If earlier-than-necessary death is bad because it deprives individuals of additional good life, then why isn't later-than-necessary conception bad for the same reason? Deprivationists have argued that prenatal non-existence is not bad because it is impossible to be conceived earlier, but postmortem non-existence is bad because it is possible to live longer. Call this the Impossibility Solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the Impossibility Solution does not work by showing how it is possible to be conceived earlier in the (...) same senses it is possible to live longer. I then offer a solution to the Asymmetry Problem by suggesting a novel way to separate the badness of each type of non-existence from the type, and frequency, of attitudes we should have towards each type of non-existence. Even if both types of non-existence are equally bad, certain contingent facts about our postmortem non-existence provide reason for the badness of early deaths to be more frequently salient than the badness of late conceptions. (shrink)

We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed (...) by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms. (shrink)

This essay places some conceptual pressure on the model of a “learning process” in Jürgen Habermas’s Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, and it asks whether this model introduces a subtle asymmetry into the relationship between religion and secular philosophy. Such an asymmetry would seem to obtain insofar as religious tradition is granted a privileged or unique status as the source of normative insights that are then available for rational scrutiny and translation into secular life. The essay also draws (...) a comparison between Lessing and Habermas: Lessing, like Habermas, saw revelation as a source of instruction for humanity, and affirmed that religion could thereby play a role in the Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. But Lessing was careful to say that no valuable normative contents are found in religion that could not also be derived by secular reason alone. Habermas’s genealogy of post-metaphysical thinking does not seem to confirm Lessing’s idea; instead, it appears to confirm an asymmetry in the relation between religion and secular philosophy. (shrink)

Bayesian confirmation theory, as traditionally interpreted, treats the temporal relationship between the formulation of a hypothesis and the confirmation (or recognition) of evidence entailed by that hypothesis merely as a component of the psychology of discovery and acceptance of a hypothesis. The temporal order of these events is irrelevant to the logic of rational theory choice. A few years ago Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci offered a reinterpretation of Bayes' Theorem in defense of the view that the temporal relationship between (...) hypothesis and evidence really does matter. More specifically, they advocated the thesis that successful predictions implied by scientific hypothesis H will increase the degree of confirmation of H only if they are novel predictions in the following sense; Evidence E is heuristically novel with respect to hypothesis H if and only if H was not deliberately designed to explain E (if E has already been corroborated) or in anticipation of E (if E is regarded as likely to be corroborated at some future date). Campbell and Vinci argue that the traditional interpretation of Bayes' Theorem misconstrues the significance of predictive novelty by ignoring heuristic novelty. In this paper I review the formal component of their preferred interpretation and demonstrate that it fails to establish that heuristic novelty has any special effect on theory confirmation. That is, even on their revisionist interpretation, regardless of whether H was deliberately designed to explain known evidence E (or in anticipation of suspected E), or whether H was designed without any awareness of the entailment relationship between H and E, Bayes' Theorem will generate the same epistemic probability for hypothesis H. Cases where new evidence was not foreseen at the time a hypothesis first emerged do not carry any more epistemic weight than they would have if such evidence had been foreseen. * Research on this paper was supported by an NEH summer grant. My thanks also to Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci for their reply to my initial evaluation of their position (in private correspondence), which compelled me to reconsider their arguments more carefully. (shrink)

Time is generally thought to be one of the more mysterious ingredients of the universe. In this intriguing book, Paul Horwich makes precise and explicit the interrelationships between time and a large number of philosophically important notions.Ideas of temporal order and priority interact in subtle and convoluted ways with the deepest elements in our network of basic concepts. Confronting this conceptual jigsaw puzzle, Horwich notes that there are glaring differences in how we regard the past and future directions of time. (...) For example, we can influence the future but not the past, and can easily gain knowledge of the past but not of the future. Moreover we see a profusion of decay processes but little spontaneous generation of order; time appears to "flow" in one privileged direction, not the other; and we tend to explain phenomena in terms of antecedent circumstances, rather than subsequent ones. Horwich explains such time asymmetries and examines their bearing on the nature of time itself.Asymmetries in Time covers many notoriously difficult problems in the philosophy of science: causation, knowledge, entropy, explanation, time travel, rational choice, laws of nature, and counterfactual implication -- and gives a unified treatment of these matters. The book covers an unusually broad range of topics in a lucid and nontechnical way and includes alternative points of view in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

Strong dispositional monism, the position that all fundamental physical properties consist in dispositional relations to other properties, is naturally construed as property structuralism. J. Lowe’s circularity/regress objection constitutes a serious challenge to SDM that questions the possibility of a purely relational determination of all property essences. The supervenience thesis of A. Bird’s graph-theoretic asymmetry reply to CRO can be rigorously proved. Yet the reply fails metaphysically, because it reveals neither a metaphysical determination of identities on a purely relational basis (...) nor a determination specifically of identities in the sense of essences. Asymmetry is thus not by itself sufficient for a solution to CRO. But it cannot even help to answer CRO when a model for the determination of essences is taken as a basis. Nor is asymmetry necessary for a reply, as property structures may well be symmetric. A metaphysics of dispositional properties as grounded in a purely relational structure faces serious obstacles, and the properties would not be fundamental. Since essence and grounding are notions of metaphysical priority, there can be no essentially dispositional metaphysically fundamental properties, and the prospects of a “coherentist” metaphysics of basic properties are dim. A modal retreat that refrains from a post-modal conception of essence and simply claims that fundamental properties play dispositional roles by metaphysical necessity is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Oliver's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's important interpretation of the problem of universals as one concerning truthmakers neglects something crucial: that there is a numerical identity between numerically distinct particulars. The problem of universals is rather how to resolve the apparent contradiction that the same things are both numerically distinct and numerically identical. Baxter's account of instantiation as partial identity resolves the apparent contradiction. A seeming objection to this account is that it appears to make instantiation symmetric, since partial identity is (...) symmetric. Armstrong's standard reply is that the difference between a particular and a universal is what makes instantiation asymmetric. Brown suggests, though, that the instantiation of a universal by a universal is sometimes symmetric. However, the examples on which he relies are not universals. (shrink)

Das Problem der Asymmetrie des Protoplasmas bedarf einer kritischen Besprechung, die der Formulierung einer Reihe grundlegender Fragen, die in erster Linie einer weiteren experimentellen Bearbeitung bedürfen, förderlich sein kann. Vor allem muss hier mit der Terminologie begonnen werden. Man muss unterscheiden: die Dissymmetrie, als Eigenschaft des individuellen Moleküls ein sich mit dem Urbild nicht deckendes Spiegelbild zu besitzen, welche Eigenschaft bei einem bestimmten Niveau der Kompliziertheit der räumlichen Architektur des Moleküls eintritt, und, andererseits, die Asymmetrie als Eigenschaft der Gesamtheit (...) der Moleküle, die in der Abwesenheit der Gleichheit der rechten und linken dissymmetrischen Formen in diesen Gesamtheiten besteht. Für den Biologen bietet die Asymmetrie der molekulären Gesamtheiten insofern Interesse, als sie eine spezifische Eigenschaft des Protoplasmas ist und bei allen dissymmetrischen Stoffen fehlt, die in den irdischen Prozessen unabhängig von der Tätigkeit lebender Wesen entstehen. Hier können folgende grundlegende Fragen gestellt werden: 1. Welcher Art ist der deskriptive Aspekt der Asymmetrie des Protoplasmas? Für welche Komponenten des Protoplasmas ist die Asymmetrie der molekularen Gesamtheiten bei den verschiedenen Vertretern des Tier- und Pflanzenreiches obligatorisch und für welche nicht? 2. Welcher Art ist die physiologische Bedeutung der Asymmetrie des Protoplasmas, und auf welche Weise wird dieser spezifische Zustand aufrechterhalten? 3. Wie kann man sich im Lichte aller dieser Daten die Entstehung der Asymmetrie des Protoplasmas vorstellen?Die asymmetrische Architektur des Protoplasmas läuft im Grunde darauf hinaus, dass das Protoplasma aus Vertretern einer bestimmten Reihe „natürlicher” Antipoden aufgebaut ist. Hierdurch findet eine genaue Fixiertheit des die räumlichen Eigenschaften des Stoffes charakterisierenden Parameters statt. Diese Fixiertheit ist eine wichtige Bedingung für die Verwirklichung der feinen protoplasmatischen Koordinationen. Von allgemeinerem Standpunkt aus ist die Fixiertheit des räumlichen Parameters ein Spezialfall des bekanntenClaude Bernard'schen Gesetzes: „La fixité du milieu intérieur est la condition de la vie libre”.Im Artikel werden zahlreiche Angaben eingehend besprochen, die es gestatten zu behaupten, dass eine Reihe spezieller und tiefer Anpassungen in der physiologischen Organisation der Zelle die vom thermodynamischen Standpunkt unvermeidliche Razemisation des Protoplasmas verhindern, und den spezifischen Zustand der Asymmetrie des Protoplasmas aufrechterhalten. Im Lichte dieser Angaben kann die Entstehung der Asymmetrie des Protoplasmas mit Hilfe der Theorie der natürlichen Zuchtwahl erklärt werden. Der asymmetrische Zustand des Protoplasmasystems verleiht seinem Besitzer eine Reihe biologischer Vorzüge im Vergleich mit dem razemischen Zustand.Le problème de l'asymétrie du protoplasma mérite un examen critique. Cela pourrait aider à formuler une série de questions fondamentales exigeant en premier lieu une étude expérimentale ultérieure. À commencer par la terminologie, on doit distinguer d'une part la dissymétrie, propriété de la molécule individuelle de posséder une image non superposable, qui apparaît à un niveau déterminé de complexité dans l'architecture spatiale de la molécule, et d'autre part, l'asymétrie comme une propriété des ensembles de molécules, représentant le manque dans ces ensembles de l'égalité de forme dissymétriques de droite et de gauche. Pour le biologiste, l'asymétrie des ensembles moléculaires est d'un intérêt particulier, en ce qu'elle présente une propriété spécifique du protoplasma, et qu'elle manque dans toutes les substances dissymétriques, qui se forment au cours des processus terrestres, indépendamment de l'activité des êtres vivants. On peut poser ici trois questions principales: 1. Quel est l'aspect descriptif de l'asymétrie du protoplasma? Quels sont les composants protoplasmiques pour lesquels l'asymétrie des ensembles moléculaires est obligatoire, et ceux pour lesquels elle ne l'est point, chez les divers représentants du règne animal et du règne végétal? 2. Quelle est la valeur physiologique de l'asymétrie protoplasmique, et de quelle manière cet état spécifique se maintient-il? 3. Comment, à la lumière de ces données, peut on se figurer l'origine de l'asymétrie du protoplasma?Dans l'essentiel, l'architecture asymétrique du protoplasma se ramène au fait que celui-ci est construit avec les représentants d'une série déterminée d'antipodes „naturels”. Par cela même il y a là un état de fixité précise du paramètre, qui caractérise les propriétés spatiales de la matière. Cet état de fixité est une condition importante pour la réalisation des délicates coordinations protoplasmiques. Á un point de vue plus général, l'état de fixité du paramètre spatial constitue un cas particulier de la proposition bien connue deClaude Bernard: „La fixité du milieu intérieur est la condition de la vie libre”.Dans le présent article on discute en détail les faits nombreux qui permettent d'affirmer que dans l'organisation physiologique de la cellule, une série d'adaptations spéciales profondes empêchent la racémisation du protoplasma, inévitable au point de vue thermodynamique, et maintenant l'état asymétrique spécifique du protoplasma. Éclairée ainsi par les faits, l'origine du protoplasma asymétrique peut s'expliquer à l'aide de la théorie de la sélection naturelle. L'état asymétrique du système protoplasmique, par comparaison avec l'état racémique, accorde à son possesseur nombre d'avantages biologiques. (shrink)

Huw Price argues that there are two conceptions of the puzzle of the time‐asymmetry of thermodynamics. He thinks this puzzle has remained unsolved for so long partly due to a misunderstanding about which of these conceptions is the right one and what form a solution ought to take. I argue that it is Price's understanding of the problem which is mistaken. Further, it is on the basis of this and other misunderstandings that he disparages a type of account (...) which does, in fact, hold promise of a solution. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has proposed a theory of explanation based on the notion of unification. Despite the genuine interest and power of the theory, I argue here that the theory suffers from a fatal deficiency: It is intrinsically unable to account for the asymmetric structure of explanation, and thus ultimately falls prey to a problem similar to the one which beset Hempel's D-N model. I conclude that Kitcher is wrong to claim that one can settle the issue of an argument's (...) explanatory force merely on the basis of considerations about the unifying power of the argument pattern the argument instantiates. (shrink)

The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: how can we know someone else's mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self-knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non-inferential and non-observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic (...) features. So what is the basic source of my knowledge of other minds if I know my mind in such a way that I cannot know the minds of others? The aim of this paper is to clarify and assess the pivotal role that the asymmetry in respect of knowledge plays within a broadly inferentialist approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. The received dogma has always been to endorse the asymmetry for conceptual reasons and to insist that the idea of knowing someone else's mental life in the same way as one knows one's own mind is a complete non-starter. Against this, I aim to show that it is at best a contingent matter that creatures such as us cannot know other minds just as we know a good deal of our own minds and also that the idea of having someone else's mind in one's own introspective reach is not obviously self-contradictory. So the dogma needs to be revisited. As a result, the dialectical position of those inferentialists who believe that we know about someone else's mentality in virtue of an analogical inference will be reinforced. (shrink)

A decision theory can be useful not only as a tool for determining which action, given your desires and beliefs, is most preferable, but also as a means for analyzing the nature of rational deliberation. In this paper, I turn to two classic proposals for a causal decision theory, that of Lewis and that of Sobel :407–437, 1986. doi: 10.1080/00048408612342621). As Rabinowicz revealed, Lewis’ proposal is unable to be applied to as broad a set of decision problems as a version (...) of CDT offered by Sobel, an account of decision theory that Lewis thought was equivalent to his own. Rabinowicz argued by offering a counterexample to Lewis’ account. In this essay, I build on that approach, offering a novel counterexample, the “Faulty Signal Problem,” which proves that Lewis’ theory fails to provide a recommendation in an even broader class decision problems than Rabinowicz recognized, particularly those that exhibit what I refer to as counterfactual asymmetries. The problem for Lewis, however, is not just a technicality. Lewis and Sobel’s theories, respectively, conceptualize rational deliberation in two different ways. Lewis’ proposal, which utilized conditionalization as its form of belief revision, shares with evidential decision theory the same underlying attitude toward the agent as evidence-maker. In contrast, Sobel’s theory, based on imaging, captures the idea that deliberation requires a distinctly suppositional attitude that respects the agent’s causal views. The Faulty Signal Problem not only gives reason to favor Sobel’s proposal over Lewis’; it also provides justification for seeing imaging as necessary for a genuinely causal decision theory. (shrink)

This paper offers a unified explanation for the procreation asymmetry and the non-identity thesis – two of the most intractable puzzles in population ethics. According to the procreation asymmetry, there are moral reasons not to create lives that are not worth living but no moral reasons to create lives that are worth living. I explain the procreation asymmetry by arguing that there are moral reasons to prevent the bad, but no moral reasons to promote the good. Various (...) explanations for the procreation asymmetry have failed to explain the non-identity thesis: if one could create a person with a good life or a different person with a better life, one has a moral reason to create the better life. I argue that reflections on the misfortune of unfulfilled potential allow us to circumvent the non-identity problem. (shrink)

The asymmetry is the view in population ethics that, while we ought to avoid creating additional bad lives, there is no requirement to create additional good ones. The question is how to embed this intuitively compelling view in a more complete normative theory, and in particular one that treats uncertainty in a plausible way. While arguing against existing approaches, I present new and general principles for thinking about welfarist choice under uncertainty. Together, these reduce arbitrary choices to uncertainty-free ones, (...) regardless of how the latter should be made. I illustrate these principles by developing two theories of the asymmetry, reflecting different views about the non-identity problem. In doing so, I clarify some other major choice-points, presenting new arguments that creating additional good lives can justify (but not require) doing harm. Finally, I consider what the developed theories have to say about the importance of extinction risk and the long-run future. (shrink)

Selecting, applying and reporting on investment screens for socially responsible investing (SRI) presents challenges for companies, investors and fund managers. This article seeks to clarify the nature of these challenges in developing an understanding of the foundations of ethical investment screens. At a conceptual level this work argues that there is a common element to the ethical foundations of SRI, even with very different apparent motivations and investment restrictions. Establishing this commonality assists in explaining the information asymmetry problem (...) inherent in SRI. A market-facilitated solution illustrates how these insights might foster the development of socially responsible investment. (shrink)

In this conceptual paper, the traditional conceptualization of sustainable entrepreneurship is challenged because of a fundamental tension between processes involved in sustainable development and processes involved in entrepreneurship: the concept of sustainable business models contains a paradox, because sustainability involves the reduction of information asymmetries, whereas entrepreneurship involves enhanced and secured levels of information asymmetries. We therefore propose a new and integrated theory of sustainable entrepreneurship that overcomes this paradox. The basic argument is that environmental problems have to be conceptualized (...) as wicked problems or sustainability-related ecosystem failures. Because all actors involved in the entrepreneurial process are characterized by their epistemic insufficiency regarding the solving of these problems, the role of information in the sustainable entrepreneurial process changes. On the one hand, the reduction of information asymmetries primarily aims to enable actors to become critical of sustainable entrepreneurs’ actual business models. On the other hand, the epistemic insufficiency of sustainable entrepreneurs guarantees that information asymmetries remain as a source of new sustainable business opportunities. Three further characteristics of sustainable entrepreneurs are distinguished: sustainability and entrepreneurship-related risk-taking; sustainability and entrepreneurship-related self-efficacy; and the development of satisficing and open-ended solutions, together with multiple stakeholders. (shrink)

Davidson holds that thinkers cannot employ radically different conceptual schemes, but he does not deny the fact that small-scale conceptual divergences are possible. He defends the former claim against Quine by appealing to interpretivism, the idea that ascriptions of intensional states to a speaker do no more than systematically record facts about the speaker’s behavior. From interpretivism it follows that it is theoretically irrelevant which set of concepts an interpreter uses to state her theory of meaning. This is what allows (...) Davidson to avoid conceptual relativism while accepting Quine’s thesis that behavioral evidence necessarily underdetermines assignments of meaning to speakers. However, as Davidson seems not to have realized, interpretivism also rules out the possibility of uncontroversial, small-scale conceptual differences. This fact, I argue, should lead us to reject interpretivism. (shrink)

In a recent book and an article, Carl Craver construes the relations between different levels of a mechanism, which he also refers to as constitutive relations, in terms of mutual manipulability (MM). Interpreted metaphysically, MM implies that inter-level relations are symmetrical. MM thus violates one of the main desiderata of scientific explanation, namely explanatory asymmetry. Parts of Craver’s writings suggest a metaphysical interpretation of MM, and Craver explicitly commits to constitutive relationships being symmetrical. The paper furthermore explores the option (...) of interpreting MM epistemologically, as a means for individuating mechanisms. It is argued that MM then is redundant. MM should therefore better be abandoned. (shrink)

Mathias Frisch provides the first sustained philosophical discussion of conceptual problems in classical particle-field theories. Part of the book focuses on the problem of a satisfactory equation of motion for charged particles interacting with electromagnetic fields. As Frisch shows, the standard equation of motion results in a mathematically inconsistent theory, yet there is no fully consistent and conceptually unproblematic alternative theory. Frisch describes in detail how the search for a fundamental equation of motion is partly driven by pragmatic considerations (...) (like simplicity and mathematical tractability) that can override the aim for full consistency. The book also offers a comprehensive review and criticism of both the physical and philosophical literature on the temporal asymmetry exhibited by electromagnetic radiation fields, including Einstein's discussion of the asymmetry and Wheeler and Feynman's influential absorber theory of radiation. Frisch argues that attempts to derive the asymmetry from thermodynamic or cosmological considerations fail and proposes that we should understand the asymmetry as due to a fundamental causal constraint. The book's overarching philosophical thesis is that standard philosophical accounts that strictly identify scientific theories with a mathematical formalism and a mapping function specifying the theory's ontology are inadequate, since they permit neither inconsistent yet genuinely successful theories nor thick causal notions to be part of fundamental physics. (shrink)

The physics of time asymmetry has never been a single well-defined subject, but more a collection of consistency problems which arise in almost all branches ...

In this paper we distinguish two versions of the non-identity problem: one involving positive well-being and one involving negative well-being. Intuitively, there seems to be a difference between the two versions of the problem. In the negative case it is clear that one ought to cause the better off person to exist. However, it has recently been suggested that this is not so in the positive case. We argue that such an asymmetrical treatment of the two versions should (...) be rejected and that this is evidence against views according to which it is permissible to cause the less well off person to exist in the positive non-identity case. (shrink)

(This is an earlier, working-paper version of a paper published open-access in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. It contains some material not included in the journal version, and it does not include certain revisions. Please cite the journal version if possible.).

Recent discussions of consequentialism have drawn our attention to the so-called “self-other” asymmetry. Various cases presented by Michael Slote and Michael Stocker are alleged to demonstrate a fundamental asymmetry between our obligations to others and ourselves.1 Moreover, these cases are taken to constitute a difficulty for consequentialism, and for the various versions of utilitarianism in particular. I agree that there is a fundamental asymmetry between our obligations to ourselves and to others, and that this fact is inconsistent (...) with the letter of traditional utilitarianisms. However, I do not think this represents a deep shortcoming of the spirit behind utilitarianism. In this paper I will argue that the self-other asymmetry can be accommodated in a broadly utilitarian framework. First, in section one, I characterize moral “asymmetry” in general. Then, in section two, I argue that the cases presented by Slote and Stocker do indeed represent a genuine self-other asymmetry. In part, this involves criticism of an attempt to accommodate the asymmetry within a preferentist framework. Finally, I will present my own solution to the problem of self and other. (shrink)

Many philosophers are attracted to a complaints-based theory of the procreation asymmetry, according to which creating a person with a bad life is wrong (all else equal) because that person can complain about your act, whereas declining to create a person who would have a good life is not wrong (all else equal) because that person never exists and so cannot complain about your act. In this paper, I present two problems for such theories: the problem of impairable-life (...) acceptance and an especially acute version of the problem of improvable-life avoidance. I explain how these problems afflict two recent complaints-based theories of the procreation asymmetry, from Joe Horton and Abelard Podgorski. (shrink)

This thesis addresses the problem of causal asymmetry. This problem may be characterized as follows: what is the relation R such that if an event c causes an event e c bears relation R to e but e does not bear relation R to e. The traditional Humean account of causal asymmetry is that "R" may be replaced by "temporally prior." Difficulties with this account based on consideration of cases of simultaneous causation and backward causation have (...) given rise to non-Humean accounts of causal asymmetry. This dissertation analyzes some of these difficulties along with various non-Humean approaches. I offer a new theory of causal asymmetry which does not depend upon the temporal priority of causes to their effects and which differs from any of the other theories available. ;In chapter one the problem of causal asymmetry is clarified. This problem is distinguished from related issues. At the same time, I articulate the various philosophical considerations which bear on the scope and importance of this problem. I also state what I take to be the conditions an adequate account of causal asymmetry must satisfy. In the second chapter I discuss the classical Humean analysis of causal priority in terms of temporal priority. It is argued that arguments which have been put forward to show that backwards causation is logically impossible are unconvincing and that there are cases of simultaneous causation. In the third chapter the manipulability theory of causation is treated. Various formulations of this theory, from the most anthropomorphic to the least anthropomorphic are treated as they bear on the problem of causal asymmetry. Manipulability theory is found to be inadequate. ;In chapter four counterfactual theories of causation are considered. A number of counterexamples to these theories are presented and developed. In chapter five, two views which are grouped under "regularity theory" are analyzed and criticized: those of Bromberger and Berofsky. Mackie's earlier and later accounts of causal asymmetry along with Sanford's view are discussed in chapter six. In chapter seven, Erik Brown's recent view is considered alongside "transference theory." In the final chapter I develop a new theory of causal priority which utilizes the "circumstantial" character of the causal relation in accounting for causal asymmetry. (shrink)

The problem of explanatory non-symmetries provides the strongest reason to abandon the view that laws can figure in explanations without causal underpinnings. I argue that this problem can be overcome. The solution that I propose starts from noticing the importance of conditions of application when laws do explanatory work, and I go on to develop a notion of nomological dependence that can tackle the non-symmetry problem. The strategy is to show how a strong notion of counterfactual dependence (...) as guaranteed by the laws is a plausible account of what we aim towards when we give law-based explanations. The aim of this project is not to deny that causal relations can do explanatory work but to restore laws of nature as capable of being explanatory even in the absence of any knowledge of causal underpinnings. (shrink)

The problem of explanatory asymmetry remains a serious challenge for non-causal accounts of explanation. This paper proposes a novel solution, and it does so by appealing to the theoretical context in which an explanation is offered. The paper develops the problem of explanatory asymmetry for non-causal dependency accounts of explanation, focusing specifically on Alexander Reutlinger’s Counterfactual Theory of Explanation and recent work by Marc Lange and Lina Jansson. It defends the idea that nomological possibility with respect (...) to a global theory is the right constraint on explanation, and it shows how this breaks the apparent symmetry in counterfactual dependence that is the source of the problem. This solution appeals to theoretical context, and the paper develops and defends the version of contextualism in explanation that is required. (shrink)

Number terms and quantifiers share a range of linguistic (syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic) properties. On the basis of these similarities, one might expect these 2 classes of linguistic expression to pose similar problems to children acquiring language. We report here the results of an experiment that explicitly compared the acquisition of numerical expressions (two, four) and quantificational (some, all) expressions in younger and older 3-year-olds. Each group showed adult-like preferences for “exact” interpretations when evaluating number terms; however they did not (...) use the corresponding upper bounded interpretation when evaluating the quantifier some. Apparently, children follow different procedures for learning and evaluating numerals and quantifiers. These findings have implications for theories of number representation in child and adult grammars. (shrink)

In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...) that it is a bad thing for a person that he is born when he actually is born, rather than earlier. That is, if the deprivation account is the correct account of death's badness, then it appears that one should have symmetric attitudes to prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. But clearly we do not in general have symmetric attitudes toward the period before our birth and the period after our death; in general, we do not think of our late births as a bad thing, but we can indeed consider our early deaths as bad for us. Thus, it appears that there is a problem for the deprivation account of death's badness. (shrink)

This paper contributes to an on-going exchange in political theory on the normative legitimacy of expert bodies. It focuses on epistemic worries about the expertisation of politics, and uses the Nordic system of advisory commissions as an empirical case. Epistemic concerns are often underplayed by those who defend an increasing role of experts in policy-making, while those who have epistemic worries often tend to overstate them and debunk expertise. We present ten epistemic worries, of which some are of an epistemological (...) nature, while others are related to failures and biases. These worries must not be overstated, but no doubt point to real problems which have to be handled through the design of expert bodies and institutions of science advice. We introduce three groups of mechanisms that are likely to contribute to remedying the problems of expertise and discuss what they imply for the design of a system of public advisory commissions. (shrink)

Two of the most difficult problems in the foundations of physics are (1) what gives rise to the arrow of time and (2) what the ontology of quantum mechanics is. I propose a unified 'Humean' solution to the two problems. Humeanism allows us to incorporate the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical Postulate into the best system, which we then use to simplify the quantum state of the universe. This enables us to confer the nomological status to the quantum state in (...) a way that adds no significant complexity to the best system and solves the ''supervenient-kind problem'' facing the original version of the Past Hypothesis. We call the resultant theory the Humean unification. It provides a unified explanation of time asymmetry and quantum entanglement. On this theory, what gives rise to time's arrow is also responsible for quantum phenomena. The new theory has a separable mosaic, a best system that is simple and non-vague, less tension between quantum mechanics and special relativity, and a higher degree of theoretical and dynamical unity. The Humean unification leads to new insights that can be useful to Humeans and non-Humeans alike. (shrink)

Research in psychology suggests that some individuals are more sensitive to positive than to negative information while others are more sensitive to negative rather than positive information. I take these cognitive positive–negative asymmetries in information processing to a Bayesian decision-theory model and explore its consequences in terms of decisions and payoffs. I show that in monotone decision problems economic agents with more positive-responsive information structures are always better off, ex ante, when they face problems where payoffs are relatively more sensitive (...) to the action chosen when the state of nature is favorable. (shrink)

Number terms and quantifiers share a range of linguistic (syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic) properties. On the basis of these similarities, one might expect these 2 classes of linguistic expression to pose similar problems to children acquiring language. We report here the results of an experiment that explicitly compared the acquisition of numerical expressions (two, four) and quantificational (some, all) expressions in younger and older 3-year-olds. Each group showed adult-like preferences for “exact” interpretations when evaluating number terms; however they did not (...) use the corresponding upper bounded interpretation when evaluating the quantifier some. Apparently, children follow different procedures for learning and evaluating numerals and quantifiers. These findings have implications for theories of number representation in child and adult grammars. (shrink)

In The Elm and The Expert (Fodor 1994), Jerry Fodor claims that in order to solve the mind/body problem (consciousness excluded), a computational psychology needs to be combined with a naturalistic theory of content such as the asymmetric dependence theory put forward in ‘A Theory of Content II’ (in Fodor 1990, pp. 89‐136). However, since this theory was first proposed, it has been reproached for a number of failings, perhaps the most significant of which is the objection that it (...) simply begs the question. In this paper I provide an outline of the story so far, covering Fodor's objectives, the theory he proposes to meet them and the objection in question, before going on to argue that a promising attempt to answer this objection will not bear fruit given the way in which Fodor tackles the original problems. I then argue that the seeming intractability of this objection is due to Fodor's striving to solve all the problems that a naturalistic theory presents in one fell swoop, and conclude by suggesting how, given a careful choice of targets and a well organised methodology, asymmetric dependence might yet prove to be an attractive theory of content. (shrink)

One of the most striking features of causation is that causes typically precede their effects – the causal arrow is strongly aligned with the temporal arrow. Why should this be so? We offer an opinionated guide to this problem, and to the solutions currently on offer. We conclude that the most promising strategy is to begin with the de facto asymmetry of human deliberation, characterised in epistemic terms, and to build out from there. More than any rival, this (...) subjectivist approach promises to demystify the asymmetry, temporal orientation, and deliberative relevance of causal judgements. (shrink)

The mechanisms responsible for the fine tuning of development, where the wildtype phenotype is reproduced with high fidelity, are not well understood. The difficulty in approaching this problem is the identification of mutant phenotypes indicative of a defect in these fine‐tuning control mechanisms. Evolutionary biologists have used asymmetry as a measure of developmental homeostasis. The rationale for this was that, since the same genome controls the development of the left and right sides of a bilaterally symmetrical organism, departures (...) from symmetry can be used to measure genetic or environmental perturbations. This paper examines the relationship between asymmtry and resistance to organophosphorous insecticides in the Australian sheep blowfly, Lucilia cuprina. A resistance gene, Rop‐1, which encodes a carboxylesterase enzyme, also confers a significant increase in asymmetry. Continued exposure of resistant populations to insecticide has selected a dominant suppressor of the asymmetry phenotype. Genetic evidence indicates that the modifier is the L. cuprina Notch homologue. (shrink)

This contribution explores disability rights protection in Inter-American States within the framework of the OAS and in the context of the obligations established under the CIADDIS and the CRPD. Following the classical division between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rules, the contribution first sketches key regulatory initiatives in the area of disability rights and second considers compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Along these lines, the first section illustrates similarities and differences between the CIADDIS and the CRPD and, within this framework, essential regional regulatory (...) initiatives. The second section assesses disability rights in select countries, based on periodic reports under the CIADDIS and CRPD. The section examines the four largest countries by population in the region, notably, the United States of America (US), Mexico, Brazil and Colombia. The third section explores the enforcement of disability rights via key cases before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAComHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The purpose is providing a comprehensive understanding of disability rights in the region and identifying key regulatory problems and ways forward. (shrink)

The ancient problem of whether our asymmetrical attitudes towards time are justified remains a live one in contemporary philosophy. Drawing on themes in the work of McTaggart, Parfit, and Heidegger, I argue that this problem is also a key concern of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or. Part I of Either/Or presents the “aesthete” as living a temporally volatilized form of life, devoid of temporal location, sequence and direction. Like Parfit’s character “Timeless,” these aesthetes are indifferent to the direction of time and (...) seemingly do not experience McTaggart’s “A-Series” mode of temporality. The “ethical” conception of time that Judge William offers in Part II contains an attempt to normativize the direction of time, by re-orienting the aesthete towards an awareness of time ’s finitude. However, the form of life Judge William articulates gives time sequentiality but not necessarily the robust directionality necessary to justify our asymmetrical attitudes to time. Hence while Either/Or raises this problem it remains unanswered until The Concept of Anxiety. Only with the eschatological understanding of time developed in The Concept of Anxiety does Kierkegaard answer the question of why directional and asymmetrical conative and affective attitudes towards time are normative. (shrink)

A comparative study is made of the eigenvalue problems of electromagnetics and quantum mechanics, with special reference to the operations of spatial inversionP and time inversionT. Electromagnetics, which permits closer agreement with the dictates of relativity (when the latter is extended toP andT), exhibits characteristic differences with respect to quantum mechanics. An evaluation of these distinctions is presented against the backdrop of a choice between absolute scalar action and charge versus pseudoscalar action and charge.

The paper analyzes the philosophical consequences of the recent discovery of direct violations of the time–reversal symmetry of weak interactions. It shows that although we have here an important case of the time asymmetry of one of the fundamental physical forces which could have had a great impact on the form of our world with an excess of matter over antimatter, this asymmetry cannot be treated as the asymmetry of time itself but rather as an asymmetry (...) of some specific physical process in time. The paper also analyzes the consequences of the new discovery for the general problem of the possible connections between direction of time and time-asymmetric laws of nature. These problems are analyzed in the context of Horwich’s Asymmetries in time: problems in the philosophy of science argumentation, trying to show that existence of a time–asymmetric law of nature is a sufficient condition for time to be anisotropic. Instead of Horwich’s sufficient condition for anisotropy of time, it is stressed that for a theory of asymmetry of time to be acceptable it should explain all fundamental time asymmetries: the asymmetry of traces, the asymmetry of causation, and the asymmetry between the fixed past and open future. It is so because the problem of the direction of time has originated from our attempts to understand these asymmetries and every plausible theory of the direction of time should explain them. (shrink)

This paper presents an empirical study on the frequency of discoveries and inventions that were awarded with the. More than 70 per cent of all Nobel Prizes were given to discoveries. The majority of inventions were awarded at the beginning of the twentieth century and only three inventions had a direct application for society. The emphasis on discoveries moves the Nobel Prize further away from its original intention to reward the greatest contribution to society in the preceding year. We propose (...) to strengthen the role of inventions for the Nobel Prize, which would encourage inventors to tackle important problems, such as global warming or the gap between the first and the third worlds. (shrink)