In its roughly 25 years of existence, the trial consulting profession has grown dramatically in membership, recognition, and breadth of practice. What began as a small activist group of social scientists volunteering their expertise to assist in the defense of Vietnam War protestors has evolved into a diverse set of professionals from a range of educational and professional backgrounds. In spite of such enormous growth, the work of trial consultants has gone largely unexamined. Trial Consulting takes an in-depth look (...) at the primary activities of trial consultants, including witness preparation, focus groups and mock trials, jury selection, change of venue surveys, and attorney presentation style. It also examines the profession's struggle to define itself, resisting certification and licensure requirements and settling instead for a set of practice standards. The authors draw upon empirical and other scholarly work in the social sciences, recommended "best practices" from trial lawyers, and the written and spoken recommendations and reflections of the trial consultants themselves. Addressing a broad spectrum of topics ranging from handwriting analysis to medical malpractice cases, they also suggest reforms for improving the profession and the efficacy of the trial consultant in the courtroom. The result is a critical analysis of what trial consulting truly adds to, and detracts from, the administration of justice. This book is an indispensable guide for practicing and aspiring trial consultants as well as the judges, attorneys, and psychologists who work with them. Trial Consulting provides a thought-provoking statement on the state of the profession, and students and professionals alike will benefit from the challenges it offers. (shrink)

There is a growing literature on corporate social responsibility, but few have focused on the implications of business groups for CSR. We examine the antecedents and outcomes of CSR behaviors of group firms in Korea. We find that group affiliation is associated with higher CSR overall and for its major societal and environmental components. However, the ownership disparity between cash flow and control by controlling inside shareholders is associated with lower CSR, consistent with opportunistic rent expropriation (...) theory. We further find that CSR initiatives can impact group firms positively in the event of bad events, consistent with insurance theory. This motive for CSR as a means of enhancing reputation capital to buffer the bad events is pronounced for group firms because of group-wide dissemination of negative reputational externality. (shrink)

ABSTRACTControl over information is essential to business. This has become increasingly true in an era in which technological advances have enabled the rapid globalization of business. This article explores the implications of this control of information for freedom of speech and information. Four different situations are considered: censorship of the Internet by search engines albeit at the direction of a government; restrictions on Internet content by Internet Services Providers acting on their own; decisions by retail businesses not to sell (...) various DVDs, CDs, etc. to their customers; and legal suits brought against individuals and groups by businesses seeking to prevent the further spread of information they deem injurious to their products or activities. The paper seeks to sort out the various rights and values involved in these cases, when a business may be justifiably said to be violating individuals' rights to freedom of information, and when customers and citizens do not have justified complaints against business decisions not to provide them with certain information products. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a popular business concept in developed economies. As typical of other business concepts, it is on its way to globalization through practices and structures of the globalized capitalist world order, typified in Multinational Corporations (MNCs). However, CSR often sits uncomfortably in this capitalist world order, as MNCs are often challenged by the global reach of their supply chains and the possible irresponsible practices inherent along these chains. The possibility of irresponsible practices puts (...) global firms under pressure to protect their brands even if it means assuming responsibilities for the practices of their suppliers. Pressure groups understand this burden on firms and try to take advantage of the situation. This article seeks to challenge the often taken-for-granted-assumption that firms should be accountable for the practices of their suppliers by espousing the moral (and sometimes legal) underpinnings of the concept of responsibility. Except where corporate control and or corporate grouping exist, it identifies the use of power as a critical factor to be considered in allocating responsibility in firm-supplier relationship; and suggests that the more powerful in this relationship has a responsibility to exert some moral influence on the weaker party. The article highlights the use of code of conducts, corporate culture, anti-pressure group campaigns, personnel training and value reorientation as possible sources of wielding positive moral influence along supply chains. (shrink)

Understanding how individual agency and group agency relate is of great importance for a range of philosophical and practical concerns, including responsibility ascription and institutional design. This article discusses the relation between corporate and individual responsibility in agency—in particular, the relation between corporate and individual control of actions. First, I criticize Christian List and Philip Pettit’s causal account of combined corporate and individual control. Second, I develop an alternative account in terms of structural (...) class='Hi'>control, and I show how this gives a better grasp of the issue. Third, I argue for an act-dualism that complements my account of control and sheds further light on the relation between corporate and individual agency and responsibility. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether corporate philanthropic decisions are associated with a firm’s listing status and business group affiliation. Analyzing a large sample of public and private firms in Korea, we find that public firms make more charitable contributions than private firms and business group-affiliated firms make more charitable contributions than non-affiliated firms. The results suggest that public firms, owing to greater public scrutiny, and business groups, owing to higher political costs, are encouraged to make more corporate (...) charitable contributions. Further, we find that greater corporate giving by public firms than private firms is more pronounced for business group-affiliated firms, compared with non-affiliated firms. The result is consistent with business groups’ strategic coordination of their affiliates’ philanthropic decisions to tunnel business group resources out to controlling shareholders who hold a larger portion of private affiliates than public affiliates. (shrink)

Managers vs. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American Democracy deals with a subject of profound importance: understanding the place of the modern corporation in a democratic society. This latest volume in the acclaimed Ruffin Series in Business Ethics describes how the balance between corporate power and government regulation has changed with the interests of society as a whole. The first section examines the debates over the rules that individuals or organized groups would agree to follow (...) in their interactions to accrue social advantages. The second section looks at management's point of view and tells how law promotes the need for managerial collective action and provides a vocabulary for articulating management as a profession. The authors conclude by looking at the impact of collective investor action - especially institutional investors - on the efforts by managers to preserve their autonomy. This examination of the inherent conflicts between the interests of corporate owners, the interests of the larger society, and the interests of managers who run corporations will be essential reading for students, scholars, and professionals concerned with the place of the large corporation in a democratic society. (shrink)

Biology is seen not merely as a privileged oppressor of women but as a co-victim of masculinist social assumptions. We see feminist critique as one of the normative controls that any scientist must perform whenever analyzing data, and we seek to demonstrate what has happened when this control has not been utilized. Narratives of fertilization and sex determination traditionally have been modeled on the cultural patterns of male/female interaction, leading to gender associations being placed on cells and their components. (...) We also find that when gender biases are controlled, new perceptions of these intracellular and extracellular relationships emerge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:We examine whether religion influences company decisions related to corporate community involvement. Employing a large US sample, we show that the CCI initiatives of a company are positively associated with the level of Christian religiosity present in the region within which that company’s headquarters is located. This association persists even after we control for a wide range of firm characteristics and after we subject our results to several econometric tests. These results support our religious morality hypothesis which holds (...) that companies headquartered in regions with higher levels of Christian religiosity will engage in more CCI initiatives. We also find that while Catholic and mainline Protestant religiosity have a positive influence on firms’ CCI initiatives, evangelical Protestant religiosity does not. This supports our differentiated responses hypothesis which holds that institutional differences among religious groups will produce different effects on companies’ CCI. This hypothesis is based on institutional theory. (shrink)

Most donated organs in the United States come from brain dead donors, while a small percentage come from patients who die in “controlled,” or expected, circumstances, typically after the family or surrogate makes a decision to withdraw life support. The number of organs available for transplant could be substantially if donations were permitted in “uncontrolled” circumstances–that is, from people who die unexpectedly, often outside the hospital. According to projections from the Institute of Medicine, establishing programs permitting “uncontrolled donation after circulatory (...) determination of death,” or uDCDD, throughout the United States has the potential to provide 22,000 more donation opportunities annually. In contrast, U.S. controlled donation after circulatory determination of death, or cDCDD, cases have increased progressively over the past decade from 87 to 848 donors, but currently account for only 10.6 percent of all deceased donors. Following the IOM recommendations, several projects exploring the feasibility of uDCDD were funded by the federal government, including a grant from the Health Resources and Services Administration that supported a pilot project in New York City in which the authors of this article participated.A key feature of our protocol, and indeed of many uDCDD protocols, is the initiation of preservation methods such as chest compressions and extracorporeal membrane oxygenation shortly after death in order to perfuse and preserve the donor's organs. Critics of uDCDD argue that the means of determining death deviates from generally ascribed principles. They assert that reinstituting circulation in order to preserve organs has the effect of “undoing” the prior determination of death. The result is that cDCDD is widely accepted and practiced routinely even though it only marginally increases the number of organs available for transplantation, and uDCDD is widely considered unacceptable despite being ethically embraced and proven to significantly increase organ donation opportunities in other countries. This article explores the evolution of this counterintuitive state of affairs and calls for a policy that, in line with the IOM report, allows for both cDCDD and uDCDD protocols. (shrink)

This paper offers novel insight into the Islamic banking business model by considering the effect of investments in human capital and corporate governance features on the market performance of Islamic banks. Based on a sample of 47 banks operating in different regions during the 2005–2010 period, and controlling for firm-specific characteristics, this paper finds investments in human capital to have a significant positive impact on the market value in the pre- and post-financial crisis period. Based on a market measure, (...) this paper finds board size and CEO power to have a significant positive impact, while the size of Shariah Supervisory Board has the opposite effect on market performance. The results further reveal that the Islamic banking sector is not a homogeneous group, with full-fledged Islamic banks having lax corporate governance mechanisms and large size, while their counterparts, Islamic Shariah-windows, having strong corporate governance mechanisms tend to invest more in human capital to yield positive market value. Overall, the analysis suggests that the financial crisis may have further spurred the impact of investments in human capital on the market performance. (shrink)

Hierarchical groups shape social, political, and personal life. This paper concerns the question of how individuals within such groups can be responsible. The paper explores how individual responsibility can be partially grounded in difference-making. The paper concentrates on the control condition of responsibility and takes into view three distinct phenomena of responsibility in hierarchical groups. First, a superior can be responsible for outcomes that her subordinates bring about. Second, a subordinate can be responsible although she is unable to prevent (...) the outcome she brings about. Third, a superior can sometimes be responsible to a greater degree than her subordinates. It is argued that difference-making, as an interpretation of the control condition that partially grounds responsibility, accounts for all three of these phenomena within a limited but significant range of circumstances and can hence partially ground individual moral responsibility in hierarchical groups. The paper provides an element of a theory of individual responsibility to complement theories of corporate responsibility. (shrink)

This book answers the question of how soft factors such as corporate cultures and individual and corporate values can be transparently steered. With its C4 management tool and reflecting the seven driving forces of corporate culture, the Values Cockpit is a powerful solution designed to steer all dimensions and processes of a company, pursuing a lean approach. The book links strategic approaches on how to steer a company towards excellence with insights into the driving forces of human (...) thoughts and actions. It subsequently introduces the Values Cockpit, which allows individual corporate cultures to be developed and controlled on the basis of a rational approach. "This intriguing book breaks new ground in suggesting that values can be managed quite as systematically as any other centrally important asset" Rebecca Henderson, John and Natty McArthur Professor, Harvard University "... a deeply articulate, profoundly relevant explication of the role played by the culture of commerce... rich with actionable tools, insights and clear examples..." Richard J Hill IV, Founder, Gabriel Consulting Group, LLC "One seldom sees practical advice on HOW strong values can be automatically practiced on a daily basis by all concerned. That is what makes this remarkable book so refreshing... his book is taking the seminal findings of Jim Collins on building great companies a step further..." Julian Clarke, Chartered Accountant and Management Consultant, European Business Ethics Network Ireland "... a brilliant yet succinct guide to teach the significance of values-development in sustainable business management..." Professor Dr. Haifeng Huang, Assistant Dean, Peking University HSBC Business School, Shenzhen, China "He admirably rejects the fatalist interpretation of the immoral might of markets and replaces it with a counter-narrative of why and how companies can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem." Professor Dr. Claus Dierksmeier, Director of the Global Ethic Institute, Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen "The values cockpit gives readers a coherent and comprehensive toolkit to help them prepare their companies for lasting success." Dr. Kurt Schmalz, C.E.O and Managing Partner J. Schmalz GmbH, Glatten, Germany. (shrink)

Non-domestic companies are increasingly present on the London Stock Exchange. Such companies have specific governance requirements. They may seek to access capital in a more liquid market and to diversify ownership. The reputational ‘bonding’ to a prestigious exchange should be a statement to the market of a propensity to disclosure and a willingness to protect minority shareholders. Yet, many non-domestic companies retain tightly controlled shareholding structures and are based in emerging regions where national culture norms differ to the UK. We (...) hypothesise that non-domestic companies are likely to be less compliant with the principles of the UK Corporate Governance Code and suggest a correlation between lower levels of compliance and non-domestic companies from countries that demonstrate high power distance in the Hofstede cultural value framework. We find some encouraging signs of compliance with the reigning governance code principles in Board structures. However, we find only partial compliance in leadership and Board effectiveness measures in those companies from cultures high on the power-distance scale. Further, we include analysis into ownership characteristics and find companies from emerging markets are dominated by a single or controlling group of shareholders, which is likely to impact on attitudes to compliance and is particularly evidenced in terms of Board structures with no executive directors or led by an executive Chairman. Much of the prior research effort into the levels of compliance with the UK’s ‘comply-or-explain’ approach to governance has produced mixed results and focused on all companies. In our exploratory approach to analysing only the non-domestic subsample, we report some evidence linking cultural distance to lower levels of compliance with the UK standards. We develop a framework to guide future research into the context and cultural underpinnings of this sub-sample of companies, hypothesising that frequent market capitalisation-induced index changes may divert attention away from any potential compliance issues. On the one hand, our evidence is encouraging for governance regimes based on voluntary compliance disclosures such as the UK and similar European and international markets, as we report partial compliance with the principles of the current governance code. Our research may, however, be helpful in guiding future versions of the UK governance framework and other international governance regimes adopting the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach and in setting policy to improve disclosure. It contributes to the understanding of the specific context of non-domestic companies and any cultural tendencies to non-compliance. By demonstrating evidence of lower levels of compliance with key principles of the Code by non-domestic companies, we present a framework enabling lawmakers to further improve corporate governance codes. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the power of corporations as epistemic agents. Corporations need to hold certain forms of knowledge in order to develop and produce goods and services. Intellectual property is meant to incentivize them to do so, in ways that orient their activities towards the public good. However, corporations often use their knowledge strategically, not only within markets, but also in the processes that set the rules for markets. I discuss various historical examples, including the so-called “tobacco strategy” (...) of creating doubt about scientific evidence, and argue that as long as corporations are set up as profit-oriented entities, it is a dangerous strategy to provide them with too much epistemic power. I suggest various policies for reigning in this form of corporate power, for example regulations on PR activities. I then turn to the power of digital corporations, which is based on their collection and analysis of data. These kinds of companies, and the technologies they use, make the control of corporations as epistemic agents all the more urgent for democratic societies. (shrink)

This paper discusses internal dynamics of the firm that contribute to the failure of knowledge conditions, using the Enron scandal as a case study. Ability of the board to effectively monitor conduct at operational levels includes various dynamics: senior management being isolated from those at operational levels; individuals pursuing subgoals that are contrary to overall corporate goals; information flow along a narrow linear channel that effectively forecloses adverse information from getting to senior management; a corporate culture of intimidation, (...) discouraging open expressions of doubt or skepticism, resulting in reluctance to challenge senior officials, and pushing the limits of ethics and the law.Elements of information blockage in the corporation include: the "law of diminishing control"; deliberate concealment of information by officers; motivation to report to the boss what one perceives the boss wants to hear; theory of "bounded rationality" that explains surprising role of irrationality in decisionmaking – unconscious emotions and motivations. Discussion of behavioralist studies of cognitive dissonance, belief perseverance, confirmatory bias, entity effect, motivated reasoning, group cohesion or "groupthink," and the false consensus effect. Problem of overoptimism – tendency of many people to overrate their own abilities, contributions and talents – and tendency toward puffery and dismissal of risks in formulating disclosures and press releases. (shrink)

Corporations despite their status as legally fictitious persons are not such, and to confound them with real persons in even the minimal legal sense is to negate much of the force of the concept of rights when applied to the society. When corporations have rights individual rights become meaningless. While corporations may need some form of protection to make them financially feasible investments, they need not be given the full protection of rights which are assigned to the individual. A much (...) attenuated version of corporate rights is warranted. I would argue against Werhane's notion of a corporation possessing “secondary rights” which can be asserted only after the claims of individual rights have been met. Ibid., p. 62.One solution to the problems raised in this essay would be to ascribe rights to individuals only. This could occur without interfering with the financial independence of the corporation by a simple legal prescription that individuals within a corporation be held responsible for their activities and that the corporation p e r se not be blamed for individual actions. This is consistent with the judgments against the Nazi war criminals who were denied the defense of justifying their actions on the basis of following orders. Responsibility for those actions which are the result of the workings of the “invisible hand” cannot be ascribed to any individual or group of individuals. Donaldson is helpful on this point in recommending an “office of social responsibility” be created as part of the corporation to monitor those actions which otherwise escape scrutiny. Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, p. 207.A more radical solution is to restructure the corporation in such a way as to introduce the element of democracy in the workplace. Opponents would argue that such a practice would diminish the profit-making potential of the corporation by limiting the discretion of the corporate officers in making decisions. Similar arguments have been advanced against the democratic state. Yet democratic states have proven to be viable institutions capable of effective action and demonstrably more survivable than the authoritarian regimes which are the analogs of the corporation.Given the current hierarchical structure of the corporation and its ability to dissolve in the face of questions of responsibility, individual accountability is the only viable solution. This requires that members of the corporation not find cover behind the “invisible hand.” This in turn necessitates the granting of a greater degree of discretionary power to corporate functionaries at all levels. We cannot be responsible for a state of affairs over which we have no effective control. The courts would make the ultimate decision as to the assignation of responsibility in particular cases of corporate crime, with the stipulation that the ascription be to an individual and not “the corporation.” By making corporate officers individually responsible for their actions a much more effective deterrent to corporate crimes would be created. Corporations can easily afford most of the fines that are imposed on them, and corporations cannot be put in prison.The view of the corporation advanced here puts it in a legal and moral position greatly inferior to that of the individual as well as the state. Consequently, corporate needs and welfare must remain a tertiary concern. The rights of the individual must figure primarily, and the welfare of the state as preserver of those rights secondarily, in social policy decisions. The libertarian vision of the corporation is therefore a misguided result of the conflation of the corporation and the individual in the legal and moral realms. Corporations and individuals are ontologically distinct entities and must be recognized as such. The failure to do so has enabled corporations to abrogate individual rights with legal and moral impunity. Such a situation is inconsistent with the demands of a rights-based democracy. (shrink)

This study examines how the corporate philanthropy decisions of group-affiliated firms in Korea are made. Based on the attention-based view, we argue that when corporate decision makers at group-affiliated firms focus their attention more on internal markets than external stakeholders because of the firm’s high reliance on intragroup transactions, the firm will decrease its level of corporate philanthropy. We further argue that the relationship will be stronger when governance mechanisms focus on the instrumental value of (...) corporate philanthropy. Using a panel sample of group-affiliated firms in Korea from 2011 to 2015, we find that as intragroup sales increase, the level of corporate philanthropy decreases, and such a negative relationship is stronger when outside director representation and foreign investor ownership are high. Our study suggests that internal dependence and corporate governance mechanisms jointly affect the level of corporate philanthropy at firms in a business group. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on corporate philanthropy, business group, and corporate governance. (shrink)

This paper presents a comparative analysis of three American and three European corporate failures. The first part of the analysis is based on a theoretical framework including six areas of ethical climate; tone at the top; bubble economy and market pressure; fraudulent financial reporting; accountability, control, auditing, and governance; and management compensation. The second and third parts consider the analysis of these cases from fraud perspective and in terms of firm-specific characteristics and environmental context. The research analyses shed (...) light on the fact that, despite major differences between Europe and U.S. in terms of political institutions, laws and regulations as well as managerial practices, there are significant similarities between six groups. The analysis also demonstrates that, the ethical dilemma has been coupled with ineffective boards, inefficient corporate governance and control mechanisms, distorted incentive schemes, accounting irregularities, failure of auditors, dominant CEOs, dysfunctional management behavior and the lack of a sound ethical tone at the top. Significant similarities were also observed in the analysis from the fraud triangle perspective. However, there are several major differences between the six corporate failure cases particularly with regard to ownership structure, coverage in media, and legal, regulatory and governance frameworks. This research study may have several academic and practical contributions, particularly because of multidisciplinary, international features, and comparative analyses used in the paper. (shrink)

Corporations have been investing in academia to an extent that could be classified as a corporate takeover of universities. Intra‐university critics see this as an ethical problem, because of the degree of business control over university policies and decisions which accompanies the funding. University critics rarely suggest that the corporate funding be given up, returned, or even limited. What they protest against is corporate control, which they see as threatening university autonomy, and as inimical to (...) the public good. Multi‐university conferences have been held focusing on this problem, and the most serious solution proposed thus far is to construct a relevant code of ethics regulating and limiting corporate involvement, through standards and guidelines which corporations will then have to subscribe to, in order to fund universities. However, there is a conflict of interest here. Universities have a public trust and a fiduciary duty not to compromise education. This implies a covenant not to cede power to outside interests, not to use university resources, or faculty and students, as a means to an educationally irrelevant end. Universities cannot sell out. However, it seems equally dishonest not to offer their students a well‐funded first‐rate, quality education in applied fields with current skills, maximum research opportunity, and the corporate ties that would allow them to obtain jobs. We examine three cases showing errors made by universities in ceding control to corporate investment, and draw some policy conclusions. (shrink)

Corporations have been investing in academia to an extent that could be classified as a corporate takeover of universities. Intra‐university critics see this as an ethical problem, because of the degree of business control over university policies and decisions which accompanies the funding. University critics rarely suggest that the corporate funding be given up, returned, or even limited. What they protest against is corporate control, which they see as threatening university autonomy, and as inimical to (...) the public good. Multi‐university conferences have been held focusing on this problem, and the most serious solution proposed thus far is to construct a relevant code of ethics regulating and limiting corporate involvement, through standards and guidelines which corporations will then have to subscribe to, in order to fund universities. However, there is a conflict of interest here. Universities have a public trust and a fiduciary duty not to compromise education. This implies a covenant not to cede power to outside interests, not to use university resources, or faculty and students, as a means to an educationally irrelevant end. Universities cannot sell out. However, it seems equally dishonest not to offer their students a well‐funded first‐rate, quality education in applied fields with current skills, maximum research opportunity, and the corporate ties that would allow them to obtain jobs. We examine three cases showing errors made by universities in ceding control to corporate investment, and draw some policy conclusions. (shrink)

This paper comments on Coleman's account of group action , and his view is compared with the present author's largely complementary view . Some criticisms concerning Coleman's linear system of action are presented. One of the main points made is that a viable theory of social action must make use of a notion of joint intention and that Coleman's theory is deficient on this score.

Progressive supranuclear palsy is a movement disorder with prominent tau neuropathology. Brain diseases with abnormal tau deposits are called tauopathies, the most common of which is Alzheimer's disease. Environmental causes of tauopathies include repetitive head trauma associated with some sports. To identify common genetic variation contributing to risk for tauopathies, we carried out a genome-wide association study of 1,114 individuals with PSP and 3,247 controls followed by a second stage in which we genotyped 1,051 cases and 3,560 controls for the (...) stage 1 SNPs that yielded P ≤ 10-3. We found significant previously unidentified signals associated with PSP risk at STX6, EIF2AK3 and MOBP. We confirmed two independent variants in MAPT affecting risk for PSP, one of which influences MAPT brain expression. The genes implicated encode proteins for vesicle-membrane fusion at the Golgi-endosomal interface, for the endoplasmic reticulum unfolded protein response and for a myelin structural component. © 2011 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in (...) which the collectively accepted function is expressed in part through its occupier’s intentional expression of her agency in that role. I identify institutions as systems of status roles and show how this is compatible with seeing the agency of institutions generally, even over time periods in which there is complete change in role occupiers, as a matter of the contributions only of individual agents. I explain how the reduction of the institution to its members is compatible with its potentially having had a completely different membership. I show in the case of the corporation in particular that, once we see its origins and function, the surface features of legal discourse about corporate agency are misleading and are compatible with a deflationary account of corporate agency. I show in connection with this that the corporation is to be identified with its shareholders, and that where a corporation separates ownership and control, its managers and employees are proxy agents of the shareholders doing business under the corporate form. Finally, I canvass the legitimate ways of construing ordinary talk about corporate intention, belief, and so on, in light of this, none of which support the attribution of genuine agency or intentionality to any group per se associated with the corporation. (shrink)

According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update Argument. An agent is morally competent only if the agent has (...) sufficient positive and negative control over updating their goal-seeking states. Positive control involves the general ability to update one’s goal-seeking states, whereas negative control involves the absence of other agents with the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with updating one’s goal-seeking states. I argue that even if purposive groups qualify as plural subjects or we-mode group agents, these groups necessarily lack negative control over updating their goal-seeking states. This creates a cut-off point for groups as duty-bearers: Organized groups may qualify as duty-bearers, whereas purposive groups cannot qualify as duty-bearers. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the relationship between Business Groups as a distinct way of organizing economic activities and their relation to the public good. We first analyze the phenomenon of Business Groups and discuss some of their core features. Subsequently, the paper moves to analyzing the existing literature on Business Groups and corporate social responsibility as the most common label for the topic of this Special Issue. Subsequently, specific peculiarities of Business Groups in the context of CSR and their contribution (...) to the public good are fleshed out. Based on this analysis, the paper delineates some implications for the field of CSR and the wider debate on the nature of the firm. We close with some perspectives for future research. (shrink)

The ethical dilemma of large-scale multinational corporations is presented. The list of complaints and issues is summarized. A case is made for the concept of multinationals being inherently beneficial in today's world of high technology and dependence on international trade. The difficulty is extreme power wielded by some groups. It is concluded that a philosophical ideal is for control on size and power as well as international rules to prevent abuses of power. The concern is that today the worthiness (...) of being relatively small is slowly but surely being eroded. (shrink)

The debate over corporate moral responsibility has become a fixture in business ethics research and teaching. Only rarely, however, does the sizable literature on that question consider whether the debate has important practical implications. This article examines that question from a corporate control perspective. After assuming corporate moral responsibility’s existence for purposes of argument, the article concludes that such responsibility makes a difference in cases where it is present but personal responsibility is absent. Then the article (...) tries to identify the forces that diminish personal responsibility when corporate responsibility exists. The most important such forces, it concludes, spring from the socialization processes people undergo when they enter groups. One example is the well-known phenomenon of groupthink, which can exculpate individuals by rendering them justifiably ignorant of foreseeable risks of harm. (shrink)

Can a group be morally responsible instead of, or in addition to, its members? An influential defense of corporate responsibility is based on results in social choice theory suggesting that a group can form and act on attitudes held by few, or even none, of its members. The members therefore cannot be (fully) responsible for the group’s behavior; the group itself, as a corporate agent, must be responsible. In this paper, I reject this view (...) of corporate responsibility by showing how it pays insufficient attention to individual agency. By accounting for group members’ strategic behavior, we shall see how they control collective attitude formation and are therefore responsible for their group’s behavior. (shrink)

This article investigates the role of commonly specified control variables in moderating the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). In addition, there are separate measures for positive (strengths) social actions, and for negative (concerns) social actions. The results support the positive relationship between CSP and CFP. The best model, as determined using factorial analysis of variance, is one which has the following control variables: size, industry, risk, and research and development expenditures. (...) In examining the CSP/CFP relationship, researchers must control for these variables, in order to properly specify the model. (shrink)

In spite of an overwhelming importance of business groups in the economic development of many countries, systematic inquiry on how the BGs and their affiliated firms approach and contribute to shared value creation and sustainable development is rare. In this paper we address this research gap by investigating two related questions—do BG-affiliated firms differ from non-BG firms in their corporate sustainability strategy and how does BG affiliation influence the relationship between stock of fungible resources and CSS of firms? Drawing (...) from the BG literature we theorize that BG-affiliated firms tend to adopt of both environmental and social sustainability strategies more than non-BG firms. We also argue that although according to resource-based view, the stock of fungible resources of firms positively influences CSS, BG affiliation negatively moderates the relationship between stock of fungible resources and CSS of firms. Stock of fungible resources matters less for BG-affiliated firms in undertaking CSS as they have access to resources of the BG network. We test our theoretical predictions using a proprietary data set of 163 Indian publicly listed firms, out of which 76 are BG-affiliated firms belonging to 74 BGs. The data for corporate environmental and social sustainability strategies have been obtained by administering a survey instrument among the top level executives of the participating firms. We find support for our theoretical predictions that signify that BGs and their affiliates make important contributions to shared value creation and sustainable development in emerging economies like India. (shrink)

This study looks at how the corporate governance of family-owned business groups, the most dominant form of private sector organising in Asia, deals with different forms of corruption during the course of common business transactions. As a part of an ethnographic study conducted in 2007 to look at the impact of corporate governance reforms in the Philippines, one of the emergent themes from the study was the presence of significant corruption in the business environment of the country. A (...) total of 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with board members from business groups and senior public sector officials supplemented by document analysis of media articles and other text and participant observation. Using Rose-Ackerman’s typology of petty and grand corruption, results show the dilemmas faced when trying to operate within the precepts of corporate governance whilst dealing with the practical reality of corruption in public sector institutions. The results of the study provide empirical evidence into corruption’s impact on Asian business groups and contribute to knowledge on the links between strong institutions and the efficacy of corporate governance. (shrink)

Tokenistic short-term economic success is not good indicia of long-term success. Sustainable business success requires sustained existence in a corporation's political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental contexts. Far beyond the traditional economic focus, consumers, governments and public interest groups alike increasingly expect the business sector to take on more social and environmental responsibilities. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the model in which economic, social and environmental responsibilities are fulfilled simultaneously. However, there is insufficient empirical evidence that demonstrates genuine (...) widespread adoption of CSR in practice, and its underlying reasons. Though research in CSR has been rapidly growing, its commercial reality and implications need to be further improved if it is to inspire corporations to voluntarily adopt CSR. In the literature, Carroll's four-dimensional (economic, legal, ethical and discretionary) CSR framework offers a theoretical basis for developing an empirically based model to explain why and how profit-motivated managers take up CSR voluntarily. Our study has developed a structural equation model to identify the key factors and their interactions that influence economically motivated managers to take on voluntary CSR, and validate Carroll's four-dimensional construct. The results support Carroll's four-dimensional CSR framework, with the exception of the link pertaining to the relationship between economic and discretionary/voluntary responsibility. This characterises the economic reality that financial market-driven economic responsibility does not automatically translate into social responsibility. Nevertheless, the empirical results demonstrate that corporations can be led to engage in more voluntary CSR activities to achieve social good when appropriate legal and ethical controls are in place. (shrink)

Purpose This paper is concerned with the place of human rights in the process of technological development but specifically as this process is situated within the corporate-technological complex of modern digital communications and their derivatives. This paper aims to argue that expecting and institutionalizing the incorporation of human rights in the process of technological innovation and production, particularly in the context of global economic actors, constitutes a necessary act if we want to navigate the immediate future of artificial intelligence (...) and ubiquitous connectivity in ways that protect democracy and human dignity. Design/methodology/approach The discussion presents the case for defending human rights through a social control perspective, which assumes the conscious quest for impacting change and cartographing a path of actions and intentions. The authors approach the problem from James Ralph Beniger’s theory of the Control Revolution to explain the emergence of a new social order and to outline the main challenges brought particularly by media and information and communication technology corporations as global actors of power. Findings Ethics initiatives, considering human rights as an ethical framework for media and ICT businesses, can be based on social control perspectives to regard the more complex variables interacting in the formation of effective policy making. It is the right to participate in the construction of knowledge in society and, informed by this knowledge, help manage or control democratic issues, including influencing on the regulation of technology and other cultural formats of control. Knowing social control tools enable citizens to lead their destinies, plan their freedom and the change what they wish in the societies they live in. Originality/value Social control is often understood as a term taken for granted and many times faced as representing malignant and anti-democratic forms. Here, the authors try to build a theoretical ground where both sides – the benign and the malignant – can be taken in consideration to bring awareness to the need to discuss social control as a democratic endeavor, and consider human rights as part of this and not something apart and idealized. The practice of human rights is directly associated with social control forms and is from within these practices individuals must understand its role on social control and act. (shrink)

Henry Hansmann has claimed we have reached the “end of history” in corporate law, organized around the “widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders.” In this paper, I examine Hansmann’s own argument in support of this view, in order to draw out its implications for some of the traditional concerns of business ethicists about corporate social responsibility. The centerpiece of Hansmann’s argument is the claim that ownership of the firm (...) is most naturally exercised by the group able to achieve the lowest agency costs, and that homogeneity of interest within the ownership group is the most important factor in achieving lower costs. He defends this claim through a study of cooperatives, attempting to show that homogeneity is the source of the competitive advantage most often enjoyed by shareholders over other constituency groups, such as workers, suppliers and customers, when it comes to exercising control over the firm. Some business ethicists, impressed by this argument, have taken it to be a vindication of Milton Friedman’s claim that profit-maximization is the only “social responsibility” of management. I would like to suggest that this conclusion does not follow, and that the “Hansmann argument” lends itself to a less minimalist view, what I refer to as a “market failures” approach to business ethics. (shrink)

Delaware case law has rendered the tender offer obsolete as a method for purchasing a company whose directors oppose the acquisition. A potential acquirer facing target opposition today must run an insurgent director slate, in the expectation that its directors are more likely to sell. The Delaware courts have not justified their preference for elections over markets as the preferred vehicle for implementing changes in control. Informal scholarly analyses ask transaction cost questions, such as whether proxy contests are more (...) costly than takeovers. This article attempts to break new ground by asking whether there are systematic differences in the performance of elections and markets in the corporate context. Recent models of voting processes, we argue, strongly suggest that elections are inferior to markets. Proxy contest elections sometimes can be won by incumbent managements when a transfer of control would be efficient, a conclusion consistent with the sparse data; and the proxy election process aggregates information regarding the sale decision less well than markets do, thereby implying that proxy voters are less well-informed. Theory and data thus suggest, at the least, that the intellectual burden of proof should change: the task now is to justify using elections to transfer control despite their apparent deficiencies. The article briefly considers the policy implications of this change in perspective. (shrink)

We examine the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures in the annual reports of Bangladeshi companies. A legitimacy theory framework is adopted to understand the extent to which corporate governance characteristics, such as managerial ownership, public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence, CEO duality and presence of audit committee influence organisational response to various stakeholder groups. Our results suggest that although CSR disclosures generally have a negative association with managerial ownership, such (...) relationship becomes significant and positive for export-oriented industries. We also find public ownership, foreign ownership, board independence and presence of audit committee to have positive significant impacts on CSR disclosures. However, we fail to find any significant impact of CEO duality. Thus, our results suggest that pressures exerted by external stakeholder groups and corporate governance mechanisms involving independent outsiders may allay some concerns relating to family influence on CSR disclosure practices. Overall, our study implies that corporate governance attributes play a vital role in ensuring organisational legitimacy through CSR disclosures. The findings of our study should be of interest to regulators and policy makers in countries which share similar corporate ownership and regulatory structures. (shrink)

There is a distinct lack of research into the relationship between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the banking sector. This paper fills the gap in the literature by examining the impact of corporate governance, with particular reference to the role of board of directors, on the quality of CSR disclosure in US listed banks’ annual reports after the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Using a sample of large US commercial banks for the period 2009–2011 and (...) controlling for audit committee characteristics, board meeting frequency, and banks’ profitability, size and risk, we find evidence that board independence and board size, the two board characteristics usually associated with the protection of shareholder interests, are positively related to CSR disclosure. This indicates that, with regard to CSR disclosure, more independent boards of directors and larger boards are the internal corporate governance mechanisms which promote both shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests. Contrary to our expectations, CEO duality also impacts positively on CSR disclosure. From an agency-theoretical viewpoint, this suggests that powerful CEOs may promote transparency about banks’ CSR activities for their private benefits. While this could indicate that powerful CEOs are under particular pressure to appease stakeholders’ concerns that they might abuse their power by providing a high degree of CSR disclosure, it could also be a sign of managerial risk aversion or managers’ private reputational concerns. (shrink)

The power of finance vis-à-vis the nonfinancial sector is changing. Macroeconomic developments and financial innovations have reduced financial actors’ exit options, thus diminishing exit-based structural power. At the same time, shareholdings have become more concentrated in the hands of large asset managers, thus increasing control-based power. This article documents these trends, before examining whether asset managers wield their power and why, despite being universal shareholders, they have not steered corporate behavior toward decarbonization. Rather than assuming orderly, good-faith interactions (...) between shareholders and managers, this article argues that in the United States today, political considerations govern the use of control-based power. Asset managers’ corporate governance policies are subservient to the—increasingly inconsistent—goals of maximizing assets under management while avoiding regulatory backlash. Unlike exit-based power, control-based power is constrained by being highly visible and, therefore, easily politicized. (shrink)

This study looks at how the corporate governance of family-owned business groups, the most dominant form of private sector organising in Asia, deals with different forms of corruption during the course of common business transactions. As a part of an ethnographic study conducted in 2007 to look at the impact of corporate governance reforms in the Philippines, one of the emergent themes from the study was the presence of significant corruption in the business environment of the country. A (...) total of 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with board members from business groups and senior public sector officials supplemented by document analysis of media articles and other text and participant observation. Using Rose-Ackerman’s typology of petty and grand corruption, results show the dilemmas faced when trying to operate within the precepts of corporate governance whilst dealing with the practical reality of corruption in public sector institutions. The results of the study provide empirical evidence into corruption’s impact on Asian business groups and contribute to knowledge on the links between strong institutions and the efficacy of corporate governance. (shrink)

Corporate social performance (CSP) has become a widely applied concept, discussed in most large firms’ corporate reports and the academic literature alike. Unfortunately, CSP has largely been employed as a way of demonstrating corporate social responsibility (CSR) in practice, or to justify the business case for CSR in academia by relating some measure of CSP to some measure of financial performance. In this article, we discuss multiple shortcomings to these approaches. We argue that (1) CSR activities need (...) to be managed and measured as projects and aggregated to the business or corporate level using a project portfolio; (2) appropriate measures need to be identified that move away from reporting the firm’s activities toward quantifying actual social outcomes achieved; and (3) given the types of projects prevalent in CSR, statistical evaluation methods common in other fields (ideally, pre-test post-test control group designs, such as used in medicine or propensity score matching for ongoing or past projects) should be employed to properly measure outcomes. We make a first, albeit imperfect, attempt at using such an approach with data collected on behalf of the Patrimonio Hoy project, a well-publicized CSR initiative carried out by Cemex in Mexico. We show that the results from this data reinforce concerns voiced earlier in this article. (shrink)

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) towards primary stakeholders influences the financial and the non-financial performance (NFP) of Indian firms. Perceptual data on CSR and NFP were collected from 150 senior-level Indian managers including CEOs through questionnaire survey.Hard data on financial performance (FP) of the companies were obtained from secondary sources. A questionnaire for assessing CSR was developed with respect to six stakeholder groups - employees, customers, investors, community, natural environment, and suppliers. A composite measure of CSR (...) was obtained by aggregating the six dimensions. Findings indicate that stock-listed firms show responsible business practices and better FP than the non-stock-listed firms. Controlling confounding effects of stock-listing, ownership, and firm size, a favorable perception of managers towards CSR is found to be associated with increase in FP and NFP of firms.Such findings hold good when CSR is assessed for the six stakeholder groups in aggregate and for each stakeholder group in segregate. Findings suggest that responsible business practices towards primary stakeholders can be profitable and beneficial to Indian firms. (shrink)

Conclusion and PostscriptThis paper opened with a quotation from the credo of the Institute of Directors: “The success of a companies depends on the leadership and performance of directors.” The performance of the group of male directors at the “Enterprise and Governance” conference has revealed patriarchal ideology exercising hegemonic control of the corporate culture and strongly resisting any challenges to its dominant position.

In the article I argue that intellectual arrogance can be an individual, collective and even corporate vice. I show that arrogance is in all these cases underpinned by defensive positive evaluations of epistemic features of the evaluator in the service of buttressing its illegitimate social dominance. Individual arrogance as superbia or as hubris stems from attitudes biased by the motive of self-enhancement. Collective arrogance is underpinned by positive defensive attitudes to a one’s social identity that seeks to maintain its (...) unwarranted social dominance. Finally, corporations are arrogant when their attitudes are the aggregation of the arrogant dispositions of its managers or when these corporations have inherited structures and policies that are defensive of its illegitimately dominant social status. (shrink)

On May 16, 2012, RAND brought together a group of public company directors and executives, chief ethics and compliance officers, and stakeholders from the government, academic, and nonprofit sectors for a series of conversations about organizational culture, as well as to explore the business and policy ramifications of efforts to build better ethical cultures in corporations.