51 found
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  1. Composition as Identity.Aaron J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press USA.
    This collection of essays is the first of its kind to focus on the relationship between composition and identity. Twelve original articles--written by internationally renowned scholars and rising stars in the field--argue for and against the controversial doctrine that composition is identity.--Provided by publisher.
  2. Many-one identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (3):193-216.
    Two things become one thing, something having parts, and something becoming something else, are cases of many things being identical with one thing. This apparent contradiction introduces others concerning transitivity of identity, discernibility of identicals, existence, and vague existence. I resolve the contradictions with a theory that identity, number, and existence are relative to standards for counting. What are many on some standard are one and the same on another. The theory gives an account of the discernibility of identicals using (...)
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  3. Identity in the loose and popular sense.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):575-582.
    This essay interprets Butler’s distinction between identity in the loose and popular sense and in the strict and philosophical sense. Suppose there are different standards for counting the same things. Then what are two distinct things counting strictly may be one and the same thing counting loosely. Within a given standard identity is one-one. But across standards it is many-one. An alternative interpretation using the parts-whole relation fails, because that relation should be understood as many-one identity. Another alternative making identity (...)
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  4. Hume's Difficulty: Time and Identity in the Treatise.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2008 - New York: Routledge.
    In this volume--the first, focused study of Hume on time and identity--Baxter focuses on Hume’s treatment of the concept of numerical identity, which is central to Hume's famous discussions of the external world and personal identity. Hume raises a long unappreciated, and still unresolved, difficulty with the concept of identity: how to represent something as "a medium betwixt unity and number." Superficial resemblance to Frege’s famous puzzle has kept the difficulty in the shadows. Hume’s way of addressing it makes sense (...)
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  5. Self‐Differing, Aspects, and Leibniz's Law.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - Noûs 52:900-920.
    I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but (...)
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  6. Instantiation as partial identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):449 – 464.
    Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie", and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular--a kind of partial identity. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and One over (...)
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  7. Identity, Discernibility, and Composition.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2014 - In A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 244-253.
    There is more than one way to say that composition is identity. Yi has distinguished the Weak Composition thesis from the Strong Composition thesis and attributed the former to David Lewis while noting that Lewis associates something like the latter with me. Weak Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is closely analogous to identity. Strong Composition is the thesis that the relation between the parts collectively and their whole is identity. Yi is (...)
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  8. Oneness, Aspects, and the Neo-Confucians.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - In Philip J. Ivanhoe, Owen Flanagan, Victoria S. Harrison, Hagop Sarkissian & Eric Schwitzgebel (eds.), The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self. New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press.
    Confucius gave counsel that is notoriously hard to follow: "What you do not wish for yourself, do not impose on others" (Huang 1997: 15.24). People tend to be concerned with themselves and to be indifferent to most others. We are distinct from others so our self-concern does not include them, or so it seems. Were we to realize this distinctness is merely apparent--that our true self includes others--Confucius's counsel would be easier to follow. Concern for our true self would extend (...)
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  9. The Discernibility of Identicals.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Research 24:37-55.
    I argue via examples that there are cases in which things that are not two distinct things qualitatively differ without contradiction. In other words, there are cases in which something differs from itself. Standard responses to such cases are to divide the thing into distinct parts, or to conceive of the thing under different descriptions, or to appeal to different times, or to deny that the property had is the property lacked. I show these responses to be unsatisfactory. I then (...)
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  10. Aspects and the Alteration of Temporal Simples.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (4):169-181.
    ABSTRACT According to David Lewis, alteration is "qualitative difference between temporal parts of something." It follows that moments, since they are simple and lack temporal parts, cannot alter from future to present to past. Here then is another way to put McTaggart's paradox about change in tense. I will appeal to my theory of Aspects to rebut the thought behind this rendition of McTaggart. On my theory, it is possible that qualitatively differing things be numerically identical. I call these differing, (...)
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  11. A Pyrrhonian Interpretation of Hume on Assent.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2016 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 380-394.
    How is it possible for David Hume to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second is a causal effect of appearances. Hume makes the (...)
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  12. Hume, Distinctions of Reason, and Differential Resemblance.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):156-182.
    Hume discusses the distinction of reason to explain how we distinguish things inseparable, and so identical, e.g., the color and figure of a white globe. He says we note the respect in which the globe is similar to a white cube and dissimilar to a black sphere, and the respect in which it is dissimilar to the first and similar to the second. Unfortunately, Hume takes these differing respects of resemblance to be identical with the white globe itself. Contradiction results, (...)
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  13. Identity through Time and the Discernibility of Identicals.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):125 - 131.
    Ordinary usage gives a way to think of identity through time: the Pittsburgh of 1946 was the same city as the Pittsburgh of today is--namely Pittsburgh. Problem: The Pittsburgh of 1946 does not exist; Pittsburgh still does. How can they have been identical? I reject the temporal parts view on which they were not but we may speak as though they were. Rather I argue that claiming their identity is not contradictory. I interpret ‘the Pittsburgh of 1946’ as ‘Pittsburgh as (...)
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  14. Identity, Continued Existence, and the External World.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 114–132.
    To the question whether Hume believed in mind-independent physical objects (or as he would put it, bodies), the answer is Yes and No. It is Yes when Hume writes “We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but ’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.” However the answer is No after inquiring into the causes of (...)
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  15. Instantiation as Partial Identity: Replies to Critics.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):291-299.
    One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to those (...)
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  16. Hume's theory of space and time in its sceptical context.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1993 - In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-146.
    Hume's Treatise arguments concerning space, time, and geometry, especially ones involving his denial of infinite divisibility; have suffered harsh criticism. I show that in the section "Of the ideas of space and time," Hume gives important characterizations of his skeptical approach, in some respects Pyrrhonian, that will be developed in the rest of the Treatise. When that approach is better understood, the force of Hume's arguments can be appreciated, and the influential criticisms of them can be seen to miss the (...)
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  17.  19
    Replies to Perry, Falkenstein, and Garrett.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):445-455.
    Replies to criticisms by John Perry, Lorne Falkenstein, and Don Garrett of my book HUME'S DIFFICULTY: TIME AND IDENTITY IN THE TREATISE, in a book symposium in PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES.
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  18. The Problem of Universals and the Asymmetry of Instantiation.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):189-202.
    Oliver's and Rodriguez-Pereyra's important interpretation of the problem of universals as one concerning truthmakers neglects something crucial: that there is a numerical identity between numerically distinct particulars. The problem of universals is rather how to resolve the apparent contradiction that the same things are both numerically distinct and numerically identical. Baxter's account of instantiation as partial identity resolves the apparent contradiction. A seeming objection to this account is that it appears to make instantiation symmetric, since partial identity is symmetric. Armstrong's (...)
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  19. Hume on Space and Time.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2016 - In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Understanding Hume’s theory of space and time requires suspending our own. When theorizing, we think of space as one huge array of locations, which external objects might or might not occupy. Time adds another dimension to this vast array. For Hume, in contrast, space is extension in general, where being extended is having parts arranged one right next to the other like the pearls on a necklace. Time is duration in general, where having duration is having parts occurring one aft (...)
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  20.  11
    Identity through time and the discernibility of identicals.Donald M. L. Baxter & Alonso Church - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):125.
    No categories
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  21. Social Complexes and Aspects.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - ProtoSociology 35:155-166.
    Is a social complex identical to many united people or is it a group entity in addition to the people? For specificity, I will assume that a social complex is a plural subject in Margaret Gilbert’s sense. By appeal to my theory of Aspects, according to which there can be qualitative difference without numerical difference, I give an answer that is a middle way between metaphysical individualism and metaphysical holism. This answer will enable answers to two additional metaphysical questions: (i) (...)
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  22. Altruism, Grief, and Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):371-383.
    The divide between oneself and others has made altruism seem irrational to some thinkers, as Sidgwick points out. I use characterizations of grief, especially by St. Augustine, to question the divide, and use a composition‐as‐identity metaphysics of parts and wholes to make literal sense of those characterizations.
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  23.  77
    Hume's Labyrinth Concerning the Idea of Personal Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1998 - Hume Studies 24 (2):203-233.
    In the Treatise Hume argues that the self is really many related perceptions, which we represent to ourselves as being one and the same thing. In the Appendix he finds this account inconsistent. Why? The problem arises from Hume's theory that representation requires resemblance. Only a many can represent a many recognized as such, and only a one can represent something as one. So for the many distinct perceptions (recognized as such) to be represented as one and the same, the (...)
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  24. Corporeal Substances and True Unities.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1995 - Studia Leibnitiana 27 (2):157.
    In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
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  25.  70
    A Defense of Hume on Identity Through Time.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1987 - Hume Studies 13 (2):323-342.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:323 A DEFENSE OF HUME ON IDENTITY THROUGH TIME A durable complaint against Hume is that he blatantly begs the question in his Treatise account of our acquisition of the idea of identity through time. Green and Grose made the accusation in 1878; one hundred years later Stroud echoed the same accusation, its force and liveliness seemingly undiminished. I suggest that this accusation is based on a tempting but (...)
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  26.  60
    Hume on Infinite Divisibility.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1988 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2):133-140.
    Hume seems to argue unconvincingly against the infinite divisibility of finite regions of space. I show that his conclusion is entailed by respectable metaphysical principles which he held. One set of principles entails that there are partless (unextended) things. Another set entails that these cannot be ordered so that an infinite number of them compose a finite interval.
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  27.  85
    Hume on Steadfast Objects and Time.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2001 - Hume Studies 27 (1):129-148.
    Hume argues that there are steadfast objects - objects not themselves successions at all, yet which co-exist with successions. Given Hume's account of moments as abstractions from temporal simples, there being steadfast objects entails there being single moments that co-exist with successions of moments. Thus time is more like a wall of variously sized bricks than like a line. I formalize the assumptions behind this surprising view, in order to make sense of it and in order to show that it (...)
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  28. Abstraction, inseparability, and identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):307-330.
    Berkeley and Hume object to Locke's account of abstraction. Abstraction is separating in the mind what cannot be separated in reality. Their objection is that if a is inseparable in reality from b, then the idea of a is inseparable from the idea of b. The former inseparability is the reason for the latter. In most interpretations, however, commentators leave the former unexplained in explaining the latter. This article assumes that Berkeley and Hume present a unified front against Locke. Hume (...)
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  29. Berkeley, perception, and identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):85-98.
    Berkeley says both that one sometimes immediately perceives the same thing by sight and touch, and that one never does. To solve the contradiction I recommend and explain a distinction Berkeley himself makes—between two uses of ‘same’. This solution unifies two seemingly inconsistent parts of Berkeley’s whole project: He argues both that what we see are bits of light and color organized into a language by which God speaks to us about tactile sensations, and yet that we directly see ordinary (...)
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  30. Corporeal Substances and True Unities: Abstract.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4 (2):9-10.
    In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
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  31. Loose identity and becoming something else.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):592–601.
    Armstrong has loose identity be an equivalence relation, yet in cases of something becoming something else, loose identity is not transitive. My alternate account has an attribution of loose identity be really two: a true attribution of an underlying relation (perhaps not transitive) and a false attribution--a Humean feigning-of strict identity. The feigning may become less appropriate as the underlying relation grows more distant. What makes it appropriate initially is that the underlying relation supports a predictable change in some collective. (...)
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  32.  32
    Hume on Virtue, Beauty, Composites, and Secondary Qualities.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):103-118.
    Hume’s account of virtue (and beauty) entails that distinct things--a quality in the contemplated and a perception in the contemplator--are the same thing--a given virtue. I show this inconsistency is consistent with his intent. A virtue is a composite of quality and perception, and for Hume a composite is distinct things--the parts--falsely supposed to be a single thing. False or unsubstantiated supposition is for Hume the basis of most of our beliefs. I end with an argument that for Hume secondary (...)
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  33. Hume on Substance: A Critique of Locke.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2015 - In Paul Lodge & Tom Stoneham (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. New York, NY, USA: pp. 45-62.
    The ancient theory of substance and accident is supposed to make sense of complex unities in a way that respects both their unity and their complexity. On Hume’s view such complex unities are only fictitiously unities. This result follows from his thoroughgoing critique of the theory of substance. I will characterize the theory Hume is critiquing as it is presented in Locke, presupposing what Bennett calls the “Leibnizian interpretation.” Locke uses the word ‘substance’ in two senses. Call substance in the (...)
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  34.  18
    Comments on Rocknak's Imagined Causes.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2019 - Hume Studies 45 (1):51-58.
    Stefanie Rocknak has written an ambitious and challenging book1 in which she argues for a new interpretation of Hume's account of how we come to believe in external objects, and what it is we believe in. I am hampered by the fact that she and I seem to agree on so little. Thus, my criticisms run the danger of simply not seeing what she is up to.A preliminary terminological point: where Rocknak uses the word "object," I will often use the (...)
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  35. Hume on Abstraction and Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2017 - In Stefano Di Bella & Tad M. Schmaltz (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 285-304.
    Hume’s critique of traditional abstraction entails a result that undercuts his account of the idea of identity. To save his account of identity, Hume would have to accept abstraction as well. What links these two discussions is (1) Hume’s widely shared assumption that traditional abstraction is separating in the mind what are inseparable in reality, (2) his principle that what are different are mentally separable, and (3) his principle that we cannot conceive of the impossible. Given these, it will turn (...)
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  36.  32
    Hume’s Empiricist Metaphysics.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2023 - Quaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 22:261-279.
    Hume’s empiricist reason for rejecting “school metaphysics” makes it natural to assume that Hume rejects all metaphysics. A.J. Ayer certainly reads Hume this way. The natural assumption is wrong, however. Hume only rejects the aprioricity of metaphysics, and not the science itself. I will argue that his empirical science of human nature supports three basic metaphysical principles. (1) The Contradiction Principle: The clearly conceivable implies no contradiction. (2) The Conceivability Principle: The clearly conceivable is possible. (3) The Conceptual Separability Principle: (...)
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  37. Temporary and Contingent Instantiation as Partial Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):763-780.
    ABSTRACT An apparent objection against my theory of instantiation as partial identity is that identity is necessary, yet instantiation is often contingent. To rebut the objection, I show how it can make sense that identity is contingent. I begin by showing how it can make sense that identity is temporary. I rely heavily on Andre Gallois’s formal theory of occasional identity, but argue that there is a gap in his explanation of how his formalisms make sense that needs to be (...)
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  38. Corporeal Substances and True Unities: Abstract.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4:9-10.
    In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
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  39. Free choice.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):12-24.
    There are two inspirations for the theory presented. One is the Kantian idea that a free choice affects a deterministic sequence of events globally rather than just locally. The second is the Leibnizian idea that God chooses for actuality the possible world he deems best. But instead of God choosing, suppose free agents collectively do. Let actuality be an office which deterministic possible worlds are voted in and not of. In this way free choice can change things even if every (...)
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  40. Précis of Hume’s difficulty: Time and identity in the TREATISE.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):407-411.
    Despite its central role in his important theories of self and external world, Hume’s account of numerical identity has been neglected or misunderstood. The account is designed as a response to a difficulty concerning identity apparently original with Hume. I argue that the problem is real, crucial, and remains unresolved today. Hume’s response to the difficulty enlists his idiosyncratic, empiricist views on time: time consists of discrete, partless moments, some of which coexist with successions of others. Time is more like (...)
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  41.  27
    Leibniz on Contingent Conceptual Truths in the Arnauld Correspondence.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2000 - Studia Leibnitiana 32 (2):191 - 214.
    Zu Arnauld und im Discours de métaphysique sagt Leibniz, daß alle Wahrheiten begrifflich (prädikativ) und manche gleichwohl kontingent sind. Ich untersuche das Problem im Hinblick auf mögliche Wesen, die ich als möglich auch betrachte und versuche nachzuweisen, daß die Position keinen Widerspruch enthält, weil Leibniz zwei Arten begrifflichen Enthaltenseins unterscheidet -logisch und kausal: Die erste ist notwendig, die zweite jedoch kontingent und nur hypothetisch notwendig, notwendig also lediglich unter der Voraussetzung des vorgegebenen freien Willens Gottes. Es gibt insofern auch zwei (...)
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  42.  71
    Hume Studies Referees 2005–2006.Kate Abramson, Donald Ainslie, Lilli Alanen, Julia Annas, Margaret Atherton, Carla Bagnoli, Donald Baxter, Martin Bell, Richard Bett & Colin Bird - 2006 - Hume Studies 32 (2):391-393.
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  43.  49
    Hume Studies Referees, 2007–2008.Donald Ainslie, Carla Bagnoli, Donald Baxter, Tom Beauchamp, Helen Beebee, Martin Bell, Deborah Boyle, John Bricke, Deborah Brown & Dorothy Coleman - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):323-324.
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    Hume Studies Referees, 2002–2003.Kate Abramson, Donald Ainslie, Donald L. M. Baxter, Tom L. Beauchamp, Martin Bell, Richard Bett, John Bricke, Philip Bricker, Justin Broackes & Stephen Buckle - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):403-404.
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  45.  52
    Hume Studies Referees, 2004–2005.Donald Ainslie, Julia Annas, Margaret Atherton, Neera Badhwar, Donald Lm Baxter, Martin Bell, Lorraine Besser-Jones, Richard Bett, Simon Blackburn & M. A. Box - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (2):385-387.
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  46.  60
    An Index of Hume Studies: 1975-1993.James Allan, Robert F. Anderson, Shane Andre, Pall S. Ardal, R. F. Atkinson, Luigi Bagolini, Annette Baier, Stephen Barker, Marcia Baron & Donald L. M. Baxter - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (2):327-364.
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  47.  98
    A Humean Temporal Logic.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 6 (Analytic Philosophy and Logic):209-216.
    Hume argues that the idea of duration is just the idea of the manner in which several things in succession are arrayed. In other words, the idea of duration is the idea of successiveness. He concludes that all and only successions have duration. Hume also argues that there is such a thing as a steadfast object—something which co-exists with many things in succession, but which is not itself a succession. Thus, it seems that Hume has committed himself to a contradiction: (...)
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  48.  48
    Continuity and Common Sense.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):93-97.
    I propose a common sense, local anti-realism for the ordinary concept of continuity. Whether or not something, e.g. a trail, is continuous ordinarily depends on people’s purposes and capabilities. This dependence entails that there is no fact of the matter whether something is continuous. Relativizing continuity to gain a fact of the matter, unacceptably fragments our ordinary concept, and makes it false that we given new information can change our minds when applying the concept.
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    Hume's puzzle about identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):187-201.
    In discussion of the "Principle of Identity" in the Treatise Hume presents a puzzle about identity - not a puzzle for semantics, like Frege's, but a puzzle for a theory of representation. In this essay I am less concerned with issues of Hume interpretation and more concerned with the puzzle itself.
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  50. 36th International Hume Society Conference. Naturalism and Hume’s Philosophy. Conference Papers.Letitia Meynell, Donald Baxter, Nathan Brett & Lívia Guimaraes (eds.) - 2009 - The Printer.
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