Results for 'doxastic justification'

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  1.  16
    Response to Oliveira on Doxastic Justification and the Basing Relation.Paul Silva Jr - 2019
    The basing demand on doxastic justification is a widely held and highly intuitive dogma of contemporary epistemology. In my [2015, AJP], I argued (only) that the dialectical significance of this dogma is severely limited by our lack of independent grounds for endorsing it. Oliveira [2015, AJP] sought to defend the basing demand on doxastic justification. Here I explain why Oliveira’s attempted defense of the basing demand misses its mark. I also briefly suggest that there is an (...)
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  2. Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva Jr - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-17.
    The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e., the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one’s (...)
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  3.  56
    A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3133-3152.
    An important question in epistemology concerns how the two species of justification, propositional and doxastic justification, are related to one another. According to the received view, basing one’s belief p on the grounds that provide propositional justification to believe p is sufficient for the belief to be doxastically justified. In a recent paper, however, John Turri has suggested that we should reverse the direction of explanation. In this paper, I propose to see the debate in a (...)
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  4.  95
    Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Evidence. Routledge.
  5. On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
    I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of (...)
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  6.  82
    How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.
    Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we’re working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing (...)
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  7.  4
    Infinitism and Doxastic Justification.Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercio - 2018 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 11:139-155.
    The article discusses infinitism, the view that a belief is justified for a subject only if she possesses an infinite chain of available reasons for that belief. In its most recent and sophisticated version, the view allegedly escapes the problems that trouble its main competitors, foundationalism and coherentism, while avoiding the traditional objections which relegated it to a marginal place. The article argues that despite these improvements, sophisticated versions of infinitism face a pressing problem, viz. they are unable to appropriately (...)
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  8.  4
    Infinitism and Doxastic Justification.Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercio - 2018 - Journal of Humanities of Valparaiso 11:139-155.
    The article discusses infinitism, the view that a belief is justified for a subject only if she possesses an infinite chain of available reasons for that belief. In its most recent and sophisticated version, the view allegedly escapes the problems that trouble its main competitors, foundationalism and coherentism, while avoiding the traditional objections which relegated it to a marginal place. The article argues that despite these improvements, sophisticated versions of infinitism face a pressing problem, viz. they are unable to appropriately (...)
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  9. On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs.Paul Silva Jr - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.
    According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling (...)
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  10. Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  11. An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):209-218.
    Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the (...)
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  12.  4
    Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.
    The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe that P versus having a justified belief in P. The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e. the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one's belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. (...)
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  13.  54
    The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification.Giacomo Melis - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):367-379.
    One important distinction in the debate over the nature of epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained (...)
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  14.  81
    Is There Immediate Justification?There Is Immediate Justification - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  15.  20
    Doxastic Justification is Fundamental.Hilary Kornblinth - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):63-80.
    It is widely assumed that the notion of doxastic justification should be explained in terms of the more fundamental notion of propositional justification, a notion which itself explains evidential support relations as a priori knowable. It is argued here, following Goldman, that this is a mistake. Doxastic justification is the more fundamental notion, and once one sees this, one must recognize that evidential support relations have an ineliminable psychological dimension which undermines the claim that they (...)
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  16.  2
    An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):209-218.
    Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein's account. Section 3 raises a problem for Klein's account and suggests an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sections 5 to 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet the (...)
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  17.  24
    Experience as a Natural Kind: Reflections on Albert Casullo's A Priori Justification.A. Priori Justification - 2011 - In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the a Priori? Open Court. pp. 93.
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  18. Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):295-313.
    It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a (...)
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  19. Personal and Doxastic Justification in Epistemology.Mylan Engel - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):133-150.
  20. How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  21.  42
    Personal and Doxastic Variants of Epistemic Justification and Their Roles in the Theory of Knowledge.Mylan Engel Jr - 1988 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly and are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, and specify substantively different requirements. requires (...)
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  22.  18
    Inference as Doxastic Agency. Part I: The Basics of Justification Stit Logic.Grigory K. Olkhovikov & Heinrich Wansing - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (1):167-194.
    In this paper we consider logical inference as an activity that results in proofs and hence produces knowledge. We suggest to merge the semantical analysis of deliberatively seeing-to-it-that from stit theory and the semantics of the epistemic logic with justification from. The general idea is to understand proving that A as seeing to it that a proof of A is available. We introduce a semantics of various notions of proving as an activity and present a number of valid principles (...)
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  23.  67
    Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency.Heinrich Wansing - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):201-227.
    A prominent issue in mainstream epistemology is the controversy about doxastic obligations and doxastic voluntarism. In the present paper it is argued that this discussion can benefit from forging links with formal epistemology, namely the combined modal logic of belief, agency, and obligation. A stit-theory-based semantics for deontic doxastic logic is suggested, and it is claimed that this is helpful and illuminating in dealing with the mentioned intricate and important problems from mainstream epistemology. Moreover, it is argued (...)
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  24.  46
    Doxastic Innocence: Phenomenal Conservatism and Grounds of Justification.Robert Audi - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 181.
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  25.  66
    The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification and Doxastic Voluntarism.Kihyeon Kim - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):282 - 284.
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  26.  46
    Epistemic Infinitism and the Conditional Character of Inferential Justification.Erhan Demircioglu - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2313-2334.
    In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various (...)
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  27.  83
    Responsible Belief and Epistemic Justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.
    For decades, philosophers have displayed an interest in what it is to have an epistemically justified belief. Recently, we also find among philosophers a renewed interest in the so-called ethics of belief: what is it to believe responsibly and when is one’s belief blameworthy? This paper explores how epistemically justified belief and responsible belief are related to each other. On the so-called ‘deontological conception of epistemic justification’, they are identical: to believe epistemically responsibly is to believe epistemically justifiedly. I (...)
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  28.  68
    ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ Against Epistemic Deontologism: Beyond Doxastic Involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.
    According to epistemic deontologism, attributions of epistemic justification are deontic claims about what we ought to believe. One of the most prominent objections to this conception, due mainly to William P. Alston, is that the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ rules out deontologism because our beliefs are not under our voluntary control. In this paper, I offer a partial defense of Alston’s critique of deontologism. While Alston is right that OIC rules out epistemic deontologism, appealing to doxastic involuntarism (...)
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  29. Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.
    Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.
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  30.  60
    Knowledge with and Without Belief.Michael Veber - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.
    This article argues for the thesis that the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification should be extended to knowledge. A consequence of this thesis is that there is a type of knowledge that requires belief and a type that does not. A familiar example strikingly similar to the sort of example used to introduce the propositional/doxastic justification makes a prima facie case. Additional theoretical advantages are revealed when the distinction is applied within the context of some (...)
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  31. The Many Ways of the Basing Relation.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge.
    A subject S's belief that Q is well-grounded if and only if it is based on a reason of S that gives S propositional justification for Q. Depending on the nature of S's reason, the process whereby S bases her belief that Q on it can vary. If S's reason is non-doxastic––like an experience that Q or a testimony that Q––S will need to form the belief that Q as a spontaneous and immediate response to that reason. If (...)
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  32. Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
    I critique Matthias Steup’s account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steup’s theory of (...)
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  33.  86
    Una proposta per la caratterizzazione della credenza religiosa.Daniele Bertini - 2014 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 16.
    My paper challenges the externalist mainstream assumptions towards the understanding of religious beliefs (i.e., reliabilism by W.Alston, the warrant belief approach by A.Plantinga, the neowittgensteinian analysis of doxastic systems). According to such assumptions, religious beliefs should be evaluated rational in terms of the same doxastic standard giving justification for ordinary factual beliefs. Moving from the empiricist intuition that the kind of content of belief matters to the form of belief and the justification practices for it, I (...)
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  34. Religious Experience and Epistemic Justification: Alston on the Reliability of Mystical Perception.Christoph Jäger - 2002 - In Carlos Ulises Moulines and Karl-Georg Niebergall (ed.), Argument und Analyse. mentis. pp. 403-423.
    I discuss Alston's theory of religious experience and maintain that his argument to the effect that it is rational to suppose that the 'mystical doxastic practice' is epistemically reliable does not stand up to scrutiny. While Alston's transitions from practical to epistemic rationality don't work here, his arguments may be taken to show that, under certain conditions, it is not epistemically irresponsible to trust one's religious experiences.
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  35.  55
    Deontology and Doxastic Control.Nicholas Tebben - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2835-2847.
    Matthias Steup has developed a compatibilist account of doxastic control, according to which one’s beliefs are under one’s control if and only if they have a “good” causal history. Paradigmatically good causal histories include being caused to believe what one’s evidence indicates, whereas bad ones include those that indicate that the believer is blatantly irrational or mentally ill. I argue that if this is the only kind of control that we have over our beliefs, then our beliefs are not (...)
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  36.  20
    In Support of the Knowledge-First Conception of the Normativity of Justification.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-258.
    The knowledge-first solution to the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) goes hand in hand with a particular conception of the normativity of justification, one according to which a justified belief is one that satisfies some sort of ought or should (Williamson forthcoming). This claim is incompatible with another, well accepted, view that regards the normativity of justification. According to this established view, a justified belief is rather something that is neither obligatory, nor forbidden (see e.g. Alston 1989, 1993, (...)
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  37.  29
    Justificação, coerência e circularidade.Júlio César Burdzinski - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):65-93.
    This paper has the following structure: in the first section, I report on the historical and philosophical roots of the problems of knowledge and justification; in the second, I lay out the distinction between truth and epistemic justification; the third section is devoted to the problem of circularity, a problem often attributed to coherentism; in the fourth section, I introduce an unorthodox notion of justification, systemic justification; in the fifth, I present and criticize another unorthodox notion (...)
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  38. Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):747-768.
    The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e., ought-implies-can). The point of this paper is to argue that there are active and passive aspects of belief, which (...)
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  39. Le contrôle des croyances: une défense de la conception déontologique de la justification.Anne Meylan - 2008 - Klesis 9:129-136.
  40. Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.
    In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.
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  41. Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.
    Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is (...)
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  42.  30
    The Need for Justification.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):201-210.
    Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by “justification.” Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, the (...)
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  43. Can the Lottery Paradox Be Solved by Identifying Epistemic Justification with Epistemic Permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. I present (...)
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  44.  87
    Is Justification Easy or Impossible? Getting Acquainted with a Middle Road.Samuel Taylor - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.
    Can a belief source confer justification when we lack antecedent justification for believing that it’s reliable? A negative answer quickly leads to skepticism. A positive answer, however, seems to commit one to allowing pernicious reasoning known as “epistemic bootstrapping.” Puzzles surrounding bootstrapping arise because we illicitly assume either that justification requires doxastic awareness of a source’s epistemic credentials or that there is no requirement that a subject be aware of these credentials. We can resolve the puzzle (...)
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  45. The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 98-124.
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism provides (...)
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  46. The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to (...)
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  47. Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
    William Alston has argued that the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we (...)
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  48. How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
    Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that (...)
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  49. Why Justification Matters.Declan Smithies - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 224-244.
    This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has (...) to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. In section three, I distinguish between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argue that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. In section four, I argue that the propositional version of access internalism also explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. In section five, I conclude with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility and personhood. (shrink)
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  50. Movin' on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.
    Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against (...)
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