Results for 'degree of belief'

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  1. Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 491--506.
    A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief: the kind arising from vagueness, and the familiar kind arising from uncertainty, which obey the laws of probability? I argue that we cannot coherently countenance two different kinds of degree of belief. Instead, I present a framework in which there (...)
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  2. Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions.James Hawthorne - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):277-320.
    I argue that Bayesians need two distinct notions of probability. We need the usual degree-of-belief notion that is central to the Bayesian account of rational decision. But Bayesians also need a separate notion of probability that represents the degree to which evidence supports hypotheses. Although degree-of-belief is well suited to the theory of rational decision, Bayesians have tried to apply it to the realm of hypothesis confirmation as well. This double duty leads to the problem (...)
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    John Venn's Opposition to Probability as Degree of Belief.Byron E. Wall - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4):550-561.
    John Venn is known as one of the clearest expounders of the interpretation of probability as the frequency of a particular outcome in a potentially unlimited series of possible events. This view he held to be incompatible with the alternate interpretation of probability as a measure of the degree of belief that would rationally be held about a certain outcome based upon the reliability of testimony and other prior information. This paper explores the reasons why Venn may have (...)
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    Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief.Edward J. R. Elliott - manuscript
    Comparativism is the view that comparative beliefs (e.g., believing p to be more likely than q) are more fundamental than partial beliefs (e.g., believing p to some degree x), with the latter explicable as theoretical constructs designed to facilitate reasoning about patterns within systems of comparative beliefs that exist under special conditions. In this paper, I fi rst outline several varieties of comparativism, including two `Ramseyan' varieties which generalise the standard `probabilistic' approaches. I then provide a general critique that (...)
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    Degrees of Belief, Expected and Actual.Rosanna Keefe - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3789-3800.
    A framework of degrees of belief, or credences, is often advocated to model our uncertainty about how things are or will turn out. It has also been employed in relation to the kind of uncertainty or indefiniteness that arises due to vagueness, such as when we consider “a is F” in a case where a is borderline F. How should we understand degrees of belief when we take into account both these phenomena? Can the right kind of theory (...)
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  6. Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle.Hartry Field - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):1–30.
  7.  33
    Conditional Degree of Belief.Jan Sprenger - unknown
    It is a commonplace in epistemology that credences should equal known chances. It is less clear, however, that conditional credences should do so, too. Following Ramsey, this paper proposes a counterfactual interpretation of conditional probability which provides a justification for this equality without relying on the Principal Principle. As a result, we obtain a refined view of Bayesian inference where both learning and supposing have a place.
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    At What Degree of Belief in a Research Hypothesis is a Trial in Humans Justified?Benjamin Djulbegovic & Iztok Hozo - 2002 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 8 (2):269-276.
  9.  28
    Decision Theory and Degree of Belief.Piers Rawling - forthcoming - Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
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    Inductive Influence: Objective Bayesianism has Been Criticised for Not Allowing Learning From Experience: It is Claimed That an Agent Must Give Degree of Belief Formula to the Next Raven Being Black, However Many Other Black Ravens Have Been Observed. I Argue That This Objection Can Be Overcome by Appealing to Objective Bayesian Nets, a Formalism for Representing Objective Bayesian Degrees of Belief. Under This Account, Previous Observations Exert an Inductive Influence on the Next Observation. I Show How This Approach Can Be Used to Capture the Johnson–Carnap Continuum of Inductive Methods, as Well as the Nix–Paris Continuum, and Show How Inductive Influence Can Be Measured. [REVIEW]Jon Williamson - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):689-708.
  11. Reasonable Degree of Belief.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - forthcoming - Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
     
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  12. Knowing Our Degrees of Belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees (...)
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    Degree of Influence on Perception of Belief and Social Setting: Its Relevance to Understanding Pendulum Motion.Dennis Lomas - 2004 - Science & Education 13 (7-8):733-742.
  14.  61
    From Degrees of Belief to Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Dietrich Franz & Christian List - manuscript
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and all-or-nothing beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the literature contains no general study of the implications of aggregation-theoretic impossibility and possibility results for belief binarization. We seek to fill this gap. This paper is (...)
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  15. Reliability for Degrees of Belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.
    We often evaluate belief-forming processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability. This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we’re considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider a natural answer to this question that focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue that this natural proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, (...)
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  16. Possibility and Permission? Intellectual Character, Inquiry, and the Ethics of Belief.Guy Axtell - 2014 - In Pihlstrom S. & Rydenfelt H. (eds.), William James on Religion. (Palgrave McMillan “Philosophers in Depth” Series.
    This chapter examines the modifications William James made to his account of the ethics of belief from his early ‘subjective method’ to his later heightened concerns with personal doxastic responsibility and with an empirically-driven comparative research program he termed a ‘science of religions’. There are clearly tensions in James’ writings on the ethics of belief both across his career and even within Varieties itself, tensions which some critics think spoil his defense of what he calls religious ‘faith ventures’ (...)
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  17.  46
    Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy—One Kind of Credence.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1027-44.
    If we think, as Ramsey did, that a degree of belief that P is a stronger or weaker tendency to act as if P, then it is clear that not only uncertainty, but also vagueness, gives rise to degrees of belief. If I like hot coffee and do not know whether the coffee is hot or cold, I will have some tendency to reach for a cup; if I like hot coffee and know that the coffee is (...)
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  18. The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
    This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and (...)
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  19. Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
    Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of (...) for a particular proposition, the higher her confidence in the truth of that proposition. For instance, Sophia’s degree of belief that it will be sunny in Vienna tomorrow might be .52, whereas her degree of belief that the train will leave on time might be .23. The precise meaning of these statements depends, of course, on the underlying theory of degrees of belief. These theories offer a formal tool to measure degrees of belief, to investigate the relations between various degrees of belief in different propositions, and to normatively evaluate degrees of belief. (shrink)
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  20. How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems.Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):341-364.
    This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is (...)
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  21. The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer. pp. 49--74.
    In a penetrating investigation of the relationship between belief and quantitative degrees of confidence (or degrees of belief) Richard Foley (1992) suggests the following thesis: ... it is epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition just in case it is epistemically rational for us to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in it, sufficiently high to make our attitude towards it one of belief. Foley goes on to suggest that rational belief may be (...)
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  22. The Nature of Doubt and a New Puzzle About Belief, Doubt, and Confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In Part 1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In Part 2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in Part 3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only (...)
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  23. What Are Degrees of Belief?Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
    Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage (...)
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    Implications of the Dutch Book: Following Ramsey’s Axioms.Wei Xiong - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):334-344.
    The Dutch Book Argument shows that an agent will lose surely in a gamble if his degrees of belief do not satisfy the laws of the probability. Yet a question arises here: What does the Dutch Book imply? This paper firstly argues that there exists a utility function following Ramsey’s axioms. And then, it explicates the properties of the utility function and degree of belief respectively. The properties show that coherence in partial beliefs for Subjective Bayesianism means (...)
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  25. Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individuation.Luca Moretti & Ken Akiba - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):73 - 95.
    Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. One might hope that probabilistic accounts of coherence such as those proposed by Lewis, Shogenji, Olsson, Fitelson, and Bovens and Hartmann will finally help solve this problem. This paper shows, however, that those accounts have a serious common problem: the problem of belief individuation. The coherence degree that each of the accounts assigns to an information set (or the verdict it (...)
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  26.  68
    The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition (...)
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  27. 'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
    Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. (...)
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  28.  61
    Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. Belief is thus central to epistemology. It comes in a qualitative form, as when Sophia believes that Vienna is the capital of Austria, and a quantitative form, as when Sophia's degree of belief that Vienna is the capital of Austria is at least twice her degree of belief that tomorrow it will be sunny in Vienna. Formal epistemology, as opposed to mainstream epistemology (Hendricks 2006), is (...)
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  29. The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief.John Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.
    John Locke proposed a straightforward relationship between qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions: belief corresponds to a sufficiently high degree of confidence. Richard Foley has further developed this Lockean thesis and applied it to an analysis of the preface and lottery paradoxes. Following Foley's lead, we exploit various versions of these paradoxes to chart a precise relationship between belief and probabilistic degrees of confidence. The resolutions of these paradoxes emphasize distinct but complementary features of coherent belief. These (...)
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  30.  2
    Nonstandard Bayesianism: How Verisimilitude and Counterfactual Degrees of Belief Solve the Interpretive Problem in Bayesian Inference.Olav B. Vassend - unknown
    Scientists and Bayesian statisticians often study hypotheses that they know to be false. This creates an interpretive problem because the Bayesian probability of a hypothesis is typically interpreted as a degree of belief that the hypothesis is true. In this paper, I present and contrast two solutions to the interpretive problem, both of which involve reinterpreting the Bayesian framework in such a way that pragmatic factors directly determine in part how probability assignments are interpreted and whether a given (...)
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    A Dialogue Model of Belief.Douglas Walton - 2010 - Argument and Computation 1 (1):23-46.
    This paper offers a new model of belief by embedding the Peircean account of belief into a formal dialogue system that uses argumentation schemes for practical reasoning and abductive reasoning. A belief is characterised as a stable proposition that is derived abductively by one agent in a dialogue from the commitment set (including commitments derived from actions and goals) of another agent. On the model (to give a rough summary), a belief is defined as a proposition (...)
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  32. BELIEF IN CAUSATION: ONE APPLICATION OF CARNAP's INDUCTIVE LOGIC.Yusuke Kaneko - 2012 - Academic Research International 3 (1).
    This paper takes two tasks. The one is elaborating on the relationship of inductive logic with decision theory to which later Carnap planned to apply his system (§§1-7); this is a surveying side of this article. The other is revealing the property of our prediction of the future, subjectivity (§§8-11); this is its philosophical aspect. They are both discussed under the name of belief in causation. Belief in causation is a kind of “degree of belief” born (...)
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  33. Consciousness and Degrees of Belief.D. H. Mellor - 1980 - In Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press.
  34.  50
    The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.
    Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis ’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While (...)
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    Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis.Lorenz Demey - 2013 - Foundations of Science 18 (4):599-610.
    This paper studies the Lockean thesis from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic. The Lockean thesis states that belief can be defined as ‘sufficiently high degree of belief’. Its main problem is that it gives rise to a notion of belief which is not closed under conjunction. This problem is typical for classical epistemic logic: it is single-agent and static. I argue that from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic, the Lockean thesis fares much better. I (...)
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  36. Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, (...)
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    Impossible Worlds and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of (...)
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    Bayesian Chance.William Harper, Sheldon J. Chow & Gemma Murray - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):447-474.
    This paper explores how the Bayesian program benefits from allowing for objective chance as well as subjective degree of belief. It applies David Lewis’s Principal Principle and David Christensen’s principle of informed preference to defend Howard Raiffa’s appeal to preferences between reference lotteries and scaling lotteries to represent degrees of belief. It goes on to outline the role of objective lotteries in an application of rationality axioms equivalent to the existence of a utility assignment to represent preferences (...)
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    Pragmatic Interpretation of Belief Systems in Hume and Peirce.Alex Espinoza - 2014 - Cinta de Moebio 50:101-110.
    In philosophical literature the issue of beliefs has been identified historically with David Hume and common sense. Beliefs are dynamic systems and its resignification is constant. Charles Sanders Pierce would interpret the fixation of beliefs, as those ones which are fixed by means of art, being this a method well-tuned with science. Truths established in beliefs are always probable and dependent on the degree of utility they have. The degree of utility is complemented with comprehension, explanations have multiple (...)
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    Belief Expansion, Contextual Fit and the Reliability of Information Sources.Stephan Hartmann & L. Bovens - 2001 - In AkmanV (ed.), Modeling and Using Context,. Springer.
    We develop a probabilistic criterion for belief expansion that is sensitive to the degree of contextual fit of the new information to our belief set as well as to the reliability of our information source. We contrast our approach with the success postulate in AGM-style belief revision and show how the idealizations in our approach can be relaxed by invoking Bayesian-Network models.
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    Calibrated Probabilities and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Barry Lam - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1079-1098.
    This paper assesses the comparative reliability of two belief-revision rules relevant to the epistemology of disagreement, the Equal Weight and Stay the Course rules. I use two measures of reliability for probabilistic belief-revision rules, calibration and Brier Scoring, to give a precise account of epistemic peerhood and epistemic reliability. On the calibration measure of reliability, epistemic peerhood is easy to come by, and employing the Equal Weight rule generally renders you less reliable than Staying the Course. On the (...)
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    Effects of Training and Instruction on Analytic and Belief-Based Reasoning Processes.Helen L. Neilens, Simon J. Handley & Stephen E. Newstead - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (1):37 – 68.
    Two studies are reported which demonstrate that analytic responding on everyday reasoning problems can be increased and bias eliminated after training on the law of large numbers. Critical thinking problems involving belief-consistent, neutral, and inconsistent conclusions were presented. Belief bias was eliminated when a written justification of argument strength was elicited. However, belief-based responding was still evident when evaluations of the arguments were elicited using rating scales. This finding demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and belief-based responding (...)
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  43.  27
    Effects of Training and Instruction on Analytic and Belief-Based Reasoning Processes.Stephen E. Newstead, Simon J. Handley & Helen L. Neilens - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (1):37-68.
    Two studies are reported which demonstrate that analytic responding on everyday reasoning problems can be increased and bias eliminated after training on the law of large numbers. Critical thinking problems involving belief-consistent, neutral, and inconsistent conclusions were presented. Belief bias was eliminated when a written justification of argument strength was elicited. However, belief-based responding was still evident when evaluations of the arguments were elicited using rating scales. This finding demonstrates a dissociation between analytic and belief-based responding (...)
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  44. Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?Dennis Whitcomb - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vits (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press.
    This article critically examines numerous attempts to build a knowledge-first ethics of belief.
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  45. Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing something whenever (...)
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  46. The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.
    The moral of Buridan's Ass is that it can sometimes be rational to perform one action rather than another even though one lacks stronger reason to do so. Yet it is also commonly believed that it cannot ever be rational to believe one proposition rather than another if one lacks stronger reason to do so. This asymmetry has been taken to indicate a deep difference between epistemic and practical rationality. According to the view articulated here, the asymmetry should instead be (...)
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    The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic (...)
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  48. Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely by (...)
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  49. The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I (...)
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  50. The Ethics of Belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The “ ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief formation, belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right to believe on the basis of sufficient evidence, (...)
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