What kind of interventions on the body of an innocent human being may be licitly intended? This question arises in relation to maternal–fetal conflicts such as ectopic pregnancy and obstructed labor, and to other cases such as organ harvesting and separation of conjoined twins. Many assume that harm must be intended for absolute moral prohibitions to apply; however, it is not always the case that foreseen harm is merely a factor to weigh against benefits we intend. On the contrary, foreseen (...) harm (and absence of benefit) for someone we affect can be morally conclusive when linked to an immedi­ate intention to affect the person’s body or invade the space it fills. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Through an exploration of a home invasion scene in Ingmar Bergman's Shame, this article explores the ways in which it is not only our own bodies that are vulnerable to assault but also the meaningful objects through which we expressively engage with the world, as well as the worldly context of these embodied engagements. First, I draw primarily on the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to explore the ways in which things come to be (...) incorporated into our bodily experience and how our vulnerability as embodied individuals is thus extended into the life of these things. Second, I engage with phenomenological accounts of home and psychoanalytic accounts of childhood development in order to argue that our extended bodily vulnerability is coextensive with our creative openness to the world. Finally, I offer some reflections on the role played by breakdown in phenomenological experience, at the level of the things through which we are “at home” to expressively extend ourselves out into the world and at the level of the sense of “homelessness” alive in the experience of anxiety. (shrink)

What does it mean to respect life and health in an innocent fellow-human being? Separating conjoined twins where one twin will die as a result need not involve the intention to kill or harm. Arguably, however, not all side-effects are “mere” side-effects which could, in principle, be outweighed by sufficiently good intended effects. Rather, foreseen serious harm for an innocent person we non-therapeutically affect can be morally conclusive when linked to the intention to affect the person’s body or invade the (...) space it fills. In the case of infant conjoined twins, such as the Maltese twins Jodie and Mary, the twin who dies from separation has no unjust, or any, intentions as regards the twin saved. She thus has the moral immunity of any innocent person from lethal bodily invasions and other serious bodily harm. Neither the final act which killed Mary nor previous acts of cutting into Mary, including parts shared with her twin Jodie, were therefore morally permissible. (shrink)

What are the ethics of child genital cutting? In a recent issue of the journal, Duivenbode and Padela (2019) called for a renewed discussion of this question. Noting that modern health care systems...

The standard of care in the United States favors stabilizing any adult who arrives in an emergency department after a failed suicide attempt, even if he appears decisionally capacitated and refuses life-sustaining treatment. I challenge this ubiquitous practice. Emergency clinicians generally have a moral obligation to err on the side of stabilizing even suicide attempters who refuse such interventions. This obligation reflects the fact that it is typically infeasible to determine these patients’ level of decisional capacitation—among other relevant information—in this (...) unique setting. Nevertheless, I argue, stabilizing suicide attempters over their objection sometimes violates a basic yet insufficiently appreciated right of theirs—the right against bodily invasion. In such cases, it is at least prima facie wrong to stabilize a patient who wants to die even if they lack a contrary advance directive or medical order and suffer from no terminal physical illness. (shrink)

The dystopian elements of the Alien films display the dark side of social mechanisms. Modern philosophy is not exempt from the temptations of this “authoritarian synthesis”. It also responds to the themes of impurity, whether through religious heresy, mental illness, or bodily invasion or corruption. In the shooting script for Alien, it is clear that Ripley has been “infected” by the Xenomorph Facehugger in the pod; on screen, that fact is held from us until much later in the (...) film for dramatic effect. Ripley's fears about contagion actually fit together well with the thinking of the German Idealist philosophers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, who were among the first philosophers of biology. Ripley does not seem much interested in sex throughout the first two Alien films, but she is interested in having a family, especially after Newt's death. (shrink)

The right to withdraw from participation in research is recognized in virtually all national and international guidelines for research on human subjects. It is therefore surprising that there has been little justification for that right in the literature. We argue that the right to withdraw should protect research participants from information imbalance, inability to hedge, inherent uncertainty, and untoward bodily invasion, and it serves to bolster public trust in the research enterprise. Although this argument is not radical, it (...) provides a useful way to determine how the right should be applied in various cases. (shrink)

I argue that the separation of the conjoined Attard twins of Manchester was not morally justified as it involved intentionally internally affecting (“invading”) the body of the weaker twin without permission and without any advantage to her.

The right to withdraw from participation in research is recognized in virtually all national and international guidelines for research on human subjects. It is therefore surprising that there has been little justification for that right in the literature. We argue that the right to withdraw should protect research participants from information imbalance, inability to hedge, inherent uncertainty, and untoward bodily invasion, and it serves to bolster public trust in the research enterprise. Although this argument is not radical, it (...) provides a useful way to determine how the right should be applied in various cases. (shrink)

The death of Jesse Gelsinger in 1999 during a gene therapy trial raised many questions about the ethical review of medical research. Here, the author argues that the principle of justice is interpreted too narrowly and receives insufficient emphasis and that what we permit in terms of bodily invasion affects the value we place on individuals. Medical research is a societally supported activity. As such, the author contends that justice requires that invasive medical research demonstrates sufficiently compelling societal (...) benefit. Many consider this societal benefit to be self evident. However, medical research is a complex activity; it yields new treatments but also creates financial rewards and affects health resource allocation. As research evolves into a multibillion pound, multinational enterprise, justice requires a much broader analysis of societal benefit. Without such evaluation we risk undermining the value of bodily integrity and of research participants. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Conscription and Combat Violence Corporal Punishment Sexual Assault Circumcision Education Family and Other Relationships Bodily Privacy Life Expectancy Imprisonment and Capital Punishment Conclusion.

This article discusses the key existential stakes of implementing biometrics in human lifeworlds. In this pursuit, we offer a problematization and reinvention of central values often taken for granted within the “ethical turn” of AI development and discourse, such as autonomy, agency, privacy and integrity, as we revisit basic questions about what it means to be human and embodied. Within a framework of existential media studies, we introduce an existential ethics of care—through a conversation between existentialism, virtue ethics, a feminist (...) ethics of care and post-humanist ethics—aiming to deepen and nuance our understanding of the human behind “human-centered” AI directives. The key argument is that biometrics implicates humans through unprecedented forms of objectification, through which the existential body—the relational, intimate and frail human being—is at risk. We interrogate these risks as they become visible at three sites where embodied humans are challenged by biometrics, and thus where the existential body is challenged by the biometric body. This occurs through reductionism (biometric passports nailing bodies to identities, removing human judgment and compromising agency at the AI border), enforced transparency (smart home assistants surveying human intimacies and invading intimate spaces in the bedroom) and the breaching of bodily integrity (chipping bodies to capture sensory data, challenging the very concept of bodily integrity through self-invasive biohacking). Our existential ethics of care is importantly not a solutionist list of principles or suggestions, but a manifesto for a way of thinking about the ethical challenges of living with biometrics in today’s world, by raising the right questions. We argue that a revitalized discussion of the basic existential stakes within human lived experience is needed and should serve as the foundation on which comprehensive frameworks can be built to address the complexities and prospects for ethical machines, responsible biometrics and AI. (shrink)

Van der Pijl et al outline data suggesting an alarmingly high incidence of violation of the bodily integrity of patients in labour, including episiotomies performed without patients’ consent, or over their explicit objection.1 Similar data have been reported from the USA and Canada.2 The authors appropriately conclude that explicit consent is required at the time of all invasive obstetrical procedures, including episiotomy. Commonsense adjustments to the duration and detail of consent under conditions of clinical urgency are appropriate and should (...) be familiar to any clinician involved in perinatal care, as well as non-obstetric proceduralists caring for acutely ill patients. However, complete omission of consent for any of these procedures is both disrespectful to patients’ autonomy and strongly associated with morbidity from birth-related psychosocial trauma.3–5 The true incidence of obstetrical procedures performed without patients’ consent is difficult to determine for multiple reasons, including sample selection, recall bias and patients’ reluctance to reengage with traumatic experiences; however, …. (shrink)

The article examines hunger as a tool of political action and necropolitics of dehumanization - reducing a person to bare life, which is a specific phenomenon of modern civilization. Conceptualization of necropolitics is carried out in the context of its understanding proposed by A. Mbembe. A thesis is being developed about supplementing biopolitics with necropolitics, when sovereign power creates zones of death, when it is death that embodies domination and ways of resisting it. Politics is defined as the "work of (...) death" and sovereignty as the "right to kill", which is based on the exceptional state and relations of enmity. Forced collectivization and the artificially created Holodomor are defined as the embodiment of necropolitics, which in general fits into the imperial-colonial discourse, which can be traced in the cultural and economic policy of the Russian Empire, the USSR, and continues with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It is noted that necropolitics can be considered not only in a dialectical connection with biopolitics, but also take the form of nihilistic regression, which is manifested in war, genocide, the destruction of cultural values, etc., of all the values of modern Western civilization that were embodied in the projections of the Enlightenment. It is emphasized that the very limitation of a person in the basic means of life, in food, is aimed at the final dehumanization of a human. The necropolitics of dehumanization consists in reducing a person to his bodily/animal, bare life, that is, existence in the horizon of death. That is why food becomes the most important weapon of the necropower, the result of which is the transformation of a person into a living dead, a zombie, or a cannibal. The phenomenon of imperial politics and totalitarian regimes looks like the perfected logic of necropolitics aimed at destroying human. Hunger is a condition of domination, a compulsion to obey the system. It is concluded that necropolitics dehumanizes not only those whom it turns into the living dead, but also those who rule or identify with the ruling regime, so it is not local, it extends to all of humanity. Holodomor or war cannot be localized, since any detachment from them extends to all the principles/basis of the necropolitics of dehumanization. (shrink)

Continuous sedation at the end of life is a practice that has attracted a great deal of attention. An increasing number of guidelines on the proposed correct performance of the practice have been drafted. All of the guidelines stress the importance of using sedation in proportion to the severity of the patient’s symptoms, thus to reduce the patient’s consciousness no more than is absolutely necessary. As different patients can have different experiences of suffering, the amount of suffering should, ideally, be (...) assessed subjectively; that is, via communication with the patient. Continuously sedated patients are often unable to communicate, however, making subjective methods of pain assessment unusable. For these patients, the degree of consciousness is the sole available measure. It therefore seems important to adequately measure how deeply the patient is sedated, thereby allowing sedation to be increased when it is too light and decreased when it is too heavy. This is in accordance with the idea that reducing consciousness is not an ethically neutral act.Although consciousness measuring techniques are a hot topic in anesthesiology, almost no research exists on the use of such techniques in the context of continuous sedation at the end of life. This article aims to review existing techniques to measure consciousness and to evaluate their applicability, efficiency, and invasiveness for patients who are continuously sedated until death.Techniques commonly used to assess the depth of sedation in continuously sedated patients are basic clinical assessment and sedation scales, as they are often considered reliable and noninvasive. These techniques might not be very reliable, however, since it is known that some patients are nonresponsive and yet aware. Moreover, sedation scales require stimulation of the patient (for example prodding, shaking, or providing painful stimuli), and can thus be considered invasive of one’s bodily integrity or dignity. Other techniques, such as EEG (electroencephalography) derivatives, may score better on reliability and invasiveness. Yet these have so far never been compared to sedation scale scores for patients receiving continuous sedation at the end of life.Therefore, we conclude that, for both clinical and ethical reasons, research into the efficiency and applicability of other techniques, such as derivatives of EEG, are urgently needed. (shrink)

This paper presents the foundation upon which the contemporary knowledge of body integrity dysphoria (BID) is built. According to the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases, 11th edition (ICD-11), the main feature of BID is an intense and persistent desire to become physically disabled in a significant way. Three putative aetiologies that are considered to explain the insurgence of the condition are discussed: neurological, psychological and postmodern theories. The concept of bodily representation within the medical context is highlighted, (...) with the concept of dysphoria, which was brought to the fore with the introduction of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5), and the ICD-11. Contemporary issues of “justice” are addressed to identify ethically relevant distinctions between BID and sex reassignment surgery. It is argued that there is no ethically relevant difference between the BID actor’s desire for invasive surgical intervention and the wish of gender dysphoric individuals to undergo sex reassignment surgery procedures. Some BID actors self-mutilate, and this presents medical professionals with difficult choices regarding whether or not to intervene in order to satisfy the BID patient’s desire. Both abstention and intervention may lead to severe ethical complications for doctors and patients despite the positive outcomes in terms of quality of life for BID individuals who manage to undergo such procedures. (shrink)

Environmental violence takes form of both ‘spectacular’ events, like ecological disasters usually recognised by the general public, and ‘slow violence’, a type of violence that occurs gradually, out of sight and on a long-term scale. Planetary seas and oceans, loaded with cultural meanings of that which ‘hides’ and ‘allows to forget’, are the spaces where such attritional violence unfolds unseen and ‘out of mind’. Simultaneously, conventional concepts of nature and culture, as dichotomous entities, become obsolete. We all inhabit and embody (...) the world differently, as variously situated people, divided by national, sexual, bodily and economic status, and as very variously situated nonhumans in an increasingly anthropogenic world. This chapter focuses on subtle ‘slow violence’ unfolding through the instances of submerged chemical weapons, so-called dead zones, invasive species and high- and low-trophic mariculture in the Baltic and North Sea regions. It zooms in on the select cases of such ‘environed bodies’, their stories of excruciating slow violence and yet also on unexpected encounters with care and hospitality. The aim is to unfold a low-trophic theory for the naturecultural research on violence and care within environmental humanities, and to engage a coexistential ethics of environmental adaptability informed by feminist posthumanities. (shrink)

In June 1931, on the eve of the invasion of Manchuria, the Japanese mass media announced the winner of the first Miss Nippon contest. Applicants were limited to rank amateurs whose photographs, and not bodies, were judged by a panel of mostly elderly men who regarded the contest as `culture work'. A second contest was held in 1934. One of the main objectives of the Miss Nippon contests was to locate and record photographically, young women whose allegedly `pure blood' (...) and ideal bodily proportions demonstrated the success of eugenics and social hygiene programs launched decades earlier. Japan's imperialist aggression in Asia and the Pacific forms the backdrop to this study on the centrality of popular cultural events and media in the state's attempt to improve the `Japanese race' through technologies of eugenics and social hygiene. The article explores the politics of blood, body and beauty, three interrelated subjects, framed by the Miss Nippon contests, that were common to the colonial project and the discourse of eugenics alike. (shrink)

The emergence of implantable drug delivery systems will allow us to produce the effects of psychosurgery and surgical sterilization without their irreversible invasions of bodily integrity. However, this clinical advantage does not resolve the most important ethical problems these surgeries face, and may even obscure them when they arise in the practice of drug implantation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AsphyxiationsSteven Connor (bio)Recent events and sociorhetorical expatiations upon them have reaffirmed breathing as the ideal form of free and unimpeded life, that struggles against the throttlings of oppression. The root meaning of oppression, from the past participle of Latin opprimere, is to press, crush or bear down upon, and the word oppression has commonly been used to signify the feeling of the difficulty of breathing, through some constriction or (...) pressure, as in the nocturnal attentions of the nightmare, the spirit imagined as settling suffocatingly on the chest of the sleeper. As a mare that rides rather than being ridden, the spirit is often imagined as a female succubus, though in Fuseli's 1781 painting the mare is accompanied by a simian incubus who squats on the chest of a female sleeper, prompting these lines from Erasmus Darwin:So on his Nightmare through the evening fogFlits the squab Fiend o'er fen, and lake, and bog;Seeks some love-wilder'd maid with sleep oppress'd,Alights, and grinning sits upon her breast.(Darwin 2.16)'Pressing' meant the forcing of somebody into some condition or service, typically the army or navy. In oppressive weather, the clouds may seem to 'lower', or the humid air to cramp and confine the body.We think of breathing as opening or release, of a piece with open windows and unbounded spaces. Human beings have brewed up fantasies for centuries of more complete modes of breathing that would overcome the constriction represented by the respiratory apparatus, exhorting themselves and each other to breathe more deeply, suffusing, not just the lungs, but the diaphragm, the head, and other items of phantasmal physiology. Indeed, the factitiously hollow spaces of the body–the head that we seek to keep 'clear'–are the proof of the belief in the strange principle of vital vacuity, the idea that we exist most fully in empty spaces of innerness, bodily enclosures evacuated of body. Without this sense of the animating function of the breath, the body suffers the inanition of a "want of living [End Page 74] breath in its lungs, which are full of gases but empty of spirit" (Wilkinson 78). In being taken in and given out, breath seems to commute between what Wittgenstein calls "two kinds of worlds, worlds built of different materials." The fact that "the mental world in fact is liable to be imagined as gaseous, or rather, aethereal," seems to Wittgenstein to be related to "the queer role which the gaseous and the aethereal play in philosophy,–when we perceive that a substantive is not used as what in general we should call the name of an object, and when therefore we can't help saying to ourselves that it is the name of an aethereal object" (Wittgenstein 47). The conception of the soul as an afflatus, or a special kind of magic gas, which has been common among so many different peoples, suggests just this kind of aethereal object-that-is-not-one. It embodies the conviction that we are most essentially present as ourselves where we are closest to being nothing, in an out-of-body kind of body.We breathe out–phew, originally in the seventeenth century a violent expression of disgust or emancipatory emptying, as we might nowadays plosively and purifyingly say poo–when we 'ex-press', as we say, our sense of being, as we also say, 'relieved,' from re + levare, to lift up, implying a lightening, or levitation, that approaches in imagination the condition of air itself. To ventilate is to levitate. To be relieved is to dream of remission from the clinging pressure of your own embodiment, as though you could simply emit or expel your own weight. To inhale is to prepare for stress and struggle: to exhale is to relax, to sigh into satisfaction, converting becoming momentarily to being. Exhalation is therefore the decorporizing of the body, or the corporealization of the incorporeal. But though human beings exalt imaginary emptying, as the purifying expulsion of what is evil, infective, invasive, persecutory, expiration is also death. Speech is the expressive sound formed from the impressing of exhaled breath, the dissolving openness of air given imaginary... (shrink)

This collection was inspired by the observation that film remakes offer us the opportunity to revisit important issues, stories, themes, and topics in a manner that is especially relevant and meaningful to contemporary audiences. Like mythic stories that are told again and again in differing ways, film remakes present us with updated perspectives on timeless ideas. While some remakes succeed and others fail aesthetically, they always say something about the culture in which_and for which_they are produced. Contributors explore the ways (...) in which the fears of death, loss of self, and bodily violence have been expressed and then reinterpreted in such films and remakes as Invasion of the Body Snatchers, Night of the Living Dead, and Dawn of the Dead. Films such as Rollerball, The Ring, The Grudge, The Great Yokai Wars, and Insomnia are discussed as well because of their ability to give voice to collective anxieties concerning cultural change, nihilism, and globalization. While opening on a note that emphasizes the compulsion of filmmakers to revisit issues concerning fear and anxiety, this collection ends by using films like Solaris, King Kong, Star Trek, Doom, and Van Helsing to suggest that repeated confrontation with these issues allows the opportunity for creative and positive transformation. (shrink)

This paper calls fresh attention to ethical problems surrounding prenatal testing by focusing on genetic knowledge gained through evolving testing procedures. Advances in reproductive and prenatal genetic testing include non-invasive tests, such as Verifi and Materniti21, designed to gather detailed information regarding fetal DNA as early as 10 weeks. Meanwhile, a new method of chromosomal microarray has proved more reliable than karyotyping in detecting fetal abnormality. This method detects abnormalities in 1 out of every 60 pregnancies in which karyotyping identified (...) the fetus as “normal.” Chromosomal microarray directly compares fetal DNA to DNA from a presumptively “healthy person” to identify genetic deviations. The chromosomal microarray method thus assumes a human genetic blueprint—that is, a normal genotype, deviance from which is risky and open to medical diagnosis. But, according to philosopher and geneticist Jackie Leach Scully, there is no genetic blueprint for human beings. Rather, genetic variation is constant. Thus, notes Scully, genetic discourse could free medical discourse from the dictates of the binary between normal and abnormal, although mistaken belief in a genetic blueprint can foil this alternative way of speaking and thinking. Prenatal testing has received critical philosophical attention from both disability theorists and feminists. Adrienne Asch suggests that prenatal testing and diagnosis stigmatizes already-existing persons with disabilities by suggesting that bodily deviance is intolerable. Licia Carlson coined the phrase “prenatal prototypes” to describe the obfuscating results of genetic profiling carried out on the fetus. The philosophical conversation Asch and Carlson stimulate involves higher stakes now that testing uncovers fetal genotype and reveals mere genetic deviation in order to aid reproductive decision-making. I argue that prenatal testing, and especially the most recently developed testing procedures described above, forecloses Scully’s alternative discourse of genetic variation by supporting an ideal of a singular “healthy genotype,” deviance from which is to be uncovered and avoided. Mobilizing this insight by drawing on the work of feminist disability scholars like Asch and Carlson, I seek to foreground the play between norm and deviance. I expose the normalizing field of statistical risk, operating in excess of medical diagnosis, which requires potential parents to manage and avoid deviance itself. (shrink)

This book proposes an alternative to the consent model which is currently at the heart of patient self-determination and which is shown here to have fundamental flaws that constrain its effectiveness. The proposed model is a property model in which the patient’s bodily integrity is protected from unauthorised invasion, and their legitimate expectation to be provided with the relevant information to make an informed decision is taken to be a proprietary right. This model enables the courts to overcome (...) the requirement to prove causation in consent cases and offers a complementary approach to patient self-determination. (shrink)

Feminist debates on sex trafficking have become entrenched and polarised, with abolitionists producing images of helpless abused victims, while sex worker advocates work hard to achieve some recognition of the agency of migrant sex workers. This article explores constructions of embodiment, subjectivity and agency in the debate, showing how abolitionist views, in spite of their efforts to challenge liberal pro-sex perspectives, rely on a familiar vision of the body as a singular, bounded and sovereign entity whose borders must be secured (...) against invasion. The result is a vision in which victimisation is taken to epistemically compromise the subjectivities of sex workers, forcing them and their advocates to argue for recognition of their agency according to familiar liberal models of consent in order to be able to enter the debate. Drawing on the recent work of Judith Butler on consent and vulnerability, this article argues that what is needed is a rethinking of bodily ontology so that the vulnerability of sex workers is not opposed to their agency, but rather seen as an inevitable aspect of embodied sociality, constituting a call to ethical engagement and a recognition of the inequitable global distributions of precarity that produce sex trafficking as part of contemporary geopolitics. From this perspective, the alignment between radical feminist efforts to secure women's bodily borders and global efforts to secure national borders no longer appears as coincidence. (shrink)

In view of the philosophical problems that vex the debate on situated affectivity, it can seem wise to focus on simple cases. Accordingly, theorists often single out scenarios in which an individual employs a device in order to enhance their emotional experience, or to achieve new kinds of experience altogether, such as playing an instrument, going to the movies or sporting a fancy handbag. I argue that this narrow focus on cases that fit a ‘user/resource model’ tends to channel attention (...) away from more complex and also more problematic instances of situated affectivity. Among these are scenarios in which a social domain draws individuals into certain modes of affective interaction, often by way of attunement and habituation to affective styles and interaction patterns that are normative in the domain in question. This can lead to a phenomenon that is not so much ‘mind extension’ than ‘mind invasion’: affectivity is dynamically framed and modulated from without, often contrary to the prior orientations of the individuals in question. As an example, I discuss affective patterns prevalent in today’s corporate workplace. I claim that workplace affect sometimes contributes to what is effectively a ‘hack’ of employees’ subjectivity. (shrink)

According to a standard view, the physical boundary of the person—the skin-and-skull boundary—matters morally because this boundary delineates between where the person begins and the world ends. On the basis of this view we make a distinction between invasive interventions that penetrate this boundary and non-invasive interventions that do not. The development of neuroprosthetics, however, raises questions about the significance of this boundary and the relationship between person and body. In particular it has been argued by appeal to the Extended (...) Mind thesis that mind and person can extend beyond the body, and hence the skin-and-skull boundary is of questionable significance. In this paper I argue that the Extended Mind thesis is consistent with the ethical relevance of the skin-and-skull barrier. Although it can be argued that cognitive processes and aspect of mind can extend beyond the skin-and-skull boundary as EM claims, it does not follow that the person is also extended beyond this boundary. The moral sense of person is closely related to the notion of person as a subject of experiences and this, in turn, is related to the sensory and somatosensory aspects of the body. The development of neuroprosthetics provides us with reason to see that persons can be variously embodied, but this is consistent with the functional and ethical significance of the skin-and-skull boundary. (shrink)

Some critics of invasion biology have argued the invasion of ecosystems by nonindigenous species can create more valuable ecosystems. They consider invaded communities as more valuable because they potentially produce more ecosystem services. To establish that the introduction of nonindigenous species creates more valuable ecosystems, they defend that value is provisioned by ecosystem services. These services are derived from ecosystem productivity, the production and cycling of resources. Ecosystem productivity is a result of biodiversity, which is understood as local (...) species richness. Invasive species increase local species richness and, therefore, increase the conservation value of local ecosystems. These views are disseminating to the public via a series of popular science books. Conservationists must respond to these views, and I outline a method of rejecting such arguments against controlling invasive species. Ecological systems are valuable for more than local productivity and biodiversity is not accurately described by a local species count. (shrink)

This book builds a new understanding of the body and its relationship to images and technology, using a framework where novel writings of pragmatist somaesthetics and phenomenology meet new research on bodily reactions. Max Ryynänen gives an overview of the topic by collecting the existing information of our bodies gazing at visual culture and the philosophies supporting these phenomena, and examines the way the gaze and the body come together in our relationship to culture. Themes covered include somatic film; (...) the body in artistic documentation of activist art; body parts (and their mutilation or surgeries) in contemporary art and film; robot cars and our visual relationship to them; the usefulness of Indian rass philosophy in explaining digital culture; and an examination of Mario Perniola's work about the idea that we, human beings, are increasingly experiencing ourselves to be simply 'things.' The book will be of interest to scholars working in art history, aesthetics, cultural philosophy, film studies, technology studies, media studies, cultural studies, and visual studies. (shrink)

This chapter, which deals with the notions of affectivity and engagement, explores the internal connection between basic affects to get at the emergence of affectivity. Additionally, it presents a discussion of motivation and the interplay of affectivity and engagement. Basic affects consist of needs, wants, and desires. Needs and then wants involve a kind of circumspective seeing in which ‘felt’ values are as much a part of objects as their utility. Intentions-in-action are rooted in basic affects. The basic types of (...) affects are each triadically structured with the moments of each type being dyadically organised. The affectivity circuit usually begins with what is not yet a profile coming to prominence out of a dark background. The circuit of engagement is inducted by a bodily drive seeking resolution. (shrink)

To a first approximation, ‘bodily skill’ refers to the capacity to successfully utilize the body in the world to achieve goals. But the body is complex, and bodily skill manifests in many different ways. Further, work on bodily skill spans the philosophy of mind, action, and cognitive science, as well as the sciences of motor control and perception. This chapter aims to provide an overview of recent themes and key ideas. First, we review work on the nature (...) of skill as such. Second, we discuss ways theorists have discussed the implementation of skill in the human body, and a theoretical difficulty associated with explanations of implementation. Third, we discuss the importance of the idea of a hierarchical representational architecture for understanding skill’s implementation, and various ways this architecture can be made more sophisticated. Fourth, we discuss work that attempts to understand skill execution on-the-fly, and in particular, work that attempts to understand the connection between intentions and motor representations, and the connection between implicit sensorimotor adaptation and explicit planning and executive control. Fifth, we discuss work on the models that assist fine-grained skill execution, as well as the idea that even at rapid, fine-grained motoric levels, one finds intelligent systems and mechanisms supporting skill. Finally, we consider the place of bodily awareness in an account of bodily skill. (shrink)

How do we understand the agency and significance of material forces and their interface with human bodies? What does it mean to be human in these times, with bodies that are inextricably interconnected with our physical world? Bodily Natures considers these questions by grappling with powerful and pervasive material forces and their increasingly harmful effects on the human body. Drawing on feminist theory, environmental studies, and the sciences, Stacy Alaimo focuses on trans-corporeality, or movement across bodies and nature, which (...) has profoundly altered our sense of self. By looking at a broad range of creative and philosophical writings, Alaimo illuminates how science, politics, and culture collide, while considering the closeness of the human body to the environment. (shrink)

Invasive neurotechnologies are a frequent subject of discussion in neuroethics. Technologies, like deep brain stimulation and implantable brain-computer interfaces, are thought to hold significant promise for human health and well-being, but they also raise important ethical questions about autonomy, safety, stigma, privacy, and agency, among others. The terms ‘invasive’ and ‘invasiveness’ are commonly applied to these and other neurotechnologies, yet the concept of invasiveness itself is rarely defined or delimited. Some have suggested that invasiveness may have multiple meanings – physical, (...) emotional, or lifestyle – and that confusion about how people use the terms may lead to harm, especially for users of invasive devices. It is uncertain if debates in neuroethics contribute to this confusion. To investigate this, we conducted a study of how the term ‘invasiveness’ is used in neuroethics. We found that neuroethicists almost always use ‘invasiveness’ to refer to the physical features of interventions, and rarely to refer to other senses of invasiveness. We also found that referencing invasiveness does not determine which ethical issues are prioritized for a given type of neurotechnology. Overall, this study affirms the importance of understanding the meaning and use of the concept of invasiveness in ethical discussion of neurotechnology while also suggesting the need for further work in the area and consideration for rethinking what forms of technology we consider to be invasive. (shrink)

If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale (...) ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve. (shrink)

Navigating the ambiguity of invasiveness: is it warranted? Authors De Marco and colleagues have presented a new model on the concept of invasiveness, redefining both its technical definition and practical implementation. 1 While the authors raise valid critiques regarding the discrepancy in definitions, I cannot help but wonder about the purpose of redefining terms for which little confusion, if any, exists? This commentary seeks to scrutinise the rationale supporting the new model in the absence of significant clinical confusion and to (...) explore the implications for clinical practice. What are we trying to solve? Initially, one may notice there is no mention of clinical relevancy, confusion among patients or whether the discrepancy in terms is causing miscommunication. It seems reasonable that some clinical confusion may exist, but so too does a similar imbalance of terms when speaking technically across the specialties; take depression and its definition... (shrink)

If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that create ecosystem malfunctions. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale (...) ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve. (shrink)

The scope of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) could expand in the future to include detailed analysis of the fetal genome. This will allow for the testing for virtually any trait with a genetic contribution, including “non-medical” traits. Here we discuss the potential use of NIPT for these traits. We outline a scenario which highlights possible inconsistencies with ethical decision-making. We then discuss the case against permitting these uses. The objections include practical problems; increasing inequities; increasing the burden of choice; negative (...) impacts on the child, family, and society; and issues with implementation. We then outline the case for permitting the use of NIPT for these traits. These include arguments for reproductive liberty and autonomy; questioning the labeling of traits as “non-medical”; and the principle of procreative beneficence. This summary of the case for and against can serve as a basis for the development of a consistent and coherent ethical framework. (shrink)

The aim of our paper is to show that there is a sense of body that is enactive in nature and that enables to capture the most primitive sense of self. We will argue that the body is primarily given to us as source or power for action, i.e., as the variety of motor potentialities that define the horizon of the world in which we live, by populating it with things at hand to which we can be directed and with (...) other bodies we can interact with. We will show that this sense of body as bodily self is, on the one hand, antecedent the distinction between sense of agency and sense of ownership, and, on the other, it enables and refines such distinction, providing a conceptual framework for the coherent interpretation of a variety of behavioral and neuropsychological data. We will conclude by positing that the basic experiences we entertain of our selves as bodily selves are from the very beginning driven by our interactions with other bodies as they are underpinned by the mirror mechanism. (shrink)

The scope of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) could expand in the future to include detailed analysis of the fetal genome. This will allow for the testing for virtually any trait with a genetic contribution, including “non-medical” traits. Here we discuss the potential use of NIPT for these traits. We outline a scenario which highlights possible inconsistencies with ethical decision-making. We then discuss the case against permitting these uses. The objections include practical problems; increasing inequities; increasing the burden of choice; negative (...) impacts on the child, family, and society; and issues with implementation. We then outline the case for permitting the use of NIPT for these traits. These include arguments for reproductive liberty and autonomy; questioning the labeling of traits as “non-medical”; and the principle of procreative beneficence. This summary of the case for and against can serve as a basis for the development of a consistent and coherent ethical framework. (shrink)

This paper explores the ethical dimensions of lionfish removal and provides an argument supporting hunting lionfish for consumption. Lionfish are an invasive species found around the world. Their presence has fueled management strategies that predominantly rely on promoting human predation and consumption. We apply rights-based ethics, utilitarian ethics, and ecocentric environmental ethics to the question of whether hunting and eating lionfish is ethical. After applying these perspectives, we argue that, from a utilitarian perspective, lionfish should be culled. Rights-based ethics, on (...) the other hand, are not applicable in this case, while ecocentric environmental ethics would support lionfish removal. (shrink)

Over 50% of the world population will develop a psychiatric disorder in their lifetime. 1 In the realm of psychiatric treatment, two primary modalities have been established: pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy. Yet, pharmacological interventions often take precedence as the initial treatment choice despite their comparable outcomes, severe side effects and disputed evidence of their efficacy. This preference for medication foregrounds a vital re-examination of what it means to be invasive in medical treatments, namely in psychiatric care. De Marco _et al_ challenge (...) the standard account of invasiveness, presenting considerations that transcend the traditional criteria of physical intrusion. 2 Through case studies centred on treatments for schizophrenia and depression, we aim to (1) reinforce De Marco _et al_’s challenge to the standard account of invasiveness and (2) extend the dialogue to the moral imperative of redefining mental invasiveness. Our aims are to broaden the definition of mental invasiveness, aligning... (shrink)

We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, (...) can withstand most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action-readiness. (shrink)

Essays on the role of the body in self-consciousness, showing that full-fledged, linguistic self-consciousness is built on a rich foundation of primitive, nonconceptual self-consciousness. These essays explore how the rich and sophisticated forms of self-consciousness with which we are most familiar—as philosophers, psychologists, and as ordinary, reflective individuals—depend on a complex underpinning that has been largely invisible to students of the self and self-consciousness. José Luis Bermúdez, extending the insights of his groundbreaking 1998 book, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, argues that (...) full-fledged, linguistic self-consciousness is built on a rich foundation of primitive, nonconceptual self-consciousness, and that these more primitive forms of self-consciousness persist in ways that frame self-conscious thought. They extend throughout the animal kingdom, and some are present in newborn human infants. Bermúdez makes the case that these primitive forms of self-awareness can indeed be described as forms of self-consciousness, arguing that they share certain structural and epistemological features with full-fledged, linguistic self-consciousness. He offers accounts of certain important classes of states of nonconceptual content, including the self-specifying dimension of visual perception and the content of bodily awareness, considering how they represent the self. And he explores the general role of nonconceptual self-consciousness in our cognitive and affective lives, examining in several essays the relation between nonconceptual awareness of our bodies and what has been called our “sense of ownership” for our own bodies. (shrink)