Results for 'de se'

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  1. De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
    This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work (...)
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  2. De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction.Stephan Torre - forthcoming - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.
    This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge (...)
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  3. De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.
    I discuss an aspect of the relation between accounts of de se thought and the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. I will argue that a (...)
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  4. De Se Belief and Rational Choice.James R. Shaw - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):491-508.
    The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, (...)
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  5.  62
    De Se Beliefs and Centred Uncertainty.Silvia Milano - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science
    What kind of thing do you believe when you believe that you are in a certain place, that it is a certain time, and that you are (...)
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  6. About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication.Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneselfas oneself” – de se thoughts, as (...) Lewis called themraise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thoughtto wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of two contrasting accountsa Lewisian one and a Perrian onein the first section of this paper, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perrys presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts. (shrink)
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  7. Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
    t f I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard (...)
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  8. Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds.Shen-yi Liao - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):17-31.
    Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such (...)
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  9. De Se Relativism.Dirk Kindermann & Andy Egan - 2019 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 518-527.
  10.  39
    Varieties of Centering and De Se Communication.Dirk Kindermann - 2016 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself. De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press. pp. 307–40.
    There has recently been a wave of attempts to make sense of the role of de se thoughts in linguistic communication. A majority of the attempts assume (...)
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  11. The Myth of the De Se.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.
  12.  59
    De Se Preferences and Empathy for Future Selves1.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.
  13.  45
    De Se and Descartes: A New Semantics for Indexicals.Eddy M. Zemach - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):181-204.
  14.  28
    De Se Content and Action Generalisation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):315-344.
    Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of (...)action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our pre-theoretical conceptions, I propose, instead, a strategy to circumvent this rather unexpected result: to reject subject-specific de se contents in favour of subject-specific ways of thinking that do not enter into the content of one's attitudes. (shrink)
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  15. In Defense of De Se Content.Stephan Torre - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):172-189.
    There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion (...)that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)
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  16. De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being.Stephan Torre - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (2):191-200.
    In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of (...)
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  17.  26
    Coordinating Perspectives: De Se and Taste Attitudes in Communication.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):912-955.
    ABSTRACT. The received picture of linguistic communication understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. This picture is in conflict with (...) the attractive Lewisian view of belief as self-location, which is motivated by de se attitudesfirst-personal attitudes about oneselfas well as attitudes about subjective matters such as personal taste. In this paper, I provide a solution to the conflict that reconciles these views. I argue for an account of mental attitudes and communication on which mental content and speech act content is understood as sets of multicentered worldsroughly, possible worldscenteredon a sequence of individuals at a time. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on multicentered worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. The resulting picture is one on which the point of conversation is the coordination of individual perspectives. (shrink)
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  18. The Problem of De Se Assertion.Isidora Stojanovic - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):49-58.
    It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 321, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513543 1981 ) that (...)
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  19. Relinquishing Control: What Romanian De Se Attitude Reports Teach Us About Immunity To Error Through Misidentification.Marina Folescu - 2019 - In Alessandro Capone, Una Stojnic, Ernie Lepore, Denis Delfitto, Anne Reboul, Gaetano Fiorin, Kenneth A. Taylor, Jonathan Berg, Herbert L. Colston, Sanford C. Goldberg, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri, Cliff Goddard, Anna Wierzbicka, Magdalena Sztencel, Sarah E. Duffy, Alessandra Falzone, Paola Pennisi, Péter Furkó, András Kertész, Ágnes Abuczki, Alessandra Giorgi, Sona Haroutyunian, Marina Folescu, Hiroko Itakura, John C. Wakefield, Hung Yuk Lee, Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Brian E. Butler, Douglas Robinson, Kobie van Krieken, José Sanders, Grazia Basile, Antonino Bucca, Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri & Kobie van Krieken (eds.), Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages. Springer. pp. 299-313.
    Higginbotham argued that certain linguistic items of English, when used in indirect discourse, necessarily trigger first-personal interpretations. They are: the emphatic reflexive pronoun and the controlled (...)understood subject, represented as PRO. PRO is special, in this respect, due to its imposing obligatory control effects between the main clause and its subordinates ). Folescu & Higginbotham, in addition, argued that in Romanian, a language whose grammar doesnt assign a prominent role to PRO, de se triggers are correlated with the subjunctive mood of certain verbs. That paper, however, didnt account for the grammatical diversity of the reports that display immunity to error through misidentification in Romanian: some of these reports are expressed by using de se triggers; others are not. Their IEM, moreover, is not systematically lexically controlled by the verbs, via their theta-roles; it is, rather, determined by the meaning of the verbs in question. Given the data from Romanian, I will argue, the phenomenon of IEM cannot be fully explained starting either from the syntactical or the lexical structure of a language. (shrink)
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  20. De Re and De Se.François Recanati - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.
    For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought. In this paper, I argue that de se thoughts come in two (...)
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  21. De Se Content and De Hinc Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):334-345.
  22. De Se Assertion.Isidora Stojanovic - unknown
    It has been long known (Perry (1977, 1979), Lewis (1981)) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a (...)
     
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  23.  41
    De Re and De Se.François Recanati - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.
    For Perry and many authors, de se thoughts are a species of de re thought ; for Lewis, it is the other way round. To a large extent (...), the conflict between the two positions is merely apparent: it is due to insufficient appreciation of the crucial distinction between two types of de se thought. In view of this distinction, we can maintain both that de se thought is a special case of de re thought, and that de re thought is a special case of de se thought. Still, I argue, Lewis's position can be criticized on the grounds that it internalizes acquaintance relations. (shrink)
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  24.  83
    De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of an Omniscient Being.Stephan Torre - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (2):191-200.
  25. Anaphora and Attitudes de Se.Gennaro Chierchia - 1989 - In Renate Bartsch, J. F. A. K. van Benthem & P. van Emde Boas (eds.), Semantics and Contextual Expression. Foris Publications. pp. 11--1.
     
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  26. Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
    This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended (...)
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  27. Imagining de Se.François Recanati - unknown
    My contribution to the 'MIMESIS, METAPHYSICS AND MAKE-BELIEVE' conference held in honour of Kendall Walton in the University of Leeds.
     
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  28.  25
    About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication By Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):780-784.
    About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication By García-CarpinteroManuel and TorreStephanOxford University Press, 2016, viii + 348 pp.
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  29. Conditionalization and Belief De Se.Darren Bradley - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.
    Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that (...) Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'. (shrink)
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  30. Self-Conception: Sosa on De Se Thought.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 73--99.
    Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued in the 1960s and 1970s that thoughts about oneselfas oneself” – de se thoughtsrequire special treatment, and advanced different (...)
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  31.  42
    Scepticism de Se.T. E. Zimmermann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):267-275.
  32.  74
    Titelbaums Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty.Namjoong Kim - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1217-1236.
    In hisRelevance of Self-locating Belief”, Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update ones degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the (...)
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  33. Between Scylla and Charibdis: The Semantics and Pragmatics of Attitudes 'de Se'.Alessandro Capone - 2010 - Intercultural Pragmatics 7 (3):471-503.
    'de se' attitudes and pragmatic intrusion. A critique of Higginbotham (2003).
     
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  34. Divine Omniscience and Knowledge de Se.Yujin Nagasawa - 2003 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):73-82.
    Patrick Grim argues that God cannot beomniscient because no one other than me canacquire knowledge de se of myself. Inparticular, according to Grim, God cannot knowwhat I (...)
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  35.  73
    Kant on de Se.Luca Forgione - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlino, Germania: De Gruyter. pp. 3779-3786.
    Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneselfas oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives (...)
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  36. Why My I is Your You: On the Communication of de Se Attitudes.Emar Maier - 2016 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.
    The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem forparticipant- neutralanalyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: (...)
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  37. Belief in Context: Towards a Unified Semantics of De Re and De Se Attitude Reports.Emar Maier - 2006 - Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen
    This thesis deals with the phenomenon of attitude reporting. More specifically, it provides a unified semantics of de re and de se belief reports. After arguing that (...)
     
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  38. The Limits of Selflessness: Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of de Se Thoughts.Marie Guillot - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.
    It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations (...)
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  39. Two Takes on the De Se.Marina Folescu & James Higginbotham - 2012 - In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    In this article we consider, relying in part upon comparative semantic evidence from English and Romanian, two contrasting dimensions of the sense in which our thoughts, including (...)
     
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  40. Presupposing Acquaintance: A Unified Semantics for de Dicto, de Re and de Se Belief Reports.Emar Maier - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (5):429--474.
    This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories (...) that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by specialde se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)
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  41.  27
    De Se Exceptionalism and Frege Puzzles.James R. Shaw - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:1057-1086.
    De se exceptionalism is the view, notably championed by Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979), that our characteristically 'first-personal' ways of thinking about ourselves present unique challenges (...)to standard views of propositional attitudes like belief. Though the view has won many adherents, it has recently come under a barrage of deserved criticism. A key claim of detractors is that classic examples used to motivate de se exceptionalism from de se ignorance or misidentification are nothing more than familiar Frege-puzzles, which raise no issues exclusive to self-directed thought. After reviewing how this simple objection has substantial force against the classic defenses of exceptionalism, I provide new arguments based on cases of pure de se ignorance that avoid the criticism. Afterward, I revisit Lewis's defense of exceptionalism, diagnosing how he arrived at roughly the right conclusions on the basis of an argument that begged critical questions and obscured the representationally unique features of the de se. (shrink)
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  42. Indexicality and de Se Reports.Philippe Schlenker - forthcoming - In Maienborn von Heusinger & Mouton Gruyter Portneder (eds.), Handbook of Semantics.
  43. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    What is the relationship between Freges puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely (...)an instance of Freges puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Freges puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended. (shrink)
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  44.  51
    On the Roads to de Se.Emar Maier - 2011 - Proceedings of Salt 21 (1):393--412.
    It is rather uncontroversial that there are different ways to report de se attitudes, but there is still disagreement about the number and the nature of the (...)
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  45. Expert Deference De Se.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    Principles of expert deference say that you should align your credences with those of an expert. This expert could be your doctor, the objective chances, or your (...)
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  46. De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge.Erich Rast - 2012 - Analysis and Metaphysics 11:106-132.
    ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jacksons original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory (...)of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also explains why neither Lewiss two gods nor Marys surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism. (shrink)
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  47.  62
    Chance Deference De Se.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face (...)
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  48.  68
    The Philosophical Significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.
    Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneselfas oneself’ – first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se (...)
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  49. Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se.Richard Holton - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell.
    There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension (...)of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription of a property is not ascription of a property to the self, on a par with ascription to someone else. This has been overlooked in much recent discussion, especially when Lewis's account is understood in terms of centered worlds. When it is back in focus it brings problems. An almost Cartesian starting point is required; and first-person plural ascriptions, and those with first person pronouns other than in subject position, become unmanageably complex. (shrink)
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  50.  73
    Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics.Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.) - 2013 - CSLI Publications.
    In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself (...)" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se. De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of our discourse about it, and also what it reveals about how humans think about themselves and the world around them. (shrink)
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