A comparison of disjunctive theories of action and perception. The development of a theory of action that warrants the name, a disjunctive theory. On this theory, there is an exclusive disjunction: either an action or an event (in one sense). It follows that in that sense basic actions do not have events intrinsic to them.

Volitionalism is a theory of action motivated by certain shortcomings in the standard causal theory of action. However, volitionalism is vulnerable to the objection that it distorts the phenomenology of embodied agency. Arguments for volitionalism typically proceed by attempting to establish three claims: (1) that whenever an agent acts, she tries or wills to act, (2) that it is possible for volitions to occur even in the absence of bodily movement, and (3) that in cases of (...) successful bodily actions the relation between volition and bodily movement is causal. I defend an argument for the second of these claims from an objection by Thor Grünbaum, but I show that several volitionalist arguments for the third are not compelling. I then argue that the dual aspect theory of action provides a better account of the relationship between an agent’s volition and the bodily movements she makes when she acts, insofar as it has the same advantages over the standard story as volitionalism without being open to the phenomenological objection. I also defend the dual aspect theory from an objection by A.D. Smith. Finally, I show why the dual aspect theory of action is a better alternative to volitionalism than the theory of action recently put forward by Adrian Haddock. In order to avoid the phenomenological objection Haddock suggests a disjunctive account of bodily movements. While disjunctivism should be taken seriously in the philosophy of action, on the dual aspect theory it is the category of volition, rather than bodily movement, that should receive a disjunctive analysis. (shrink)

Die in diesem Band versammelten Essays erörtern die Frage nach der Möglichkeit des Verstehens menschlichen Handelns ohne den Rückbezug auf moralische Werte und Normen. Obwohl die Autoren sich dieser Frage auf ganz unterschiedliche, manchmal divergierende, Weisen nähern, verbindet sie alle die Annahme, es sei nicht wünschenswert oder sogar inkohärent, das menschliche Handeln grundsätzlich unabhängig von moralischen Werten zu betrachten. Die Herausgeber haben sich um eine für Philosophen und Gesellschaftswissenschaftler gleichermaßen attraktive Beitragssammlung bemüht. Die Verknüpfung philosophischer und soziologischer Perspektiven könnte zur (...) Klärung gegenseitiger Missverständnisse beitragen, die aufgrund eines mangelhaften Dialogs zwischen der philosophischen und soziologischen Handlungstheorie erwachsen sind. In diesem Band enthalten sind Essays von Terry Pinkard, Sebastian Rödl, Dieter Schönecker, Ana Marta González, John Levi Martin, Alejandro N. García Martínez, Sophie Djigo, Teresa Enríquez und Evgenia Mylonaki. The essays in this volume address the question of whether we can understand human action without reference to moral norms or values. Although the authors approach this question in different and sometimes even incompatible ways, they are united in thinking that it is undesirable or even incoherent to treat human agency as if it were conceptually independent of value questions. The editors have attempted to invite contributions that would be interesting to both philosophers and social theorists. The conjunction of philosophic and sociological perspectives might help to overcome some of the mutual misunderstandings that have been fostered by a lack of dialogue between the philosophic and sociological action theory. The volume includes essays by Terry Pinkard, Sebastian Rödl, Dieter Schönecker, Ana Marta González, John Levi Martin, Alejandro N. García Martínez, Sophie Djigo, Teresa Enríquez, and Evgenia Mylonaki. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the conscious experience that (...) occurs in each of these three cases. Those who hold a disjunctive theory of perception deny this. Disjunctivists typically reject the claim that the same kind of experience is common to all three cases because they hold views about the nature of veridical perception that are inconsistent with it. (shrink)

This paper suggests that art cannot be defined in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Instead, we propose that there are several sufficient conditions for something's being art, and that a successful definition will consist of a disjunction of minimally sufficient conditions. Our proposal owes much to the insights of Berys Gaut's ‘“Art” as a Cluster Concept’ but offers a much simpler logical formulation, which, in addition, is immune to the objections that have been raised to Gaut's account. (...) This paper agrees with Gaut's claim that there are borderline cases of art, and suggests that they arise from indeterminacy about the content of some of the minimally sufficient conditions. It is argued that this disjunctive account is superior to classical theories, resemblance-to-paradigm theories, and prototype theories of art. (shrink)

Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemological or both) between veridical perceptual experiences occurring when one perceives and perceptual (...) experiences involved in hallucination. Common-kind theorists have denied this. In this paper, I examine the nature of introspection – a faculty that has often been compared and contrasted to perception. I reflect on cases where introspection goes wrong in ways analogous to that in which our perceptual faculties can go wrong and formulate, what I take to be, an attractive theory of introspection. The cases that I focus on in which things go wrong are the case of zombies and the case of subjects with Anton’s syndrome. (Anton’s syndrome is a condition in which people who are blind claim that they can see.) I suggest that, just as it is possible to be a disjunctivist about perception, it is possible to be a disjunctivist about introspection. I argue that this is a good view of one type of introspection, namely, introspection of states that have phenomenal character, such as perceptual experiences. It has a good account to give of the cases in which such introspection seems to go wrong and it yields a plausible metaphysical and epistemological view of the nature of introspection. However, while I favour a disjunctive view of introspection, I do not favour a disjunctive view of perception. And, I suspect, that many disjunctivists about perception would not wish to condone my disjunctivist theory of introspection. I therefore go on to examine to what extent.. (shrink)

Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of the causal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to the case of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.

The theory of action underlying Immanuel Kant's ethical theory is the subject of this book.

'With admirable clarity, Mrs Peters sums up what determines competence in spelling and the traditional and new approaches to its teaching.' -Times Literary Supplement.

In order to characterize actions, It is not necessary to describe the characteristic way in which they are caused by an agent's wants and beliefs, As a I goldman and d davidson have supposed. It is enough to note the absence of alternative causes. Nor are all our actions intentional, As both davidson and, In a more limiting way, A c danto, Have suggested. These are the theses argued in this paper.

Causal theories of action are attempts to develop an account of actions in terms of events which have the right kind of causal ancestry. The causal ancestry must be traced back to some kind of intentional state in the agent, such intentional state must have the right kind of content, and it must cause the bodily movement in the ‘right’ way. Causal accounts differ on the nature of the intentional state, the nature of the content it must have, and (...) the specification of the ‘right’ kind of causal connection to bodily movements or other effects. Causal accounts also differ on the identification of the action itself. Some acounts say that the action is the bodily movement, provided that it was caused in the right way and had the right kind of effects. Others identify the action with the triggering intentional state, provided that it has the right kind of effects. Yet others identify the action with the composite event of the intentional state's causing the appropriate effects. Finally there are those which fail to identify the action with any of these events or combinations of them. (shrink)

This work by Pierre Bourdieu develops the anthropological theory which has formed the basis of his scientific research. It discusses the problems posed by "structuralist" philosophers in order to solve or dissolve them.

Once affirmed that a formal and finalistic theory of action is one of the four pillars of neo‐institutionalism, the author introduces the concept of Freedom of action, which is based on two points: the empirical existence of a scope for action and an information process which determine the choice between alternative actions. He then analyzes different versions of determinism and the distinction between descriptive and practical sentences, and concludes that a theory of action based (...) on the information process has to deal with the structures of teleological thought. In this sense he stresses the practical relevance of the plurality of ends, often conflicting with each other. Finally, he explains how formal teleology is used in his theory of action and how this theory provides methodological achievements for jurisprudence.*. (shrink)

Book synopsis: Contemporary Action Theory, Volume I is concerned with topics in philosophical action theory such as reasons and causes of action, intentions, freedom of will and of action, omissions and norms in legal and ethical contexts, as well as activity, passivity and competence from medical points of view. Cognitive trying, freedom of the will and agent causation are challenges in the discussion on computers in action. The Volume consists of contributions by leading (...) experts in the field written specifically for this volume. No comparable volume currently exists. (shrink)

An exchange between Christopher Tollefsen and Steven Jensen highlights the contrast between a theory of natural law that relies purely first-person account of intention and one that relies more on elements from the physical world. Tollefsen, a proponent of New Natural Law theory, argues that the fetus’s death in the Phoenix case was an unintended side effect of saving the mother’s life. Jensen criticizes NNL generally and particularly for this conclusion. He argues that facts outside the agent make (...) this procedure immoral. This essay provides a more neutral perspective on the debate by laying out each argument clearly and identifying the fundamental issues present in the discussion. A fundamental and probably irreconcilable difference involves whether certain intentions should be included in the species of an action or characterized as fairly or unfairly accepted side effects. Nevertheless, the differences between these two accounts are not as great as they initially appear. (shrink)

This paper takes a critical stance on Tallis’s separation of causation and agency. While his critique of the causal theory of action and the assumptions about causation underlying different versions of determinism, including the one based on neuroscience is right, his rejection of causation has implausible consequences. Denying the link between action and causation amounts to overlooking the role action plays in causal inference and in the origin of causal concepts. I suggest that a weaker version (...) of Tallis’ claim, compatible with causation understood as agency, would work better. (shrink)

I develop a basic theory of content within the framework of truthmaker semantics and, in the second part, consider some of the applications to subject matter, common content, logical subtraction and ground.

This chapter contains sections titled: Action Intentional vs Unintentional Action Autonomous Action Action for Reasons References Further reading.

I examine Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of action, addressing the question how his view that human actions are determined by reason accounts for the capacity of doing otherwise. Calling into question the standard view that Alexander frees agents from internal determination, I argue that (1) the capacity of doing otherwise is a consequence of determination by reason, since it enables agents to do something different from what they would have done had they followed external circumstances; and (2) this (...) capacity is compatible with causal determination by reason because as a case of potentiality for opposites, it grants agents the qualified possibility of doing otherwise insofar as their nature as human beings is concerned – a possibility which remains also when their actions are causally determined by reason and by their internal disposition. I show further that these elements of Alexander’s theory of action are ultimately based on his conception of the soul, specifically on his commitment to Aristotle’s view that the human soul is not purely rational, as the Stoics hold, but has nonrational and rational parts. (shrink)

According to the phenomenological argument for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions about perception (what Michael Martin calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects. In this paper, I try to explain why is the phenomenal argument (...) exceptionally strong argument for disjunctivism and at the same time against sense-datum and intentional theories. Furthermore, I try to show that the disjunctivist’s explanation of hallucination (which is allegedly the weak point of the theory) is as plausible as its rivals’. (shrink)

Theories based on Frankfurt’s (Am Philos Q 15(2):157–162, 1978) view of action have recently been developed to account for passive, automatic, and habitual actions. What these theories share is that they aim to distinguish between actions and mere bodily movements without appealing to psychological states as causes. Instead, agents have guidance control over their actions. In this paper I argue that the versions of the theory that have been proposed are problematic. I propose to pay attention to Frankfurt’s (...) other claim instead: that actions and mere bodily movements are inherently different. I argue that Anscombe’s approach to action does take this inherent distinction seriously, and is able to account for passive, automatic, and habitual actions. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that ‘art’, though an open concept, is not undefinable. I propose a particular kind of definition, a disjunctive definition, which comprises extant theories of art. I co-opt arguments from the philosophy of science, likening the concept ‘art’ to the concept ‘species’, to argue that we ought to be theoretical pluralists about art. That is, there are a number of legitimate, perhaps incompatible, criteria for a theory of art. In this paper, I consider three: (...) functionalist definitions, procedural definitions, and an intentional-historical definition. The motivation for this pluralism comes from an analysis of practice, because the term is of apparent value to practitioners. However, a closer analysis of the concept reveals that, while disjunctive definitions help us to understand how we use certain terms, they lack ontological import. In sum, I attempt to glean lessons from the philosophy of science about the philosophy of art. If my analysis is correct, we ought to be eliminative pluralists about art as a concept. (shrink)

The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others (...) criticize it; some draw from historical sources while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action ; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action -oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

This book deals with central topics in the theory of action: the nature of action, ability and intention, the explanation of actions, and finally autonomy and responsibility. However, it is no mere simplified summary of the field for philosophical beginners. Rather, the summary is usually fairly sophisticated and always preparation for the presentation and defense of the author's own views. As such the book can be recommended not only as an excellent introduction to action theory, (...) but also as an upper-level student's model of original analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Thomas Reid: Theory of Action Thomas Reid made important contributions to the fields of epistemology and philosophy of mind, and is often regarded as the founder of the common sense school of philosophy. However, he also offered key arguments and observations concerning human agency and morality. Reid carefully criticized the views of his contemporaries, and defended … Continue reading Reid: Theory of Action →.

In this paper, I intend to introduce what I think is a novel proposal in the metaphysics of action: one-particularism. In order to do so, I must first explain two ideas: a concept in the semantics of English that many philosophers of action take to be of great importance in action theory, causative alternation; and the idea of an intrinsic event. By attempting to understand the role that intrinsic events are meant to play in action (...) theory, I then introduce my proposal. Getting clear on what is an intrinsic event is a key, I think, to producing a viable theory of action, or, to be more precise, part of such a general theory, since it is limited to actions whose descriptions employ gerunds or perfect nominals formed from ergative verbs. I conclude by replying to two arguments that would be advanced against my proposal, both found in Alvin Goldman’s A Theory of Action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Theory of ActionLara DenisRichard McCarty. Kant’s Theory of Action. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xxiv + 250. Cloth, $74.00.This significant, stimulating contribution to Kantian practical philosophy strives to interpret Kant’s theory of action in ways that will increase readers’ understanding and appreciation of Kant’s moral theory. Its thesis is that Kant combines metaphysical freedom and psychological determinism: our actions (...) within the phenomenal world are causally determined by our prior psychological states in that world and are appearances of our free action in the noumenal world. McCarty argues for a metaphysical, “two-worlds” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves over epistemological or methodological “two-standpoints” interpretations familiar from Christine Korsgaard [End Page 533] and Henry Allison (along the way, McCarty also challenges Allison’s “Incorporation Thesis”). Some of the book’s arguments are textual, displaying perceptive readings of Kant’s lecture notes, published works, and philosophical influences. Others primarily concern the philosophical plausibility or moral tenability of various positions one might attribute to Kant. The book’s greatest strength is McCarty’s positive account of Kant’s theory of action. He presents a coherent, even elegant, two-worlds model. His interpretations of maxims, incentives, empirical character, and Gesinnung are insightful.The book’s first two chapters introduce McCarty’s understanding of maxims and incentives and begin tackling what he calls “the problem of justification and explanation.” Chapter 3 defends the claim that Kant embraced psychological determinism. Chapters 4 and 5 present McCarty’s two-worlds interpretation of the transcendental distinction, defend it from objections, and argue for its superiority over two-standpoint interpretations. Chapter 6 focuses on moral motivation, presenting respect for the moral law as an incentive capable of explaining morally justified actions, and distinguishing between morally worthy and virtuous action so as to defend Kant’s ethics from common objections. Chapter 7 similarly disentangles notions of a good will and virtue, provocatively claiming that all human agents have both a good will and virtue. The main task of chapter 7, however, is analysis of the radical evil in human nature. Chapter 8 raises questions about Kant’s conception of the highest good—particularly, the afterlife in which we are to continue our moral progress—as an object of rational hope.I read the book’s main argument as follows:1. Kant’s theory of action must solve “the problem of justification and explanation”: it must show how the reasons that justify a judgment that one ought to do something can also explain one’s doing it. Kant’s theory of action must solve this problem because if what justifies an action cannot also explain it, such justification is “irrelevant.” Only if our actions are explicable in terms of practical reasoning is justification of action by practical reasoning (e.g. by reference to hypothetical or categorical imperatives) “relevant” to our conduct. The problem of justification and explanation arises as it does within Kant’s ethics because Kant holds that pure reason is capable of issuing in action; yet he also holds that human beings and other imperfectly rational agents do not invariably act as we recognize we ought. So we cannot explain our acting as we ought (when we do) simply by appeal to “ought implies can,” internalism, or “the causality of freedom.”2. Psychological determinism, combined with a metaphysical interpretation of Kant’s transcendental distinction, allows Kant to solve the problem of justification and explanation. Through a timeless, free act in the noumenal world, we each fix our empirical character, which serves as the “causal law” for our actions in the phenomenal world. Maxims, which function as both major premises in practical syllogisms and rules of our empirical characters, provide bases for both the imperatival justifications and motivational explanations of human actions. The “logical force” of a maxim justifies action on it; the “psychological force” of the maxim—specifically, of the incentive incorporated into the maxim—explains action on it.3. Psychological determinism is compatible with and beneficial for Kant’s moral theory. Most crucially, it is compatible with the freedom necessary for moral agency and responsibility.4. Two-standpoint... (shrink)

During the past 25 years, the words “theory of action” and “agency theory” have become key-terms in a new branch of philosophy. The themes appear to gain a centrality and influence such that one is led to think that they should cover most of philosophy, including the foundation for all of the human sciences. The number of treatises on human action and on philosophical and special-scientific theories of action is staggering. For the most part inspired (...) by analytic philosophy, the new approach threatens to take over that school’s central place on the stage of international philosophical concern. Having ousted theory of science from that position with an avalanche of analytic studies, analytic philosophy, in turn, is now being overrun by philosophy of action as supposedly suitable basis for the sciences. (shrink)

A new methodology for developing theories of action has recently emerged which provides means for formally evaluating the correctness of such theories. Yet, for a theory of action to qualify as a solution to the frame problem, not only does it need to produce correct inferences, but moreover, it needs to derive these inferences from a concise representation of the domain at hand. The new methodology however offers no means for assessing conciseness. Such a formal account of (...) conciseness is developed in this paper. Combined with the existing criterion for correctness, our account of conciseness offers a framework where proposed solutions to the frame problem can be formally evaluated. (shrink)

Both mindreading and stereotyping are forms of social cognition that play a pervasive role in our everyday lives, yet too little attention has been paid to the question of how these two processes are related. This paper offers a theory of the influence of stereotyping on mental-state attribution that draws on hierarchical predictive coding accounts of action prediction. It is argued that the key to understanding the relation between stereotyping and mindreading lies in the fact that stereotypes centrally (...) involve character-trait attributions, which play a systematic role in the action–prediction hierarchy. On this view, when we apply a stereotype to an individual, we rapidly attribute to her a cluster of generic character traits on the basis of her perceived social group membership. These traits are then used to make inferences about that individual’s likely beliefs and desires, which in turn inform inferences about her behavior. (shrink)

According to a familiar objection to Davidson's causal theory of action, reasons are not causes qua reasons unless explanations of actions fit reason and action into a nomic nexus. The focus of this criticism should really be redirected to the issue of whether or not Davidson's theory provides an account of the explanatory force of explanations of actions.

Philosophical accounts of "action" standardly take an action to be a doing which _satisfies some description that is semantically related to the content of a propositional attitude of the subject's which _explains why that doing occurred. Causal theories of action require that the explanation in question must involve the causation of action-doings by propositional attitudes (typically intentions, volitions, or combinations of belief and desire). I argue that there are actions whose status, as such, cannot be acknowledged (...) by any causal theory, since no such theory can allow that they fulfill the satisfaction condition. (shrink)

In any generation there are relatively few people who make major original contributions to even a single area of philosophy. But the man whose work is the topic of this conference has made such contributions not only in a single field, but in several. This morning and afternoon we have devoted our attention to Chisholm's epistemology, the breadth and significance of which is evident. Equally deserving of our attention, however, are his contributions to the theory of action and (...) metaphysics, and we shall be turning to these topics this evening and tomorrow. As in epistemology, Chisholm's work in these areas has focused on the deepest philosophical problems. He has worked out suggested solutions to these problems with a scope, precision, and care which serve as models for others to emulate. (shrink)

This paper presents an interpretation of Kant’s understanding of the concept of an action of a subject as an instance of a causal way he has of understanding certain other concepts as well, including his concept of appearance and that of event. I will call this way of understanding a concept “a causal theory” of the object so conceived, e.g. a causal theory of an action, an appearance, or an event, because the indicated concept logically requires (...) the existence of an object as the cause of the existence of the object so conceived. The argument is that the theory I am attributing to Kant as his causal theory of action provides the basis for an interpretation of his theory of the freedom of the will that is integral to his moral philosophy. The paper thus starts with a general way of understanding his use of causal theory, continues with his understanding of the concepts of appearance, event, and action, thence to his theory of freedom, and concludes, briefly, with his theory of morality. (shrink)

Here, for the first time in English, is volume one of Jurgen Habermas's long-awaited magnum opus: The Theory of Communicative Action. This pathbreaking work is guided by three interrelated concerns: to develop a concept of communicative rationality that is no longer tied to the subjective and individualistic premises of modern social and political theory; to construct a two-level concept of society that integrates the 'lifeworld' and 'system' paradigms; and to sketch out a critical theory of modernity (...) that explains its sociopathologies in a new way. Habermas approaches these tasks through a combination of conceptual analyses, systematic reflections, and critical reconstructions of such predecessors as Marx and Weber, Durkheim and Mead, Horkheimer and Adorno, Schutz and Parsons. Reason and the Rationalization of Society develops a sociological theory of action that stresses not its means-ends or teleological aspect, but the need to coordinate action socially via communication. In the introductory chapter Habermas sets out a powerful series of arguments on such foundational issues as cultural and historical relativism, the methodology of Verstehen, the inseparabilty of interpretation from critique. In addition to clarifying the normative foundations of critical social inquiry, this sets the stage for a systematic appropriation of Weber's theory of rationalization and its Marxist reception by Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno. This is an important book for degree students of philosophy, sociology and related subjects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Living the Truth: A Theory of ActionBenjamin J. BrownLiving the Truth: A Theory of Action Klaus Demmer Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010. 179 pp. $34.95.Klaus Demmer is one of the most influential Catholic moral theologians in Europe since Vatican II. Unfortunately, he is relatively unknown in America. Living the Truth is only the second of his works to be translated into English, although other (...) translations are anticipated. In Living the Truth, Demmer provides an incredibly balanced and nuanced work of fundamental moral theology and brims with insights. Not content with easy answers or oversimplifications, Demmer seeks in this book not only to chart a way between apparent opposites but also to synthesize the best of both into a new unity.For example, Demmer returns regularly to the question of the foundation and role of moral norms. Norms are indispensable in the life of the “ethical personality,” the person who is fully alive as a human being. They serve to open a person to the truth and to freedom and help to make a space for genuinely good, free, and vibrant action. However, norms are not at the heart of Demmer’s ethics, either as a discipline or in actual life. He also speaks of the ways in which a person establishes norms for herself even as he is careful to avoid relativism or subjectivism. Acknowledging that norms derived from a natural law ethics are true and important and that Christian morality may not be able to add any propositional content to natural law, he also argues at length that Christianity does in fact significantly shape a natural law ethics into something that is both deeper and more expansive. For Demmer, the Christian context changes the basis and meaning of morality. Although frustratingly spare with examples, he brings to the fore the difference between grounding human dignity in human nature as reason can grasp it and grounding it more specifically in the image and likeness of God and the love shown in the incarnation and redemption.Demmer’s moral theology is profoundly human and existential; it is immersed in the context and texture of real human experience. In many ways, it is very pastoral. It certainly manifests a depth of psychological insight into the nature and workings of the human mind, for example, in analyzing the ways in which people fall into pride and self-deception (33–37).Living the Truth’s concern with truth and truthfulness is an important and timely theme. Once again, Demmer synthesizes distinct elements. Truthfulness is a multifaceted reality, referring both to internal and external forces. Systematically [End Page 227] grounding his ethics in a robust classical metaphysic, Demmer understands the “true,” the “good,” and “being” to be related as transcendentals (42). The “truth” opens one up to “goodness,” which in turn allows for the flourishing of the human person. Far from being restrictive, the truth opens up possibilities for true freedom. But this only occurs when it is internalized as “truthfulness,” a virtue of many dimensions that Demmer unfolds throughout the book, particularly in the last of the three main parts.Living the Truth is very dense. It definitely is not an undergraduate text. Both the meaning of individual sentences and the flow of Demmer’s thought are elusive at times. Many subsections discuss a range of ideas and seem at times to wander. Even readers with a strong background in moral theology will find it necessary to reread and think carefully in order to catch the precise meaning of specific phrases and follow the argument. Nonetheless, the rewards are well worth the effort. Every moral theologian owes it to herself to read this book. [End Page 228]Benjamin J. BrownLourdes UniversityCopyright © 2012 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behaviour, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the scepticism of many philosophers who have argued that 'free will' is impossible under 'scientific determinism'. This scepticism is best overcome, according to the author, by defending a causal theory of (...) class='Hi'>action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavourial events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature. (shrink)

Most contemporary philosophers of action accept Aristotle’s view that actions involve movements generated by an internal cause. This is reflected in the wide support enjoyed by the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), according to which actions are bodily movements caused by mental states. Some critics argue that CTA suffers from the Problem of Disappearing Agents (PDA), the complaint that CTA excludes agents because it reduces them to mere passive arenas in which certain events and processes take place. (...) Extant treatments of PDA, most notably those of Michael Bratman and David Velleman, interpret the problem as a challenge to CTA’s ability to capture the role of rational capacities like deliberation and reflection in the etiology of human action. I argue that PDA admits of another interpretation, one that arises when we appreciate that the exercise of higher rational capacities in action presupposes possession of a prior lower-level capacity for basic self-movement – the power to initiate and control one’s bodily behavior. Bolstering CTA so that it accommodates richer exercises of practical thought – as Bratman and Velleman do – will not resolve PDA unless CTA already captures this basic agential power. Adequately responding to PDA, therefore, requires answering a question unaddressed by current responses: How do bodily movements caused by sub-agential items like mental states count as movements actively performed by the whole agent? I argue that CTA can answer this question by adopting a normative account of the nature of self-moving agents. On this view, self-moving agents are teleologically constituted, meaning (1) their nature and proper function derives from their characteristic ends and aims, and (2) the nature and proper function of their parts depend on these ends and aims. Basic self-movement consists of movements caused by a sub-agential part whose own proper function is to generate behavior that constitutes or contributes to the pursuit of the agent’s overall proper function. After showing how this picture applies to artifactual and collective agents (i.e., robots and teams), I extend the account to organic agents (human beings) by sketching a broadly Aristotelian picture of the nature of living things. (shrink)