Results for 'conscious experience'

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  1. Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  2. Brain, Conscious Experience, and the Observing Self.Bernard J. Baars, Thomas Zoega Ramsoy & Steven Laureys - 2003 - Trends in Neurosciences 26 (12):671-5.
    Conscious perception, like the sight of a coffee cup, seems to involve the brain identifying a stimulus. But conscious input activates more brain regions than are needed to identify coffee cups and faces. It spreads beyond sensory cortex to frontoparietal association areas, which do not serve stimulus identification as such. What is the role of those regions? Parietal cortex support the ‘first person perspective’ on the visual world, unconsciously framing the visual object stream. Some prefrontal areas select and (...)
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  3. How Conscious Experience and Working Memory Interact.Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):166-172.
  4. Conscious Experience.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 1995 - Ferdinand Schoningh.
    The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 thematic sections, compiled by David Chalmers and Thomas (...)
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  5.  11
    Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry.Anil Gupta - 2019 - Harvard University Press.
    This book aims to offer an account of conscious experience and of concepts that help us understand empirical reasoning and empirical dialectic. The account offered possesses, it is claimed, two virtues. First, it provides great theoretical freedom. It allows the theoretician freedom to radically reconceive the world. The theoretician may, for example, begin with the conception that colors are genuine qualities of physical bodies and may, in light of empirical findings, shift to the conception that colors are not (...)
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  6. Can Conscious Experience Affect Brain Activity?Benjamin W. Libet - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):24-28.
    The chief goal of Velmans' article is to find a way to solve the problem of how conscious experience could have bodily effects. I shall discuss his treatment of this below. First, I would like to deal with Velmans' treatment of my own studies of volition and free will in relation to brain processes. Unconscious Initiation and Conscious Veto of Freely Voluntary Acts Velmans appropriately refers to our experimental study that found that onset of an electrically observable (...)
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  7. Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
    Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning (...) thinking, one that would leave the reality of conscious experience untouched. In the end, I shall argue that while there might be no such thing as conscious judging or conscious wanting, there is (or may well be) such a thing as conscious generic thinking. (shrink)
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  8. Conscious Experience and Delusional Belief.Max Coltheart - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
  9. Inner Privacy of Conscious Experiences and Quantum Information.Danko D. Georgiev - 2020 - Biosystems 187:104051.
    The human mind is constituted by inner, subjective, private, first-person conscious experiences that cannot be measured with physical devices or observed from an external, objective, public, third-person perspective. The qualitative, phenomenal nature of conscious experiences also cannot be communicated to others in the form of a message composed of classical bits of information. Because in a classical world everything physical is observable and communicable, it is a daunting task to explain how an empirically unobservable, incommunicable consciousness could have (...)
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  10. Unconscious Modulation of the Conscious Experience of Voluntary Control.Katrin Linser & Thomas Goschke - 2007 - Cognition 104 (3):459-475.
    How does the brain generate our experience of being in control over our actions and their effects? Here, we argue that the perception of events as self-caused emerges from a comparison between anticipated and actual action-effects: if the representation of an event that follows an action is activated before the action, the event is experienced as caused by one’s own action, whereas in the case of a mismatch it will be attributed to an external cause rather than to the (...)
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  11.  59
    Consciousness, Experience, and Justification.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-28.
    I think it is important to try to make sense of these thoughts concerning the justificatory role of experiences, for I suspect that we are losing the ability to see why philosophers have traditionally been attracted to such thoughts. Coherentism and reliabilism, perhaps the two most currently popular theories of epistemic justification, appear simply to reject the idea that experiences can justify beliefs. Thus according to coherentism, the view that ‘a belief is justified by its coherence with other beliefs one (...)
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  12. How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?Max Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.
    In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other ‘mental interventions’ can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction (...)
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  13. The Puzzle of Conscious Experience.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Scientific American 273 (6):80-86.
    Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
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  14. Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction.Patrick Haggard & Sam Clark - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a (...)
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  15. The Illusion of Conscious Experience.François Kammerer - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...)
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  16. Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made (...)
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  17. Conscious Experiences as Ultimate Seemings: Renewing the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.François Kammerer - 2016 - Argumenta 1 (2):233-243.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy is a popular strategy used to support physicalism in the realm of conscious experience. This Strategy accounts for dualist intuitions but uses the ways in which we think about our experiences to explain these intuitions in a physicalist framework, without any appeal to ontological dualism. In this paper, I will raise two issues related to the currently available versions of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. First, most of the theories belonging to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (...)
     
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  18.  30
    Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry, by Anil Gupta: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2019, 440 Pages.Ann-Sophie Barwich - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1255-1262.
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  19.  35
    Symbolic Conscious Experience.Venkata Rayudu Posina - 2017 - Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):1-12.
    Inspired by the eminently successful physical theories and informed by commonplace experiences such as seeing a cat upon looking at a cat, conscious experience is thought of as a measurement or photocopy of given stimulus. Conscious experience, unlike a photocopy, is symbolic—like language—in that the relation between conscious experience and physical stimulus is analogous to that of the word "cat" and its meaning, i.e., arbitrary and yet systematic. We present arguments against the photocopy model (...)
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  20. How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?M. Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.
    In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other 'mental interventions' can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction (...)
     
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  21.  53
    Inhabiting Conscious Experience: Engaged Objectivity in the First-Person Study of Consciousness.J. Petranker - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):3-23.
    First-person methodologies have been criticized for their inability to arrive at reliable and verifiable knowledge of the contents of conscious experience. Consciousness, however, is not its contents, but the cognitive capacity that makes those contents available. That capacity is directly and uniquely accessible to first-person inquiry, provided a suitable methodology can be developed. As a framework for such inquiry, this paper distinguishes two structures that give rise to conscious contents: narrative and story. While narratives are told, stories (...)
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  22. Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience.Barry Dainton - 2000 - Routledge.
    _Stream of Consciousness_ is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
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  23.  27
    Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Explanatory Gaps, One Solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.
    This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl’s “twofold-access theory,” is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although twofold-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way “eliminates” conscious experience; rather, (...)
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  24. Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience.P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser - 1978 - Elsevier.
  25.  39
    Cosmic Consciousness Experience and Psychedelic Experiences: A First Person Comparison.Allan L. Smith & Charles T. Tart - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):97-107.
    The descriptions in the literature of mystical experience and psychedelic experience, such as that induced by LSD, are usually written by persons who have actually experienced only one or perhaps neither of the two states. Because many of the most important effects can be understood by direct experience but only partially described in ordinary language, such lack of direct experience is a major drawback. Since there is disagreement over the question of whether mystical experience and (...)
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  26.  90
    Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Gaps, One Solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-246.
    This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl's "dual-access theory," is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although dual-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way "eliminates" conscious experience; rather, (...)
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  27. The Timing of Conscious Experience: A Critical Review and Reinterpretation of Libet's Research.Gilberto Gomes - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):559-595.
    An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 (...)
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  28.  3
    Mindworks: Time and Conscious Experience.Ernst Poppel - 1988 - Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
    Discusses the nature of time, suggests a hierarchical model of human temporal experience, and proposes a new definition of consciousness.
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  29. Conscious Experience and Concept-Forming Abilities.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2001 - Acta Analytica 16 (26):45-52.
    Pierre Jacob's book, What Minds Can Do , is mainly concerned with intentionality. Jacob's primary goal is to explain both how it is possible for a physical system to have intentional mental states and how the intentional content of such mental states can play a role in the causal explanation of behaviour. Yet, he also tackles the issue of the nature of conscious experience. I shall focus here on a claim he makes in connection with this latter topic. (...)
     
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  30. From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience.Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):216-233.
    When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could (...)
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  31.  68
    Neuronal Dynamics and Conscious Experience: An Example of Reciprocal Causation Before Epileptic Seizures. [REVIEW]Michel Le Van Quyen & Claire Petitmengin - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):169-180.
    Neurophenomenology (Varela 1996) is not only philosophical but also empirical and experimental. Our purpose in this article is to illustrate concretely the efficiency of this approach in the field of neuroscience and, more precisely here, in epileptology. A number of recent observations have indicated that epileptic seizures do not arise suddenly simply as the effect of random fluctuations of brain activity, but require a process of pre-seizure changes that start long before. This has been reported at two different levels of (...)
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  32.  7
    Conscious Experience and Memory.John C. Eccles - 1966 - In Brain and Conscious Experience. Springer. pp. 314--344.
  33.  35
    How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?Max Velmans - 2003 - Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.
    In daily life we take it for granted that our minds have conscious control of our actions, at least for most of the time. But many scientists and philosophers deny that this is really the case, because there is no generally accepted theory of how the mind interacts with the body. Max Velmans presents a non-reductive solution to the problem, in which ‘conscious mental control’ includes ‘voluntary’ operations of the preconscious mind. On this account, biological determinism is compatible (...)
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  34.  95
    The Neural Correlates of Conscious Experience: An Experimental Framework.Chris Frith, Richard Perry & Erik Lumer - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):105-114.
  35. Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.Gary Bartlett - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):195-209.
    Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in conflict (...)
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  36.  5
    Consciousness, Experience, and Justification.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-28.
    I think it is important to try to make sense of these thoughts concerning the justificatory role of experiences, for I suspect that we are losing the ability to see why philosophers have traditionally been attracted to such thoughts. Coherentism and reliabilism, perhaps the two most currently popular theories of epistemic justification, appear simply to reject the idea that experiences can justify beliefs. Thus according to coherentism, the view that ‘a belief is justified by its coherence with other beliefs one (...)
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  37. The Emperor's New Phenomenology? The Empirical Case for Conscious Experience Without First-Order Representations.Hakwan Lau & Richard Brown - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. MIT Press.
    We discuss cases where subjects seem to enjoy conscious experience when the relevant first-order perceptual representations are either missing or too weak to account for the experience. Though these cases are originally considered to be theoretical possibilities that may be problematical for the higher-order view of consciousness, careful considerations of actual empirical examples suggest that this strategy may backfire; these cases may cause more trouble for first-order theories instead. Specifically, these cases suggest that (I) recurrent feedback loops (...)
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  38.  26
    On the Unity of Conscious Experience.Rodney M. J. Cotterill - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):290-311.
    It is suggested that consciousness is primarily associated not with stimuli and perception, as commonly supposed, but with movement and responses. Consciousness of stimuli arises in situations in which possible movements are planned, or in which information must be actively acquired rather than passively registered, and may or may not require overt movements to be performed. By emphasizing response, this formulation provides a simple explanation for the perceived unity of consciousness: though stimuli can be diverse, with independent components, movements must (...)
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  39. Attentional Mechanisms and Conscious Experience.Michael I. Posner & M. K. Rothbart - 1992 - In A. David Milner & M. D. Rugg (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. Academic Press.
  40.  5
    Brain and Conscious Experience: Study Week September 28 to October 4, 1964, of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum.John C. Eccles (ed.) - 1966 - Springer.
    The planning of this Study Week at the Pontifical Academy of Science from September 28 to October 4, 1964, began just two years before when the President, Professor Lemaitre, asked me if 1 would be responsible for a Study Week relating Psychology to what we may call the Neurosciences. 1 accepted this responsibility on the understanding that 1 could have as sistance from two colleagues in the Academy, Professors Heymans and Chagas. Besides participating in the Study Week they gave me (...)
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  41.  12
    Brain Mechanisms of Conscious Experience and Voluntary Action.Herbert H. Jasper - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):543-543.
  42.  9
    Conscious Experience and Autonomic Response to Emotional Stimuli Following Frontal Lobe Damage.Alfred W. Kaszniak, Sheryl L. Reminger, Steven Z. Rapcsak & Elizabeth L. Glisky - 1999 - In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press.
  43.  72
    Conscious Experience and the Non-Triviality Principle.Cory F. Juhl - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (1):91-101.
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  44. How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):35-53.
    Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked (...)
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  45.  20
    A Unified 3D Default Space Consciousness Model Combining Neurological and Physiological Processes That Underlie Conscious Experience.Ravinder Jerath, Molly W. Crawford & Vernon A. Barnes - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-26.
    The Global Workspace Theory and Information Integration Theory are two of the most currently accepted consciousness models; however, these models do not address many aspects of conscious experience. We compare these models to our previously proposed consciousness model in which the thalamus fills-in processed sensory information from corticothalamic feedback loops within a proposed 3D default space, resulting in the recreation of the internal and external worlds within the mind. This 3D default space is composed of all cells of (...)
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  46.  42
    Conscious Experience and Quantum Consciousness Theory: Theories, Causation, and Identity.Mika Suojanen - 2019 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 26 (2):14-34.
    Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little (...)
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  47.  25
    Brain Stimulation and Conscious Experience.Daniel A. Pollen - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):626-645.
    Libet discovered that a substantial duration (> 0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of the somatosensory cortex at threshold currents is required before human subjects can report that a conscious somatosensory experience had occurred. Using a reaction time method we confirm that a similarly long stimulation duration at threshold currents is required for activation of elementary visual experiences (phosphenes) in human subjects following stimulation of the surface of the striate cortex. However, the reaction times for (...)
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  48. Conscious Experiences Are a Memory Process.Hugh M. Roberts - 1971 - Psychological Reports 29:591-94.
  49.  86
    Timing of Conscious Experience: Reply to the 2002 Commentaries on Libet’s Findings.Benjamin Libet - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
  50. An Account of Conscious Experience.Anil Gupta - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):1-29.
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