Results for 'de re'

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  1. De Re Senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.
  2. De Re and De Se.François Recanati - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.
    For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought. In this paper, I argue that de se thoughts come in two (...)
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  3. Acquiantanceless De Re Belief'.Robin Jeshion - 2002 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 53-74.
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  4.  41
    De Re and De Se.François Recanati - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.
    For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought ; for Lewis, it is the other way round. To a large extent (...), the conflict between the two positions is merely apparent: it is due to insufficient appreciation of the crucial distinction between two types of de se thought. In view of this distinction, we can maintain both that de se thought is a special case of de re thought, and that de re thought is a special case of de se thought. Still, I argue, Lewis's position can be criticized on the grounds that it internalizes acquaintance relations. (shrink)
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  5. Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):22-49.
    The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not (...)
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  6. Epistemic Modality De Re.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:475-527.
    Focusing on cases which involve binding into epistemic modals with definite descriptions and quantifiers, I raise some new problems for standard approaches to all of these expressions. (...)
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  7. De Re Belief Generalized.Maxwell J. Cresswell & Arnim Stechow - 1982 - Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4):503 - 535.
  8. Love De Re.Robert Kraut - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):413-430.
  9. De Re and De Dicto Explanation of Action.Sean Crawford - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):783-798.
    This paper argues for an account of the relation between thought ascription and the explanation of action according to which de re ascriptions and de dicto ascriptions (...)
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  10. De Re Belief.David Kaplan - 2013 - In Richard Hull (ed.), Presidential Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 1981–1990. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-37.
  11. Intentionality "de Re".John McDowell - 1991 - In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 215--25.
     
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  12. Empty de Re Attitudes About Numbers.Jody Azzouni - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):163-188.
    I dub a certain central tradition in philosophy of language (and mind) the de re tradition. Compelling thought experiments show that in certain common cases the truth (...)
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  13. "De Re" Belief and Methodological Solipsism.Kent Bach - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.
  14. De Re Et de Dicto.Alvin Plantinga - 1969 - Noûs 3 (3):235-258.
  15. The de Re/de Dicto Distinction.Thomas McKay & Michael Nelson - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 15:2010.
     
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  16. De Re Belief in Action.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (3):363-387.
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  17.  82
    De Re Propositional Attitudes Toward Integers.Diana Ackerman - 1978 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):145-153.
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  18. De Re A Priori Knowledge.Cian Dorr - 2011 - Mind 120 (480):939-991.
    Suppose a sentence of the following form is true in a certain context: ‘Necessarily, whenever one believes that the F is uniquely F if anything is, and (...)
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  19. Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes.Tyler Burge - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--324.
    I shall propose five theses on de re states and attitudes. To be a de re state or attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistemic and (...)
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  20.  86
    De Re And De Dicto: Against The Conventional Wisdom.Ken Taylor - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):225-265.
    Conventional wisdom has it that there is a class of attitude ascriptions such that in making an ascription of that sort, the ascriber undertakes a commitment to (...)
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  21.  62
    Representing de Re Beliefs.Thomas J. McKay - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (6):711 - 739.
  22.  31
    De Re Modality: Lessons From Quine.Greg Ray - 2000 - In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic. pp. 347-365.
    The aim of the paper is twofold: i) to give a logically explicit formulation of a slight generalization of Quine's master argument about de re modalityan (...) argument which imposes important constraints on modal semantics, ii) to briefly present my favored account of modal locutions (especially locutions of the de re metaphysical flavor) and show how it successfully copes with Quine's argument. Though Quine made this argument so many years ago, it is still widely misunderstood, and so careful attention to detail seems warranted. From what I have seen, philosophers' attitudes towards Quine's master argument fall into two kinds: i) there are those that think that the argument has no force, because it is based on some mistake (usually, something about definite descriptions), and ii) there are those that think that the argument poses some insuperable barrier to any kind of de re modality. Neither of these attitudes is justified. So, I hope to make plain along the way that a) the original version of Quine's argument is sound, b) there is a version of this same basic argument which imposes very definite constraints on any proposed account of de re "metaphysical" modality in particular, an c) there is an account that satisfies these constraints. Part 1 of the paper is concerned with laying out and discussing three versions of Quine's argument, in the service of establishing points (a) and (b). -/- In Part 2 of the paper, I briefly sketch what I take to be a very promising, and also very Quinean account of de re modality -- one that respects the constraint on modal semantics that Quine's argument reveals and comports well with the few positive remarks Quine makes, for example, in Word and Object regarding our use of modal locutions. This will put us in a position to see that the proposed account does not fly in the face of Quine's master argument. (shrink)
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  23.  98
    Indeterminacy de Re.Dorothy Edgington - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):27--44.
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  24. Singular Thoughts and de Re Attitude Reports.James Openshaw - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437.
    It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that (...)
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  25. About de Re Belief.Mark J. Pastin - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):569-575.
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  26. Belief De Re, Knowing Who, and Singular Thought.Michaelis Michael - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):293-310.
  27.  95
    Belief de Re and de Dicto.Justin Broackes - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):374-383.
  28.  81
    Is de Re Belief Reducible to de Dicto?Nathan Salmon - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):85-110.
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    De Re Belief, Action Explanations, and the Essential Indexical.Ernest Sosa - 1995 - In Ruth Barcan Marcus, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.), Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge University Press. pp. 235--249.
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  30.  31
    De Re and De Dicto: Against the Conventional Wisdom.Kenneth A. Taylor - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):225 - 265.
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  31. Kant on de Re. Some Aspects of the Kantian Non-Conceptualism Debate.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Kant Studies Online (1):32-64.
    In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims (...)at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description4). This work intends to dismiss the possibility that intuition may have an autonomous function of de re knowledge in support of an interpretative reading which can be labelled as weak conceptualism. To this end, the exploration will be conducted from a strictly transcendental perspectivei.e., by referring to the so called theory of theconcept of a transcendental object”. (shrink)
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  32.  45
    De Re Belief Ascriptions and Action Explanations.Eric Stiffler - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):513 - 525.
    The well known fact that beliefs may be ascribed either de dicto or de re raises a problem about the role of belief ascriptions in the explanation (...)
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  33. The Communication of de Re Thoughts.Anne L. Bezuidenhout - 1997 - Noûs 31 (2):197-225.
  34.  7
    De Re and De Se Belief.Thomas J. McKay - 1988 - In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 207--217.
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  35.  15
    De Re Modality Entails de Re Vagueness.F. Howard-Snyder - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):101--12.
  36. The Problem of de Re Modality.Kit Fine - 1989 - In John Perry, J. Almog & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--272.
     
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  37. Phenomenology and De Re Interpretation: A Critique of Brandoms Reading of Hegel.Stephen Houlgate - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (1):29 – 47.
    Brandom's interpretation of Hegel in Tales of the Mighty Dead is subtle, tightly argued and hugely impressive. It takes no account, however, of Hegel's distinctive conception (...) of phenomenology and as a result - for all its subtlety - offers a somewhat distorted picture of Hegel. In the opening chapters of Hegel's Phenomenology we learn that perception is committed as much to the unity of differences as to exclusive difference, that neither perception nor understanding is committed to holism as Brandom understands it, and that the understanding is not governed by the law of non-contradiction but in fact understands the world to be a thoroughly contradictory place. All of this, however, gets lost sight of in Brandom's de re interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology. (shrink)
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  38. Belief in Context: Towards a Unified Semantics of De Re and De Se Attitude Reports.Emar Maier - 2006 - Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen
    This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifically, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After arguing that (...)
     
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  39. Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions.Mark Balaguer - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):325-355.
    I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the formS believes that p’) and I explain how (...)my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to KripkesLondon’–‘Londrespuzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism. (shrink)
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  40. Divine Hiddenness and Belief de Re.Benjamin S. Cordry - 2009 - Religious Studies 45 (1):1-19.
    In this paper I argue that Poston and Dougherty's attempt to undermine the problem of divine hiddenness by using the notion of belief de re is (...)problematic at best. They hold that individuals who appear to be unbelievers (because they are de dicto unbelievers) may actually be de re believers. I construct a set of conditions on ascribing belief de re to show that it is prima facie implausible to claim that seemingly inculpable and apparent unbelievers are really de re believers. Thus, while it is indeed possible that a de dicto unbeliever is a de re believer, it is unlikely that this has sufficiently general application to actual individuals to alleviate the problem of divine hiddenness. (shrink)
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  41.  25
    Belief de Re and de Se.B. L. Davidson - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):389 – 406.
  42.  99
    Split Intensionality: a New Scope Theory of de Re and de Dicto.Ezra Keshet - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):251-283.
    The traditional scope theory of intensionality (STI) (see Russell 1905; Montague 1973; Ladusaw 1977; Ogihara 1992, 1996; Stowell 1993) is simple, elegant, and, for the most part, (...)
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  43. Presupposing Acquaintance: A Unified Semantics for de Dicto, de Re and de Se Belief Reports.Emar Maier - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (5):429--474.
    This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories (...) that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by specialde se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)
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  44. Acquaintance and de Re Thought.Chris John Daly - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):79-96.
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  45.  7
    Cicero, De Re Publica II, and His Socratic View of History.R. F. Hathaway - 1968 - Journal of the History of Ideas 29 (1):3.
  46. De What Re is de Re Modality?J. L. Mackie - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (16):551-561.
  47.  73
    Between de Dicto and de Re: De Objecto Attitudes.Manuel Rebuschi & Tero Tulenheimo - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):828-838.
    Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in (...)terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non-factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, calledde objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified propertyin each world the same individual, which or who need not exist actually. The philosophical benefits of our analysis of propositional attitudes include a refined account of the behaviour of proper names as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports. Some remarks about perception and about the hallucination argument are also presented. (shrink)
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  48.  95
    De Re and de Dicto Interpretations of Modal Logic or a Return to an Aristotelean Essentialism.Baruch A. Brody - 1972 - Philosophia 2 (1-2):117-136.
  49.  65
    De Dicto and de Re.Pavel Tichý - 1978 - Philosophia 8 (1):1-16.
  50.  25
    The Elimination of de Re Formulas.Michael Kaminski - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):411-422.
    It is shown that de re formulas are eliminable in the modal logic S5 extended with the axiom scheme □∃ ⊃ ∃xφ.
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