Results for 'concept possession'

1000+ found
Order:
See also
  1. Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and (...) possession can be generalized via reflection on the cognitive nature of intentional action and the potential of certain misunderstandings to undermine know-how even when the corresponding abilities and associated propositional knowledge are in place. Such considerations make explicit the intimate relation between know-how and understanding, motivating a general intellectualist analysis of the former in terms of the latter. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  2. Assessing Concept Possession as an Explicit and Social Practice.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (4):801-816.
    We focus on issues of learning assessment from the point of view of an investigation of philosophical elements in teaching. We contend that assessment of concept possession at school based on ordinary multiple-choice tests might be ineffective because it overlooks aspects of human rationality illuminated by Robert Brandom’s inferentialism––the view that conceptual content largely coincides with the inferential role of linguistic expressions used in public discourse. More particularly, we argue that multiple-choice tests at schools might fail to accurately (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Concept Possession.George Bealer - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:331-338.
    This paper answers critical responses to the author’s “A Theory of Concepts and Concept Possession.” The paper begins with a discussion of candidate counterexamples to the proposed analysis of concept possession -- including, e.g., a discussion of its relationship to Frank Jackson’s Mary example. Second, questions concerning the author’s general methodological approach are considered. For instance, it is shown that -- contrary to the critics’ suggestions -- an analysis of concept possession cannot invoke belief (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. A Puzzle About Concept Possession.Mark Siebel - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):1-22.
    To have a propositional attitude, a thinker must possess the concepts included in its content. Surprisingly, this rather trivial principle refl ects badly on many theories of concept possession because, in its light, they seem to require too much. To solve this problem, I point out an ambiguity in attributions of the form 'S possesses the concept of Fs'. There is an undemanding sense which is involved in the given principle, whereas the theoretical claims concern a stronger (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5.  9
    The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness.Stephane Savanah - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):713-720.
    This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6.  3
    Fully Understanding Concept Possession.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):3-27.
    Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  89
    Concepts or Metacognition - What is the Issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness”.Kristina Musholt - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):721-722.
    The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy: A Dialogue.H. A. Knott - 2007 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book offers a Wittgensteinian study of concept possession and of the nature of conceptual investigation in philosophy. It is both an ideal advanced introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy and an original treatment of some of its most crucial yet least developed regions. The book is written as a Socratic dialogue, which frames the discussion within a backward glance to Plato's Theory of Forms. In so doing it makes a bold claim as to Wittgenstein's place in Western philosophy.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  24
    Content, Concepts, Concept Possession.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I clarify the notions of mental content and of concept. I present competing views on these notions and indicate my own position. I introduce content in terms of correctness conditions and distinguish several kinds of propositions, as well as non-propositional scenario content, with which perceptual content might be identified. I relate this discussion to a wide-spread commitment in philosophy of perception to respect the subject’s perceptual perspective in ascriptions of perceptual content. Then I compare views of (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  15
    Scepticism and Concept Possession.Stephen Nathanson - 1974 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):215-223.
    This is an attempt to clarify the ways in which traditional empiricist theories of mind lend support to sceptical doubts about physical objects. I argue that a crucial role is played by the assumption that having a concept consists of being able to recognize instances of that concept. I further argue that this view of concept possession is false so that any sceptical view based on empiricist assumptions about the mind is unwarranted.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Free Content A Puzzle About Concept Possession.Mark Siebel - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):1-22.
    To have a propositional attitude, a thinker must possess the concepts included in its content. Surprisingly, this rather trivial principle refl ects badly on many theories of concept possession because, in its light, they seem to require too much. To solve this problem, I point out an ambiguity in attributions of the form 'S possesses the concept of Fs'. There is an undemanding sense which is involved in the given principle, whereas the theoretical claims concern a stronger (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  34
    Partial Understanding and Concept Possession: A Dilemma.Víctor M. Verdejo & Xavier Donato Rodríguez - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):153-162.
    In the light of partial understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept-individuating possession conditions include cases of partially understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  14
    Arguments from Concept Possession.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I discuss arguments for the claim that a subject can both have an experience with a certain content and not be in possession of all the concepts needed to specify this content. If she does not possess all the relevant concepts, then she cannot exercise them. So, she can undergo such an experience without being required to exercise all the concepts needed to specify its content. The argument from memory experience goes back to Martin (Philos Rev (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Concept Individuation, Possession Conditions, and Propositional Attitudes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):140-66.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  15.  65
    Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terence E. Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
  16. Concept Possession, Experimental Semantics, and Hybrid Theories of Reference.James Genone & Tania Lombrozo - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):1-26.
    Contemporary debates about the nature of semantic reference have tended to focus on two competing approaches: theories which emphasize the importance of descriptive information associated with a referring term, and those which emphasize causal facts about the conditions under which the use of the term originated and was passed on. Recent empirical work by Machery and colleagues suggests that both causal and descriptive information can play a role in judgments about the reference of proper names, with findings of cross-cultural variation (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  17.  75
    Incorrect Understanding and Concept Possession.Halvor Nordby - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):55-70.
    Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known 'arthritis' case involves a patient who understands 'arthritis' incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  18. Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession.Derek Ball - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
    It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession.Edison Barrios - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.
    This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  4
    Nurse-Patient Communication: Language Mastery and Concept Possession.Halvor Nordby - 2006 - Nursing Inquiry 13 (1):64-72.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  11
    Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terry Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27 - 33.
  22.  46
    The Significance of the Distinction Between Concept Mastery and Concept Possession.Genoveva Marti - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:163-167.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  35
    Bealer's Intuitions on Concept Possession.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:303-309.
  24.  9
    The Meaning of Illness in Nursing Practice: A Philosophical Model of Communication and Concept Possession.Halvor Nordby - 2016 - Nursing Philosophy 17 (2):103-118.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  21
    A Response to Dow's and Musholt's Commentaries on the Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness.Stephane Savanah - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):725-726.
  26.  12
    Concept Possession, Cognitive Value and Anti-Individualism.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):1-25.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  19
    Innate Powers, Concepts and Knowledge: A Critique of D. W. Hamlyn's Account of Concept Possession.Malcolm Jones - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 15 (1):139–145.
  28.  19
    Some Critical Remarks on an Explanation of Concept Possession.Eleonora Orlando - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:323-330.
  29.  6
    David E. Cooper on Language and Concept Possession.Margaret A. Fairhurst - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 14 (2):249–254.
    David e cooper has argued that it makes no sense to credit a young child with beliefs or concepts of any sort, since the young child lacks a fairly sophisticated linguistic system. in my paper i attempt to show that such a position cannot consistently be maintained. in fact, most of the arguments put forward by cooper to defend his position implicitly assume that the child has a conceptual system of some kind.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  1
    Scepticism and Concept Possession.Stephen Nathanson - 1974 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):215-223.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Qualitative Quantitative and Experimental Concept Possession, Criteria for Identifying Conceptual Change in Science Education.Otto Lappi - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (6):1347-1359.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  9
    John Locke on Native Right, Colonial Possession, and the Concept of Vacuum Domicilium.Paul Corcoran - 2018 - The European Legacy 23 (3):225-250.
    The early paragraphs of John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government describe a poetic idyll of property acquisition widely supposed by contemporary theorists and historians to have cast the template for imperial possessions in the New World. This reading ignores the surprises lurking in Locke’s later chapters on conquest, usurpation, and tyranny, where he affirms that native rights to lands and possessions survive to succeeding generations. Locke warned his readers that this “will seem a strange doctrine, it being quite contrary to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. A Theory of Concepts and Concepts Possession.George Bealer - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:261-301.
    The paper begins with an argument against eliminativism with respect to the propositional attitudes. There follows an argument that concepts are sui generis ante rem entities. A nonreductionist view of concepts and propositions is then sketched. This provides the background for a theory of concept possession, which forms the bulk of the paper. The central idea is that concept possession is to be analyzed in terms of a certain kind of pattern of reliability in one’s intuitions (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  34.  5
    The Importance of Knowing How to Talk About Illness Without Applying the Concept of Illness.Halvor Nordby - 2004 - Nursing Philosophy 5 (1):30-40.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  35.  93
    Fuzzy Concepts and Relations between Them.Vladimir Kuznetsov - 2006 - In М Попович (ed.), Problems of Mentality Theory. pp. 163-197.
    It is proposed to analyze fuzzy concepts and relations between them in the frame of triplet concept modeling. Fuzzy concepts are introduced by means of the so-called fuzzification of dichotomous concepts. The cognitive and psychological aspects of concept possession are separated and studied.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Bealer and the Autonomy of Philosophy.Alexander Sarch - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):451 - 474.
    George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  72
    Possession Conditions: A Focal Point for Theories of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (1-2):51-56.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  38. Remarks on Fodor on Having Concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf & William P. Bechtel - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):48-56.
    Fodor offers a novel argument against Bare-bones Concept Pragmatism (BCP). He alleges that there are two circularities in BCP’s account of concept possession: a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to sort; and a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to draw inferences. We argue that neither of these circles is real.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  59
    Possession of Concepts.John Campbell - 1984 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85:149-170.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
    It is commonplace in cognitive science that concepts are individuated in terms of the roles they play in the cognitive lives of thinkers, a view that Jerry Fodor has recently been dubbed ‘Concept Pragmatism’. Quinean critics of Pragmatism have long argued that it founders on its commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction, since without such a distinction there is plausibly no way to distinguish constitutive from non-constitutive roles in cognition. This paper considers Fodor’s empirical arguments against analyticity, and in particular (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  41. Inference and Rational Commitment.James Trafford - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (1):5-20.
    This peer-reviewed paper intervenes in debates relating to overarching themes that impact upon mass media studies, communication theory and theories of cognition more generally. In particular, the paper discusses issues involving how our ordinary psychological thinking relates to norms of rationality (and how these latter are conceived). In essence, I argue against a dominant approach taken by Christopher Peacocke, that rationality can be grounded in the possession of certain concepts. The article makes a new contribution to the field by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. The Status of Altruism.Angus Ross - 1983 - Mind 92 (366):204-218.
    It is argued that to possess the concept of distress is to be able to apply the concept to others, and that this implies a qualified form of altruism, in the sense that to perceive another as being in distress is, other things being equal, to see them as in need of help and be moved to help them.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Is Intuition Based On Understanding?[I Thank Jo].Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
    According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective. I argue that there are cases in which intuiting (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  44. Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
    According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45.  67
    How to Use a Concept You Reject.Mark McCullagh - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):293-319.
    Inferentialist accounts of concept possession are often supported by examples in which rejection of some inference seems to amount to rejection of some concept, with the apparently implausible consequence that anyone who rejects the inference cannot so much as understand those who use the concept. This consequence can be avoided by distinguishing conditions necessary for direct uses of a concept (to describe the non-cognitive world) from conditions necessary for content-specifying uses (to specify what someone thinks (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. The a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 2004.
    In the history of epistemology, discussions of the a priori have been bound up with discussions of necessity and analyticity, often in confusing ways. Disentangling these confusions is an essential step in the study of the a priori. This will be the aim of my introductory remarks. The goal of the remainder of the paper will then be to try to develop a unified account of the a priori, dealing with the notions of intuition and a priori evidence, the question (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  47.  12
    Innatism, Concept Formation, Concept Mastery and Formal Education.Christopher Winch - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 49 (4):539-556.
    This article will consider the claim that the possession of concepts is innate rather than learned. Innatism about concept learning is explained through consideration of the work of Fodor and Chomsky. First, an account of concept formation is developed. Second the argument against the claim that concepts are learned through the construction of a learning paradox developed by Fodor is considered. It is argued that, despite initial plausibility, the learning paradox is not, in fact, a paradox at (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):212-236.
    A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  49. A Kantian Justification of Possession.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2002 - In M. Timmons (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Ethics: Interpretive Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Kant’s justification of possession appears to assume rather than prove its legitimacy. This apparent question-begging has been recapitulated or exacerbated but not resolved in the literature. However, Kant provides a sound justification of limited rights to possess and use things (qualified choses in possession), not of private property rights. Kant’s argument is not purely a priori; it is in Kant’s Critical sense ‘metaphysical’ because it applies the pure a priori ‘Universal Principles of Right’ to the concept of (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50.  23
    Laws, Demands, and Dispositions: John Dewey and His ‘Concept Pragmatism’. Hsin - 2014 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (2):286.
    Cognitive science has come down with a nasty cold, so Jerry Fodor has recently lamented, and the afflicting strain is something called concept pragmatism.1 Its chief symptom is the urge to identify the content of a concept with the inferences habitually drawn upon in its use (a ‘definition-in-use’), these serving also as its condition of possession, in knowing how to draw those inferences definitive of the concept.2 The affliction is quite fatal if Fodor is right, but (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000