Not a day goes by that we don't hear of a crisis, declared or looming: the ecological crisis, the public health crisis, the housing crisis, the race crisis, the constitutional crisis, the economic crisis. In an age where everything seems to be a crisis, or in a permanent state of crisis, it can be difficult to distinguish between what is urgent and what isn't, what to act on now and what to act on later. In A Philosophy of Crisis, Miguel (...) de Beistegui offers a typology of crisis that will help us make sense of these issues. While some social scientists and philosophers have become skeptical of the notion of crisis, de Beistegui holds that crisis can be a useful concept so long as we make it a polysemic one that can evolve and operate alongside other concepts. He outlines four regimes of crisis: crises of deviation, exception, contradiction, and extinction. Each involves a certain relation to the norm and requires a certain response. Drawing on the tools of philosophy and disciplines including political economy, law, sociology, and the sciences, A Philosophy of Crisis equips us to understand our current state of crisis and deal with it. (shrink)

Ce livre propose de relire la philosophie de Walter Benjamin à partir de sa cosmologie. Le cosmos de Benjamin n'est pas un univers ordonné, composé de corps célestes identifiables, mais l'occasion d'une expérience fulgurante: dans l'univers post-copernicien de Benjamin, l'intériorité du désir et l'extériorité des étoiles, le politique et le théologique, le présent et le distant passé se rencontrent sans fusionner. Situant Benjamin dans la tradition philosophique (G. W. Leibniz, K. Marx, F. Hegel) tout en s'appuyant sur des pensées contemporaines (...) (J. Butler, S. Hartmann, M. Löwy), ce livre crée une 'correspondance' entre Benjamin et notre actualité. Dans un monde soumis aux replis nationalistes, aux virus destructeurs d'altérité et à l'intrusion technologique, le lointain semble s'évanouir. En prise avec l'histoire la plus récente, celle du New Space et de la Sixième Extinction, de Black Lives Matter et des Communes éphémères, ce livre soutient qu'aucune transformation politique radicale, aucune émancipation, aucun communisme n'est possible, et souhaitable, sans relation avec un lointain telle l'Étoile du Nord que les esclaves en fuite suivaient dans le ciel nocturne pour les guider vers la liberté."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L’œuvre de Cabanis a eu énormément de mal à sortir d’une place qui lui était prescrite au moment même de son inscription dans le champ philosophique et scientifique allemand. Cette place, c’est celle de continuateur audacieux, informé, d’un projet lui-même daté : le projet d’une anthropologie physiologique, dont on estimait que les limites en avaient d’emblée été fixées par Kant et qu’en conséquence il n’était pas voué à un grand avenir. Pendant un demi-siècle environ, l’œuvre philosophique de Cabanis, limitée ici (...) aux fameux mémoires sur les Rapports du physique et du moral chez l’homme, a trouvé dans l’anthropologie physiologique, critiquée par Kant, son pré carré et les conditions de sa relative extinction. C’est une seconde réception, sans doute plus souterraine, plus muette aussi sur l’influence réelle que Cabanis a pu exercer, qui lui a permis de ressurgir au début des années 1860, sous une autre forme ou en une autre place : celle de père de la psychophysiologie, une place en apparence identifiable ou superposable à la précédente mais bien distincte. C’est sur cette seconde position, plus favorable à Cabanis, qu’on conclut ces analyses. (shrink)

In this series of papers, I attempt to provide an answer to the question how the Babylonian scholars arrived at their mathematical theory of planetary motion. Paper I (de Jong in Arch Hist Exact Sci 73:1–37, 2019) was devoted to a study of system A theory of the outer planets. In this second paper, I will study system A theory of the planet Venus. All presently known ephemerides of Venus appear to have been written after 200 BC so that the (...) development of system A theory of Venus may have been a late development. On the other hand, there are several earlier texts in which the motion of Venus, going from one synodic phenomenon to the next one, is parametrized in quite some detail. At least six computational systems of Venus are known of which only two, systems A0 and A3, are genuine type-A systems. Both are based on the hypothesis that in exactly 1151 years Venus experiences 720 synodic phenomena of the same kind and that after this period of 1151 years Venus returns to exactly the same position in the sky. This period relation was probably derived from the observational fact that after 8 years Venus returns to a position in the zodiac that falls on average 2.5° short of its previous position. The study of the Babylonian planetary theory of Venus presented here will be primarily based on the system A3 theory of Venus because it is the most complete of the two systems. The parameters of the four step functions characterizing the system A3 model of the first and last appearances of Venus are known from previous studies of tablet BM 32599 (ACT 1050). Based on a database of synthetic observations of the first and last appearances (morning first, morning last, evening first and evening last) and the two stationary points (morning station and evening station) of Venus between 315 BC and 50 BC, I first discuss the observational material from the point of view of a Babylonian astronomer. This involves deriving synodic time intervals and synodic arcs from the observed dates and longitudes of Venus. Both vary with the position of Venus in the zodiac. This variation shows up most purely in the synodic arcs and synodic time intervals of Venus at its stations. The variation pattern of the synodic arcs and of the synodic time intervals at the first and last appearances of Venus differ considerably because they are strongly affected by atmospheric extinction and by the ecliptic latitude of Venus. A comparison of predictions of the first and last appearances of Venus computed according to system A3 with observations in the synthetic database shows that the models provide fairly accurate fits to the observations of evening last and morning first with typical standard deviations of about 2° but rather poor fits to the observations of morning last and evening first with typical standard deviations of about 7° and 4°. Quite surprisingly, it turns out that the morning first A3 model fits the observed longitudes of Venus at its stations almost perfectly, with standard deviations of about 1°. This suggests that observations of the stations of Venus must have been available to the Babylonian astronomer(s) who constructed the system A3 model of Venus and who computed the longitudes of Venus at its first and last appearances preserved in tablet BM 32599. This is quite puzzling because observations of the stations of Venus were definitely not part of the standard observing program of the Babylonian astronomers as we know it from the Astronomical Diaries. To resolve this problem, I propose that observations could have been made by some individual astronomer for his own use but that these observations never became part of the tradition of what was regularly observed and recorded in the Astronomical Diaries. It turns out that 25 years of observations of Venus (here illustrated for the years 203 BC to 178 BC) is sufficient for the construction of a system A model that perfectly fits the variation of the synodic arcs of Venus at its stations. By combining observed time intervals and known velocities of Venus, observations over this limited timespan can also be used to construct longitudes of Venus at its first and last appearances from previous known positions of Venus based on Normal Stars passages or from known positions at its stations. This is the only way in which positions of Venus at its first and last appearances can be determined because at its first and last appearances the sky is too bright for Normal Stars to be visible. I propose that the Babylonian system A3 models of Venus were based on longitudes constructed in this way. I finally suggest that the tablet, of which BM 32599 is the remainder, was filled line by line starting with a set of initial values in the bottom left-hand corner of the tablet and that the choice of these initial values was based on an observation of Venus at its evening station when it was exceptionally close to the Normal Star η Piscium in February 179 BC. Based on this choice of initial conditions, the tablet covers the years 403 BC to 170 BC and it may have been composed around 170 BC. It was probably computed with the purpose of creating a raster of longitudes with mazes of about 2.5° that could be used to predict future positions of Venus at its first or last appearance once a position at a previous first or last appearance was available. (shrink)

In this series of papers I attempt to provide an answer to the question how the Babylonian scholars arrived at their mathematical theory of planetary motion. Papers I and II were devoted to system A theory of the outer planets and of the planet Venus. In this third and last paper I will study system A theory of the planet Mercury. Our knowledge of the Babylonian theory of Mercury is at present based on twelveEphemeridesand sevenProcedure Texts. Three computational systems of (...) Mercury are known, all of system A. System A1is represented by nineEphemeridescovering the years 190 BC to 100 BC and system A2by twoEphemeridescovering the years 310 to 290 BC. System A3is known from aProcedure Textand from Text M, anEphemerisof the last evening visibility of Mercury for the years 424 to 403 BC. From an analysis of the Babylonian observations of Mercury preserved in theAstronomical DiariesandPlanetary Textswe find: (1) that dates on which Mercury reaches its stationary points are not recorded, (2) that Normal Star observations on or near dates of first and last appearance of Mercury are rare (about once every twenty observations), and (3) that about one out of every seven pairs of first and last appearances is recorded as “omitted” when Mercury remains invisible due to a combination of the low inclination of its orbit to the horizon and the attenuation by atmospheric extinction. To be able to study the way in which the Babylonian scholars constructed their system A models of Mercury from the available observational material I have created a database of synthetic observations by computing the dates and zodiacal longitudes of all first and last appearances and of all stationary points of Mercury in Babylon between 450 and 50 BC. Of the data required for the construction of an ephemeris synodic time intervals Δt can be directly derived from observed dates but zodiacal longitudes and synodic arcs Δλ must be determined in some other way. Because for Mercury positions with respect to Normal Stars can only rarely be determined at its first or last appearance I propose that the Babylonian scholars used the relation Δλ = Δt −3;39,40, which follows from the period relations, to compute synodic arcs of Mercury from the observed synodic time intervals. An additional difficulty in the construction of System A step functions is that most amplitudes are larger than the associated zone lengths so that in the computation of the longitudes of the synodic phases of Mercury quite often two zone boundaries are crossed. This complication makes it difficult to understand how the Babylonian scholars managed to construct System A models for Mercury that fitted the observations so well because it requires an excessive amount of computational effort to find the best possible step function in a complicated trial and error fitting process with four or five free parameters. To circumvent this difficulty I propose that the Babylonian scholars used an alternative more direct method to fit System A-type models to the observational data of Mercury. This alternative method is based on the fact that after three synodic intervals Mercury returns to a position in the sky which is on average only 17.4° less in longitude. Using reduced amplitudes of about 14°–25° but keeping the same zone boundaries, the computation of what I will call 3-synarc system A models of Mercury is significantly simplified. A full ephemeris of a synodic phase of Mercury can then be composed by combining three columns of longitudes computed with 3-synarc step functions, each column starting with a longitude of Mercury one synodic event apart. Confirmation that this method was indeed used by the Babylonian astronomers comes from Text M (BM 36551+), a very early ephemeris of the last appearances in the evening of Mercury from 424 to 403 BC, computed in three columns according to System A3. Based on an analysis of Text M I suggest that around 400 BC the initial approach in system A modelling of Mercury may have been directed towards choosing “nice” sexagesimal numbers for the amplitudes of the system A step functions while in the later final models, dating from around 300 BC onwards, more emphasis was put on selecting numerical values for the amplitudes such that they were related by simple ratios. The fact that different ephemeris periods were used for each of the four synodic phases of Mercury in the later models may be related to the selection of a best fitting set of System A step function amplitudes for each synodic phase. (shrink)

Utilitarianism may well be the most influential secular ethical theory in the world today. It is also one of the most controversial. It clashes, or is widely thought to clash, with many conventional moral views, and with human rights when they are seen as inviolable. Would it, for example, be right to torture a suspected terrorist in order to prevent an attack that could kill and injure a large number of innocent people? In this Very Short Introduction Peter Singer and (...) Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek provide an authoritative account of the nature of utilitarianism, from its nineteenth-century origins, to its justification and its varieties. Considering how utilitarians can respond to objections that are often regarded as devastating, they explore the utilitarian answer to the question of whether torture can ever be justified. They also discuss what it is that utilitarians should seek to maximize, paying special attention to the classical utilitarian view that only pleasure or happiness is of intrinsic value. Singer and de Lazari-Radek conclude by analysing the continuing importance of utilitarianism in the world, indicating how it is a force for new thinking on contemporary moral challenges like global poverty, the treatment of animals, climate change, reducing the risk of human extinction, end-of-life decisions for terminally-ill patients, and the shift towards assessing the success of government policies in terms of their impact on happiness. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

The nonrandom distribution of fears is not as clearly related to phylogenetically survival relevance as preparedness theory seems to imply. Although delayed extinction reflects some of the best human evidence for preparedness, even this phenomenon is not as robust as it once seemed to be. Apart from the evidence reviewed by Davey, recent studies from our laboratory provide further evidence for an expectancy bias model of selective associations.

Following Darwin, many comparative psychologists assume that the human mind is a kind of ape mind, differing only in degree from the extant apes – we call this the mental continuity assumption. However, the continuity principle in evolutionary theory does not posit continuity between extant closely related species, but between extant species and their extinct ancestors. Thus, it is possible that some human cognitive capacities have no parallels in extant apes, but that they emerged in extinct hominid species after the (...) human-chimpanzee divergence. Our examination of the case of social cognition from an archaeological and comparative psychological perspective suggests that the human brain is not simply an enlarged chimpanzee brain. Instead, natural selection seems to have favoured a different social cognition in both species. (shrink)

The evaluative conditioning effect refers to the change in the liking of a neutral stimulus due to its pairing with another stimulus. We examined whether the extinction rate of the EC effect is moderated by feature-specific attention allocation. In two experiments, CSs were abstract Gabor patches varying along two orthogonal, perceptual dimensions. During the acquisition phase, one of these dimensions was predictive of the valence of the USs. During the extinction phase, CSs were presented alone and participants were (...) asked to categorise the CSs either according to their valence, the perceptual dimension that was task-relevant during the acquisition phase, or a perceptual dimension that was task-irrelevant during the acquisition phase. As predicted, explicit valence measures revealed a linear increase in the extinction rate of the EC effect as participants were encouraged to assign attention to non-evaluative stimulus information during the extinction phase. In Experiment 1, Affect Misattribution Paradigm data mimicked this pattern of results, although the effect just missed conventional levels of significance. In Experiment 2, the AMP data revealed an increase of the EC effect if attention was focused on evaluative stimulus information. Potential mechanisms to explain these findings are discussed. (shrink)

This book brings together Steiner's philosophical, biodynamic and cultural contributions to education, where 'spirit' and ‘soul’ are the creative elements in human evolution. His thought is applied to selected examples of innovative artistic practice and pedagogy of the present. This volume is intended for researchers in the arts and education with an interest in Rudolf Steiner's huge influence on educational thought and policy.This is an urgent point in time to reflect on the role of arts in education and what it (...) might mean for our souls. An accessible yet scholarly study of interdisciplinarity, imagination and creativity is of critical widespread interest now, when arts education in many countries is threatened with near-extinction. (shrink)

De-extinction raises anew ontological and epistemological problems that have engaged environmental philosophers for decades. This essay re-examines these issues to provide a fuller understanding—and a critique—of de-extinction. One of my claims is that de-extinction as a philosophical problem merely recycles old issues and debates in the field (hence, “zombie” arguments). De-extinction is a project that arises out of the assertion of human domination of the natural world. Thus the acceptance of de-extinction as an environmental policy (...) is an expression of a human-nature relationship that disvalues the natural world and subjugates nature completely to the interests of humanity. (shrink)

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is one of the terms that is used to refer to associatively induced changes in liking. Many controversies have arisen in the literature on EC. Do associatively induced changes in liking actually exist? Does EC depend on awareness of the fact that stimuli are associated? Is EC resistant to extinction? Does attention help or hinder EC? As an introduction to this special issue, we will discuss the extent to which the papers that are published in this (...) issue help to resolve some of the controversies that surround EC. We also speculate about possible boundary conditions of EC and attempt to reconcile conflicting results on the functional properties of EC. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Resumo O texto trata da Folia de Reis na Comunidade de Cruzeiro dos Peixotos - Uberlândia - MG, que foi alvo de um projeto de pesquisa, financiado pelo Programa Institucional de Bolsas de Extensão (PIBEX/UFU) e pelo Programa de Extensão e Integração UFU/Comunidade (PEIC/UFU). Os autores partem da premissa de que foliões, festeiros e devotos são, na feliz expressão de Carlos Rodrigues Brandão, "especialistas" do saber da devoção, por sentirem-se incumbidos de representar a (...) Igreja em cada uma da partes que compõem a Folia, desde a saída do Terno até chegar o dia da festa de Santos Reis. O texto procura mesclar reflexão teórica conceitual sobre a festa com os métodos de pesquisa da História Oral, a partir da observação in loco . Conclui com a constatação de que esta importante tradição popular mantem-se ainda muito viva e forte, não apenas na comunidade em foco, mas ainda na região do Triângulo Mineiro. Reconhece que seu sentido se modificou ao longo do tempo e procura afirmar que esta festa não sofre da 'ameça da extinção', como quer a doxa corrente, representada pela voz da mídia, pelos agentes das secretarias de cultura, pesquisadores acadêmicos ou ainda pelos próprios devotos. Palavras-chave : devoção; Folia de Reis; festa.This paper covers the 'Folia de Reis' (a traditional folk celebration of the visit from the Three Kings, during Epiphany) in the community of Cruzeiro dos Peixotos - Uberlândia - MG, which was the target of a research project, funded by the Institutional Program of Extension Fellowships (PIBEX / UFU) and the Extension and Integration Program UFU/Comunidade (PEIC/UFU). The authors begin with the premise that revelers, "party goers" ( festeiros ) and devotees are, in the fortunate expression of Carlos Rodrigues Brandão, "experts" in the knowledge of devotion, for they feel responsible to represent the Church in each of the component parts of the Folia, from the departure of the Terno (group of musicians) up to the celebration of the Three Kings. The text seeks to merge a theoretical conception about the party with the research methods of oral history, based on direct observation. In conclusion, it observes that this important folk tradition has been kept very much alive and strong, not only in the community that was the focus of this study, but also in the Triangulo Mineiro region. It acknowledges that the meaning of the party has changed over time and intends to assert that this party does not suffer from the 'threat of extinction', as wants to believe the current doxa , represented by the voices of the media, by the officials from the departments of culture, by academic researchers or even by their own devotees. Key words : devotion; Folia de Reis (a traditional folk celebration of the visit from the Three Kings, during Epiphany); party. (shrink)

This paper offers a paleobiological perspective on the debate concerning the possible use of biotechnology to bring back extinct species. One lesson from paleobiology is that extinction selectivity matters in addition to extinction rates and extinction magnitude. Combining some of Darwin’s insights about artificial selection with the theory of species selection that paleobiologists developed in the 1970s and 1980s provides a useful context for thinking about de-extinction. Using recent work on the prioritization of candidate species for (...) de-extinction as a test case, the paper argues that de-extinction would be a form of artificial species selection in which humans influence which species persist vs. go extinct. This points to a serious gap in our ethical theory: Much work has been done to clarify the value of biological diversity, but we also need theoretical guidance for decisions that amount to species sorting, and that will shape the macroevolutionary future. (shrink)

“de-extinction” refers to the process of resurrecting extinct species by genetic methods. This science-fiction-sounding idea is in fact already in early processes of scientific implementation. Although this recent “revival of the dead” raises deep ethical questions, the ethics of de-extinction has barely received philosophical treatment. Rather than seeking a verdict for or against de-extinction, this paper attempts an overview and some novel analyses of the main ethical considerations. Five dimensions of the ethics of de-extinction are explored: (...) (a) the possible contribution of de-extinction to promoting ecological values, (b) the deontological argument that we owe de-extinction to species we rendered extinct, (c) the question of “playing God” through de-extinction, (d) the utilitarian perspective, and (e) the role of aesthetic considerations in the ethics of de-extinction. A general feature arising from the paper’s discussion is that, due to de-extinction’s special character, it repeatedly tests the limits of our ethical notions. (shrink)

Extinction deeply colors the way we think about conservation and the role of humans in nature. It is easy to overlook how recently, in fact, it has entered our consciousness. Only in the last two centuries has science sought to critically study life's origins, development, and diversification. Only in the last several generations have we identified and calibrated life's five major extinction events and speculated on their causes and effects. And only in recent decades have we come to (...) appreciate the still‐unfolding fate of life's diversity under the increasing influence of humanity. The story of extinction has continually changed as this monumental process of interdisciplinary synthesis and imagination has unfolded. Geology, paleontology, taxonomy, biogeography, and evolutionary biology have allowed us to comprehend the deep temporal and broad spatial dynamics of the extinction story. Archaeology, cultural anthropology, and environmental and economic history have illuminated the role of humans in altering the trajectory of species, landscapes, and ecosystems over the millennia. Ecology, genetics, population biology, and conservation biology have revealed the more recent patterns in life's vulnerability and resilience. As a phenomenon, extinction is as old as life itself. As a story shaping our consciousness, values, and intentions, it is still new. And it is uncomfortable. (shrink)

Developments in genetic engineering may soon allow biologists to clone organisms from extinct species. The process, dubbed “de-extinction,” has been publicized as a means to bring extinct species back to life. For theorists and philosophers of biology, the process also suggests a thought experiment for the ongoing “species problem”: given a species concept, would a clone be classified in the extinct species? Previous analyses have answered this question in the context of specific de-extinction technologies or particular species concepts. (...) The thought experiment is given more comprehensive treatment here. Given the products of three de-extinction technologies, twenty-two species concepts are “tested” to see which are consistent with the idea that species may be resurrected. The ensuing discussion considers whether or not de-extinction is a conceptually coherent research program and, if so, whether or not its development may contribute to a resolution of the species problem. Ultimately, theorists must face a choice: they may revise their commitments to species concepts or they may recognize de-extinction as a means to make progress in the species problem. (shrink)

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is one of the terms that is used to refer to associatively induced changes in liking. Many controversies have arisen in the literature on EC. Do associatively induced changes in liking actually exist? Does EC depend on awareness of the fact that stimuli are associated? Is EC resistant to extinction? Does attention help or hinder EC? As an introduction to this special issue, we will discuss the extent to which the papers that are published in this (...) issue help to resolve some of the controversies that surround EC. We also speculate about possible boundary conditions of EC and attempt to reconcile conflicting results on the functional properties of EC. (shrink)

Tristan Murail est, avec Gérard Grisey, un des deux grands représentants de ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler la "musique spectrale". L'expression indique une référence constante à la structure microscopique des spectres sonores : c'est la vie intérieure des sons, avec leur harmonicité ou inharmonicité, leurs transitoires d'attaque ou d'extinction, qui constitue chez Murail le modèle par excellence pour construire des formes musicales. Cet ouvrage - le premier entièrement consacré à l'œuvre de Murail - évoque sa situation esthétique face à (...) d'autres courants de la musique d'après 1945. Un long entretien donne la parole au compositeur, pour retracer un parcours qui l'a mené de Messiaen à Scelsi et au-delà, ainsi qu'au pédagogue (Murail enseigne depuis plusieurs années aux Etats-Unis). Une analyse approfondie de l'une de ses pièces marquantes, L'Esprit des dunes, permet d'entrer dans son atelier, de suivre le processus de création qui conduit de l'analyse des sons à l'invention des formes. Enfin, Tristan Murail lui-même revient en détail sur chacune de ses œuvres, nous livrant son regard rétrospectif en un document précieux. (shrink)

T.J. Kasperbauer argues that the most pressing problem for de-extinction is that it implies significant suffering for sentient animals. Though it is true that de-extinction entails suffering for se...

I have been involved with the current interest in de‐extinction since early 2012, nearly its beginning. I have given a lot of thought to the potential risks and benefits of de‐extinction. But only recently, after deep immersion in discussions around CRISPR‐Cas9, the hottest new tool in bioscience since polymerase chain reaction, have I thought about a more fundamental question: how, if at all, is de‐extinction special? Are “revived species” just another kind of genetically modified organism, raising essentially (...) the same general concerns? I answer, for the most part, yes. De‐extinction is not (very) special. New biotechnologies are giving humans even more power to change the biosphere but more directly, more quickly, and more utterly than ever before. De‐extinction is just one possible, and probably small, use of those technologies. Our attention, for the most part, should be on the bigger issues of regulating this power, rather than focusing specifically on their application to de‐extinction. (shrink)

In a laboratory on a university campus in Santa Cruz, California, Ben Novak is doing everything he can to bring Ectopistes migratorius back from the dead. Using techniques now available in genome reading and gene synthesis, he and paleogenomicist Beth Shapiro hope that, by 2032, a flock of passenger pigeons ten thousand or more strong will have resumed an ecologically significant role in the mast forests of the Eastern United States. Novak knows—and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (...) affirms—that the challenges involved in making de‐extinction work are far from solely genetic. Novak is doing an ecological risk assessment of passenger pigeon reintroduction to figure out whether flocks of the resurrected species would pose any special hazards to ecosystems. Ecological harm is one of several worries attending the prospect of de‐extinction. Among other concerns are the possible harm that individuals born through this process might suffer and the possible introduction of disease vectors. But I want to step back from these immediate questions and think about some conceptual ones that operate in the background. Technology can be a grand shaper of cultural norms and expectations, and de‐extinction should be looked at in relation to a number of emerging technologies. This paper will examine the degree to which de‐extinction is part of a more widespread restructuring of ethical relationships to the surrounding world that are under way at the hands of emerging technologies. This restructuring is part of an ongoing shift in how to think about conservation in the new epoch of the Anthropocene. (shrink)

T. J. Kasperbauer presents an analysis of the ethics of de-extinction that is fairly distinctive in its focus on the welfare of individual animals. But while he is right to express concerns about individual animal well-being, individualism may not be the most important lens through which to view this issue. If one examines more closely what is at issue in de-extinction technologies in relation to species, additional problems appear that cast doubt both on the legitimacy of de-extinction (...) projects, and on the limited defense of them that Kasperbauer offers. (shrink)

Authors sometimes treat the promise of de-extinction as a forgone conclusion. But if we take Kasperbauer’s approach and assess the moral acceptability of de-extinction by weighting benefits to species against the suffering of individuals, the promise of de-extinction deserves greater critical attention. Accepting de-extinct individuals as replacements for extinct predecessors assumes species are separate from environment and can be reduced to DNA. In this response to Kasperbauer’s essay, I examine how the acceptability of de-extinction might shift (...) if we instead view species as the persistence of processes—the successful know-how of living in relation to other unfolding processes. (shrink)

We are living in what is widely considered the sixth major extinction. Most ecologists believe that biodiversity is disappearing at an alarming rate, with up to 150 species going extinct per day according to scientists working with the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. Part of the reason the loss signified by biological extinction feels painful is that it seems irremediable. These creatures are gone, and there's nothing to be done about it. In recent years, however, the possibility (...) has been broached that, just possibly, something can be done, in at least some cases. Human ingenuity, a contributing factor in the extinction crisis, might achieve their “de‐extinction”—in at least some cases, and with sometimes significant qualifications about whether the original species had been “recreated” and whether it could resume its original place in the environment. De‐extinction is an entry point into a larger set of questions about how biotechnological tools can support, coexist with, or undermine the goals of conservation and about the very meaning of conservation. Are we beings in control of the world or beings who prosper by accommodating ourselves to webs of symbiotic interdependencies? Are we creators or creatures, or both—and if both, then how can we achieve the balance between them that might be called humility? The interplay of perfecting and accommodating is not unique to human beings—perhaps it characterizes all forms of life on Earth—but with humans, these modes of being are distinctive, and our technology greatly expands their scale and effects. It is such questions that the ten essays in this special report explore. (shrink)

One interesting feature of de‐extinction—particularly with respect to long‐extinct species such as the passenger pigeon, thylacine, and mammoth—is that it does not fit neatly into the primary rationales for adopting novel ecosystem‐management and species‐conservation technologies and strategies: efficiency and necessity. The efficiency rationale is that the new technology or strategy enables conservation biologists to do what they already do more effectively. Why should researchers embrace novel information technologies? Because they allow scientists to better track, monitor, map, aggregate, and analyze (...) species behaviors, biological systems, and human‐environment interactions. This enables better decision‐making about how to protect species, which areas to conserve, and how to reduce anthropogenic impacts on ecological systems. Many projects in conservation genomics are justified in this way. But de‐extinction is not a more efficient or necessary means to some conservation aim that is already recognized as acceptable or important. In fact, because it is focused on reconstituting approximations of nonexistent species, rather than maintaining extant ones, the social and ethical assessment of de‐extinction is not limited to asking whether it is a good means. We can ask as well whether de‐extinction is a worthwhile “conservation” goal in the first place. (shrink)

The Unnaturalness Objection to De-Extinction: A Critical Evaluation Carolyn Mason, University of Canterbury, New Zealand Abstract De-extinction of species has been criticised for being unnatural, as have the techniques that might be used to accomplish de-extinction. This objection of unnaturalness will be dismissed by those who claim that everything that humans do is natural, by those who claim that naturalness is a social construct, and by those who argue that ethical concerns arising from considerations of unnaturalness rest (...) on a failure properly to distinguish facts from values. However, none of these criticisms of the objection of unnaturalness is convincing, for reasons I will explain in this paper. The objection of unnaturalness might be motivated by concerns about either: (i) the attitude to nature that underpins de-extinction practices; or (ii) the consequences of interfering with nature. I show that objections of type (i) are rare in the literature, while objections of type (ii) can generally be ameliorated by working with cultures that have ties to the flora and fauna at issue, careful research into the value and nature of ecological systems, limiting risky activities, and limiting the use of de-extinction processes whenever their consequences are unclear. I conclude that the unnaturalness objection to de-extinction is of real but limited force. It gives reasons for caution rather than prohibition. (shrink)

Decades of globally coordinated work in conservation have failed to slow the loss of biodiversity. To do better—even if that means nothing more than failing less spectacularly—bolder thinking is necessary. One of the first possible conservation applications of synthetic biology to be debated is the use of genetic tools to resurrect once‐extinct species. Since the currency of conservation is biodiversity and the discipline of conservation biology was formed around the prevention of species extinctions, the prospect of reversing extinctions might have (...) been expected to generate unreserved enthusiasm. But it was not universal acclaim that greeted the coming‐out party for “de‐extinction” that was the TEDx conference and accompanying National Geographic feature in 2013. Why the concern, the skepticism, even the hostility among many conservationists about the idea of restoring lost species? And how does this professional concern relate to public perception and support for conservation? This essay explores the barriers to the acceptance of risky new genomic‐based conservation tools by considering five key areas and associated questions that could be addressed in relation to any new conservation tool. I illustrate these using the specific example of de‐extinction, and in doing so, I consider whether de‐extinction would necessarily be the best first point of engagement between conservation biology and synthetic biology. (shrink)

Are the methods of synthetic biology capable of recreating authentic living members of an extinct species? An analogy with the restoration of destroyed natural landscapes suggests not. The restored version of a natural landscape will typically lack much of the aesthetic value of the original landscape because of the different historical processes that created it—processes that involved human intentions and actions, rather than natural forces acting over millennia. By the same token, it would appear that synthetically recreated versions of extinct (...) natural organisms will also be less aesthetically valuable than the originals; that they will be, in some strong sense, ‘inauthentic’, because of their peculiar history and mode of origin. I call this the ‘genesis argument’ against de-extinction. In this article I critically evaluate the genesis argument. I highlight an important disanalogy between living organisms and natural landscapes: viz., it is of the essence of the former, but not of the latter, to regularly reproduce and die. The process of iterated natural reproduction that sustains the continued existence of a species through time obviously does not undermine the authenticity of the species. I argue that the authenticity of a species will likewise be left intact by the kind of artificial copying of genes and traits that a de-extinction project entails. I conclude on this basis that the genesis argument is unsound. (shrink)

This chapter commences with an account on the Zillo Beasts. The reawakening of extinct species, or "de‐extinction," has gained massive popular appeal. The chapter explains some facts before delving into the philosophical debate over de‐extinction. Philosophers sometimes use far‐fetched examples to answer the questions that are left after we agree on all the facts. These “thought experiments” are meant to show us what we really believe. What makes a duck a duck, a mammoth a mammoth, or a Zillo (...) Beast a Zillo Beast? This is called the species problem, and it is one of the oldest in the philosophy of biology. Essentialism is the view that permits us to say that the Zillo Beast's clone would be a member of the Zillo Beast species. The New Essentialists argue that essentialism can be compatible with natural selection if one looks beyond organisms' traits for species essences. (shrink)

Eric Katz in Zombie Arguments defends the thesis authenticity is indispensable to conservation. I agree. However, I argue authenticity appears in degrees and can be reclaimed by populations through their continuing evolutionary responses to the world. This means that interventions that diminish the value of a population through reducing their authenticity can be permitted in limited cases. When our actions retain the remaining authentic features in a threatened population we should allow such a diminishment as authenticity can be reclaimed in (...) time. (shrink)

De-extinction is the process through which extinct species can be brought back into existence. Although these projects have the potential to cause great harm to animal welfare, discussion on issues surrounding de-extinction have focussed primarily on other issues. In this paper, I examine the potential types of welfare harm that can arise through de-extinction programs, including problems with cloning, captive rearing and re-introduction. I argue that welfare harm should be an important consideration when making decisions on de- (...) class='Hi'>extinction projects. Though most of the proposed benefits of these projects are insufficient to outweigh the current potential welfare harm, these problems may be overcome with further development of the technology and careful selection of appropriate species as de-extinction candidates. (shrink)

In his article, Considering de-extinction, Katz (2022) mounts a two-pronged criticism of de-extinction efforts as elements of environmental policy. First, Katz argues that there is no positive case...

In this paper, we discuss the following four alternative ways of understanding the outcomes of resurrection biology. Implications of each of the ways are discussed with respect to concepts of species and extinction. Replication: animals created by resurrection biology do not belong to the original species but are copies of it. The view is compatible with finality of extinction as well as with certain biological and ecological species concepts. Re-creation: animals created are members of the original species but, (...) despite their existence, the species remains extinct. The view is incompatible with all species concepts presented. Non-extinction: animals produced belong to the original species which actually never went extinct. The view may be consistent with phenetic and phylogenetic species concepts as well as with finality of extinction. According to literal resurrection, resurrection biology is successful in reversing extinction through the creation of new members of species that once went extinct. This view presupposes non-finality of extinction and it is compatible with phenetic species concepts. It is notable that no species or extinction concept is consistent with all possible views of resurrection biology nor is any view of resurrection biology consistent with all species or extinction concepts. Thus, one’s views regarding species and extinction determine which views one can adopt regarding resurrection biology and vice versa. (shrink)

We are living in what is widely considered the sixth major extinction. Most ecologists believe that biodiversity is disappearing at an alarming rate, with up to 150 species going extinct per day according to scientists working with the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. Part of the reason the loss signified by biological extinction feels painful is that it seems irremediable. These creatures are gone, and there's nothing to be done about it. In recent years, however, the possibility (...) has been broached that, just possibly, something can be done, in at least some cases. Human ingenuity, a contributing factor in the extinction crisis, might achieve their “de‐extinction”—in at least some cases, and with sometimes significant qualifications about whether the original species had been “recreated” and whether it could resume its original place in the environment. De‐extinction is an entry point into a larger set of questions about how biotechnological tools can support, coexist with, or undermine the goals of conservation and about the very meaning of conservation. Are we beings in control of the world or beings who prosper by accommodating ourselves to webs of symbiotic interdependencies? Are we creators or creatures, or both—and if both, then how can we achieve the balance between them that might be called humility? The interplay of perfecting and accommodating is not unique to human beings—perhaps it characterizes all forms of life on Earth—but with humans, these modes of being are distinctive, and our technology greatly expands their scale and effects. It is such questions that the ten essays in this special report explore. (shrink)

De-extinction technology aims to bring extinct species back into existence, often with the goal of releasing created organisms into natural environments. In this paper, I argue that there are aesthetic reasons to avoid engaging in de-extinction and release projects, even if they pass moral permissibility criteria. The strength of these reasons depends on conclusions regarding species authenticity - a problem that arises at the intersection of de-extinction technology and the 'species problem' in the philosophy of biology. Since (...) species authenticity affects the perceived naturalness of 'natural' environments, and thus the aesthetic judgments thereof, I contend that there will be negative aesthetic consequences of de-extinction efforts that ought to be further explored before such projects move forward. (shrink)

Katz (2022) provides a range of arguments drawn from the environmental philosophy literature to criticize the conceptualisation and practice of de-extinction. The discussion is almost completely de...

Eric Katz (1992) influentially argued that ecological restoration involves the ‘big lie’ that a successful restoration re-establishes or re-creates all of what was lost through human degradation, a...

The title of Beth Shapiro’s ‘How to Clone a Mammoth’ contains an implicature: it suggests that it is indeed possible to clone a mammoth, to bring extinct species back from the dead. But in fact Shapiro both denies this is possible, and denies there would be good reason to do it even if it were possible. The de-extinct ‘mammoths’ she speaks of are merely ecological proxies for mammoths—elephants re-engineered for cold-tolerance by the addition to their genomes of a few mammoth (...) genes. Shapiro’s denial that genuine species de-extinction is possible is based on her assumption that resurrected organisms would need to be perfectly indistinguishable from the creatures that died out. In this article I use the example of an extinct New Zealand wattlebird, the huia, to argue—contra Shapiro—that there are compelling reasons to resurrect certain species if it can be done. I then argue—again, contra Shapiro—that synthetically created organisms needn’t be perfectly indistinguishable from their genetic forebears in order for species de-extinction to be successful. (shrink)

Recent advances in synthetic biology have made it possible to revive extinct species of animals, a process known as ‘de-extinction’. This paper examines two reasons for supporting de-extinction: the potential for de-extinct species to play useful roles in ecosystems; and human valuing of certain de-extinct species. I focus on the particular case of passenger pigeons to argue that the most critical challenge for de-extinction is that it entails significant suffering for sentient individual animals. I also provide reasons (...) to take existence value, or valuing the mere the fact that a species exists, into consideration in debates over de-extinction. (shrink)

The emergence of de‐extinction is a study in technological optimism. What has already been accomplished in recovering ancient genomes, recreating them, and reproducing animals with engineered genomes is amazing but also has a long ways to go to achieve “de‐extinction” as most people would understand that term. Still, with some caveats in place, creating a functional replacement for an extinct species may sometimes be doable, and given the right goals, might sometimes make sense. The International Union for Conservation (...) of Nature guidelines for de‐extinction do a reasonable job of keeping the caveats in place and clarifying the goals. In fact, given the right caveats about what de‐extinction can accomplish, we should pay a lot of attention to the technology and should think carefully about the goals. Not only has the technology been advancing, but our environmental standards have been getting looser and more flexible, providing less guidance for implementing the technology. The guiding ideals for conservation are often explained as a choice between John Muir, founder of The Sierra Club, and Gifford Pinchot, who helped create the U.S. Forest Service. Muir argued for preserving some places in the world in their natural state because of their great value and beauty. Pinchot, by contrast, was bluntly utilitarian. He argued for trying to keep some natural places more or less undamaged so that we could use them later. There has long been dissatisfaction with this choice, and in the last couple of decades, a number of prominent voices have proposed a “gardening ethic” as a new standard that combines elements of Muir and Pinchot. A gardening ethic is supposed to both celebrate the land and declare that it must now be managed. But what would good gardening mean when it comes to de‐extinction? (shrink)

A number of influential biologists are currently pursuing efforts to restore previously extinct species. But for decades, philosophers of biology have regarded “de-extinction” as conceptually incoherent. Once a species is gone, it is gone forever. We argue that a range of metaphysical, biological, and ethical grounds for opposing de-extinction are at best inconclusive and that a pragmatic stance that allows for its possibility is more appealing.

We argue that the de-extinction of the mammoth cannot be ethically grounded by duties to the extinct mammoth, to ecosystem health or to individual organisms in ecosystems missing the mammoth. However, the action can be shown to be morally permissible via the goods it will afford humans, including advances in scientific knowledge, valuable experiences of awe and pleasure, and perhaps improvements to our moral character or behaviour—if and only if suffering is minimal. Finally, we call for empirical research into (...) how the possibility of the technology affects our behaviour or our character to help the debate transcend duelling intuitions. (shrink)

This chapter surveys and critically evaluates all the main arguments both for and against de-extinction. It presents a qualified defence of the claim that conservationists should embrace de-extinction. It ends with a list of do’s and don’ts for conservationist de-extinction projects.

I will entertain and reject three arguments which putatively establish that the individuals produced through de-extinction ought to be the same species as the extinct population. Forms of these arguments have appeared previously in restoration ecology. The first is the weakest, the conceptual argument, that de-extinction will not be de-extinction if it does not re-create an extinct species. This is misguided as de-extinction technology is not unified by its aim to re-create extinct species but in its (...) use of the remnants of extinct populations as a resource. The second is the argument from authenticity; the populations produced by de-extinction technologies will be inauthentic if they are not of the extinct species and, therefore, will not be valuable. I argue authenticity is not required in conservation as the value of authenticity varies between people and cultures, and the novelty of de-extinct species will be equally desirable in many cases. The third argument is from retributive justice; we need the de-extinct population to have the same species identity as we owe a moral debt to the extinct population. I find the case for retributive justice unconvincing and argue that acting as if we have a duty to resurrect extinct species will result in a world with less species. Ultimately all the arguments that connect de-extinction technology to species identity fail, leaving us to consider a more complex calculus for the justification of de-extinction in conservation. (shrink)