Results for 'doing and allowing'

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  1.  43
    Doing, Allowing, and the Problem of Evil.Daniel Lim - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (3):273-289.
    Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave (...)
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  2.  25
    Still in Hot Water: Doing, Allowing, and Rachels’ Bathtub Cases.Duncan Purves - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):129-137.
    The aim of this paper is to explain and defend a type of argument common in the doing/allowing literature called a “contrast argument.” I am concerned with defending a particular type of contrast argument that is intended to demonstrate the moral irrelevance of the doing/allowing distinction. This type of argument, referred to in this paper as an “irrelevance argument,” is exemplified by an argument offered by James Rachels (1975) that employs the Smith and Jones bathtub cases. (...)
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  3. Doing, Allowing, and Enabling Harm: An Empirical Investigation.Christian Barry, Matthew Lindauer & Gerhard Øverland - 2014 - In Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Traditionally, moral philosophers have distinguished between doing and allowing harm, and have normally proceeded as if this bipartite distinction can exhaustively characterize all cases of human conduct involving harm. By contrast, cognitive scientists and psychologists studying causal judgment have investigated the concept ‘enable’ as distinct from the concept ‘cause’ and other causal terms. Empirical work on ‘enable’ and its employment has generally not focused on cases where human agents enable harm. In this paper, we present new empirical evidence (...)
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  4. A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Xiaofei Liu - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.
    Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a (...)
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  5.  32
    Moral Fiction or Moral Fact? The Distinction Between Doing and Allowing in Medical Ethics.Thomas S. Huddle - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (5):257-262.
    Opponents of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) maintain that physician withdrawal-of-life-sustaining-treatment cannot be morally equated to voluntary active euthanasia. PAS opponents generally distinguish these two kinds of act by positing a possible moral distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, ceteris paribus. While that distinction continues to be widely accepted in the public discourse, it has been more controversial among philosophers. Some ethicist PAS advocates are so certain that the distinction is invalid that they describe PAS opponents who hold to the distinction as (...)
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  6.  20
    Doing, Allowing, and the Moral Relevance of the Past.Jason Hanna - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):677-698.
    Most deontologists claim that it is more objectionable to do harm than it is to allow harm of comparable magnitude. I argue that this view faces a largely neglected puzzle regarding the moral relevance of an agent's past behavior. Consider an agent who chooses to save five people rather than one, where the one person's life is in jeopardy because of something the agent did earlier. How are the agent's obligations affected by the fact that his now letting the one (...)
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  7.  9
    The Evil of Refraining to Save: Liu on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Jacob Blair - 2017 - Diametros 52:127-137.
    In a recent article, Xiaofei Liu seeks to defend, from the standpoint of consequentialism, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: DDA. While there are various conceptions of DDA, Liu understands it as the view that it is more difficult to justify doing harm than allowing harm. Liu argues that a typical harm doing involves the production of one more evil and one less good than a typical harm allowing. Thus, prima facie, it takes a (...)
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  8. Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation (...)
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  9.  95
    Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources.Timothy Hall - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.
    Of great importance to many non-consequentialists is a claimed moral difference between doing and allowing harm. I argue that non-consequentialism is best understood, however, as consisting in three morally distinct categories where commentators typically identify two: standard doings of harm, standard allowings of harm, and denials of resources. Furthermore, the moral distinctness of denials of resources is independent of whether denials are doings or allowings of harm, I argue. I argue by way of matched examples, as well as (...)
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  10.  6
    A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.David K. Chan - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. MIT Press. pp. 25-45.
    Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot have given versions of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing justifying a moral distinction between doing something to bring about harm, and doing nothing to prevent harm. They argue that it is justified to allow one person to die so that one can save a larger number of people, but not to kill one person to achieve the same purpose. In this chapter, I show that the examples typically used to support (...)
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  11. Doing, Allowing, and the State.Adam Omar Hosein - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (2):235-264.
    The doing/allowing distinction plays an important role in our thinking about a number of legal issues, such as the need for criminal process protections, prohibitions on torture, the permissibility of the death penalty and so on. These are areas where, at least initially, there seem to be distinctions between harms that the state inflicts and harms that it merely allows. In this paper I will argue for the importance of the doing/allowing distinction as applied to state (...)
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  12.  71
    The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing I: Analysis of the Doing/Allowing Distinction.Fiona Woollard - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (7):448-458.
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the first of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I explore some of the most prominent (...)
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  13.  12
    Doing, Allowing, and Precaution.Marion Hourdequin - 2007 - Environmental Ethics 29 (4):339-358.
    Many environmental policies seem to rest on an implicit distinction between doing and allowing. For example, it is generally thought worse to drive a speciesto extinction than to fail to save a species that is declining through no fault of our own, and worse to pollute the air with chemicals that trigger asthma attacks thanto fail to remove naturally occurring allergens such as pollen and mold. The distinction between doing and allowing seems to underlie certain versions (...)
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  14.  31
    Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement.Fiona Woollard - 2010 - Ratio 23 (2):199-216.
    Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required (...)
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  15.  51
    Consequentialism and the Doing-Allowing Distinction.Bashshar Haydar - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):96.
    This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or (...)
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  16.  1
    On the Doing-Allowing Distinction and the Problem of Evil: A Reply to Daniel Lim.Andrew Ter Ern Loke - forthcoming - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-7.
    In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.
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  17.  61
    The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing II: The Moral Relevance of the Doing/Allowing Distinction.Fiona Woollard - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (7):459-469.
    According to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant. Doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. This paper is the second of a two paper critical overview of the literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. In this paper, I consider the moral status of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. I look at objections to the (...)
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  18.  56
    If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Fiona Woollard - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341.
    I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent (...)
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  19.  86
    The Consequences of Rejecting the Moral Relevance of the DoingAllowing Distinction.Bashshar Haydar - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (2):222-227.
    The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is (...)
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  20. Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences.Fiona Woollard - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):261–277.
    The distinction between doing and allowing appears to have moral significance, but the very nature of the distinction is as yet unclear. Philippa Foot's ‘pre-existing threats’ account of the doing/allowing distinction is highly influential. According to the best version of Foot's account an agent brings about an outcome if and only if his behaviour is part of the sequence leading to that outcome. When understood in this way, Foot's account escapes objections by Warren Quinn and Jonathan (...)
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  21.  25
    State Action, State Policy, and the Doing/Allowing Distinction.Brian Berkey - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):147-149.
  22.  20
    Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles Governing Deontological Restrictions. [REVIEW]Alec Walen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (2):183 - 215.
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  23.  35
    Environmentalism, Moral Responsibility, and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Allen Thompson - 2006 - Ethics, Place and Environment 9 (3):269 – 278.
    In 'Doing and Allowing', Samuel Scheffler argues that if a person sees herself as subject to norms of individual moral responsibility, then the content of her first-order substantive norms of individual moral responsibility must attribute greater responsibility to what one does than to what one could, but fails, to prevent. This paper is about how a morally responsible agent could deny the doctrine of doing and allowing, why an environmentalist should, and what this means for environmental (...)
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  24.  18
    Doing and Allowing Harm.Fiona Woollard - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Fiona Woollard presents an original defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, according to which doing harm seems much harder to justify than merely allowing harm. She argues that the Doctrine is best understood as a principle that protects us from harmful imposition, and offers a moderate account of our obligations to offer aid to others.
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  25. Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Warren S. Quinn - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):287-312.
  26. Doing and Allowing.Samuel Scheffler - 2004 - Ethics 114 (2):215-239.
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  27.  86
    Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Kai Draper - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (3):253-280.
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  28.  98
    Fiona Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm. [REVIEW]Jacob Blair - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):673-681.
  29. Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing.Ben Bradley & Michael Stocker - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):799-808.
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  30.  78
    The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Samuel C. Rickless - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):555-575.
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  31. 2.“Doing and Allowing” and Doing and AllowingDoing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing (Pp. 799-808).William J. FitzPatrick, Gerhard Øverland, Talbot Brewer, David Enoch & Philip Stratton‐Lake - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4).
     
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  32.  45
    The First Dogma of Deontology: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Notion of a Say.Alan Strudler & David Wasserman - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (1):51 - 67.
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  33.  43
    Quinn on Doing and Allowing.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):343-352.
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  34.  17
    Doing and Allowing Harm. Fiona Woollard, 2015 Oxford, Oxford University Press 239 Pp., £40.00. [REVIEW]Fei Song - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (4).
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  35.  31
    Doing and Allowing: Dispensing with Rights and Agency.David Ryan - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):557-573.
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  36.  2
    The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Samuel C. Rickless - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):555-575.
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  37.  4
    Redirecting Threats, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the Special Wrongness of Solar Radiation Management.Patrick Taylor Smith - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):143-146.
  38. Doing and Allowing Harm. FionaWoollard, 2015 Oxford, Oxford University Press 239 Pp., £40.00. [REVIEW]Fei Song - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):278-280.
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  39. Double Effect, Doing and Allowing, and the Relaxed Nonconsequentialist.Fiona Woollard - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):142-158.
    Many philosophers display relaxed scepticism about the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Doctrine of Double Effect, suspecting, without great alarm, that one or both of these Doctrines is indefensible. This relaxed scepticism is misplaced. Anyone who aims to endorse a theory of right action with Nonconsequentialist implications should accept both the DDA and the DDE. First, even to state a Nonconsequentialist theory requires drawing a distinction between respecting and promoting values. This cannot be done without accepting (...)
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  40.  32
    Two Grades of Non-Consequentialism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):795-814.
    In this paper, I explore how to accommodate non-consequentialist constraints with a broadly value-based conception of reasons for action. It turns out that there are two grades of non-consequentialist constraints. The first grade involves attaching ethical importance to such distinctions as the doing/allowing distinction, and the distinction between intended and unintended consequences that is central to the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, at least within the value-based framework, this first grade is insufficient to explain rights, which ground weighty (...)
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  41.  27
    Starting a Flood to Stop a Fire? Some Moral Constraints on Solar Radiation Management.David R. Morrow - 2014 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (2):123-138.
    Solar radiation management (SRM), a form of climate engineering, would offset the effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations by reducing the amount of sunlight absorbed by the Earth. To encourage support for SRM research, advocates argue that SRM may someday be needed to reduce the risks from climate change. This paper examines the implications of two moral constraints?the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and the Doctrine of Double Effect?on this argument for SRM and SRM research. The Doctrine of (...)
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  42. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the (...)
     
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  43.  11
    Can Deontological Principles Be Unified? Reflections on the Mere Means Principle.Stijn Bruers - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-16.
    The mere means principle says it is impermissible to treat someone as merely a means to someone else’s ends. I specify this principle with two conditions: a victim is used as merely a means if the victim does not want the treatment by the agent and the agent wants the presence of the victim’s body. This principle is a specification of the doctrine of double effect which is compatible with moral intuitions and with a restricted kind of libertarianism. An extension (...)
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  44.  51
    Extreme Poverty and Global Responsibility.Bashshar Haydar - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (1‐2):240-253.
  45.  29
    Enabling Harm, Doing Harm, and Undoing One’s Own Behavior.Jason Hanna - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):68-90.
    Philosophers disagree about the moral status of harm-enabling, or behavior by which an agent removes an obstacle to the completion of a threatening sequence. I argue that enabling harm is equivalent to doing harm, at least when an agent withdraws a resource to which neither she nor the victim has any prior moral claim. This conclusion reinforces the common objection that deontological appeals to the doing/allowing distinction cannot easily handle cases involving the withdrawal of aid. I argue (...)
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  46. Are Trade Subsidies and Tariffs Killing the Global Poor?Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland - 2012 - Social Research (4):865-896.
    In recent years it has often been claimed that policies such as subsidies paid to domestic producers by affluent countries and tariffs on goods produced by foreign producers in poorer countries violate important moral requirements because they do severe harm to poor people, even kill them. Such claims involve an empirical aspect—such policies are on balance very bad for the global poor—and a philosophical aspect—that the causal influence of these policies can fairly be characterized as doing severe harm and (...)
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  47. On Doing Being a Stranger: The Practical Constitution of Civil Inattention.Stefan Hirschauer - 2005 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (1):41–67.
    The article takes on a less developed aspect of the sociology of the stranger: the normalized non-relations people in urban settings establish in their effort to stay strangers for one another. How is their “civil inattention”accomplished in practice? What is the social orderliness of “asocial” relations? In order to answer these questions the article uses the elevator as a sociological research instrument allowing for a highly detailed investigation in structural problems of public encounters: bodily navigation, contact avoidance, feigned preoccupation, (...)
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  48.  31
    Affirmative Action, Non-Consequentialism, and Responsibility for the Effects of Past Discrimination.Mark Van Roojen - 1997 - Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (3):281-301.
    One popular criticism of affirmative action is that it discriminates against those who would otherwise have been offered jobs without it. This objection must rely on the non- consequentialist distinction between what we do and what we merely allow to claim that doing nothing merely allows people to be harmed by the discrimination of others, while preferential programs actively harm those left out. It fails since the present effects of past discrimination result from social arrangements which result from actions (...)
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  49. Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1052-1075.
    Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations (...)
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  50. Civic Trust.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17 (4).
    It is a commonplace that there are limits to the ways we can permissibly treat people, even in the service of good ends. For example, we may not steal someone’s wallet, even if we plan to donate the contents to famine relief, or break a promise to help a colleague move, even if we encounter someone else on the way whose need is somewhat more urgent. In other words, we should observe certain constraints against mistreating people, where a constraint is (...)
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