We provide a general investigation of Logic in which the notion of a simple consequence relation is taken to be fundamental. Our notion is more general than the usual one since we give up monotonicity and use multisets rather than sets. We use our notion for characterizing several known logics (including Linear Logic and non-monotonic logics) and for a general, semantics-independent classi cation of standard connectives via equations on consequence relations (these include Girard's \multiplicatives" and \additives"). We (...) next investigate the standard methods for uniformly representing consequence relations: Hilbert type, Natural Deduction and Gentzen type. The advantages and disadvantages of using each system and what should be taken as.. (shrink)

This paper contains a detailed account of the notion of admissibility in the setting of consequence relations. It is proved that the two notions of admissibility used in the literature coincide, and it provides an extension to multi–conclusion consequence relations that is more general than the one usually encountered in the literature on admissibility. The notion of a rule scheme is introduced to capture rules with side conditions, and it is shown that what is generally understood (...) under the extension of a consequence relation by a rule can be extended naturally to rule schemes, and that such extensions capture the intuitive idea of extending a logic by a rule. (shrink)

We characterize all finitary consequence relations over S4.3, both syntactically, by exhibiting so-called passive rules that extend the given logic, and semantically, by providing suitable strongly adequate classes of algebras. This is achieved by applying an earlier result stating that a modal logic L extending S4 has projective unification if and only if L contains S4.3. In particular, we show that these consequence relations enjoy the strong finite model property, and are finitely based. In this way, (...) we extend the known results by Bull and Fine, from logics, to consequence relations. We also show that the lattice of consequence relations over S4.3 is countable and distributive and it forms a Heyting algebra. (shrink)

Equivalences and translations between consequence relations abound in logic. The notion of equivalence can be defined syntactically, in terms of translations of formulas, and order-theoretically, in terms of the associated lattices of theories. W. Blok and D. Pigozzi proved in [4] that the two definitions coincide in the case of an algebraizable sentential deductive system. A refined treatment of this equivalence was provided by W. Blok and B. Jónsson in [3]. Other authors have extended this result to the (...) cases of k-deductive systems and of consequence relations on associative, commutative, multiple conclusion sequents. Our main result subsumes all existing results in the literature and reveals their common character. The proofs are of order-theoretic and categorical nature. (shrink)

The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation ⇒x. We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, (...) and (b) is an inverse to—more precisely, forms a Galois connection with—the Bolzano-Tarski function. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to developing a formalism that takes rejection seriously. Bilateral notation of signed formulas with force indicators is adopted to define signed consequences which can be viewed as the bilateral counterpart of Tarskian consequence relations. Its relation to some other bilateral approaches is discussed. It is shown how David Nelson’s logic N4 can be characterized bilaterally and the corresponding completeness result is proved. Further, bilateral variants of three familiar notions are considered and investigated: that of (...) a fragment, of definitional equivalence, and of a conservative extension. (shrink)

In this paper, we define some consequence relations based on supervaluation semantics for partial models, and we investigate their properties. For our main consequence relation, we show that natural versions of the following fail: upwards and downwards Lowenheim-Skolem, axiomatizability, and compactness. We also consider an alternate version for supervaluation semantics, and show both axiomatizability and compactness for the resulting consequence relation.

Rational consequence relations and Popper functions provide logics for reasoning under uncertainty, the former purely qualitative, the latter probabilistic. But few researchers seem to be aware of the close connection between these two logics. I’ll show that Popper functions are probabilistic versions of rational consequence relations. I’ll not assume that the reader is familiar with either logic. I present them, and explicate the relationship between them, from the ground up. I’ll also present alternative axiomatizations for each (...) logic, showing them to depend on weaker axioms than usually recognized. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this work the connections between the fuzzy closure operators and the graded consequence relations are examined Namely, as it is well known, in the crisp case there is a complete equivalence between the notion of closure operator and the one of consequence relation. We extend this result by proving that the graded consequence relations are related to a particular class of fuzzy closure operators, namely the class of fuzzy closure operators that can be (...) obtained by a chain of classical closure operators. (shrink)

Some theorists have developed formal approaches to truth that depend on counterexamples to the structural rules of contraction. Here, we study such approaches, with an eye to helping them respond to a certain kind of objection. We define a contractive relative of each noncontractive relation, for use in responding to the objection in question, and we explore one example: the contractive relative of multiplicative-additive affine logic with transparent truth, or MAALT. -/- .

Information is contained in statements and «flows» from their structure and meaning of expressions they contain. The information that flows only from the meaning of logical constants and logical structure of statements we will call logical information. In this paper we present a formal explication of this notion which is proper for sentences being Boolean combination of atomic sentences. 1 Therefore we limit ourselves to analyzing logical information flowing only from the meaning of truth-value connectives and logical structure of sentences (...) connected with these connectives. (shrink)

Graham Priest has asked whether the consequence relation associated with the Anderson–Belnap system of Tautological Entailment,1 in the language with connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, and countably many propositional variables as tomic formulas, maximal amongst the substitution-invariant relevant consequence relations on this language. Here a consequence relation is said to be relevant just in case whenever for a set of formulas Γ and formula B, we have Γ B only if some propositional variable occurring in B occurs (...) in at least one formula in Γ. (It follows that relevant consequence relations are atheorematic in the sense that whenever Γ B for some such consequence relation , Γ = ∅.) Here I write up in more detail the upshot of the conversation – returning an affirmative answer to Priest’s question – about this in the common room that Greg Restall and I were participating in last Friday [ = October 6, 2006], dotting some “i”s and crossing some “t”s (and adding the odd further reflection). (shrink)

An analogy between functional dependencies and implicational formulas of sentential logic has been discussed in the literature. We feel that a somewhat different connexion between dependency theory and sentential logic is suggested by the similarity between Armstrong's axioms for functional dependencies and Tarski's defining conditions for consequence relations, and we pursue aspects of this other analogy here for their theoretical interest. The analogy suggests, for example, a different semantic interpretation of consequence relations: instead of thinking ofB (...) as a consequence of a set of formulas {A1,...,A n} whenB is true on every assignment of truth-values on which eachA i is true, we can think of this relation as obtaining when every pair of truth-value assignments which give the same truth-values toA 1, the same truth-values toA 2,..., and the same truth-values toA n, also make the same assignment in respect ofB. We describe the former as the consequence relation inference-determined by the class of truth-value assignments (valuations) under consideration, and the latter as the consequence relation supervenience-determined by that class of assignments. Some comparisons will be made between these two notions. (shrink)

Syntax and semantics in Łukasiewicz infinite-valued sentential logic Ł are harmonized by revising the Bolzano-Tarski paradigm of “semantic consequence,” according to which, θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\theta $$\end{document} follows from Θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Theta $$\end{document} iff every valuation v that satisfies all formulas in Θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Theta $$\end{document} also satisfies θ.\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\theta.$$\end{document} For θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} (...) \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\theta $$\end{document} to be a consequence of Θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Theta $$\end{document}, we also require that any infinitesimal perturbation of v that preserves the truth of all formulas of Θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\Theta $$\end{document} also preserves the truth of θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\theta $$\end{document}. An elementary characterization of Łukasiewicz implication shows that the Łukasiewicz axiom →Y)→→X)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ \rightarrow Y ) \rightarrow \rightarrow X )$$\end{document} guarantees the continuity and the piecewise linearity of the implication operation →\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\rightarrow $$\end{document}, an appropriate fault-tolerance property of any logic of [0,1]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\,\mathrm{[0,1]}\,}}$$\end{document}-valued observables. The directional derivability of the functions coded by all ψ∈Θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\psi \in \Theta $$\end{document} and by θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\theta $$\end{document} then provides a quantitative formulation of our refinement of Bolzano-Tarski consequence, which turns out to coincide with the time-honored syntactic Ł-consequence. (shrink)

In this paper functional completeness results are obtained for certain positive and constructive propositional logics associated with a Tarski-type structured consequence relation as defined by Gabbay.

A consequence relation in the framework of preferential semantics based on the four-valued Belnap-Dunn logic is constructed which proves that the sorites paradoxes are unsound or invalid inferences .

In this paper I argue that a variety of consequence relations can be subsumed under a common core. The reduction proceeds by taking the unconditional consequence, or judgment, as basic and deriving the conditional consequence via a uniform abstraction scheme. A specific outcome is that it is better not to base such a scheme on the semantic notion of a matrix and valuation but rather on theories and substitutions. I will also briefly look at consequence (...) relations that are not reducible in this way. (shrink)

We discuss nonmonotonic reasoning in terms of consequence relations and corresponding operators. Based on the matrix consequence that gives the monotonic case, we define a restricted matrix consequence that illustrates the nonmonotonic case. The latter is a generalization of the relation of logical friendliness introduced by D. Makinson. We prove that any restricted single matrix consequence, although it may be nonmonotonic, is always weakly monotonic and, in the case of a finite matrix, the restricted matrix (...) consequence is very strongly finitary. Further, by modifying the definition of logical friendliness relation formulated specifically in a proof-theoretic manner, we show a possibility of obtaining other reflexive nonmonotonic consequence relations, for which a limited result towards finitariness is proved. This leads to numerous questions about nonmonotonic consequence relations in the segment between the monotonic consequence relation based on intuitionistic propositional logic and logical friendliness. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the study of the rôle of disjunction inAlgebraic Logic. Several kinds of (generalized) disjunctions, usually defined using a suitable variant of the proof by cases property, were introduced and extensively studied in the literature mainly in the context of finitary logics. The goals of this paper are to extend these results to all logics, to systematize the multitude of notions of disjunction (both those already considered in the literature and those introduced in this paper), (...) and to show several interesting applications allowed by the presence of a suitable disjunction in a given logic. (shrink)

We discuss the axiomatization of generalized consequence relations determined by non-deterministic matrices. We show that, under reasonable expressiveness requirements, simple axiomatizations can always be obtained, using inference rules which can have more than one conclusion. Further, when the non-deterministic matrices are finite we obtain finite axiomatizations with a suitable generalized subformula property.

The concept of multiple-conclusion consequence relation from [8] and [7] is considered. The closure operation C assigning to any binary relation r the least multiple-conclusion consequence relation containing r, is dened on the grounds of a natural Galois connection. It is shown that the very closure C is an isomorphism from the power set algebra of a simple binary relation to the Boolean algebra of all multiple-conclusion consequence relations.

In [BAT 00b], the flat Rescher–Manor consequence relations — the Free, Strong, Argued, C-Based, andWeak consequence relation—were shown to be characterized by inconsistency-adaptive logics defined from the paraconsistent logic CLuN. This provided these consequence relations with a dynamic proof theory. In the present paper we show that the detour via an inconsistency-adaptive logic is not necessary. We present a direct dynamic proof theory, formulated in the language of Classical Logic, and prove its adequacy. The present (...) paper contains the first direct dynamic proof theory for consequence relations that are characterized by an adaptive logic. (shrink)

In his book from 1984 Horst Wessel presents the system of strict logical consequence Fs (see also (Wessel, 1979)). The author maintained that this system axiomatized the relation |=s of strict logical consequence between formulas of Classical Propositional Calculi (CPC). Let |= be the classical consequence relation in CPC. The relation |=s is defined as follows: phi |=s psi iff phi |= psi, every variable from psi occurs in phi and neither phi is a contradiction nor psi (...) is a tautology. Clearly, if phi |=s psi, then neither phi is a tautology nor psi is a contradiction. Intuitions connected with the relation |=s were presented in (Wessel, 1984). The analysis of the relation |=s is also carried out in (Pietruszczak, 2004). In the present paper we will show that the system Fs is not a complete axiomatization of the relation |=s. Moreover, we will present the system VF s that is an «extension to completeness» of the Fs. (shrink)

There are several areas in logic where the monotonicity of the consequence relation fails to hold. Roughly these are the traditional non-monotonic systems arising in Artificial Intelligence (such as defeasible logics, circumscription, defaults, ete), numerical non-monotonic systems (probabilistic systems, fuzzy logics, belief functions), resource logics (also called substructural logics such as relevance logic, linear logic, Lambek calculus), and the logic of theory change (also called belief revision, see Alchourron, Gärdenfors, Makinson [2224]). We are seeking a common axiomatic and semantical (...) approach to the notion of consequence whieh can be specialised to any of the above areas. This paper introduces the notions of structured consequence relation, shift operators and structural connectives, and shows an intrinsic connection between the above areas. (shrink)

There are several areas in logic where the monotonicity of the consequence relation fails to hold. Roughly these are the traditional non-monotonic systems arising in Artificial Intelligence, numerical non-monotonic systems, resource logics, and the logic of theory change. We are seeking a common axiomatic and semantical approach to the notion of consequence whieh can be specialised to any of the above areas. This paper introduces the notions of structured consequence relation, shift operators and structural connectives, and shows (...) an intrinsic connection between the above areas. (shrink)

In this paper, first, we determine the number of sublogics of variable inclusion of an arbitrary finitary logic ⊢ with a composition term. Then, we investigate their position into the lattice of co...

The main goal of this paper is to provide an abstract framework for constructing proof systems for various many-valued logics. Using the framework it is possible to generate strongly complete proof systems with respect to any finitely valued deterministic and non-deterministic logic. I provide a couple of examples of proof systems for well-known many-valued logics and prove the completeness of proof systems generated by the framework.

One of the main tools in the study of nonmonotonic consequence relations is the representation of such relations in terms of preferential models. In this paper we give an unified and simpler framework to obtain such representation theorems.

The global consequence relation of a normal modal logic \ is formulated as a global sequent calculus which extends the local sequent theory of \ with global sequent rules. All global sequent calculi of normal modal logics admits global cut elimination. This property is utilized to show that decidability is preserved from the local to global sequent theories of any normal modal logic over \. The preservation of Craig interpolation property from local to global sequent theories of any normal (...) modal logic is shown by proof-theoretic method. (shrink)

Two different kinds of multiple-conclusion consequence relations taken from Shoesmith and Smiley and Galatos and Tsinakis or Nowak, called here disjunctive and conjunctive, respectively, defined on a formal language, are considered. They are transferred into a bounded lattice and a complete lattice, respectively. The properties of such abstract consequence relations are presented.

Thomason (1979/2010)'s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject's competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject's beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain (...) 'natural assumptions', then it implies that the subject is inconsistent if the beliefs include arithmetic. I challenge the result by insisting that the motivation for Thomason's principle (ii), via Moore's Paradox, leads to a more complex representation, in which stating the facts and expressing one's beliefs are treated differently. Certain logical connections among expressions of assent, and between expression and statement, are a matter of consequence on pain of pragmatic incoherence, not consequence on pain of classical logical inconsistency. But while this salvages the possibility that a modification of the above sort of representation could be adequate, Thomason's devastating conclusion returns if the scientist identifies himself as the subject of that representation, even when paying heed to the requirement of pragmatic coherence of the sort highlighted by Moore's Paradox. (shrink)