Results for 'dogmatism'

715 found
Order:
See also
  1. The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.
    According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle relies on called (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  2. Phenomenalist Dogmatist Experientialism and the Distinctiveness Problem.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1549-1566.
    Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if $S$ has a perceptual experience that $p$ , then $S$ has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that $p$ in virtue of the experience’s phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  3. The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
    Dogmatism is sometimes thought to be incompatible with Bayesian models of rational learning. I show that the best model for updating imprecise credences is compatible with dogmatism.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  4. Dogmatism Repuzzled.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):307 - 321.
    Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  5. The Perils of Dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    "Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  6. Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.
  7. The Dogmatist, Moore's Proof and Transmission Failure.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):382-389.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
    According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  9. Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):611-633.
    Suppose that you and I disagree about some non-straightforward matter of fact (say, about whether capital punishment tends to have a deterrent effect on crime). Psychologists have demonstrated the following striking phenomenon: if you and I are subsequently exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on the question, doing so tends to increase the extent of our initial disagreement. That is, in response to exactly the same evidence, each of us grows increasingly confident of his or her original (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  10. Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.
    I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   158 citations  
  11.  73
    The Struggle Against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy.Oskari Kuusela - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
    Wittgenstein on philosophical problems : from one fundamental problem to particular problems -- The Tractatus on philosophical problems -- Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophical problems -- Examples of philosophical problems as based on misunderstandings -- Tendencies and inclinations of thinking : philosophy as therapy -- Wittgenstein's notion of peace in philosophy : the contrast with the Tractatus -- Two conceptions of clarification -- The Tractatus's conception of philosophy as logical analysis -- Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractatus's notion of logical (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  12. The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   574 citations  
  13. Dogmatism, Probability, and Logical Uncertainty.David Jehle & Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 95--111.
    Many epistemologists hold that an agent can come to justifiably believe that p is true by seeing that it appears that p is true, without having any antecedent reason to believe that visual impressions are generally reliable. Certain reliabilists think this, at least if the agent’s vision is generally reliable. And it is a central tenet of dogmatism (as described by Pryor (2000) and Pryor (2004)) that this is possible. Against these positions it has been argued (e.g. by Cohen (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.
  15. Against Emotional Dogmatism.Brogaard Berit & Chudnoff Elijah - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):59-77.
    It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  16.  18
    Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nick Hughes - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):591-596.
    Volume 27, Issue 4, October 2019, Page 591-596.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation.Peter Kung - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.
    Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes' and Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  18.  45
    Metaphysical Dogmatism, Humean Scepticism, Kantian Criticism.Robert Stern - 2006 - Kantian Review 11:102-116.
    In this article, I want to argue that scepticism for Kant must be seen in ancient and not just modern terms, and that if we take this into account we will need to take a different view of Kant's response to Hume from the one that is standardly presented in the literature. This standard view has been put forward recently by Paul Guyer, and it is therefore his view that I want to look at in some detail, and to try (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  19. Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 270.
  20. Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
    Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. Dogmatism holds that, in the absence of defeaters, a seeming that P necessarily provides non-inferential justification for P. I show that dogmatism provides an intuitive explanation of four issues concerning non-inferential justification. It is particularly impressive that dogmatism can explain these issues because prominent epistemologists have argued that it can’t address at least two of them. Prominent epistemologists also object that dogmatism is absurdly permissive because (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  21.  76
    On Synchronic Dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22. Knowledge and Dogmatism.Peter Baumann - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):1-19.
    There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions of the puzzle (mainly a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23.  84
    Grounding Perceptual Dogmatism: What Are Perceptual Seemings?Harmen Ghijsen - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):196-215.
    Perceptual Dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that p, then S has immediate prima facie justification for the belief that p. Various philosophers have made the notion of a perceptual seeming more precise by distinguishing perceptual seemings from both sensations and beliefs to accommodate a) the epistemic difference between perceptual judgments of novices and experts, and, b) the problem of the speckled hen. Using somewhat different terminology, perceptual seemings are supposed to be high-level percepts instead of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.
    ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Closed-Mindedness and Dogmatism.Heather Battaly - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):261-282.
  26.  23
    Drama, Dogmatism, and the 'Equals'argument in Plato's Phaedo.David Lee - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 44:1.
  27.  1
    Drama, Dogmatism, and the ‘Equals’ Argument in Plato’s Phaedo.David C. Lee - 2013 - In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 44. Oxford University Press UK.
    Mainstream interpretations of the Phaedo take the dialogue to have a metaphysical theory at its core, primarily disagreeing on whether this theory is assumed without argument in the dialogue, or whether an attempt is made to justify it. This disagreement particularly bears on the interpretation of the ‘equals argument’ at 74a–c. The present discussion brings out a commitment shared by these different interpretations: they adopt a ‘top-down’ method, according to which the Phaedo must be understood in terms of premises and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  33
    Blasphemy, Dogmatism and Injustice: The Rough Edges of on Certainty. [REVIEW]Robert Plant - 2003 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (2):101-135.
    On Certainty remains one the mostprovocative and challenging parts ofWittgenstein's intellectual legacy.Philosophers generally read this text as anassault on the traditional sceptic/anti-scepticdebate. But some commentators identifypolitical – specifically `conservative' –sentiments at work here. Others embraceWittgenstein's (alleged) `pluralism', whilethose less enthused think the latter collapsesinto relativism. Although this mixed receptionis, I will argue, partly due to Wittgenstein'sown troubled engagement with the central themesof On Certainty, the real difficultyand value of this text lies in itsintertwining questions of epistemology,religious belief and ethical-politicaljudgement.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.
    ABSTRACTRational agents have consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  30.  39
    Searching for True Dogmatism.P. Markie - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 248.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  31. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology.Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat & Jonathan Barnes (eds.) - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
    THE PROTAGONISTS David Sedley The primary object of this historical introduction1 is to enable a reader encountering Hellenistic philosophy for the first ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32. The Dogmatism Paradox and the Problem of Misleading Evidence.Hamid Vahid - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):47-58.
  33. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Chris Tucker (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  34.  20
    Why Reid Was No Dogmatist.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4511-4525.
    According to dogmatism, a perceptual experience with p as its content is always a source of justification for the belief that p. Thomas Reid has been an extant source of inspiration for this view. I argue, however, that, though there is a superficial consonance between Reid’s position and that of the dogmatists, their views are, more fundamentally, at variance with one another. While dogmatists take their position to express a necessary epistemic truth, discernible a priori, Reid holds that if (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35.  48
    Non-Dogmatism and Ethical Paradoxes.Brenda Cohen - 1972 - Mind 81 (323):432-433.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism.Mark Walker - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):1-29.
    _ Source: _Page Count 29 Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37.  57
    Externalism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism.Mark Walker - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (1):27-57.
    A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic externalists, however, allow a residual amount of internalism in terms of a defeasibility condition. The paper argues that this internal condition is sufficient for skeptics to cast doubt on many claims to justified belief about perceptual matters about the world. Furthermore, the internal defeasibility condition also opens the door to a darker form of skepticism; skeptical dogmatism, which maintains that many of our perceptually based (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38.  10
    Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy. [REVIEW]Arthur O. Lovejoy - 1911 - Philosophical Review 20 (5):535-545.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39.  7
    Naive Empiricism and Dogmatism in Confidence Research: A Critical Examination of the Hard–Easy Effect.Peter Juslin, Anders Winman & Henrik Olsson - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (2):384-396.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  40. Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn 'Versus' Popper and Lakatos.John Worrall - 2003 - In Thomas Nickles (ed.), Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press. pp. 65.
  41.  15
    Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism.Mark Walker - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):134-167.
    Following Wittgenstein’s lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  13
    A Defense of Dogmatism.Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
    Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Dogmatism and the Epistemology of Covert Selection.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - In Nathan Ballantyne & David Dunning (eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual dogmatism is a prominent theory in epistemology concerning the relationship between perceptual experience and reasonable belief. It holds that, in the absence of counterevidence, it is reasonable to believe what your perceptual experience tells you. Thus, if you are not aware of your experience’s casual history, then it doesn’t matter. Critics object that the causal history does matter: when a perceptual experience is caused in certain ways, it is unreasonable to trust what it tells you. These objections regularly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  3
    Beyond Dogmatism: Rationality in Theology and Science.Wentzel Van Huyssteen - 1988 - Hts Theological Studies 44 (4).
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  46.  2
    Doubt and Dogmatism in Cicero’s Academica.Alexandre Skvirsky - 2019 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 27:e02705.
    The objective is to show the peculiar way in which Cicero’s philosophical thinking is original and distances itself from the main representatives of the New Academy: the Roman thinker does not practice epoche, nor does he assign any special role to it in his thought. Instead, Cicero introduces the concept of doubt to characterize his own way of thinking.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Dogmatism Without Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):195-211.
    One common way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes (or perhaps entails) Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. This paper is an attempt to articulate the latter view.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology.Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat & Jonathan Barnes - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (216):275-276.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  49. Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism.Robert Audi - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:407-442.
  50.  9
    Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. [REVIEW]Paul Sanford - 1983 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 103:191-191.
1 — 50 / 715