Results for 'cognitivism'

946 found
Order:
  1. Non-cognitivism and rational inference.Mark Bryant Budolfson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
    Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that Dorr's (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  2. Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 292-307.
    This chapter discusses the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in metaethics. It considers the main arguments for and against each view, as well as arguments that the distinction cannot survive critical scrutiny.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Ethics 117 (4):649-673.
    Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   137 citations  
  4. Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think (...) faces significant difficulties. I proceed by considering two attempts by Cognitivists to explain requirements of practical rationality and I argue that neither of them succeed. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  5. Cognitivism about imperatives.Josh Parsons - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):49-54.
    Cognitivism about imperatives is the thesis that sentences in the imperative mood are truth-apt: have truth values and truth conditions. This allows cognitivists to give a simple and powerful account of consequence relations between imperatives. I argue that this account of imperative consequence has counterexamples that cast doubt on cognitivism itself.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  6.  69
    Aesthetic Cognitivism and Serialized Television Fiction.Iris Vidmar Jovanović - 2023 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 81 (1):69-79.
    In this article, I defend the cognitive value of certain generic television series. Unlike media and television scholars, who have been appreciative of the informative capacity of television fiction, philosophers have been less willing to acknowledge the way in which these works contribute to our understanding of our social reality. My aim here is to provide one such account, grounded in aesthetic cognitivism, that is, the view that fiction is a source of knowledge. Focusing on crime and courtroom dramas, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Trying Cognitivism: A Defence of the Strong Belief Thesis.Avery Archer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):140-156.
    According to the Strong Belief Thesis (SBT), intending to X entails the belief that one will X. John Brunero has attempted to impugn SBT by arguing that there are cases in which an agent intends to X but is unsure that she will X. Moreover, he claims that the standard reply to such putative counterexamples to SBT – namely, to claim that the unsure agent merely has an intention to try – comes at a high price. Specifically, it prevents SBT (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind.Micah Allen & Karl J. Friston - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2459-2482.
    Predictive processing approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  9.  52
    Cognitivism about Moral Judgement.Alison Hills - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.
    What is it to make a moral judgement? There are two standard views, cognitivist and non-cognitivist, plus hybrid options according to which moral judgements have cognitivist and non-cognitivist components. In this context, cognitivism is typically defined as the theory that moral judgements are beliefs. This chapter aims to clarify what it means for a moral judgement to be a belief. It begins by identifying a tension between three claims: cognitivism, an account of belief, and an account of moral (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  10. Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment.Brendan Cline - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. Expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty.John Eriksson & Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):719-735.
    ABSTRACTIt has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  12.  95
    Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):794-799.
    Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  13. Why cognitivism?Yair Levy - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244.
    Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of 'Practical Knowledge'. In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one's intention; and from the explanation (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  14.  26
    Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.
    Several philosophers have recently challenged cognitivism, i.e., the view that moral judgments are beliefs, by arguing that moral judgments are evidence non-responsive in a way that beliefs are not. If you believe that P, but acquire (sufficiently strong) evidence against P, you will give up your belief that P. This does not seem true for moral judgments. Some subjects maintain their moral judgments despite believing that there is (sufficiently strong) evidence against the moral judgments. This suggests that there is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  18
    Perspectivism, Cognitivism, and the Ethical Evaluation of Art.Iris Vidmar Jovanović - 2023 - The Journal of Aesthetic Education 57 (3):31-48.
    Abstract:My aim in this article is to explore the role of perspectivism—roughly, the view that works of art prescribe a certain perspective—in aesthetic cognitivism and in the ethical evaluation of art, particularly as it features in the value-interaction debate. Although I am critical of perspectivism’s capacity to shoulder an artwork’s cognitive and ethical value, I find some of the arguments mounted against it, most notably those by Ted Nannicelli, misdirected, and I present several arguments against them. However, because my (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Non-Cognitivism and Validity.David Alm - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):121-147.
    In this paper I defend against a certain objection the view that it is possible to account for validity and kindred notions for moral language within a non-cognitivist framework by appeal to the descriptive meaning of moral terms. The objection is that such an account leads to an asymmetry in the accounts it offers for synonymy in different contexts; in certain contexts it holds that sameness of meaning for a moral term depends on its evaluative meaning, in other contexts that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  17. (1 other version)Non-cognitivism and motivation.Nick Zangwill - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 416--24.
    In sum, the non-cognitivist account of motivation is far from unproblematic. The non-cognitivist has trouble telling us what moral attitudes are in a way that is consistent with the phenomenon of variable motivation. Given that the cognitivist has an easy explanation of variable motivation, it seems that cognitivism is preferable to non-cognitivism on the score of motivation, which is a reversal of the way the issue is usually perceived.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  18.  27
    Radical Cognitivism about Practical Reason.William Ratoff - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (1).
    Cognitivism about practical reason is the doctrine that certain aspects of practical reason are really instances of theoretical reason. For example, that intentions are beliefs or that certain norms of practical rationality just are, or reduce to, certain norms of theoretical rationality. Radical cognitivism about practical reason, in contrast, is the more heady view that practical reason just is a species of theoretical reason. It entails that what it is to be a motivational state (of any kind) is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  59
    Cognitivism and explanatory relativity.Jeffrey Hershfield - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):505-526.
    In much of his writing in the philosophy of mind, John Searle has been highly critical of what N. Block refers to as ‘The Computer Model of the Mind’ — the approach that treats the mind as a symbol-manipulating device akin in spirit, if not detail, to the modem computer. Searle refers to this philosophical approach as ‘cognitivism.’ The extent of his skepticism and animus toward the computer model of the mind is plainly apparent in the following quotation from (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Modal Cognitivism and Modal Expressivism.David Elohim - manuscript
    This paper aims to provide a mathematically tractable background against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I argue that epistemic modal algebras comprise a materially adequate fragment of the language of thought, and endeavor to show how such algebras provide the resources necessary to resolve Russell's paradox of propositions. I demonstrate, then, how modal expressivism can be regimented by modal coalgebraic automata, to which the above epistemic modal algebras are dually isomorphic. I examine, in particular, the (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Modal Cognitivism and Modal Expressivism.Hasen Khudairi - manuscript
    This paper aims to provide a mathematically tractable background against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I argue that epistemic modal algebras comprise a materially adequate fragment of the language of thought. I demonstrate, then, how modal expressivism can be regimented by modal coalgebraic automata, to which the above epistemic modal algebras are dual. I examine, in particular, the virtues unique to the modal expressivist approach here proffered in the setting of the foundations of mathematics, by (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's ‘Do so as well!’.Michael Ridge - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):563-574.
    Meta-ethical non-cognitivism makes two claims—a negative one and a positive one. The negative claim is that moral utterances do not express beliefs which provide the truth-conditions for those utterances. The positive claim is that the primary function of such utterances is to express certain of the speaker's desire-like states of mind. Non-cognitivism is officially a theory about the meanings of moral words, but non-cognitivists also maintain that moral states of mind are themselves at least partially constituted by desire-like (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  23. Cognitivism and the arts.John Gibson - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):573-589.
    Cognitivism in respect to the arts refers to a constellation of positions that share in common the idea that artworks often bear, in addition to aesthetic value, a significant kind of cognitive value. In this paper I concentrate on three things: (i) the challenge of understanding exactly what one must do if one wishes to defend a cognitivist view of the arts; (ii) common anti-cognitivist arguments; and (iii) promising recent attempts to defend cognitivism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  24.  95
    Videogame Cognitivism.Alexandre Declos - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Games 1:1-31.
    The aim of this article is to examine and defend videogame cognitivism (VC). According to VC, videogames can be a source of cognitive successes (such as true beliefs, knowledge or understanding) for their players. While the possibility of videogame-based learning has been an extensive topic of discussion in the last decades, the epistemological underpinnings of these debates often remain unclear. I propose that VC is a domain- specific brand of aesthetic cognitivism, which should be carefully distinguished from other (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
    Non-cognitivism is a variety of irrealism about ethics with a number of influential variants. Non-cognitivists agree with error theorists that there are no moral properties or moral facts. But rather than thinking that this makes moral statements false, noncognitivists claim that moral statements are not in the business of predicating properties or making statements which could be true or false in any substantial sense. Roughly put, noncognitivists think that moral statements have no truth conditions. Furthermore, according to non-cognitivists, when (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  26. Normative uncertainty for non-cognitivists.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  27. Cognitivism about emotion and the alleged hyperopacity of emotional content.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):315-320.
    According to cognitivism about emotion, emotions are reducible to some non-emotional states. In one version, they are reducible entirely to cognitive states, such as beliefs or judgments; in another, they are reducible to combinations of cognitive and conative states, such as desire or intention. Cognitivism is plausibly regarded as the orthodoxy in the philosophy of emotion since the 1980s. In a recent paper, however, Montague develops a powerful argument against cognitivism. Here I argue that the argument nonetheless (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Against Cognitivism About Supposition.Margherita Arcangeli - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):607-624.
    A popular view maintains that supposition is a kind of cognitive mental state, very similar to belief in essential respects. Call this view “cognitivism about supposition”. There are at least three grades of cognitivism, construing supposition as (i) a belief, (ii) belief-like imagination or (iii) a species of belief-like imagination. I shall argue against all three grades of cognitivism and claim that supposition is a sui generis form of imagination essentially dissimilar to belief. Since for good reasons (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  29. Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.
    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  30.  19
    Emotional Cognitivism without Representationalism.Dave Beisecker - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):113-122.
    In _Knowing Emotions_, Rick Anthony Furtak seeks an account that does justice to both the cognitive and corporeal dimensions of our emotional lives. Concerning the latter dimension, he holds that emotions serve to represent axiological features of the world. Against such a representationalist picture, I shall suggest an alternative way to understand how our emotions gear in with the rest of our cognitive states.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. A cognitivist approach to concepts.Hans Johann Https://Orcidorg909X Glock - 2011 - .
    Th is article explores a cognitivist approach to concepts. Such an approach steers a middle course between the Scylla of subjectivism and the Charybdis of objectivism. While concepts are not mental particulars, they have an ineliminable cognitive dimension. Th e article explores several versions of cognitivism, focusing in particular on Künne’s Neo-Fregean proposal that concepts are modes of presentation. It also tackles a challenge facing all cognitivist accounts, namely the ‘proposition problem’: how can the cognitive dimension of concepts be (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  32. Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truthmaking, and Ontological Cheating.Farbod Akhlaghi - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):291-321.
    Derek Parfit defended Non-Realist Cognitivism. It is an open secret that this metaethical theory is often thought at best puzzling and at worst objectionably unclear. Employing truthmaker theory, I provide an account of Non-Realist Cognitivism that dispels charges of objectionable unclarity, clarifies how to assess it, and explains why, if plausible, it would be an attractive theory. I develop concerns that the theory involves cheating into an objection that ultimately reveals Non-Realist Cognitivism faces a dilemma. Whether it (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason.Errol Lord - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational. Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still needs to show that they entail certain practical requirements. That is, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Cognitivism in the theory of emotions.John Deigh - 1994 - Ethics 104 (4):824-54.
  35.  62
    Was Mill a non-cognitivist?Christopher Macleod - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):206-223.
    In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing, and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin, in Section I, by laying out the ‘received view’ of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. There is, I claim in Sections II and III, no firm textual evidence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  36.  51
    Moral cognitivism and character.Craig Taylor - 2005 - Philosophical Investigations 28 (3):253–272.
    It may seem to follow from Peter Winch's claim in ‘The Universalizability of Moral Judgements’ that a certain class of first‐person moral judgments are not universalizable that such judgments cannot be given a cognitivist interpretation. But Winch's argument does not involve the denial of moral cognitivism and in this paper I show how such judgements may be cognitively determined yet not universalizable. Drawing on an example from James Joyce's The Dead, I suggest that in the kind of situation Winch (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Against Cognitivism About Personhood.Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):657-686.
    The present paper unravels ontological and normative conditions of personhood for the purpose of critiquing ‘Cognitivist Views’. Such views have attracted much attention and affirmation by presenting the ontology of personhood in terms of higher-order cognition on the basis of which normative practices are explained and justified. However, these normative conditions are invoked to establish the alleged ontology in the first place. When we want to know what kind of entity has full moral status, it is tempting to establish an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  38. The value of cognitivism in thinking about extended cognition.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  39. IV*—Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs.David Wiggins - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1):61-86.
    David Wiggins; IV*—Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, P.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  40.  8
    Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind.Mariela Destéfano - 2021 - Phenomenology and Mind 21:142-153.
    No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully post-cognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.
    The article begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are always beliefs, never desires. The article next argues that Dancy’s argument for his position is flawed. On the one hand, it is not true that desire always comes with motivation in the agent; on the other, even if this was the case, it would (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument from Direction of Fit.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):561-580.
    An important argument for the belief-desire thesis is based on the idea that an agent can be motivated to act only if her mental states include one which aims at changing the world, that is, one with a “world-to-mind”, or “telic”, direction of fit. Some cognitivists accept this claim, but argue that some beliefs, notably moral ones, have not only a “mind-to-world”, or “thetic”, direction of fit, but also a telic one. The paper first argues that this cognitivist reply is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  43. Cognitivism and Metaphysical Weight: A Dilemma for Relaxed Realism.Annika Böddeling - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):546-559.
    Another view has entered the metaethical debate—relaxed realism [Dworkin 1996; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014]. Relaxed realists claim that there are irreducible moral properties, but seek to avoid the...
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  44. (1 other version)Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency.Folke Tersman - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.
    This is acknowledged by moral realists and non-cognitivists alike, but, for obvious reasons, they relate differently to this resemblance. For realists, it provides arguments, and for non-cognitivists, it provides potential trouble. Realists claim that the various points of resemblance between moral and factual discourse indicate that moral discourse simply is a kind of factual discourse.1 However, in recent years a number of interesting attempts have been made in trying to show that the realist appearance of moral discourse can after all (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Clearing conceptual space for cognitivist motivational internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus . But (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  46. Non‐cognitivism and Wishful Thinking.Cian Dorr - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):97–103.
    Even if non-cognitivists about some subject-matter can meet Geach’s challenge to explain how there can be valid implications involving sentences which express non-cognitive attitudes, they face a further problem. I argue that a non-cognitivist cannot explain how, given a valid argument whose conclusion expresses a belief and at least one of whose premises expresses a non-cognitive attitude, it could be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  47.  19
    Skepticism and Cognitivism: A Study in the Foundations of Knowledge.Oliver A. Johnson - 1978 - University of California Press.
    _Skepticism and Cognitivism_ addresses the fundamental question of epistemology: Is knowledge possible? It approaches this query with an evaluation of the skeptical tradition in Western philosophy, analyzing thinkers who have claimed that we can know nothing. After an introductory chapter lays out the central issues, chapter 2 focuses on the classical skeptics of the Academic and Pyrrhonistic schools and then on the skepticism of David Hume. Chapters 3 through 5 are devoted to contemporary defenders of skepticism—Keith Lehrer, Arne Næss, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. Cognitivism: A New Theory of Singular Thought?Sarah Sawyer - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):264-283.
    In a series of recent articles, Robin Jeshion has developed a theory of singular thought which she calls ‘cognitivism’. According to Jeshion, cognitivism offers a middle path between acquaintance theories—which she takes to impose too strong a requirement on singular thought, and semantic instrumentalism—which she takes to impose too weak a requirement. In this article, I raise a series of concerns about Jeshion's theory, and suggest that the relevant data can be accommodated by a version of acquaintance theory (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  49. Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and Second Person Authority.Jane Heal - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt052.
    We are social primates, for whom language-mediated co-operative thinking (‘co-cognition’) is a central element of our shared life. Psychological concepts may be illuminated by appreciating their role in enriching and improving such co-cognition — a role which is importantly different from that of enabling detailed prediction and control of thoughts and behaviour. This account of the nature of psychological concepts (‘co-cognitivism’) has social anti-individualism about thought content as a natural corollary. The combination of co-cognitivism and anti-individualism further suggests (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  50. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox.Mark Pinder - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1221-1242.
    A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence. Borg and Larson and Segal defend a version of the view on which semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a truth-conditional semantic theory—a semantic theory which is true. Let us call this view the “cognitivist account of meaning”. In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that the cognitivist account of meaning faces in light of the liar paradox. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 946