What would happen if we succeeded in ‘turning down’ our emotional reactions? In this paper I compare two conditions that play out the answer to this question in very different ways—the lived experience of flattened affect characteristic of depression, and the idealised emotional restraint of the tranquil Epicurean ataraxic. I use this comparison to develop a new proposed source of value for the presence of emotion in our ordinary lives: it feels good to feel like oneself, and there are facts (...) about our reflexive relationship to our emotional lives that provides one explanation of when and why we get to feel that way. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to examine a conception of happiness that seems to have become popular after the time of Plato and Aristotle: tranquillity or, as one might also say, peace of mind. This conception is interesting for two reasons: first, because it seems to come from outside the tradition that began with Plato or Socrates, second, because it is the only conception of eudaimonia in Greek ethics that identifies happiness with a state of mind and makes it (...) depend entirely on a person’s attitude or beliefs. In this way it may be closer to more recent ideas about happiness, notably those of utilitarians who treat “happiness” as a synonym of “pleasure,” than to the classical Greek conceptions of the good life. For Plato and Aristotle the happy life certainly had to be pleasant or enjoyable, but they did not think that happiness itself consisted in being pleased with one’s life. As the Stoic Seneca puts it, “it is not that virtue is chosen because it pleases, but that, if chosen, it also pleases.” I will argue that tranquillity was in fact not a serious contender for the position of ultimate good in ancient times. Greek theories of happiness from Plato to Epicurus were attempts to spell out what sort of a life one would have to lead in order to have good reasons for feeling tranquil or contented; they were not recipes for reaching a certain state of mind. Looking at the case of tranquillity will show, I think, that modern philosophers interested in questions about the good life might be well advised to follow the lead of their ancient predecessors. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to examine a conception of happiness that seems to have become popular after the time of Plato and Aristotle: tranquillity or, as one might also say, peace of mind. This conception is interesting for two reasons: first, because it seems to come from outside the tradition that began with Plato or Socrates, second, because it is the only conception of eudaimonia in Greek ethics that identifies happiness with a state of mind and makes it (...) depend entirely on a person’s attitude or beliefs. In this way it may be closer to more recent ideas about happiness, notably those of utilitarians who treat “happiness” as a synonym of “pleasure,” than to the classical Greek conceptions of the good life. For Plato and Aristotle the happy life certainly had to be pleasant or enjoyable, but they did not think that happiness itself consisted in being pleased with one’s life. As the Stoic Seneca puts it, “it is not that virtue is chosen because it pleases, but that, if chosen, it also pleases.” I will argue that tranquillity was in fact not a serious contender for the position of ultimate good in ancient times. Greek theories of happiness from Plato to Epicurus were attempts to spell out what sort of a life one would have to lead in order to have good reasons for feeling tranquil or contented; they were not recipes for reaching a certain state of mind. Looking at the case of tranquillity will show, I think, that modern philosophers interested in questions about the good life might be well advised to follow the lead of their ancient predecessors. (shrink)

Neste artigo examino a noção de ataraxía tal como presente no ceticismo pirrônico de Sexto Empírico. Meu propósito é mostrar que, a despeito de conservar aspectos que parecem estar a ela associados desde a filosofia de Pirro, o sentido da noção de ataraxía muda substancialmente e passa a possuir, ao menos nas Hipotiposes, um aspecto fundamental de ordem “intelectual” associado à supressão de um tipo específico de perturbação filosófica. Pretendo igualmente mostrar que tal peculiaridade permitiria compreender como ele se relacionaria (...) de modo coerente com a noção de investigação cética pirrônica e, para tanto, como ele se associa com a noção de “terapia filosófica” e de “epokhé sobre todas as coisas” que se fazem presentes na obra de Sexto. (shrink)

The fundamental principle of Hans Blumenberg’s concept of Modernity is “immanent self-assertion,” through which the modern human being identifies within itself the possibilities of transforming or re-constructing the world according to a human order. “Immanent self-assertion” is a product of human progress and is conditioned by the historical development of theoretical curiosity. In this article, it is argued that Blumenberg’s concept of Modernity is founded on a misinterpretation of Epicurean ataraxia, which is traditionally defined as “freedom from anxiety” and (...) which Blumenberg himself characterizes as “dispassionate ease.” For Blumenberg, ataraxia epitomizes the limitations of theoretical curiosity before the modern era. Where Blumenberg identifies “immanent self-assertion” as the means of extending absolute influence over the world through the subjugation of nature, it is argued that Epicurean worldliness resides within a sense of self-mastery against the radical contingency of tuchē that defines the world order.Le principe fondamental du concept de modernité de Hans Blumen-berg est « l’affirmation de soi immanente», par laquelle l’être humain moderne identifie en lui-même les possibilités de transformer ou de reconstruire le monde selon l’ordre humain. « L’affirmation de soi immanente » est un produit du progrès humain, conditionnée par le développement historique de la curiosité théorique. Dans cet article, on avance que le concept de modernité de Blumenberg est fondé sur une interprétation erronée du ataraxia épicurien, défini traditionnellement comme « l’absence d’anxiété » et que Blumenberg lui-même qualifie de « facilité impartiale ». Pour Blumenberg, ataraxia incarne les limites de la curiosité théorique avant l'ère moderne. Là où Blumenberg identifie « l’affirmation de soi immanente » comme le moyen d'étendre une influence absolue sur le monde par la subjugation de la nature, il est soutenu que la mondanité épicurienne réside dans un sentiment de maîtrise de soi contre la contingence radicale de tuchē qui définit l'ordre mondial. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with two interrelated questions. First, a broad question: in what sense is Skepticism a philosophy− or in what sense is it “philosophy” (as we will see, these are not identical questions)? Second, a narrow one: how should we understand the process whereby ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) emerges out of epochē (suspension of judgment)? The first question arises because Skepticism is often portrayed as anti-philosophy. This depiction, I contend, surreptitiously turns a Skeptical method into a so-called (...) Skeptical doctrine which is then either condemned for being self-refuting or salvaged as a plausible (albeit odd) epistemological theory. Instead, philosophy, for the Skeptics, is a matter of practice. Skepticism is not so much a philosophy that has a worldview to proclaim as it is a philosophy that invites us to perform something. (shrink)

고대 피론주의자들의 목표는 마음의 평정, 즉 아타락시아였다. 그리고 아타락시아를 가능하게 하는 필요조건으로 그들이 내세운 것이 판단유보였다. 일체의 결정을 유보함으로써 그들은 모든 불안에서 해방되어 행복한 삶을 향유할 수 있다고 주장하였다. 과연 그들의 말대로 아타락시아는 가능한가? 가능하다면 그런 삶은 어떤 종류의 것일까? 아타락시아의 철학적 의의는 무엇인가? 이런 물음들이 이 논문에서 다루려고 하는 주제이다. 섹스투스 엠피리쿠스는 피론주의자가 택한 행위의 기준이 현상이며, 이 현상의 강제성에 수동적으로 따름으로써 행위자는 아타락시아에 도달할 수 있다고 역설하였다. 이로써 그는 피론주의자가 비행동적이지도 않으며 비일관적이지도 않음을 보였다고 자신하였다. 그러나 섹스투스 엠피리쿠스의 (...) 주장대로 아타락시아가 가능하다 하더라도, 피론주의자가 목표로 하는 아타락시아의 삶은 강고한 현실에 예속된 삶에 불과하다고 나는 생각한다. 피론주의자가 판단유보를 이론영역에서뿐만 아니라 실천영역에서도 관철하려면, 그 대가로 그는 삶에 대한 비판적 반성이 결여된 뿌리 없는 삶을 영위해야 한다. 반대로 아타락시아의 의의를 독단주의에 대한 치유에서 찾으려고 한다면, 피론주의의 이론의 철저함은 부차적인 문제로 격하되고 만다. 섹스투스 엠피리쿠스는 자기 이론의 정합성을 해치는 이런 해석을 받아들이기 어려울 것이다. 그러나 그가 이론과 실천에서 철저한 판단유보를 유지하려고 하는 한, 다시 그는 철저하게 현실에 순응하는 삶의 양식을 받아들이지 않을 수 없을 것이다. (shrink)

My purpose in this article is to revisit an issue concerning the state of undisturbedness or tranquility (ἀταραξία) in ancient Pyrrhonism as this skeptical stance is depicted in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works. The issue in question is whether both the pursuit and the attainment of undisturbedness in matters of opinion should be regarded as defining features of Pyrrhonism not merely from a systematic standpoint that examines Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy, but mainly according to Sextus’s own account of that (...) skeptical stance. In exploring this issue, I will develop an interpretation defended in previous work, responding to some objections, discussing alternative interpretations, offering further textual support, and putting forward new arguments. It is my contention that examining whether both the pursuit and the attainment of undisturbedness in matters of opinion are essential to Pyrrhonism will make it possible to gain a more accurate understanding of this brand of skepticism. (shrink)

The Epicurean philosophical system has enjoyed much recent scrutiny, but the question of its philosophical ancestry remains largely neglected. It has often been thought that Epicurus owed only his physical theory of atomism to the fifth-century BC philosopher Democritus, but this study finds that there is much in his ethical thought which can be traced to Democritus. It also finds important influences on Epicurus in Democritus' fourth-century followers such as Anaxarchus and Pyrrho, and in Epicurus' disagreements with his own Democritean (...) teacher Nausiphanes. The result is not only a fascinating reconstruction of a lost tradition, but also an important contribution to the philosophical interpretation of Epicureanism, bearing especially on its ideal of tranquillity and on the relation of ethics to physics. (shrink)

Both Stoic and Buddhist ethics are deeply concerned with the ethical dangers of attachments. Three dangers stand out: (1) the destructive consequences of overwhelming emotionality, brought on by attachment, both for oneself and others, (2) the dangers to one's agency posed by strongly held, but ultimately unstable, attachments, and (3) the threat to virtuous emotional engagement with others caused by one's own attachment to them. The first two kinds of moral dangers have informed Stoic models of detachment (see Wong (2006). (...) In this paper I draw on Buddhist texts to present a model of detachment that responds primarily to the third moral danger of attachment, the danger of not loving well. (shrink)

Epicurus’ debt to Democritus’ metaphysics is obvious. Even where Epicurus feels the need to modify Democritus’ metaphysics because of its skeptical or fatalist implications, he is working within Democritus’ general framework. The situation is quite different in ethics. Ancient critics of Epicurus claim that the Cyrenaics’ hedonism is the inspiration for his ethics, and in modern times, Epicurus’ ethics is usually viewed in the context of Aristotle’s eudaimonism.

에피쿠로스는 쾌락을 최고선으로 보고, 쾌락과 행복을 동일시한다. 그는 쾌락과 고통의 관계를 모순 관계로 파악함으로써 ‘고통 없음’을 ‘쾌락’과 동일시하고 같은 논리로 고통 부재의 평온함(ataraxia)에서 ‘불행하지 않음’을 ‘행복’과 동일시한다. 그러나 고통의 부재가 곧 쾌락을 의미하는 것이 아닐 수도 있고, 평온함 속에서 ‘불행하지 않음’이 곧 행복을 의미하는 것이 아닐 수도 있다. 고통의 부재는 쾌락과 고통의 중립 상태를 의미할 수도 있고, 불행하지 않음도 행복과 불행의 중립 상태를 의미할 수 있다. 더욱이 고통 없는 상태의 평온함은 무료와 권태로 이어져서 불행을 야기할 수도 있다. 이처럼 ‘고통 (...) 없는 상태에서의 불행 내지 행복하지 않음’은 얼마든지 가능하다. 쾌락과 행복하지 않음의 양립 가능성은 쾌락—행복 동일론을 반증한다. 따라서 아타락시아는 행복을 위해서 필요한 것일 수는 있어도 그 자체를 행복이라고 하기는 어렵다. 또한 고통의 부재 상태로서의 평온함은 그것과 구별되는 순수한 쾌락의 존재 가능성과 그것이 더 큰 상위의 목적을 위한 수단으로 사용될 가능성을 배제하지 못한다. 따라서 아타락시아는 최고선이 될 수 없다. 에피쿠로스가 이상적인 상태로 보는 아타락시아는 결코 행복과 동일한 것이 아닐 뿐만 아니라 최고선도 아니다. 에피쿠로스의 쾌락주의 행복론은 ‘고통 없음’을 쾌락과 동일시하고 ‘불행하지 않음’을 행복과 동일시함으로써 행복이 아닌 것을 행복이라고 강변하는 오류에 빠졌다. (shrink)

Philosophers have said less than is needed about the nature of premature death, and about the badness or otherwise of that death for the one who dies. In this paper, premature death’s nature is clarified in Epicurean terms. And an accompanying argument denies that we need to think of such a death as bad in itself for the one who dies. Premature death’s nature is conceived of as a death that arrives before ataraxia does. (Ataraxia’s nature is also (...) clarified. It is a pervasive inner peace that is a kind of purity and completeness in how one is living.) Whatever harm we might attribute to a premature death is better attributed to a life’s being lived at that time without ataraxia. The paper ends by explaining how its Epicurean account, more so than comparativist or narrativist accounts, could allow a person to know that her death will not be premature. (shrink)

피론주의를 부활시켰던 아이네시데모스는 고대 회의주의 역사에서 독특한 위치를 차지하고 있다. 처음에는 아카데미 학파의 일원이었으나, 독단주의로 경도된 아카데미학파를 떠나 회의주의자인 피론에게서 새로운 철학의 가능성을 찾았기 때문이다. 그가 부활시킨 피론주의는 크게 다음 3가지 특징을 가진다.BR 첫째, 아이네시데모스의 주저는 『피론의 담화』이나 현존하지는 않는다. 그 대신, 디오게네스 라에르티오스의 『철학자 열전』, 섹스투스의 『피론주의 개요』, 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』에 등장하는 아리스토클레스의 언급 그리고 포티우스의 『도서관』등에 이 책의 단편적인 내용들이 존재한다. 섹스투스와 라에르티오스의 보고는 정당하나, 아리스토클레스와 포티우스의 보고는 많은 문제점을 안고 있다. 특히, 후자들은 그의 회의주의를 소개하면서 그의 철학적 (...) 목적을 인식론적 토대의 부재성에 찾고 있으나, 그의 철학을 인식론적인 것으로 한정하고, 그의 회의주의적 태도를 자기모순적인 것으로 이해하는 오류를 범하였다. 그러기에, 아이네시데모스의 회의주의에 대한 논의는 라에르티오스와 섹스투스의 기록에 힘입어 재구성되어야 한다.BR 둘째, 아이네시데모스의 회의주의에는 “이소스테네이아(isostheneia)”에 근거한 양립화의 기술이 있다. 이 기술을 통하여, 그는 모든 문제에 있어서 긍정적인 논증과 부정적인 논증이 동시적으로 성립될 수 있는 가능성을 보여준다. 하나의 이슈에 동일한 힘을 가지고 있는 대립항을 성립시키고 인식론적 판단유보를 이끌어냄으로써, 그는 사물의 한쪽 면만을 절대시하는 인식론적 독단주의로부터 자유로워지고, 마음의 평안(ataraxia)을 획득할 것을 강조하였다.BR 셋째, 아이네시데모스 회의주의의 중심에는 10개의 논증방식들(tropen)이 있다. 10개의 논증방식들은 ‘주체에 기인한 논증방식’, ‘판단되는 대상에 기인한 논증방식’ 그리고 ‘주체와 객체 양자에 기인한 논증방식’이 있으며, 3개의 상위 논증방식들은 다시 1개의 최상위 논증방식인 ‘상대성에 기인한 논증방식’으로 수렴된다. 그의 논증방식들은 딜레마적인 형태를 갖춘 10가지 파괴적인 논증방식으로, 판단의 가능성에 대한 그의 논증의 형태이자 체계적인 이해의 산물이다. 아이네시데모스는 이 파괴적인 논증방식들을 사용함으로써, 그는 인식론적 독단주의를 제거하고, 마음의 혼란을 잠재우고자 하였다.BR 결론적으로, 아이네시데모스는 새롭게 부활한 피론주의에 최고의 논증방식을 제공한 최초의 피론주의자였다. 물론, 그의 철학에 대한 많은 오해가 있음에도 불구하고, 그는 초기 피론주의를 확립하는데 부족함이 없었다. 이후, 섹스투스는 이러한 아이네시데모스의 성과에 힙 입어 성숙한 피론주의를 완성한다. (shrink)

The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, to examine what beliefs, if any, underlie (a) the Pyrrhonist’s desire for ataraxia and his account of how this state may be attained, and (b) his philanthropic therapy, which seeks to induce, by argument, ejpochv and ataraxia in the Dogmatists. Second, to determine whether the Pyrrhonist’s philanthropy and his search for and attainment of ataraxia are, as scholars have generally believed, essential aspects of his stance.

O foco deste trabalho é a compreensão da felicidade como fruto de práticas virtuosas, tal como sugere Sêneca. Aqui, são empregados pensamentos dispostos em quatro obras do pensador romano. O primeiro aparece em Sobre a clemência, escrita com a finalidade de tornar Nero um bom imperador. A beatitude verdadeira deveria consistir em proporcionar uma vida feliz a muitos. Desse modo, a felicidade de um governante só poderia ser a partir da felicidade do povo. A segunda ideia aparece em Sobre a (...) ira, onde a máxima regente é evitar a decepção por meio da ataraxia – a conformidade com a natureza. Aqui, a felicidade se encontra na redução das expectativas e no preparo/espera para as adversidades. A terceira concepção de felicidade aparece na sua Consolação à mãe Hélvia, escrita no exílio, para lembrar sua mãe de todas as infelicidades que já teve, pois, a infelicidade constante teria esta característica positiva: endurecer aqueles a quem incansavelmente persegue. Por fim, o conselho é afastar-se do caminho das multidões e entregar-se à filosofia, que é prática, e buscar o equilíbrio, fugindo dos prazeres frívolos, negando as voluptuosidades e exaltando a moral, típica do estoicismo romano. (shrink)

As the premier early modern advocate of an Epicurean alternative to the prevailing neo-Scholastic framework of Aristotelianism, Pierre Gassendi promoted not only ancient but also innovative reasoning on behalf of atomism, probabilism, empiricism, psychological hedonism, social contractarianism, and a range of other stances associated with the philosophy of the Garden. Much commentary has focused on the extent to which Gassendi ‘baptizes’ Epicurean thought. Beyond this aspect of his Epicureanism are questions as to whether, and how, Gassendi is true to core (...) Epicurean thinking, and what he preserves and promotes as valuable to philosophical and natural investigations of his time. Indeed, much subsequent modern philosophy builds on or reacts to an Epicurean legacy bequeathed by Gassendi, comprising his adjustments to, constraints on, or corrections of, the canonical views. Yet, for all his amendments, he retains as a primary philosophical motivation the Epicurean goal of striving for ataraxia. In this, he signals his firm commitment to philosophy in the tradition of the canonical Epicurean views. And, as with Epicurus’ own notion, his account of the centrality of attaining tranquility directs us to a better understanding of our nature and that of the world around us; amenable, in Gassendi’s framework, to Christian thought and contemporary natural philosophical investigations. (shrink)

This paper provides a description of the ancient sceptic’s way of life that frames skepticism as a pervasive state of mind and character. This state is presented through a causal account of the process through which it is created. Noted as the first rung in this account is the Sceptic Teacher, who, by blending the characteristics of the idea types of Universal Refuter and the Universal Persuader, causes a dispositional tendency in the sceptic student to suspend belief for all propositions (...) p and ~p by presenting equally convincing arguments for each over a range representative of all beliefs. As a result, the sceptic loses many cognitive attitudes completely, and this essay discusses the moral implications of losses of cognitive attitudes of this kind, addressing criticisms of the sceptic’s cognitive tendencies by examining various benefits to such an attitudinal disposition. Such benefits include reduced ataraxia and increased respect for the views of others in that the sceptic grants no special status to his/her own point of view. (shrink)

This chapter presents Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy as modern fictions with ancient-skeptical ambitions. Whether in the affective domain (Flaubert) or in the cognitive (Beckett), the aim is to help the reader achieve a position of studied neutrality—ataraxia, époché—thanks not to an a priori decision but to the mutual cancellation of opposing tendencies. Understanding Flaubert and Beckett in this way allows us, first, to enrich our sense of what “catharsis” may involve; second, to see why the (...) apparently odious Charles, in Madame Bovary, suddenly becomes a deeply touching figure; and third, to recognize the severe limitations of empathy-based moralist theories of fiction. (shrink)

Do unknown and unrealized risks of harm diminish an individual’s well-being? The traditional answer is no: that the security of prudential goods benefits an individual only instrumentally or by virtue of their subjective sense of security. Recent work has argued, however, that the security of prudential goods non-instrumentally benefits an individual regardless of whether or not they enjoy subjective security. In this paper, I critically examine three claims about the way in which unknown and unrealized risks of harm might diminish (...) individual well-being: it frustrates a desire to be secure, it frustrates the enjoyment of modally-robust goods, and it undermines the ability to make reasonable plans. Ultimately, I argue that all three of these hypotheses are mistaken, but that they deepen our understanding of the ways in which subjective security is an important constituent of individual well-being. (shrink)

To highlight care in architecture, I resuscitate Epicurus’ valorization of friendship in philosophy, contending that friendly love of wisdom is a practice of well-being, ataractic know-how. I emphasize the body as the instrument of the ataractic project of living. John McDermott and architect Christopher Alexander argue that affection has a place in contemporary design: what a person feels love for in the initial situation guides design. I argue that friendship with things leads us to care for and repair them. Repair (...) familiarizes one with materials, makes one a maker, increases bodily skill. Reparative architecture revivifies natural human affections for place. (shrink)

그리스 철학사에서 피론은 그리스 최초의 회의주의자임과 동시에, 아이네시데모스가 창설한 피론학파의 시조였다. 그는 삶의 문제에 있어서 ‘초연함(adiaphoria)’과 ‘태연함(apatheia)’ 그리고 ‘마음의 평정(ataraxia)’을 강조하였으며, 외부 대상에 대한 ‘이해불가능성(acatalepsia)’과 ‘판단유보(epoche)’의 원리를 정립하였다.BR 서구철학사에 나타나는 피론의 모습은 다양하고, 기이하며, 이중적이고, 모순적이기까지 하다. 필자는 디오게네스 라에르티오스의 『유명한 철학자들의 생애와 사상』, 아리스토클레스의 『철학에 대하여』그리고 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』등에 대한 연구를 통해, 일차적으로는 그의 회의주의가 피론주의가 아니라는 테오도시오스의 시각을 불식시킴과 아울러, 궁극적으로는 그의 회의주의가 후대의 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다.BR 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』에 나타난 아리스토클레스의 토막글들은, 피론 철학에 대한 다양한 (...) 모습과 복잡한 해석가능성들을 잘 보여준다. 특히, 아리스토클레스의 단편 C는 복잡한 논쟁을 불러일으키는 문제적 토막글이다. 이것에 대한 해석에는 주관적(인식론적) 해석과 객관적(형이상학적) 해석이 존재하는데, 전자의 입장을 대표하는 연구자로는 E. 젤러가 있고, 후자의 입장을 대표하는 학자로는 연구자로는 S. H. 스바르브손과 R. 베트 등이 있다. 그런데, 주관적 해석을 강조하게 되면 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 있는 장점이 있으나, 텍스트를 일부 수정해야 한다는 단점이 있다. 객관적 해석을 강조하게 되면, 텍스트를 해석하는데 있어서는 논리성을 확보할 수 있으나, 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 없다는 문제점이 노출된다. 이에, 필자는 객관적 해석 또는 형이상학적 해석과 일정한 거리를 두면서, 피론을 회의주의자로, 그리고 피론의 회의주의를 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다. (shrink)

James Warren a rappelé il y a quelques années que l’« ataraxie » n’est pas seulement un concept épicurien. L’« arrière-plan philosophique », la « tradition philosophique » qui précède Épicure remonte, a-t-il montré, à Démocrite, et a mené d’un côté à l’« ataraxie » pyrrhonienne (dès Timon) et de l’autre à l’« ataraxie » épicurienne, selon une double généalogie dont il a reconstitué dans son livre les principaux maillons. Les témoignages sur l’éthique démocritéenne sont si controversés qu’une...

This chapter presents Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy as modern fictions with ancient-skeptical ambitions. Whether in the affective domain (Flaubert) or in the cognitive (Beckett), the aim is to help the reader achieve a position of studied neutrality—ataraxia, époché—thanks not to an a priori decision but to the mutual cancellation of opposing tendencies. Understanding Flaubert and Beckett in this way allows us, first, to enrich our sense of what “catharsis” may involve; second, to see why the (...) apparently odious Charles, in Madame Bovary, suddenly becomes a deeply touching figure; and third, to recognize the severe limitations of empathy-based moralist theories of fiction. (shrink)

PYRRHONIAN BUDDHISM: AN IMAGINATIVE RECONSTRUCTION -/- Author: -/- Adrian Kuzminski 279 Donlon Road Fly Creek, NY 13337 USA -/- Description of Pyrrhonian Buddhism: -/- The ancient Greek sceptic philosopher, Pyrrho of Elis, accompanied Alexander the Great to India, where he had contacts with Indian sages, so-called naked philosophers (gymnosophists), among whom were very probably Buddhist mendicants, or sramanas. My work, entitled Pyrrhonian Buddhism, takes seriously the hypothesis that Pyrrho’s contact with early Buddhists was the occasion of his rethinking, in a (...) Greek philosophical idiom, of what he experienced in those encounters. This has major implications for our understanding of both Buddhism and Pyrrhonism. -/- Pyrrho’s rethinking of Buddhism, I argue, enabled him to introduce into Greek philosophy and culture several key Buddhist notions. These include the primacy and interdependence of immediate phenomenal experience (which the Buddhists called dependent origination), the suspension of judgment about beliefs lacking phenomenal verification (reflecting the scepticism of the Buddha about ‘unanswered’ or ‘metaphysical’ questions), and the promise of personal enlightenment said to follow such suspension, which Pyrrho called ataraxia, and the Buddhists called bodhi. -/- Pyrrho, like Socrates, wrote nothing, but the movement he founded—Pyrrhonism--became an important tradition in Western philosophy. When the texts of later Pyrrhonian philosophers, particularly Sextus Empiricus, were redicovered during the Renaissance, they sparked a reexamination of the foundations of knowledge, thereby helping to prompt the modern scientific revolution. -/- The notion that early Buddhism played a pivotal role in the birth of ancient Greek Pyrrhonian philosophy remains provocative, but has found increasing support in recent years. An earlier work of mine, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism (Lexington Books, 2008), was, as far as I know, the first book-length comparison of the common features of the two traditions. My current work, Pyrrhonian Buddhism, seeks to broaden and deepen this comparison. It argues that ancient Greek Pyrrhonism is best understood as a fully developed but hitherto largely unrecognized Western version of Buddhism. -/- The Introduction reviews our current understanding of Pyrrhonism in light of recent scholarship on ancient Greek-Indian cultural exchanges, and outlines the methodology I employ. -/- Part I of the book offers re-readings of the classic Pyrrhonian texts, with parallels to Buddhism in mind, including Diogenes Laertius (Chapter One), Sextus Empiricus (Chapter Two) and Timon and Aulus Gellius (Chapter Three). -/- Part II enlists the rubric of the Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma to illuminate the fundamental points of comparison between early Buddhism and ancient Pyrrhonism. -/- The First Turning (Chapter Four) centers on the Buddhist insistence on the dependent origination of the objects of immediate consciousness, which can also be found in the understanding of immediate experience expressed in the phenomenalistic atomism of the Pyrrhonists. The Second Turning (Chapter Five), as posed by the ‘unanswered questions’ of the Buddha and the ‘emptiness’ of the Madhyamaka, finds its Pyrrhonian correlation in the suspension of judgment over ‘indeterminate’ beliefs. And the Third Turning (Chapter Six), reported as bodhi in Buddhism and ataraxia in Pyrrhonism, is shown in both traditions to follow liberation from suffering and existential angst, caused by what the Buddhists call our attachments and the Pyrrhonists call our beliefs. -/- Other Writers/Commentators: -/- Aspects of the Pyrrhonian/Buddhism question have been addressed by Edward Conze, Everard Flintoff, Thomas McEvilley, Jay Garfield, Mathew Neale, Ethan Mills, Christopher Beckwith, and Robin Brons, among other recent writers. The book-length studies on the issue (since my earlier work) are by Beckwith (Greek Buddha) and Neal (Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism). Other writers/scholars with relevant expertise include C. W. Huntington, Jr., Charles Goodman, Stephen Batchelor, Dan Lusthaus, Rupert Gethin, and Mark Siderits. -/- . (shrink)

The ancient philosophical school of Epicureanism tried to argue that death is "nothing to us." Were they right? James Warren provides a comprehensive study and articulation of the interlocking arguments against the fear of death found not only in the writings of Epicurus himself, but also in Lucretius' poem De rerum natura and in Philodemus' work De morte. These arguments are central to the Epicurean project of providing ataraxia (freedom from anxiety) and therefore central to an understanding of Epicureanism (...) as a whole. They also offer significant resources for modern discussions of the value of death--one which stands at the intersection of metaphysics and ethics. If death is the end of the subject, and the subject can not be benefited nor harmed after death, is it reasonable nevertheless to fear the ceasing-to-be? If the Epicureans are not right to claim that the dead can neither be benefited nor harmed, what alternative models might be offered for understanding the harm done by death and do these alternatives suffer from any further difficulties? The discussion involves consideration of both ethical and metaphysical topics since it requires analysis not only of the nature of a good life but also the nature of personal identity and time. A number of modern philosophers have offered criticisms or defences of the Epicureans' views. Warren explores and evaluates these in the light of a systematic and detailed study of the precise form and intention of the Epicureans' original arguments. Warren argues that the Epicureans also were interested in showing that mortality is not to be regretted and that premature death is not to be feared. Their arguments for these conclusions are to be found in their positive conception of the nature of a good and complete life, which divorce the completeness of a life as far as possible from considerations of its duration. Later chapters investigate the nature of a life lived without the fear of death and pose serious problems for the Epicureans being able to allow any concern for the post mortem future and being able to offer a positive reason for prolonging a life which is already complete in their terms. (shrink)

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

This book deals with the psychotherapeutic factor that permeates the whole Epicurean philosophical program. It is the aim of this study to research and to rehabilitate its healing function. Since the Garden’s philosophy is a very systematic one, the question about the natural reality, φύσις, had to be addressed firstly. Anti-nihilism, materialism, eternal atoms, infinite void, perpetual movement, clinamen and the plurality worlds are key notions of the axiomatic and scientific Epicurus’ physics. Once we had gained clarity about those core (...) concepts, the central role of human beings in the system was to be discussed. As natural, yet exceptional, atomic compounds, men and women do have flesh and soul and are, therefore, completely mortal. Nevertheless, they possess numerous qualities, originating in their ψυχή, which render them unique: freedom, rationality and even a material community with the gods. According to Epicurus, there is a fourth element constituting the souls of both people and deities, so that a physical continuity and material formation are preserved through the entire nature. -/- Gods are studied from a naturalistic physiologic perspective and at the very same time they act exemplary and, freed from any providential, governing tasks, they provide a regula uitae in order to achieve a pleasant, authentic happiness. In fact, this research tries to demonstrate that complete curation is not to be linked to an eternal extra-corporeal soul, but arises from the removal of pain and fear, aponia and ataraxia. These two are the paramount pleasures, far distant from a gross hedonism. Ethics are, then, presented as a soothing practice, having a nuclear medical purpose. Taking this into account, it was necessary to explore the historical connections between philosophy and rational Hellenic medicine before Epicurus. After that, multiple therapeutic forms conceived or applied by the Samian philosopher were analyzed. The λόγος proved to be the unifying element among them and involved not only human reason but also analogy. Epicurus’ diagnose is very sad: we are in pain. To reverse that, he presented exercises such as meditation, confession, self-examination, laugh therapy, emotional intelligence, intrusive thoughts control, companionship, solidarity and friendship. There are still two additional therapies completing the above mentioned: an Epicurean thanatology, because we miss the point when considering (im)mortality and forget about sensation as the ground of any life; and an ars desidrandi, because we should accept only natural and necessary desires, instead of chasing whimsy dreams with vain hopes. All this will help us regain our primal bodily and mental health and happiness, our essential, frugal and glad wellbeing. (shrink)

How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials (nerve impulses) become like the feeling of pain in one's experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain. However, although we know that experience arises from a physical basis, we don't have a good explanation of why and how it so arises. The problem of how physical processes give rise (...) to experience is called the 'hard problem' of consciousness and it is the contemporary manifestation of the mind-body problem. This book explains the key concepts that surround the issue as well as the nature of the hard problem and the several approaches to it. It gives a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon incorporating its main metaphysical and epistemic aspects, as well as recent empirical findings, such as the phenomenon of blindsight, change blindness, visual-form agnosia and optic ataraxia, mirror recognition in other primates, split-brain cases and synaesthesia. (shrink)

pKuzminski’s bookem Pyrrhonian Buddhism: A Philosophical Reconstruction/em presents a comparative study of Buddhism and Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonian Buddhism, Kuzminski’s novelty, designates a synthesis of Greek and Indian influences on Pyrrho’s thought—namely Democritean atomism and Buddhist phenomenalism. It is a philosophical construct that reveals the similarities between the Buddhist and Pyrrhonian models of enlightenment (viz. bodhi and ataraxia). The book examines striking similarities between both Pyrrhonism and Buddhism, suggesting their virtual identity. In Kuzminski’s opinion, it is essentially the Buddhist practice and (...) the description of the Buddhist experience adopted by Pyrrho of Elis that resulted in the original synthesis he calls Pyrrhonian Buddhism. Putting Pyrrhonism in the setting of Buddhism and its practice brings a new understanding of Pyrrhonism as the ancient Greek school influencedbrby the east./p. (shrink)

The "culture of war" has been formed firmly and minutely enough by humanity and is used with greater effectiveness than the "culture of peace" in modern world. Scepticism is one of the philosophical traditions where conceptual idea was worked out and later became a theoretical base of culture of peace. Seeing the meaning of scepticism in formation of culture of peace as an ideological paradigm in proper perspective one should mark those intentions which were offered and taken by philosophical society. (...) The following principle can be referred to such philosophical intentions as principle of “isosthenea”, principle of “epoche”, tradition of “ataraxia”, principle of religious tolerance. The admission of principle of isosthenia means that the most preferable (that is valid, logical) way of settling the argument or conflict is a peaceful, compromise way because nobody can rely on greater truth of one's statement in comparison with the statement of an opponent. Principle of abstention from judgment (epoche) means that nobody can establish some values as absolute ones, nobody can possess the role of a judge while appraising the situation, and nobody can interfere the case which doesn't concern him. The result of abstention from judgment is the reaching of “ataraxia”. Scepticism of XVI - XVII centuries played a great role in methodological formation of culture of peace by means of manifestation and detailedbasing of principle of religious tolerance. (shrink)

Epicurus is strongly committed to psychological and ethical egoism and hedonism. However, these commitments do not square easily with many of the claims made by Epicureans about friendship: for instance, that the wise man will sometimes die for his friend, that the wise man will love his friend as much as himself, feel exactly the same toward his friend as toward himself, and exert himself as much for his friend's pleasure as for his own, and that every friendship is worth (...) choosing for its own sake. These claims have led some scholars to assert that Epicurus inconsistently affirms that friendship has an altruistic element. I argue that the Epicurean claims about friendship can be reconciled with egoism and hedonism in psychology and ethics. Friendship is valuable because having friends provides one with security more effectively than any other means, and having confidence that one will be secure in the future either is identical to ataraxia, or the grounds on which one has it. (shrink)

According to Epicurus (1966a,b), neither death, nor anything that occurs later, can harm those who die, because people who die are not made to suffer as a result of either. In response, many philosophers (e.g., Nagel 1970, Feinberg 1984, and Pitcher 1984) have argued that Epicurus is wrong on both counts. They have defended the mortem thesis: death may harm those who die. They have also defended the post-mortem thesis: posthumous events may harm people who die. Their arguments for this (...) joint view are by now quite familiar, and there is no need to rehearse them here (for a summary, see Luper 2002). Instead, our topic is a third position, which carves out intermediate ground between the other two. The intermediate view takes the mortem thesis for granted, like the critics of Epicurus, but rejects the post-mortem thesis, like Epicurus himself. For Epicurus’ project—the attainment of ataraxia, or equanimity—the intermediate view is almost useless (we are not tranquil if we regard death as a tragedy whose peculiarity is that it frees us from the possibility of any further misfortune); however, it is far more plausible than Epicurus’ own position since it avoids his absurd claim that death cannot harm us, while retaining his view that events occurring while we are dead and gone cannot harm us. According to the proponent of the intermediate view, when we understand the harm death inflicts, we must reject the idea that events following death can be bad for us. The damage death itself does is so severe that people are not subject to harm by any subsequent events. Thus the intermediate view rests on the mortem thesis together with the immunity thesis: death leaves its victims immune from posthumous harm. (shrink)

A superb new edition of Epictetus’s famed handbook on Stoicism—translated by one of the world’s leading authorities on Stoic philosophy Born a slave, the Roman Stoic philosopher Epictetus taught that mental freedom is supreme, since it can liberate one anywhere, even in a prison. In How to Be Free, A. A. Long—one of the world’s leading authorities on Stoicism and a pioneer in its remarkable contemporary revival—provides a superb new edition of Epictetus’s celebrated guide to the Stoic philosophy of life (...) along with a selection of related reflections in his Discourses. Freedom, for Epictetus, is not a human right or a political prerogative but a psychological and ethical achievement, a gift that we alone can bestow on ourselves. We can all be free, but only if we learn to assign paramount value to what we can control, treat what we cannot control with equanimity, and view our circumstances as opportunities to do well and be well, no matter what happens to us through misfortune or the actions of other people. How to Be Free features splendid new translations and the original Greek on facing pages, a compelling introduction that sets Epictetus in context and describes the importance of Stoic freedom today, and an invaluable glossary of key words and concepts. The result is an unmatched introduction to this powerful method of managing emotions and handling life’s situations, from the most ordinary to the most demanding. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that Epicurus' identification of aponia (painlessness) and the absence of anxiety (ataraxia) yields as a consequence the claim that the most pleasant life is one that requires little in the way of resources or power. This paper argues that the remarks in Cicero which attempt to reconstruct Epicurus' reasons for thinking that aponia and ataraxia are the limit of pleasure are best interpreted if we suppose that the inference runs the other direction. Epicurus supposed (...) that it was a pre-theoretical constraint on any account of human happiness that it should be natural. Moreover, its naturalness means its in-principle availability to most humans. (shrink)

This essay investigates the tradition of interwar German-Jewish political theology associated most of all with Leo Strauss and Franz Rosenzweig. It is suggested here that the Straussian notion of an eternal conflict between politics and religions may be derived, in part, from Rosenzweig's image of the depoliticized Jewish community. Furthermore, this "concept of the apolitical" represents something like a modernist reprisal of Stoic ideals, most especially the ancient ideal of ataraxia, or "freedom from disturbance." This apoliticism is distinguished most (...) of all by two interlocking principles; first, that politics is mere disorder if not a return to the state of unredeemed nature; and second, that religious peace must accordingly be found elsewhere than politics. This argument for the near-incommensurability of politics and religion represents the special if not altogether unique contribution of Weimar German-Jewish intellectuals to the enduring tradition of political theology. It is therefore worth posing the following question: Why does Hannah Arendt's political theory appear to bear almost no trace whatsoever of this political-theological tradition? By what logic did Arendt dissent from the political-theological principles that so captivated her German-Jewish contemporaries? And which tradition should command our allegiance today? (shrink)