The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y (...) might doubt that X believes Y is rational, or that X believes Y believes X is rational, or Y might have some higher-order doubt. X’s deviant first move might cause a breakdown in common belief in rationality, therefore. Once that goes, the entire argument fails. The argument also assumes that the players act rationally at each stage of the game, even if this stage could not be reached by rational play. But it is also dubious to assume that past irrationality never exerts a corrupting influence on present play. However, the backwards-induction argument can be reconstructed for the centipede game on a more secure basis.1 It may be implausible to assume a common belief in rationality throughout the game, however the game might go, but the argument requires less than this. The standard idealisations in game theory certainly allow us to assume a common belief in rationality at the beginning of the game. They also allow us to assume this common belief persists so long as no one makes an irrational move. That is enough for the argument to go through. (shrink)

According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by fear of (...) retaliation in the future. For finite games, however, where the number of plays is known beforehand, there is a backward induction argument showing that rational agents will not be able to achieve cooperation. On behalf of the Hobbesian “Foole”, who cannot see any advantage in cooperation, Gregory Kavka (1983, 1986) has presented an argument that significantly extends the range of the backward induction argument. He shows that, for the backward induction argument to be effective, it is not necessary that the precise number of future interactions be known. It is sufficient that there is a known definite upper bound on the number of interactions. A similar argument is developed by John W. Carroll (1987). We will here question the assumption of a known upper bound. When the assumption is made precise in the way needed for the argument to go through, its apparent plausibility evaporates. We then offer a reformulation of the argument, based on weaker, and more plausible, assumptions. (shrink)

According to the standard objection to backward induction in games, its application depends on highly questionable assumptions about the players' expectations as regards future counterfactual game developments. It seems that, in order to make predictions needed for backward reasoning, the players must expect each player to act rationally at each node that in principle could be reached in the game, and also to expect that this confidence in the future rationality of the players would be kept by each (...) player come what may: even at the game-nodes that could only be reached by irrational play. Both expectations seem to be rather unreasonable: a player's initial disposition to rational behaviour may be weakened by a long stretch of irrational play on his part and, even more importantly, his initial confidence in the other players' future rationality may be undermined by an irrational play on their part. For different formulations of this objection see Binmore, Reny and, Bicchieri, Pettit and Sugden. and Aumann and.). (shrink)

In 2003, the Combined Code emphasised two important aspects of Board contribution: the importance of induction for newly appointed Public Limited Company board members, and appropriate training and development for all directors serving on a PLC board and its delegated committees, including the Audit and Remuneration Committees. This paper explores the principles of good induction and re-induction programmes for boards of directors and trustees, and its conclusions draw on the author's previous research on non-executive contribution and her (...) recent experience of reviewing board and committee performance and effectiveness through Boardroom Review. (shrink)

Courts have determined that adaptive management does not satisfy the Endangered Species Act's requirement to use the 'best available science'. This is due, in part, to the failure to recognise the role of non-epistemic values in science. We examine the role of values in the legal controversy over the scientific reports and adaptive management plans for endangered salmon in the Columbia River Basin. To do this, we employ philosophical concepts related to risk and uncertainty that demonstrate how non-epistemic values are (...) internal to science. We describe how, because adaptive management is a method for dealing with inductive risk, by remaining flexible, responsive and adaptive in those circumstances where the costs of making a mistake are very high, it requires special attention to ensure that it remains useful. We conclude that, because non-epistemic values will inevitably influence the 'best available science', it is critical that they are clarified in any adaptive management planning so that we can ensure the salmon conservation that the ESA mandates. Fortunately, because adaptive management is iterative in nature and includes opportunities for engagement between policymakers and scientists, it enables clarification of non-epistemic values through making standards of evidence transparent, acknowledging aims and goals and dealing with uncertainty at the institutional level. (shrink)

Can you think of a meme that made you laugh or a political post that made you angry? These examples illustrate how social media use (SMU) impacts how people feel. Similarly, how people feel when they initiate SMU may impact the emotional effects of SMU. Someone feeling happy may feel more positively during SMU, whereas someone feeling sad may feel more negatively. Using an experimental design, we examined whether following SMU, those in a happy mood would experience increases in positive (...) affect (PA) and those in a sad mood would experience increases in negative affect (NA). A large sample of college students (N = 703) were randomly assigned to a happy, sad, or neutral mood induction before SMU. PA and NA were assessed at baseline, post-mood induction, and after SMU. Contrary to hypotheses, after SMU, people in happy moods experienced decreases in PA, and those in sad moods experienced decreases in NA, reflecting SMU having a dampening effect on emotions. PA and NA were significantly lower after SMU compared to baseline and did not vary by condition. How young adults feel when they log onto SMU matters in understanding how SMU impacts PA and NA, but on average, emotional experiences are dampened. (shrink)

The emphasis in most process-oriented models of argumentation is placed heavily upon analysis of dialogue. The current work puts forward an account which examines the argumentation involved in persuasive monologue, drawing upon commitment-based theories of dialogue. The various differences between monologue and dialogue are discussed, with particular reference to the possibility of designing a monologue game in which commitments are dynamically incurred and updated as the monologue is created. Finally, the computational advantages of adopting such an approach are explored in (...) the context of an existing architecture for the generation of natural language arguments. (shrink)

A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and (...) going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics. (shrink)

Using educational robots to integrate computational thinking with cross-disciplinary content has gone beyond Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics, to include foreign-language learning and further cross-context target-language acquisition. Such integration must not solely emphasise CT problem-solving skills. Rather, it must provide students with interactive learning to support their target-language interaction while reducing potential TL anxiety. This study aimed to validate the effects of the proposed method of pair programming along with question-and-response interaction in a board-game activity on young learners’ CT skills (...) and TL learning across contexts. Two Grade 6 classes, one with 16 students who were studying Chinese as a Second Language and the other with 16 students who were studying English as a Foreign Language, participated in the activity. A series of instruments on achievement assessment, questionnaires on CT skills and TL anxiety, and sequential learning behaviour analysis were used to critically examine the results. The main conclusion is that the EFL group showed better social skills of cooperation on CT and lower TL learning anxiety, while the CSL group demonstrated better problem-solving skills in CT, but presented more behaviours of trial-and-error loops. Results not only contribute suggestions for cross-disciplinary learning but also provide support for cross-context instruction beyond educational coursework. (shrink)

Backward induction has been the standard method of solving finite extensive-form games with perfect information, notwithstanding the fact that this procedure leads to counter-intuitive results in various games. However, beginning in the late eighties, the method of backward induction became an object of criticism. It is claimed that the assumptions needed for its defence are quite implausible, if not incoherent. It is therefore natural to ask for the justification of backward induction: Can one show that (...) rational players who know the structure of the game, have trust in each other's practical rationality and reason correctly, will act in accordance in backward induction? Several researchers have tried a justification of this kind, but the argument presented in Robert Aumann's paper from 1995 is perhaps the most well-known and influential attempt to provide such a justification. Clausing provides a sustained discussion of the justification problem for backward induction. It is an excellent work and the criticism I will present below does not detract from this evaluation: the issues discussed by the author are complex and it is difficult to get everything right. Furthermore, I hope that the criticism to be presented may be instructive; Even though it has not been Clausing's intention, his logical reconstruction of Aumann's defence of backward induction allows us to see very clearly what is wrong with that argument. It also provides us with * This paper was presented at workshops in Lund and in Uppsala, in the Fall of 1999. I am indebted to the participants for their useful comments. The work on the paper was supported by a generous research grant from The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. (shrink)

We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination (...) with a principle of rationality that is incompatible with it, while a rejection of the claim à la Reny (1988) assumes a temporally extended, many-moment interpretation of extensive games in combination with implausible belief revision policies. In addition, the logical system provides an original inductive and implicit axiomatization of rationality in extensive games based on relations of dominance rather than the usual direct axiomatization of rationality as maximization of expected utility. (shrink)

We provide eductive foundations for the concept of forward induction, in the class of games with an outside option. The formulation presented tries to capture in a static notion the rest point of an introspective process, achievable from some restricted preliminary beliefs. The former requisite is met by requiring the rest point to be a Nash equilibrium that yields a higher payoff than the outside option. With respect to the beliefs, we propose the Incentive Dominance Criterion. Players should (...) consider one action more likely than another whenever the former is better than getting the outside option for more conjectures over his rival's actions. We apply this model to the case where the subgame is a coordination game with a conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance. Our results provide support for dominance solvability, but not for Van Damme's notion of forward induction. We show how the forward induction logic helps to select the Pareto dominant equilibrium. This is the case whenever player 1's act of giving up the outside option reverses the incentive dominance relations among 1's pure actions in the subgame. (shrink)

Backward induction was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats. BI can be also extended to solve complex games that include an infinite number of actions or an infinite number of periods. However, some more complex empirical or experimental predictions remain dramatically at odds with theoretical predictions obtained by BI. The primary example (...) of such a troublesome game is Centipede. The problems appear in other long games with sufficiently complex structure. BI also shares the problems of subgame perfect equilibrium and fails to eliminate certain unreasonable Nash equilibria. (shrink)

Over the last few decades Michael Dummett developed a rich program for assessing logic and the meaning of the terms of a language. He is also a major exponent of Frege's version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. Over the last decade, Neil Tennant developed an extensive version of logicism in Dummettian terms, and Dummett influenced other contemporary logicists such as Crispin Wright and Bob Hale. The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for Fregean logicism within (...) a broadly Dummettian framework. The conclusions are mostly negative: Dummett's views on analyticity and the logical/non-logical boundary leave little room for logicism. Dummett's considerations concerning manifestation and separability lead to a conservative extension requirement: if a sentence S is logically true, then there is a proof of S which uses only the introduction and elimination rules of the logical terms that occur in S. If basic arithmetic propositions are logically true-as the logicist contends-then there is tension between this conservation requirement and the ontological commitments of arithmetic. It follows from Dummett's manifestation requirements that if a sentence S is composed entirely of logical terminology, then there is a formal deductive system D such that S is analytic, or logically true, if and only if S is a theorem of D. There is a deep conflict between this result and the essential incompleteness, or as Dummett puts it, the indefinite extensibility, of arithmetic truth. (shrink)

We prove a number of results on the determinacy of σ-projective sets of reals, i.e., those belonging to the smallest pointclass containing the open sets and closed under complements, countable unions, and projections. We first prove the equivalence between σ-projective determinacy and the determinacy of certain classes of games of variable length <ω^2 (Theorem 2.4). We then give an elementary proof of the determinacy of σ-projective sets from optimal large-cardinal hypotheses (Theorem 4.4). Finally, we show how to generalize the (...) proof to obtain proofs of the determinacy of σ-projective games of a given countable length and of games with payoff in the smallest σ-algebra containing the projective sets, from corresponding assumptions (Theorem 5.1, Theorem 5.4). (shrink)

We study game formulas the truth of which is determined by a semantical game of uncountable length. The main theme is the study of principles stating reflection of these formulas in various admissible sets. This investigation leads to two weak forms of strict-II11 reflection . We show that admissible sets such as H and Lω2 which fail to have strict-II11 reflection, may or may not, depending on set-theoretic hypotheses satisfy one or both of these weaker forms.

We obsess about what our politicians are doing, but ignore that our companies are no longer investing, instead they are focusing on next quarter's profits in order to justify ever higher executive compensation. This is in turn accelerating the West’s economic decline versus the East. While the short-term focus of business is becoming widely acknowledged, we are not doing enough to reverse this. Looking at the less known history of companies shows us the choices we can no longer afford to (...) ignore. Some current reforms need to go further and some areas that need reform are currently being ignored. Encouraging our businesses to invest again is one of the most important issues of our time. (shrink)

The paper presents a variation of the EMAIL Game, originally proposed byRubinstein (American Economic Review, 1989), in which coordination ofthe more rewarding-risky joint course of actions is shown to obtain, evenwhen the relevant game is, at most, ``mutual knowledge.'' In the exampleproposed, a mediator is introduced in such a way that two individualsare symmetrically informed, rather than asymmetrically as in Rubinstein,about the game chosen by nature. As long as the message failure probabilityis sufficiently low, with the upper bound being (...) a function of the gamepayoffs, conditional beliefs in the opponent's actions can allow playersto choose a more rewarding-risky action. The result suggests that, forefficient coordination to obtain, the length of interactive knowledge onthe game, possibly up to ``almost common knowledge,'' does not seem to bea major conceptual issue and that emphasis should be focused instead onthe communication protocol and an appropriate relationship between thereliability of communication channels and the payoffs at stake. (shrink)

Philosophers have long been interested in the study of induction. This paper aims at examining Philoponus’ treatment, with a focus on his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, which is an especially rich source of information on this topic. Following in Aristotle’s footsteps, Philoponus maintains that it is through induction that universal knowledge is achieved, but in his interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine he also introduces intriguing novelties. In particular, I argue that in some passages he treats (...) class='Hi'>induction as an intellectual means of teaching and learning, that is, as a logical argument-form in which a universal conclusion is inferred from particular premises. In other passages, however, he treats induction as a sort of sense perception, specifically that which triggers the recovery of innate universal knowledge. (shrink)

Two players bargain to select a utility allocation in some set X⊂R+2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$X\subset {\mathbb {R}}_+^2$$\end{document}. Bargaining takes place in infinite discrete time, where each period t is divided into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period, the players play a simultaneous-move game to determine that period’s proposer, and bargaining takes place in the second sub-period. Rejection triggers a one-period delay and move to t+1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$t+1$$\end{document}. For (...) every x∈X∩R++2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$x\in X\cap {\mathbb {R}}^2_{++}$$\end{document}, there exists a cutoff δ<1\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\delta <1$$\end{document}, such that if at least one player has a discount factor above δ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\delta $$\end{document}, then for every y∈X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$y\in X$$\end{document} that satisfies y≥x\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$y\ge x$$\end{document} there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement on y. The equilibrium is supported by “dictatorial threats.” These threats can be dispensed with if X is the unit simplex and the target-vector is Pareto efficient. The results can be modified in a way that allows for arbitrarily long delays in equilibrium. (shrink)

Although certain recent developments in mendacious political manipulation of public discourse are horrifying to the academic mind, I argue that we should not panic. Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare balance between robust realism and contrite fallibilism offers guidance to weather the storm, and perhaps even see it as inevitable in our intellectual development. This paper explores Peirce’s classic “four methods of fixing belief”, which takes us on an entertaining and still very pertinent (...) tour through tenacity, authority and a priori speculation to the method of science – the only method which is both public and self-correcting. Although in the West we (mostly) proudly self-conceive as living in a ‘scientific age’, I argue that this is premature. Precisely insofar as we treat the misbehavior of governments as a harbinger of doom, we remain trapped in authoritarian modes of thinking which Peirce identified with medievalism, although modernity is increasingly quickening around us in worldwide information-sharing practices that are shaped entirely by mutual help. With this framework in mind, many tactics of recent media are most helpfully seen as belonging not to a post-truth, but a pre-truth stage of human intellectual development. Advice on this is sought from Plato, who of course also faced a world that was ‘pre-academic’. (shrink)

Normative game theory unsatisfactorily explains rational behavior. Real people do not behave as predicted, and what is prescribed as rational behavior is normally unattainable in real-life. The problem is that current normative analysis does not account for people's cognitive limitations – their bounded rationality. However, this paper develops an account of bounded rationality that explains the rationality of more realistic behavior. I focus on the Centipede Game, in which boundedly rational players explore and test others' immediate behavior, until they can (...) apply limited backward induction. The result is that the game has a solution in the form of a subjective Nash equilibrium, which boundedly rational players can possibly realize. (shrink)

Research showed that action real-time strategy gaming experience is related to cognitive and neural plasticity, including visual selective attention and working memory, executive control, and information processing. This study explored the relationship between ARSG experience and information transmission in the auditory channel. Using an auditory, two-choice, go/no-go task and lateralized readiness potential as the index to partial information transmission, this study examined information transmission patterns in ARSG experts and amateurs. Results showed that experts had a higher accuracy rate than amateurs. (...) More importantly, experts had a smaller stimulus-locked LRP component than amateurs on no-go trials, while the response-locked LRP component on go trials did not differ between groups. Thus, whereas amateurs used an asynchronous information transmission pattern, experts used a reduced asynchronous information transmission pattern or a synchronous pattern where most of processing occurred prior to response execution – an information transmission pattern that supports rapid, error-free performance. Thus, experts and amateurs may use different information transmission patterns in auditory processing. In addition, the information transmission pattern used by experts is typically observed only after long-term auditory training according to past research. This study supports the relationship between ARSG experience and the development of information processing patterns. (shrink)

The theories of cerebellar function presented in this BBS special issue cannot be reconciled with the established induction properties of cerebellar LTD. At the same time, the authors presenting their research on cerebellar LTD do not appear very interested in function.

A. A. Long’s study of Greek notions of mind and human selfhood is anchored in questions of universal interest. What happens to us when we die? How is the mind or soul related to the body? Are we responsible for our own happiness? Can we achieve autonomy? Long shows that Greek thinkers’ modeling of the mind gave us metaphors that we still live by.

This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification (...) of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. *Received November 2005; revised March 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21, Duesseldorf, Germany D-40225; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Historically, the dispute between empiricists and nativists in philosophy and cognitive science has concerned human and animal minds (Margolis and Laurence in Philos Stud: An Int J Philos Anal Tradit 165(2): 693-718, 2013, Ritchie in Synthese 199(Suppl 1): 159–176, 2021, Colombo in Synthese 195: 4817–4838, 2018). But recent progress has highlighted how empiricist and nativist concerns arise in the construction of artificial systems (Buckner in From deep learning to rational machines: What the history of philosophy can teach us about the (...) future of artificial intelligence. Oxford University Press.). This paper uses nativism and empiricism to address questions about the nature of artificial intelligence and its trajectory. It begins by defining the nativism/empiricism debate in terms of the generality of a system. Nativist systems have initial states with domain-specific features; empiricist systems have initial states with only domain-general features. With the debate framed in this way, it then explores a variety of arguments for nativism and empiricism in AI. These arguments revolve around two different questions which must be distinguished: whether nativism the only possible approach to developing human-level AI (HLAI); and whether nativism is the most practical approach to developing HLAI. On the first question, it argues that nativism is quite clearly not the only possible approach to developing HLAI, as is sometimes suggested. It argues that existing arguments for the necessity of nativism are unconvincing, because they analogize from poverty of the stimulus arguments about humans, while AIs often have access to much more data than humans. Then it argues that the case of evolution gives us a compelling argument against nativism. On the second, practical question, the paper argues that there is a tradeoff between the advantages of encoding innate machinery directly, and the advantages of evolving or learning it. However, as the past decade has shown, empiricism is a much more viable path to greater capability levels, given the ‘bitter lesson’ (Sutton in _Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction_. MIT press.) that encoding the ‘correct’ knowledge in AI systems is perennially outperformed by more empiricist methods that leverage large-scale data and computation. (shrink)

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference (...) in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons. (shrink)

On a traditional view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences always provide prima facie justification for beliefs based on them. Against this view, Matthew McGrath and Susanna Siegel argue that if an experience is formed in an epistemically pernicious way then it is epistemically downgraded. They argue that "wishful seeing"—when a subject sees something because he wants to see it—is psychologically and normatively analogous to wishful thinking. They conclude that perception can lose its traditional justificatory power, and that our epistemic norms (...) should govern how experiences are formed. To make this case, the downgrader must first isolate a feature of wishful thinking that makes it epistemically defective, then show that this feature is present in wishful seeing. I present a dilemma for the downgrader. There are two features of wishful thinking that could plausibly explain why it is irrational: the fact that a desire causes you to form a belief not supported by adequate evidence, or the mere influence that desire holds over belief formation. Each option presents formidable difficulties. Although the first “bad evidence” explanation, which McGrath employs, explains the irrationality of wishful thinking, it does not transfer to wishful seeing, since experiences are not formed in response to evidence. The second “influence of desire” explanation, which Siegel employs, fails to isolate an epistemically defective feature of wishful thinking, and also does not transfer to wishful seeing. I conclude that the downgrader’s argument from wishful seeing fails. (shrink)

A. G. Long presents a new account of the importance of conversation in Plato's philosophy.

The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown (...) to be universally reliable (Hume's insight) nor to be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods that are accessible to her. By means of mathematical analysis and computer simulations of prediction games I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal among all accessible prediction strategies, modulo a small short-run loss. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. In the final section I draw conclusions about the significance of meta-induction for the social spread of knowledge and the cultural evolution of cognition, and I relate my results to other simulation results which utilize meta-inductive learning mechanisms. (shrink)

Previous research on the role of negative emotions in social bargaining games has focused primarily on social emotions such as anger and guilt. In this article, we provide a test for behavioural differences between two prototypical decision-related negative emotions—regret and disappointment—in one-shot social dilemma games. Three experiments with two different emotion-induction procedures (autobiographical recall and imagined scenarios) and two different games (the ultimatum game and the 10-coin give-some game) revealed that regret increased prosocial behaviour, whereas disappointment (...) decreased prosocial behaviour. These results extend previous findings concerning differences between regret and disappointment to interdependent (social) situations. (shrink)

Evolution and Religion in American Education shines a light into one of America’s dark educational corners, exposing the regressive pedagogy that can invade science classrooms when school boards and state overseers take their eyes off the ball. It sets out to examine the development of college students’ attitudes towards biological evolution through their lives. The fascinating insights provided by interviewing students about their world views adds up to a compelling case for additional scrutiny of the way young people’s educational experiences (...) unfold as they consider—and indeed in some cases reject—one of science’s strongest and most cogent theoretical constructs. Inevitably, open discussion and consideration of the theory of evolution can chip away at the mental framework constructed by Creationists, eroding the foundations of their faith. The conceptual battleground is so fraught with logical challenges to Creationist dogma that in a number of cases students’ exposure to such dangerous ideas is actively prevented. This book provides a detailed map of this astonishing struggle in today’s America—a struggle many had thought was done and dusted with the onset of the Enlightenment. (shrink)

The Routledge Companion to Christian Ethics brings together two different but related disciplines; the first is contemplative or theoretical, asking what are the beliefs or doctrines that characterize Christianity, whilst the second is practical, asking what are the ethical practices that attend its teachings. The movement between the theoretical and practical aspects is not, however, one way, as doctrine and life are mutually informing. In this comprehensive volume, leading scholars address key topics, problems and debates in this hotly debated topic (...) within a truly global context. Comprising over thirty-five chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into three parts based on the three persons of the Trinity: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. Within these sections, cutting-edge issues are examined, including: God and genetics; War, peace and violence; White supremacy; Creation and sexuality; Digital ethics; Transgender studies; Climate change; Immigration and refugees. Adopting a practical approach that must consider new concerns that have arisen with recent social, political, and cultural shifts, The Routledge Companion to Christian Ethics is essential reading for students and researchers in Christian ethics, religious ethics and Christianity Studies. The Handbook will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as ethics and philosophy. (shrink)

Both short and long-term video-game play may result in superior performance on visual and attentional tasks. To further these findings, we compared the performance of experienced male video-game players (VGPs) and non-VGPs on a Simon-task. Experienced-VGPs began playing before the age of 10, had a minimum of 8 years of experience and a minimum play time of over 20 h per week over the past 6 months. Our results reveal a significantly reduced Simon-effect in experienced-VGPs relative to non-VGPs. However, (...) this was true only for the right-responses, which typically show a greater Simon-effect than left-responses. In addition, experienced-VGPs demonstrated significantly quicker reaction times and more balanced left-versus-right-hand performance than non-VGPs. Our results suggest that experienced-VGPs can resolve response-selection conflicts more rapidly for right-responses than non-VGPs, and this may in part be underpinned by improved bimanual motor control. (shrink)

This study analyses behaviour in non-zero-sum finite multi-stage games, particularly the Centipede Game. The classical Nash Equilibrium fails to explain empirical behaviour and intuitive logic and has therefore been challenged. This paper introduces the ‘Pure Collective Equilibrium’, or PCE, which describes the equilibrium reached when agents assess their utility not by their own payoffs but by the mean collective payoff of the team, as outlined by some team-reasoning hypotheses. Classical behaviour and purely collective team reasoning then both represent special (...) cases—the first in which agents and their counterparts are on the Nash Equilibrium path, and the second in which agents and their counterparts are purely collective team reasoners. It is argued that agents intentionally and consistently deviate from classical rationality in the Centipede Game, even in the absence of philanthropic altruists or error-plagued populations. (shrink)