-realisms ultimately show (...)
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  16. Ontological anti-realism.David J. Chalmers - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    The basic question of ontology is “What exists?”. The basic question of metaontology is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ontology? Here ontological realists say yes, and ontological anti-realists say no. (Compare: The basic question of ethics is “What is right?”. The basic question of metaethics is: are there objective answers to the basic question of ethics? Here moral realists say yes, and moral anti-realists say no.) For example, the ontologist may ask: Do numbers exist? (...)
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  17.  73
    Medicine, anti-realism and ideology: Variation in medical genetics does not show that race is biologically real.Phila Mfundo Msimang - 2020 - SATS 20 (2):117-140.
    Lee McIntyre’s Respecting Truth chronicles the contemporary challenges regarding the relationship amongst evidence, belief formation and ideology. The discussion in his book focusses on the ‘politicisation of knowledge’ and the purportedly growing public (and sometimes academic) tendency to choose to believe what is determined by prior ideological commitments rather than what is determined by evidence-based reasoning. In considering these issues, McIntyre posits that the claim “race is a myth” is founded on a political ideology rather than on support from scientific (...)
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  18.  43
    The Anti-Realist Boogeyman (And How To Avoid Him).Dana Goswick - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (1):189-204.
    I distinguish Local Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing some of the objects we have epistemic access to) from Global Constructivism (humans play a constitutive role in constructing all of the objects we have epistemic access to). I explicate and clarify Local Constructivism and show how the metaphysical concerns which motivate endorsing Local Constructivism about some objects (e.g. social objects, modal objects) differ from the epistemic and semantic concerns which motive endorsing Global Constructivism. I, then, examine the criticisms (...)
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  19. An anti-realist account of the application of mathematics.Otávio Bueno - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2591-2604.
    Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features of the (...)
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  20.  40
    Anti-Realism and Infinitary Proofs.Diego Tajer - 2012 - Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):45-51.
    In the discussion about Yablo’s Paradox, a debated topic is the status of infinitary proofs. It is usually considered that, although a realist could (with some effort) accept them, an anti-realist could not do it at all. In this paper I will argue that there are plausible reasons for an anti-realist to accept infinitary proofs and rules of inference. En la discusión sobre la Paradoja de Yablo, un tópico debatido es el estatus de las pruebas infinitarias. Se suele (...)
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  21.  4
    Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community.William Seager - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):181-187.
    The ability to observe is the ability to reliably detect, but that is not all observation is. A thermometer reliably detects temperature yet does not observe the temperature, whereas I do, even though in terms of reliability I cannot match the thermometer. An observation is detection accompanied by active classification and, typically, the subsequent formation of opinion. Even when we say of an animal that it can see something we mean more than that it reliably detects things of a certain (...)
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  22.  72
    Anti-Realist Classical Logic and Realist Mathematics.Greg Restall - unknown
    I sketch an application of a semantically anti-realist understanding of the classical sequent calculus to the topic of mathematics. The result is a semantically anti-realist defence of a kind of mathematical realism. In the paper, I begin the development of the view and compare it to orthodox positions in the philosophy of mathematics.
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  23.  11
    Anti-Realism and Realism About the Past: A Present for Mark Siderits.Arindam Chakrabarti - 2023 - In Christian Coseru (ed.), Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality: Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits. Springer. pp. 283-293.
    Nyāya realists drew an important distinction between absence and non-existence. Perished particulars, such as Aristotle, emperor Ashoka, or the Bamiyan Buddha statues in Afghanistan are absent now but they are not non-existent in the sense of having become unreal or fictional. By dying, my grandmother did not become nonexistent like Snow White, though she suffered post-cessation absence. In order to be really dead, one could aptly remark, she has to be real. Can we therefore be realists about now deceased individuals (...)
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  24.  70
    Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition.Gabriele Usberti - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):37-45.
    I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the (...)
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  25. Mathematical anti-realism and explanatory structure.Bruno Whittle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6203-6217.
    Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...)
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  26.  44
    Anti-realist Semantics: the Role of Criteria.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 13:225-248.
    §I. Anti-realism of the sort which Michael Dummett has expounded takes issue with the traditional idea that an understanding of any statement (here, declarative sentence) is philosophically correctly analysed as involving grasp of conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Many kinds of statement to which, as we ordinarily think, we attach a clear sense would have to be represented, according to this tradition, as possessingverification-transcendenttruth-conditions; if true that is to say, they would be so in virtue of (...)
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  27. What anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics must offer.Feng Ye - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach (...)
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  28.  26
    Why AntiRealism Breaks up Relationships.Christopher J. Insole - 2002 - Heythrop Journal 43 (1):20–33.
    Some theologians are inclined to regard realism with hostility or indifference. I do not present an argument for realism, but for why realism matters, and what is at stake.First of all, I separate the heart of realism from gratuitous doctrines which are too often associated with it. Religious realism is the claim that truth is independent of our beliefs about truth, and that we can in principle hope to have true beliefs about God. Realism (...)
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  29.  57
    Deconstruction, AntiRealism and Philosophy of Science—an interview with Christopher Norris.Christopher Norris & Marianna Papastephanou - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 36 (2):265-289.
    In this interview, Christopher Norris discusses a wide range of issues having to do with postmodernism, deconstruction and other controversial topics of debate within present–day philosophy and critical theory. More specifically he challenges the view of deconstruction as just another offshoot of the broader postmodernist trend in cultural studies and the social sciences. Norris puts the case for deconstruction as continuing the ‘unfinished project of modernity’ and—in particular—for Derrida’s work as sustaining the values of enlightened critical reason in various spheres (...)
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  30.  99
    Anti-realist interpretations of Plato: Paul Natorp.Vasilis Politis - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):47 – 62.
    The paper considers Paul Natorp's Kantian reading of Plato's theory of ideas, as developed in his monumental work, Platos Ideenlehre, eine Einführung in den Idealismus (1903, 1921). Central to Natrop's reading are, I argue, the following two claims: (1) Plato's ideas are laws, not things; and (2) Plato's theory of ideas in the first instance a theory about the possibility and nature of thought - in particular cognitive and indeed scientific or explanatory thought - and only as a consequence is (...)
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  31. Radical anti-realism, Wittgenstein and the length of proofs.Mathieu Marion - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):419 - 432.
    After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.
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  32. Anti-realism and the epistemology of understanding.John McDowell - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 225--248.
     
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  33.  66
    Disagreement, Anti-Realism about Reasons, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Brian Leiter - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
    I defend an inference to the best explanation (IBE) argument for anti-realism about reasons for acting based on the history of intractable disagreement in moral philosophy. The four key premises of the argument are: 1. If there were objective reasons for action, epistemically-well-situated observers would eventually converge upon them after two thousand years; 2. Contemporary philosophers, as the beneficiaries of two thousand years of philosophy, are epistemically well-situated observers; 3. Contemporary philosophers have not converged upon reasons for action; (...)
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  34.  22
    Why AntiRealism Breaks up Relationships.Christopher J. Insole - 2002 - Heythrop Journal 43 (1):20-33.
    Some theologians are inclined to regard realism with hostility or indifference. I do not present an argument for realism, but for why realism matters, and what is at stake.First of all, I separate the heart of realism from gratuitous doctrines which are too often associated with it. Religious realism is the claim that truth is independent of our beliefs about truth, and that we can in principle hope to have true beliefs about God. Realism (...)
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  35. Negation, anti-realism, and the denial defence.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new (...)
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  36.  30
    Anti-Realism and Logic.Michael Luntley - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):361.
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  37. Indispensability argument and anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics.Feng Ye - 2007 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):614-628.
    The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract (...)
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  38.  22
    Anti-realism or pro-something else? Response to Deichsel.Tony Lawson - 2011 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 4 (1):53.
    In those parts of his paper that have the clearest bearing upon mycontributions, Simon Deichsel 1) elaborates various conceptions ofrealism; 2) declares himself an anti-realist of a specific sort; 3) seeks toidentify and criticise pragmatic aspects of my justification for adoptinga realist orientation; and 4) argues that his anti-realist perspective ispreferable to realism.An immediate problem with Deichsel’s project, if intended as acritique of my own realist orientation, is that the sort of realism againstwhich his anti- (...) is oppositionally defined is not the versionof realism I maintain. In fact the only one of Deichsel’s formulationsthat I unambiguously accept as a version of realism is ontological realism. Realism as I understand the term is about existence.It is ontological in nature. At its most basic, it posits the existence of an‘external’ reality.1So understood, realism is not a theory of knowledge, or of language,or even of truth. Indeed so formulated it says nothing about knowledgeor truth.2In particular it does not commit anyone to the correspondencetheory of truth, or indeed to any other theory or conception of truth.In fact it is not a semantic theory at all. (shrink)
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  39.  9
    AntiRealism about the Past.Fabrice Pataut - 2008 - In Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 190–198.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Realism vs. Antirealism in the Semantics of Mathematical Language Antirealism about the Empirical Realm and, in Particular, about the Past Historical Significance and Historical Insignificance Generality and Holistic Explanations The Objectivity of Historiography Conclusion Bibliography Further Reading.
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  40.  7
    Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding.John Mcdowell - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 225-248.
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  41.  14
    AntiRealism under Mind?von Drew Khlentzos - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (4):315-328.
    SummaryAnti‐Realism claims that the Classical or Realist conception of truth as verification‐transcendent is incoherent. Our grasp of the meanings of statements from any given class is to be assimilated to a grasp of their assertibility or deniability conditions. In this paper I present an apparent counter‐example to the Anti‐Realist's positive claim which derives from the traditional problem of other minds.ResumeL'anti‐réalisme affirme ľincohérence de la conception réaliste classique de la vérité comme transcendante à la vérification. Notre saisie des (...)
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  42.  57
    Modern anti-realism and manufactured truth.Gerald Vision - 1988 - New York: Routledge.
    I INTRODUCTION - THE TOPIC EXPLAINED 1 GENERAL DIFFERENCES From its inception to the present, philosophy may be viewed as a series of struggles between ...
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  43. An Anti-Realist Critique of Dialetheism.Neil Tennant - 2004 - In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The law of non-contradiction : new philosophical essays. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  44. Should Anti-Realists be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism?Roy T. Cook - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):233-258.
    On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful (...)
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  45. Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?Michael Zhao - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Call "radical moral theorizing" the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral intuitions, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency, simplicity, explanatory depth, and so on. Many moral philosophers assume that radical moral theorizing does not require any particular metaethical commitments. In this paper, I argue against this assumption. The most natural justification for radical moral theorizing presupposes moral realism, broadly construed; in contrast, there may be no justification for radical (...)
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  46.  66
    Wittgenstein, Anti-Realism and Mathematical Propositions.Jacques Bouveresse - 1992 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 42 (1):133-160.
    Wittgenstein is generally supposed to have abandoned in the 1930's a realistic conception of the meaning of mathematical propositions, founded on the idea of tmth-conditions which could in certain cases transcend any possibility of verification, for a realistic one, where the idea of truth-conditions is replaced by that of conditions of justification of assertability. It is argued that for Wittgenstein mathematical propositions, which are, as he says, "grammatical" propositions, have a meaning and a role which differ to a much greater (...)
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  47.  10
    Wittgenstein, Anti-Realism and Mathematical Propositions.Jacques Bouveresse - 1992 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 42 (1):133-160.
    Wittgenstein is generally supposed to have abandoned in the 1930's a realistic conception of the meaning of mathematical propositions, founded on the idea of tmth-conditions which could in certain cases transcend any possibility of verification, for a realistic one, where the idea of truth-conditions is replaced by that of conditions of justification of assertability. It is argued that for Wittgenstein mathematical propositions, which are, as he says, "grammatical" propositions, have a meaning and a role which differ to a much greater (...)
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  48.  50
    Anti-realistic Notions of Truth.Luca Tranchini - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):5-8.
    Validity, the central concept of the so-called ‘proof-theoretic semantics’ is described as correctly applying to the arguments that denote proofs. In terms of validity, I propose an anti-realist characterization of the notions of truth and correct assertion, at the core of which is the idea that valid arguments may fail to be recognized as such. The proposed account is compared with Dummett’s and Prawitz’s views on the matter.
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  49.  11
    Anti-realism and recognitional capacities.A. J. Clark - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):171-178.
  50. Against Social Kind Anti-Realism.Rebecca Mason - forthcoming - Metaphysics 3 (1):55-67.
    The view that social kinds (e.g., money, migrant, marriage) are mind-dependent is a prominent one in the social ontology literature. However, in addition to the claim that social kinds are mind-dependent, it is often asserted that social kinds are not real because they are mind-dependent. Call this view social kind anti-realism. To defend their view, social kind anti-realists must accomplish two tasks. First, they must identify a dependence relation that obtains between social kinds and our mental states. (...)
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