The paper takes up a proposal made in 1936 by Guido Calogero concerning Parmenides 8.34-41 DK. According to Calogero, these verses should be placed behind 8.52 DK. Calogero's conjecture has gone unnoticed in the bulk of the Parmenides literature. I defend this transposition, partly enlarging Calogero's arguments, and discuss the philosophical implications of moving this text to the beginning of the doxa part of Parmenides' poem.
Retomo, en este artículo, la conocida distinción platónica entre doxa y epistêmê, hecha principalmente en el Menón y la República. Pero subrayo con énfasis particular la diferencia de criterios, de un diálogo a otro. Mientras que en el primero predomina el criterio lógico de la estabilidad de epistêmê y la inestabilidad dóxa, debida respectivamente a la concatenación (desmós) y la falta de concatenación de sus elementos, el segundo enfatiza el criterio ontológico de los objetos:la misma cosa no puede ser (...) aprehendida por la ciencia y la opinión, pues la primera concierne al ser absoluto, identificado con las Formas platónicas, y la segunda a algo que es intermedio entre el ser absoluto y el no-ser absoluto. Después de objetar que Platón no logra demostrar su división tripartita de la realidad, sostengo que la diferencia de criterios aquí analizada se debe a la ausencia de la Teoría Platónica de las Formas en el Menón. Palabras clave: Platón; Doxa; Epistêmê; Distinción; CriteriosI return in this paper to the well-known Platonic distinction between doxa and episteme, drawn mainly in Meno and Republic. However, I stress now the difference in criteria from one dialogue to the other. While in the first prevails the logical criterion of stability of epistêmê and unstableness of dóxa, owing respectively to the concatenation (desmós) and the lack of concatenation of their elements, the second emphasizes the ontological criterion of objects: the same thing cannot be apprehended by science and opinion, for the former concerns to absolute being, identified with Platonic Ideas, while the latter to something which is halfway between absolute being and absolute not-being. After objecting that Plato fails to demonstrate his tripartite division of reality, I claim that the difference of criteria hereby analyzed is due to the absence of Plato’s Theory of Ideas in Meno. KeyWords: Plato; Doxa; Epistêmê; Distinction; Criteria. (shrink)
El valor epistémico que Platón concede a la «doxa» al reconocerla como cierto tipo de conocimiento es claro. Desde este punto de vista, en el presente ensayo estudio desde el símil de la luz de República, algunos aspectos de la posible relación entre la concepción platónica de la «doxa» y la concepción aristotélica de los «endoxa», partiendo del supuesto según el cual «doxa» y «endoxa» coinciden en diferenciarse de la verdad. Las preguntas clave de esta lectura son (...) las siguientes: ¿Qué tipo de relación hay entre «doxa» y «endoxa»? ¿Es posible ensayar algún tránsito desde la «doxa» platónica a los «endoxa» aristotélicos? Palabras clave: Dialéctica; Doxa; EndoxaIt is clear the epistemic value which Plato gives to «doxa», by recognizing it as a certain type of knowledge. From this standpoint, in the following essay I shall study, based on Republic’s simile of light, certain aspects of the possible relation between the Platonic conception of «doxa», and the Aristotelian conception of «endoxa». I shall start from the assumption that «doxa» and «endoxa» coincide in differentiating themselves from truth. The key questions of this reading are the following: What sort of relation exists between «doxa» and «endoxa»? Is it possible to pass over from the Platonic «doxa» to the Aristotelian «endoxa»? Keywords: Dialectics; Doxa; Endoxa. (shrink)
Aristotle contrasts episteme and doxa through the key notions of universal and necessary. These notions have played a central role in Aristotle’s characterization of scientific knowledge in the previous chapters of APo. They are not spelled out in APo I.33, but work as a sort of reminder that packs an adequate characterization of scientific knowledge and thereby gives a highly specified context for Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa. I will try to show that this context introduces a (...) contrast in terms of explanatory claims: on the one hand, episteme covers those claims which capture explanatory connections that are universal and necessary and thereby deliver scientific understanding; on the other hand, doxa covers the explanatory attempts that fail at doing so. (shrink)
This article examines Bourdieu’s adoption of Husserl’s concept of ‘doxa’ and argues that Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl overpolarizes doxa and reflexivity. The article argues that there is a need for Bourdieusian sociology to adopt a more complex interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology in order to understand the potential range of states of consciousness between doxa and reflexivity. In contrast to Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl, this article argues that the philosophical underlabouring for an adequate understanding of doxa is (...) now available within recent Husserlian studies which marks a radical development from earlier readings in the ‘sociology of consciousness’. (shrink)
Si la eliminación de la palabra y la persuasión determinan el origen de la violencia, ¿su restauración no podría abrir la posibilidad de la convivencia pacífica? La doxa, aquella forma de conocimiento que la filosofía desde sus orígenes ha desterrado al reino de lo ilusorio ¿no podría constituir el ámbito propicio del diálogo político en donde los interlocutores se abran a la comprensión del otro sin querer imponer una verdad absoluta? El objetivo de este trabajo será considerar el papel (...) de la doxa en el pensamiento de Arendt, dentro de su proyecto de reinterpretar la relación entre la filosofía y la política. (shrink)
Através da leitura que Heidegger faz de Aletheia, Arendt vincula a noção de verdade à de aparência ao custo de desmantelar a conhecida dicotomia entre o ser verdadeiro e a mera aparência, deslocando a verdade do domínio dos noumena ao dos phenomena enquanto reino da visibilidade, o domínio doxástico da ação política. Doxa como desvelamento não mais nos conduz à adequação cognitiva do self interno, mas antes à dimensão arendtiana cognitiva interpessoal de seres humanos no mundo: quem nós somos (...) no espaço público. Será mostrado que não há nenhuma contradição entre dialética e persuasão, na medida em que Arendt desloca o registro positivo da doxa em direção a suas considerações sobre a faculdade de julgar, reforçando a primazia da comunicabilidade, pluralidade e diversidade de pontos de vista na construção da doxa quando alguém constitui sua visão particular e única no mundo. Finalmente, mostrar-se-á que a amizade deve ser tomada como o tipo de insight político por excelência, enquanto praxis de ver o mundo a partir da perspectiva do outro. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Amizade espaço público. Comunicabilidade. Doxa, praxis. ABSTRACT Through Heidegger’s reading of Aletheia, Arendt links the notion of truth to appearance at the expense of dismantling the well-known dichotomy between true being and mere appearance, displacing truth from the domain of noumena to the realm of phenomena which is the realm of visibility, the doxastic domain of political action. Doxa as uncovering no longer leads to the cognitive adequation of the inner self, but rather to Arendt’s main interpersonal dimension of men into the appearing world: who we are in the public space. Thus, it will be asserted that there is by no means sheer contradiction between the dialectics and persuasion. It will also be claimed that Arendt displaces the positive account of doxa toward her considerations on the faculty of judging, reinforcing the primacy of communicability, plurality and diversity of viewpoints in building up someone’s doxa, in how one constitutes ones particular view and uniqueness, into the world. Finally, friendship is claimed to hold the political kind of insight par excellence, as the praxis of seeing the world from the other’s viewpoint. KEY WORDS – Communicability. Doxa. Friendship. Praxis. Public space. (shrink)
In this paper, I discuss the new edition of Y. Lafrance’s La théorie platonicienne de la Doxa, trying to examine the Author’s reconstruction and interpretation of Plato’s conception of δόξα in the dialogues.
This paper deals with Parmenides of Elea’s way of inquiry about reality and the opposition emerging from it. In more detail, it analyses how Parmenides’ concepts of logos and doxa present some analogies with Bergson’s thoughts about duration and Time and how these theories influenced the understanding of visual media, especially the cinematographic camera. This survey will allow us to demonstrate that some scientific theories about space that accompanied the development of the cinematographic camera progressively allowed for the birth (...) of a new understanding of this device. In the last section of this study, we will then focus on the way through which the film camera - understood as an intelligent device - passes from the sphere of doxa to the sphere of logos. (shrink)
The religious identity of Turkey’s Alevis, with the origins of their traditions, and in particular their relation to Islam, are the focus of a debate current in Turkey as well as in those western European countries with strong Turkish migrant populations. This debate began in the late 1980s, with the public coming-out of the Alevi community, when the Alevis set out on a manifest campaign to be recognized as a distinct cultural and/or religious tradition. Against the backdrop of this debate, (...) this article discusses the impact of Turkish politics of doxa on the possibilities of Alevi representation in Turkey. It gives particular attention to the implication of secularism and nationalism in the knowledge regime that subscribes heterodoxy to the Alevis – an ascription that secures their principal integratability in the Turkish nation, while at the same time preparing the ground for otherizing them from the Sunni majority perspective. (shrink)
Standard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker and Lewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties of (...) conditional belief and belief revision. For this I show that the Lewisian hierarchy of conditional logics can be reproduced within ranking semantics, provided we slightly stretch the notion of a ranking function. Given this, acceptance of a conditional can be interpreted as a conditional belief. The epistemic and the neutral conditional deviate from Lewis’ weakest system $V$, in that ID or even CN are dropped, and new axioms appear. The logic of the metaphysical conditional is completely axiomatised by $V$ to which we add the known Kripke axioms T5 for the outer modality. Related completeness results for variations of the ranking semantics are obtained as corollaries. (shrink)
Philosophical interests of Joseph Życiński in the domain of the philosophy of science were focused on the debate concerning the nature of science and philosophy of science that followed the Einstein-Planck revolution in science. The unexpected discovery of the philosophical, extra-scientific presuppositions in science, as well as of the extra-rational factors determining the way these presuppositions are accepted in science were to be explained within the meta-scientific framework. It is the aim of this paper to present ˙ Życiński’s diagnosis of (...) this post-revolutionary situation in the philosophy of science as well as his critique of the metascientific answers to this challenge. The reasons will be given why all those answers are put under two dichotomous rubrics of _internalism_ and _externalism_. It will be also explained how Życiński intends to supersede this false in his opinion opposition with a new concept of the doxatic rationality. However, the details of the metascientific proposal of Życiński will be given only in the subsequent paper. In order to perform the aim of the paper the metatheoretic tools set out by Popper will be used. (shrink)
This essay explicates the primary interpretative import of B1: 31-32 in Parmenides poem (On Nature)—lines which have radical implications for the overall argument, and which the traditional arrangement forces into an irreconcilable dilemma. I argue that the “negative” reading of lines 31-32 is preferable, even on the traditional arrangement. This negative reading denies that a third thing is to be taught to the reader by the goddess—a positive account of how the apparent world is to be “acceptably” understood. I then (...) suggest that a rearrangement of the fragments would make more sense overall, while further supporting the “negative” reading as more natural and coherent. In particular, the rearrangement dispels the objection that, “if mortal opinions were not true, why would Parmenides include such a lengthy false account of the apparent world--an account which explicitly denies the conclusions of the earlier section, Truth?”. (shrink)
Recent democratic theorists have drawn on the work of the late Pierre Bourdieu to make the case that patterned inequalities in the social capacity to engage in deliberation can undermine deliberative theory?s democratic promise. They have proposed a range of deliberative democratic responses to the problem of cultural inequality, from enabling the marginalised to adopt the communicative dispositions of the dominant, to broadening the standards that define legitimate deliberation, to strengthening deliberative counter?publics. The author interprets Bourdieu?s theory of the linguistic (...) habitus to prompt an even more radical critique of deliberative democracy than these theorists acknowledge, one to which the proposed solutions fail adequately to respond. Her argument suggests that empirical work on deliberative democracy should expand to address specifically the problems of cultural inequality that Bourdieu?s work highlights. (shrink)
This article takes a linguistic perspective of argumentation, as proposed by Marion Carel and Oswald Ducrot with the “Théorie des blocs sémantiques” (SBT: Semantic Block Theory). This theory argues that the meaning of a linguistic entity is determined by a collection of discourses that this entity calls to mind. Describing the meaning of a word, a syntagm or an utterance amounts to specifying the argumentative linkages (“enchaînements argumentatifs”) allowed by these entities. We propose a semantic and argumentative analysis of syntagms (...) mujer fácil , femme facile [easy woman] and hombre fácil , homme facile [easy man] that, in Romance languages in particular, hold different meanings: both hombre fácil/homme facile describe a man’s character or nature, whereas mujer fácil/femme facile, in their most common usage, imply a certain sexual behavior. We will compare the argumentative linkages that make up the meaning of mujer fácil/femme facile with those of other expressions that are part of the same semantic block. Also, this analysis will connect the proposed description to certain proverbial discourse about women, and it will call attention to the role that these expressions can play in a persuasive strategy. (shrink)
The title of the paper productively suggests a double-meaning of truth vis-à-vis dialogue. The claim is both that the concept of truth is essential for a comprehensive conception of dialogue, and that dialogue points toward a concept of truth beyond dogmatic infallibity or doxastic relativism. At stake is to show how truth entails an essentially dialogical moment, and dialogue, if conceived philosophically, must entail the concept of truth.In theological as well as philosophical dogmatism, a final truth is assumed. Interesting are (...) positions such as Cardinal Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI’s or Karl-Otto Apel’s “transcendental pragmatics” since they attempt to engage in dialogue yet assume an “infallible” or “ultimately grounded” foundation for their own assumptions. Radically opposed to this infallibilism is the postmodern relativistic view according to which the “groundless grounds” of human understanding make all claims to truth meaningless. Since understanding and dialogue are situated in contingent cultural contexts, as Richard Rorty argues, no ascent to truth is ever possible. The result of our analysis suggests that both positions lead to an insulation of experience from true dialogicalchallenge. Dogmatic positions miss the dialogical core of truth, as they believe that insulated truth-content remains “true” regardless of engaged and challenged reassertions. Doxastic conceptions miss the truth-relation of dialogue, as they fail to capture the seriousness and intentionality of intersubjective and intercultural dialogue.From these critical points emerges a productive concept of dialogue that entails truth as an open-ended and dynamic, and thereby indispensable, concept. Moreover, our analysis lays out that the basic dialogical notions involve truth, openness, and reciprocity in an interconnected way. Dialogue is unavoidable for truth, as much as truth is intrinsic to dialogue. But the new synthesis of truth and dialogue allows for a pluralistic understanding of truth that still, we hope, remains truthful to its content. As such, it alone can ground a non-relativistic notion of multiculturalism. (shrink)