John P. Lizza has long been a major figure in the scholarly literature on criteria for death. His searching and penetrating critiques of the dominant biological paradigm, and his defense of a theory of death of the person as a psychophysical entity, have both significantly advanced the literature. In this special issue, Lizza reinforces his critiques of a strictly biological approach. In my commentary, I take up Lizza’s challenge regarding a biological concept of death. He is (...) certainly right to point out that science is not value-free; however, this does not imply that there cannot be a characterization of biological death that can be shown to be superior to other concepts. After characterizing and justifying such a theory of biological death, I show that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for brain death are unequivocally biologically alive. However, with respect to concepts of personhood and related ideas, I urge the acceptance of a pluralism of such concepts for matters of public policy. (shrink)

Consciousness has traditionally been the subject matter of philosophy. However, especially in recent years, various branches of science have attempted to develop theories of consciousness. I evaluate the biological theories of Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, and Antti Revonsuo in order to gauge the current state of biological accounts of consciousness. I begin with an explication of the easy and hard problems of consciousness as defined by David Chalmers. Next, I summarize how each theory defines ‘consciousness’ and then (...) I evaluate each theoretical model. Finally, I evaluate the models in terms of the easy problems and, especially, the hard problem. My aim in this work is to demonstrate that the current biological theories of consciousness are inadequate. This claim is not tantamount to one that claims that the theories are ineffective. On the contrary, these theories tend to be more useful than not. However, these biological models do not address the most essential component of consciousness that is subjective phenomenological experience. (shrink)

After briefly putting Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Animal Food into its historical context, I present two biological theories which appear in this treatise: the first may be called “providential ecology,” the theory that the natural world operates very well without the intervention of man, that God or Nature takes care of biological balance most effectively without human intervention; the second may be called “the rationality of animals,” the theory that there is no radical distinction between human (...) reason and the rationality displayed by animals. Both theories may be placed into the general philosophical position elaborated by the earlier Neoplatonists conceming man’s place in nature, the character of embodied souls, and the interrelationships between being, God, and λόγοϛ; I have not, however, set myself this larger task. (shrink)

In Kaplan and Winther’s recent article (Biol Theory. doi:10.1007/s13752-012-0048-0, 2012) they argue for three bold theses: first, that “it is illegitimate to read any ontology about ‘race’ off of biological theory or data”; second, that “using biological theory to ground race is a pernicious reification”; and, third, that “race is fundamentally a social rather than a biological category.” While Kaplan and Winther’s theses are thoughtful, I show that the arguments that their theses rest on (...) are unconvincing. In order to be constructive, I go on to show exactly how one can use biological theory and data to legitimately infer an ontological view of race, to infer a biological view of race that is not a reification, and to argue that race is both socially constructed and biologically real. (shrink)

Having laid the groundwork in his critically acclaimed books Neural Darwinism (Basic Books, 1987) and Topobiology (Basic Books, 1988), Nobel laureate Gerald M. Edelman now proposes a comprehensive theory of consciousness in The Remembered ...

RESUMEN Con el objetivo de fundamentar la importancia de la teoría biológica del conocimiento de Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela y sus seguidores para comprender la articulación entre los fenómenos biológicos y sociales, se aplicaron los métodos del nivel teórico analítico-sintético, inductivo-deductivo, histórico-lógico y ascensión de lo abstracto a lo concreto, con la intención de sistematizar información proveniente de la bibliografía consultada y de la experiencia profesional del autor, con énfasis en la formación de masters y doctores en pedagogía. Desde esta (...) posición teórica, se explica la aparición de las formas básicas de la cognición en el operar de sistemas autopoiéticos y la su importancia que, en la evolución hacia formas más complejas como la conciencia reflexiva, tuvo la coordinación del comportamiento para un acoplamiento estructural conjunto al entorno. Se realizan valoraciones sobre el posicionamiento de esta teoría en el contexto de la filosofía, sociología, psicología y de las ciencias de la educación contemporáneas. ABSTRACT The importance of the biological theory of the knowledge, for understanding the existent articulation between the biological and social phenomena, are explained. Methods of the theoretic level to systematize information obtained from the bibliography and from the vocational experience of the author, with emphasis in doctors' and masters' formation in pedagogy were used. From this theoretic position, the appearing of the elemental forms of the cognition in the operation of the autopoietic systems and the importance of the coordination of the behaviour for a join structural connection with the environment, for the evolution toward more complexes forms like the reflexive conscience are explained. Some valuations about the positioning of this theory in the contemporary context of the philosophy, sociology, psychology and the sciences of the education are presented. (shrink)

The central thesis of this book is that the semantic conception is a logical methodologically and heuristically richer and more accurate account of scientific theorizing, and in particular of theorizing in evolutionary biology, than the ...

Over the past few decades, philosophers of biology have debated the need for a revised evolutionary synthesis that could integrate the causal dynamics of singular organisms into mainstream biological theory. In this chapter I examine two synthesizing arguments (extension and accretion) by turning to a historical source that has recently caught the attention of philosophers on both sides of the debate: Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. I argue that accretionists and extenders both pick out one (...) of two key components in Kant’s account of teleological judgment, which, according to Kant, must be held together. By emphasizing one part of Kant’s account of teleological judgment at the expense of the other, both sides overlook the practical nature of his critique. Kant does not simply identify the conditions that render it necessary to judge some products of nature teleologically, I suggest, but also demonstrates the need for second-order analysis to define various domains of inquiry that arise in response to the explanatory demands of nature. The shared turn to Kant indicates that synthesizing arguments can be evaluated against their capacity to accommodate ongoing negotiation between the plurality of research aims in practice. I conclude that a deflationary version of the extension argument is best suited to the task. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to show how the science of biology has been influenced by ethical, religious, social, cultural and philosophical beliefs as to the nature of life and our human place in the natural world. It follows that there are accounts of theories and investigations from those of Aristotle to research in molecular biology today. These have been selected to illustrate the theme and there is no intention to present a comprehensive history of biology. It is suggested (...) that ethical beliefs in particular have a greater influence in biology than in other sciences, such as physics and chemistry, and this is because biology includes the study of ourselves and involves us in consideration of the value and purpose of life. Attitudes to non-human life are also coloured by ethical beliefs and though some philosophers, for example Descartes, thought that only human beings were capable of thought and feeling the general view has always been that animals were sentient. Our treatment of animals and our attitudes toward them have also been conditioned by religious views as to the position of humans in relation to the natural world. (shrink)

Man's interpretations of natural phenomena change and develop gradually in accordance with his knowledge of them and the accumulation of scientific data about them. In studying a subject, it is very important to understand the history of the development of the subject and the general state of theoretical thinking on the subject. By so doing, we can embrace the experience and knowledge secured by scholars in the past and broaden our vision in order to avoid tortuous paths. The author of (...) this article will review biological theories and the history of their development as the beginning of our study of the histories of natural science and philosophy. (shrink)

Ernst Mach, philosopher, physicist, historian, and physiological-psychologist, presented a bio-psychological model of nature. Although within the community of philosophers Mach has been primarily seen as a physicist who took interest in philosophical questions about the foundations of physics, this thesis places Mach with the context of nineteenth-century evolutionary theory and psychology and sees his views on physics as being largely derivative of his bio-psychology. ;For Mach, nature was a unified whole under the inner direction of evolutionary processes. Evolution produced (...) humans, and humans, still under naturalistic influences, have produced science. Science, then, is deeply part of the natural world, both in its origination and its current practice. Mach can thus be seen as a deep evolutionary naturalist. ;This evolutionary perspective is integrated with psychology. Mach's research in psychology led him to see perception as fundamentally the comparison of contrasts. In fact, evolution, perception, and cognition all followed this model. Furthermore, since science is based upon the act of making measurements, and since measurement is at root the comparison of something to a given standard, all measurement inherently involves psychological comparison. Our knowledge of the world, then, cannot escape the psychological boundaries which constitute it. ;After tracing out Mach's views in bio-psychology, Mach's applications of this to physics are examined. In particular, his famous critique of Newtonian space and time which inspired Einstein can now be seen as partly arising out of the tradition of bio-psychology, and thus a path can be traced from the nineteenth century life sciences to the revolution in twentieth century physics. (shrink)

To make possible the integration proposed by Domjan et al., psychologists first need to close the research gap between behavioral ecology and the study of Pavlovian conditioning. I suggest two strategies, namely, to adopt more behavioral ecological approaches to social behavior or to co-opt problems already addressed by behavioral ecologists that are especially well suited to the study of Pavlovian conditioning.

At the turn of the twentieth century, biologists such as Oscar Riddle, Thomas Hunt Morgan, Frank Lillie, and Richard Goldschmidt all puzzled over the question of sexual difference, the distinction between male and female. They all offered competing explanations for the biological cause of this difference, and engaged in a fierce debate over the primacy of their respective theories. Riddle propounded a metabolic theory of sex dating from the late-nineteenth century suggesting that metabolism lay at the heart of (...) sexual difference. Thomas Hunt Morgan insisted on the priority of chromosomes, Frank Lillie emphasized the importance of hormones, while Richard Goldschmidt supported a mixed model involving both chromosomes and hormones. In this paper, I will illustrate how the older metabolic theory of sex was displaced when those who argued for the relatively newer theories of chromosomes and hormones gradually formed an alliance that accommodated each other and excluded the metabolic theory of sex. By doing so, proponents of chromosomes and hormones established their authority over the question of sexual difference as they laid the foundations for the new disciplines of genetics and endocrinology. Their debate raised urgent questions about what constituted sexual difference, and how scientists envisioned the plasticity and controllability of this difference. These theories also had immediate political and cultural consequences at the turn of the twentieth century, especially for the eugenic and feminist movements, both of which were heavily invested in knowledge of sex and its determination, ascertainment, and command. (shrink)

Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...) to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture. Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, 1988). (shrink)

Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers’ attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...) to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture.Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, Citation 1988 ). (shrink)

In 1964, the British psychologist Hans Jürgen Eysenck published Crime and Personality, the book that set forth his theory of the criminal as a psychopathic poor conditioner. Crime and Personality went through three editions, and even those who vehemently rejected the theory acknowledged it as the most highly articulated and influential biological explanation of crime of its time. Yet today Eysenck’s name is fading from criminological memory - and none too soon, in the opinion of critics who (...) continue to anathematize him as a self-serving showman, charlatan, and dangerous right-wing conservative. This article addresses four questions. Who was Eysenck? What did he say about the causes of crime? Why was he (and why does he continue to be) such a controversial figure? And did he contribute any ideas of lasting significance to criminology? The answers open a window onto the late 20th-century revival of biocriminology, a return to biological explanations that continues into the present and seems to be accelerating. They also reveal characteristics of criminology itself as a knowledge enterprise that has changed over time. (shrink)

Although “theory” has been the prevalent unit of analysis in the meta-study of science throughout most of the twentieth century, the concept remains elusive. I further explore the leitmotiv of several authors in this issue: that we should deal with theorizing (rather than theory) in biology as a cognitive activity that is to be investigated naturalistically. I first contrast how philosophers and biologists have tended to think about theory in the last century or so, and consider recent (...) calls to upgrade the role of theory in the life sciences against the background of the recent “data deluge” in molecular biology, systems biology, etc. I then review thinking about theory in biology in relation to physical theory as a positive or negative exemplar. I conclude by discussing various aspects of a positive program for “naturalizing theorizing.”. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative (...) purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different "degrees of contingency". We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative (...) purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. (shrink)

It has been suggested that biological theories differ from physical theories because the subject matter of biology differs from the subject matter of physics especially in the fact that living bodies are more complex than nonliving bodies. It is shown that the interactional complexity of living bodies can only be expressed by invoking biological theories. The claim that living bodies are complex is, therefore, ultimately a claim about the nature of scientific theories rather than a claim about the (...) nature of the subject matter of biology resting upon a presystematic judgement. (shrink)