Results for 'belief bias'

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  1.  23
    Accounting for Belief Bias in a Mental Model Framework: Comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer.Alan Garnham & Jane V. Oakhill - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (2):509-517.
    K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data (...)
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  2.  35
    The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning.Adrian P. Banks - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (3):544-577.
    A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on (...)
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  3. Scientific and Religious Belief.Paul Weingartner, Elena Klevakina-Uljanov, Gerhard Schurz & International Conference on Scientific and Religious Belief - 1994
     
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  4.  3
    Postscript: Accounting for Belief Bias in a Mental Model Framework--No Problem for Whom?Alan Garnham & Jane V. Oakhill - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (2):517-518.
    A reply to Klauer and Musch's reply to our commentary on their original article.
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  5. Rapid Responding Increases Belief Bias: Evidence for the Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Jodie Curtis-Holmes - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (4):382 – 389.
    In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, (...)
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  6.  42
    Belief Bias in Informal Reasoning.Valerie Thompson & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):278 - 310.
    In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce belief bias generalise across reasoning tasks. In formal reasoning (i.e., syllogisms) judgements of validity are influenced by actual validity, believability of the conclusions, and an interaction between the two. Although apparently analogous effects of belief and argument strength have been observed in informal reasoning, the design of those studies does not permit an analysis of the interaction effect. In the present studies we redesigned two informal (...)
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  7.  28
    Better but Still Biased: Analytic Cognitive Style and Belief Bias.Dries Trippas, Gordon Pennycook, Michael F. Verde & Simon J. Handley - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (4):431-445.
    Belief bias is the tendency for prior beliefs to influence people's deductive reasoning in two ways: through the application of a simple belief-heuristic and through the application of more effortful reasoning for unbelievable conclusions. Previous research indicates that cognitive ability is the primary determinant of the effect of beliefs on accuracy. In the current study, we show that the mere tendency to engage analytic reasoning is responsible for the effect of cognitive ability on motivated reasoning. The implications (...)
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  8.  51
    Individual Differences and the Belief Bias Effect: Mental Models, Logical Necessity, and Abstract Reasoning.Donna Torrens - 1999 - Thinking and Reasoning 5 (1):1 – 28.
    This study investigated individual differences in the belief bias effect, which is the tendency to accept conclusions because they are believable rather than because they are logically valid. It was observed that the extent of an individual's belief bias effect was unrelated to a number of measures of reasoning competence. Instead, as predicted by mental models theory, it was related to a person's ability to generate alternative representations of premises: the more alternatives a person generated, the (...)
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  9.  25
    On Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning.Karl Christoph Klauer, Jochen Musch & Birgit Naumer - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (4):852-884.
  10.  10
    The Source of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead, Paul Pollard, Jonathan StB. T. Evans & Julie L. Allen - 1992 - Cognition 45 (3):257-284.
  11.  12
    Assessing the Belief Bias Effect with ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect.Chad Dube, Caren M. Rotello & Evan Heit - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (3):831-863.
  12.  11
    The Source of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead, Paul Pollard, Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Julie L. Allen - 1992 - Cognition 45 (3):257-284.
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  13.  6
    Assessing the Belief Bias Effect with ROCs: Reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit.Karl Christoph Klauer & David Kellen - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):164-173.
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  14. Belief, Bias, and Ideology.Jon Elster - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism. MIT Press. pp. 123--148.
     
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  15.  11
    Fluency and Belief Bias in Deductive Reasoning: New Indices for Old Effects.Dries Trippas, Simon J. Handley & Michael F. Verde - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  16.  4
    The Belief Bias Effect is Aptly Named: A Reply to Klauer and Kellen.Chad Dube, Caren M. Rotello & Evan Heit - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):155-163.
  17.  5
    Using Forced Choice to Test Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning.Dries Trippas, Michael F. Verde & Simon J. Handley - 2014 - Cognition 133 (3):586-600.
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  18.  16
    Can Any Ostrich Fly?: Some New Data on Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning.P. Cherubini - 1998 - Cognition 69 (2):179-218.
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  19.  18
    Cultural Differences in Belief Bias Associated with Deductive Reasoning?Sara J. Unsworth & Douglas L. Medin - 2005 - Cognitive Science 29 (4):525-529.
  20.  12
    On Theories of Belief Bias in Syllogistic Reasoning.Jane Oakhill & Alan Garnham - 1993 - Cognition 46 (1):87-92.
  21.  9
    Mental Models as an Explanation of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead & Jonathan StB. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 46 (1):93-97.
  22. Deductive Reasoning Through the Life-Span-Effects of Belief Bias.As Gilinsky - 1989 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 27 (6):526-526.
     
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  23.  30
    Belief Bias is Stronger When Reasoning is More Difficult.Janie Brisson, Pier-Luc de Chantal, Hugues Lortie Forgues & Henry Markovits - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (3):385-403.
  24.  22
    Modulation of Reasoning by Emotion: Findings From the Belief-Bias Paradigm.M. Eliades, W. Mansell, A. Stewart & I. Blanchette - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning.
  25.  14
    Accounting for Belief Bias in a Mental Model Framework? No Problem! Reply to Garnham and Oakhill.Karl Christoph Klauer & Jochen Musch - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (2):519-520.
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  26.  21
    Belief Bias in the Perception of Sample Size Adequacy.Richard B. Anderson & Beth M. Hartzler - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (3):297-314.
  27.  16
    Belief Bias and the Extinction of Induced Fear.Maartje S. Vroling & Peter J. de Jong - 2013 - Cognition and Emotion 27 (8):1405-1420.
  28.  9
    Mental Models as an Explanation of Belief Bias Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.Stephen E. Newstead & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Cognition 46 (1):93-97.
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  29.  25
    Knowledge, Belief, and Egocentric Bias.Paul Dimmock - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    Changes in conversationally salient error possibilities, and/or changes in stakes, appear to generate shifts in our judgments regarding the correct application of ‘know’. One prominent response to these shifts is to argue that they arise due to shifts in belief and do not pose a problem for traditional semantic or metaphysical accounts of knowledge. Such doxastic proposals face familiar difficulties with cases where knowledge is ascribed to subjects in different practical or conversational situations from the speaker. Jennifer Nagel has (...)
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  30. Cognitive Bias, the Axiological Question and the Epistemic Probability of Theistic Belief.Dan Linford & Jason Megill - 2018 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Theistic Beliefs. De Gruyter. pp. 77-92.
    Some recent work in philosophy of religion addresses what can be called the “axiological question,” i.e., regardless of whether God exists, would it be good or bad if God exists? Would the existence of God make the world a better or a worse place? Call the view that the existence of God would make the world a better place “Pro-Theism.” We argue that Pro-Theism is not implausible, and moreover, many Theists, at least, (often implicitly) think that it is true. That (...)
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  31.  19
    Implicit Learning of Sequential Bias in a Guessing Task: Failure to Demonstrate Effects of Dopamine Administration and Paranormal Belief☆.John Palmer, Christine Mohr, Peter Krummenacher & Peter Brugger - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):498-506.
    Previous research suggests that implicit sequence learning is superior for believers in the paranormal and individuals with increased cerebral dopamine. Thirty-five healthy participants performed feedback-guided anticipations of four arrow directions. A 100-trial random sequence preceded two 100-trial biased sequences in which visual targets on trial t tended to be displaced 90° clockwise or counter-clockwise from those on t − 1. ISL was defined as a positive change during the course of the biased run in the difference between pro-bias and (...)
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  32.  37
    Explaining Modulation of Reasoning by Belief.Vinod Goel & Raymond J. Dolan - 2003 - Cognition 87 (1):B11-B22.
    Although deductive reasoning is a closed system, one's beliefs about the world can influence validity judgements. To understand the associated functional neuroanatomy of this belief-bias we studied 14 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they performed reasoning tasks under neutral, facilitatory and inhibitory belief conditions. We found evidence for the engagement of a left temporal lobe system during belief-based reasoning and a bilateral parietal lobe system during belief-neutral reasoning. Activation of right lateral prefrontal cortex was evident (...)
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  33.  50
    How Irrelevant Influences Bias Belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott‐Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.
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  34.  7
    The Heart Trumps the Head: Desirability Bias in Political Belief Revision.Ben M. Tappin, Leslie van der Leer & Ryan T. McKay - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 146 (8):1143-1149.
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  35. Identity, Belief, and Bias.Geoffrey L. Cohen - 2012 - In Jon Hanson & John Jost (eds.), Ideology, Psychology, and Law. Oup Usa. pp. 385.
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  36.  12
    Contamination in Reasoning About False Belief: An Instance of Realist Bias in Adults but Not Children.P. Mitchell, E. J. Robinson, J. E. Isaacs & R. M. Nye - 1996 - Cognition 59 (1):1-21.
  37. Belief as Construction: Inference and Processing Bias.Peter Mitchell & Haruo Kikuno - 2000 - In P. Mitchell & Kevin J. Riggs (eds.), Children's Reasoning and the Mind. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.
     
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  38.  24
    Reasoning Biases, Non‐Monotonic Logics and Belief Revision.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2017 - Theoria 83 (1):29-52.
    A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One (...)
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  39.  11
    Reasoning Biases, Non‐Monotonic Logics and Belief Revision.Catarina Dutilh Novaes & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4).
    A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics, probabilistic systems, belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One (...)
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  40.  14
    Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio‐Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their (...)
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  41. Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.
    The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by (...)
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  42.  29
    A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision.Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & John Hummel - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (8):1950-1964.
    What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate (...)
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  43. Against Dispositionalism: Belief in Cognitive Science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.
    Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, (...)
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  44. Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Brenda Yang & Felipe De Brigard - forthcoming - Political Behavior.
    People seem more divided than ever before over social and political issues, entrenched in their existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical research on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a limited set of well-known, charged, contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to experimental sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3,001), we attempt to overcome these existing problems, and we investigate the (...)
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  45. The Belief Illusion.J. Christopher Jenson - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):965-995.
    I offer a new argument for the elimination of ‘beliefs’ from cognitive science based on Wimsatt’s concept of robustness and a related concept of fragility. Theoretical entities are robust if multiple independent means of measurement produce invariant results in detecting them. Theoretical entities are fragile when multiple independent means of detecting them produce highly variant results. I argue that sufficiently fragile theoretical entities do not exist. Recent studies in psychology show radical variance between what self-report and non-verbal behaviour indicate about (...)
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  46.  39
    Belief-Overkill in Political Judgments.Jonathan Baron - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (4):368-378.
    When people tend toward a political decision, such as voting for the Republican Party, they are often attracted to this decision by one issue, such as the party’s stance on abortion, but then they come to see other issues, such as the party’s stand on taxes, as supporting their decision, even if they would not have thought so in the absence of the decision. I demonstrate this phenomenon with opinion poll data and with an experiment done on the World Wide (...)
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  47. Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism.Neil Levy - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):534-551.
    There is good evidence that many people harbour attitudes that conflict with those they endorse. In the language of social psychology, they seem to have implicit attitudes that conflict with their explicit beliefs. There has been a great deal of attention paid to the question whether agents like this are responsible for actions caused by their implicit attitudes, but much less to the question whether they can rightly be described as racist in virtue of harbouring them. In this paper, I (...)
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  48. Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy079.
    In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when (...)
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  49.  87
    Habituation and First-Person Authority.Jonathan Webber - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. Routledge.
    Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind rests on a form of mind-body dualism that does not allow for habituation as part of normal psychological functioning. We have good intuitive and empirical reason to accept that habituation is central to the normal functioning of desire. There is some empirical support for the idea that habituation plays a parallel role in belief. In particular, at least one form of implicit bias (...)
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  50. Why Implicit Attitudes Are (Probably) Not Beliefs.Alex Madva - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8).
    Should we understand implicit attitudes on the model of belief? I argue that implicit attitudes are (probably) members of a different psychological kind altogether, because they seem to be insensitive to the logical form of an agent’s thoughts and perceptions. A state is sensitive to logical form only if it is sensitive to the logical constituents of the content of other states (e.g., operators like negation and conditional). I explain sensitivity to logical form and argue that it is a (...)
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