Results for 'doxasticism'

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  1. The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):326-345.
    Doxasticism is the thesis that intention is or involves belief in the forthcoming action (Velleman, Harman). Supporters claim that it is only by accepting that thesis that we can explain a wide array of important phenomena, including the special knowledge we have of intentional action, the roles intention plays in facilitating coordination, and the norms of rationality for intention. Others argue that the thesis is subject to counterexample (Davidson, Bratman). Yet some others contend that the thesis can be reformulated (...)
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  2.  16
    Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions.Federico Bongiorno - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but (...)
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  3.  73
    A New Defence of Doxasticism About Delusions: The Cognitive Phenomenological Defence.Peter Clutton - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):198-217.
    Clinicians and cognitive scientists typically conceive of delusions as doxastic—they view delusions as beliefs. But some philosophers have countered with anti-doxastic objections: delusions cannot be beliefs because they fail the necessary conditions of belief. A common response involves meeting these objections on their own terms by accepting necessary conditions on belief but trying to blunt their force. I take a different approach by invoking a cognitive-phenomenal view of belief and jettisoning the rational/behavioural conditions. On this view, the anti-doxastic claims can (...)
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  4.  20
    Doxasticism: Belief and the Information-Responsiveness of Mind.Robert Audi - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):542-562.
    ABSTRACTThis paper concerns a problem that has received insufficient analysis in the philosophical literature so far: the conditions under which an information-bearing state – say a perception or recollection – yields belief. The paper distinguishes between belief and a psychological property easily conflated with belief, illustrates the tendency of philosophers to overlook this distinction, and offers a positive conception of the mind's information-responsiveness that requires far less belief-formation – and far less formation of other propositional attitudes – than has been (...)
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  5. In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
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  6.  36
    Double Bookkeeping and Doxasticism About Delusion.José Eduardo Porcher - 2019 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 26 (2):111-119.
    Clinical delusions are commonly thought of and characterized as beliefs, both by psychiatrists and by the general population. That fact is encoded in the definition of delusion in the Glossary of Technical Terms of the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders :A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary.Although almost (...)
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  7. The Causal Role Argument Against Doxasticism About Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.
  8.  9
    Believing in Doxasticism.Adriano Carvalho Tupinambá Rodrigues - 2019 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 26 (2):125-127.
    One of the most critical challenges faced in science is that of categorization. Both at the inception of a new field and recurrently as it matures, its objects of interest must be classified according to their similarities, and the resulting kinds must be conceptualized in a way that mirrors the best of what is known or postulated about them—all in the hope that those kinds are either real or of practical significance. Transformations in the conceptual chart of any scientific discipline (...)
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  9. Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.
    Clinical delusions have traditionally been characterized as beliefs in psychiatry. However, philosophers have recently engaged with the empirical literature and produced a number of objections to the so-called doxastic status of delusion, stemming mainly from the mismatch between the functional role of delusions and that expected of beliefs. In response to this, an appeal to dispositionalism about the nature of belief has been proposed to vindicate the doxastic status of delusion. In this paper, I first present the objections to attributing (...)
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  10.  14
    Exorcising the Myth of the Given: The Idea of Doxasticism.Refeng Tang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-32.
    We can distinguish two senses of the Given, the nonconceptual and the non-doxastic. The idea of the nonconceptual Given is the target of Sellars’s severe attack on the Myth of the Given, which paves the way for McDowell’s conceptualism, while the idea of the non-doxastic Given is largely neglected. The main target of the present paper is the non-doxastic Given. I first reject the idea of the nonconceptual Given by debunking the false assumption that there is a systematic relation between (...)
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  11.  18
    Faith and Doubt at the Cry of Dereliction: A Defense of Doxasticism.Joshua Mugg - 2022 - Sophia 61 (2):253-265.
    Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith that p entails belief that p. This view has recently come under fire within analytic philosophy of religion. One common objection is that faith is compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. One version of this objection, recently employed by Beth Rath, is to use a particular story, in this case Jesus Christ’s cry of dereliction, to argue that someone had propositional faith while ceasing to believe. Thus, doxasticism (...)
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  12. The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons.Fabian Dorsch - 2018 - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. (...)
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  13.  92
    Delusions and Dispositional Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - unknown
    In some ways, someone suffering from the delusion that his or her spouse has been kidnapped and replaced with an imposter appears to believe that he or she eats dinner with an imposter every night. But the imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it hard to classify them as beliefs, and easier to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie want to use Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief to restore confidence in the doxastic character of delusion. While dispositionalism appears to (...)
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  14. Faith Entails Belief: Three Avenues of Defense Against the Argument From Doubt.Joshua Mugg - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Doxasticism is the view that propositional faith entails belief. A common criticism of doxasticism is that faith seems compatible with doubt in a way that belief is not. Thus, it seems possible to have faith without belief, and several non-doxasticist accounts of faith are motivated inter alia by the need to account for this type of doubt. I provide three avenues of response: (1) favored cases of faith without belief beg the question by stipulating faith-that-p-without-belief-that-p, or if the (...)
     
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  15. Markan Faith.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):31-60.
    According to many accounts of faith—where faith is thought of as something psychological, e.g., an attitude, state, or trait—one cannot have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. According to other accounts of faith, one can have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. Call the first sort of account doxasticism since it insists that faith requires belief; call the second nondoxasticism since it allows faith without belief. The New Testament may seem to favor doxasticism over nondoxasticism. For (...)
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  16. What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. (...)
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  17. Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.
    Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...)
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  18.  45
    Biased by Our Imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.
    I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I begin by endorsing a principle of parsimony when confronted with unfamiliar phenomena. I introduce implicit bias in terms congenial to what most philosophers and psychologists have said about their nature in the literature so far, before moving to a discussion of the doxastic model of implicit bias and objections to it. I then introduce unconscious imagination and argue that appeal to it (...)
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  19.  61
    Knowledge and Non-Traditional Factors: Prospects for Doxastic Accounts.Alexander Dinges - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8267-8288.
    Knowledge ascriptions depend on so-called non-traditional factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once we are reminded of possible sources of error. A number of potential explanations of this data have been proposed in the literature. They include revisionary semantic explanations based on epistemic contextualism and revisionary metaphysical explanations based on anti-intellectualism. Classical invariantists reject such revisionary proposals and hence face the challenge to provide an alternative account. The most prominent (...)
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  20.  29
    Beyond Belief : On the Nature and Rationality of Agnostic Religion.Carl-Johan Palmqvist - 2020 - Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University.
    It is standardly assumed that a religious commitment needs to be based upon religious belief, if it is to be rationally acceptable. In this thesis, that assumption is rejected. I argue for the feasibility of belief-less religion, with a focus on the approach commonly known as “non-doxasticism”. According to non-doxasticism, a religious life might be properly based on some cognitive attitude weaker than belief, like hope, acceptance or belief-less assumption. It provides a way of being religious open exclusively (...)
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  21. The Doxastic Status of Delusion and the Limits of Folk Psychology.José Eduardo Porcher - 2018 - In Inês Hipólito, Jorge Gonçalves & João G. Pereira (eds.), Schizophrenia and Common Sense: Explaining the Relation Between Madness and Social Values. New York: Springer. pp. 175–190.
    Clinical delusions are widely characterized as being pathological beliefs in both the clinical literature and in common sense. Recently, a philosophical debate has emerged between defenders of the commonsense position (doxasticists) and their opponents, who have the burden of pointing toward alternative characterizations (anti-doxasticists). In this chapter, I argue that both doxasticism and anti- doxasticism fail to characterize the functional role of delusions while at the same time being unable to play a role in the explanation of these (...)
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  22.  13
    Desiderata for Rational, Non-Doxastic Faith.Carl-Johan Palmqvist - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):499-519.
    According to an increasingly popular view known as non-doxasticism, religious faith need not include belief, but only some cognitively weaker attitude. This view comes with great promises, as it offers a way for the agnostic to partake in religion. My concern is how such a non-doxastic faith might be understood as a rational attitude. I offer three desiderata for any account of rational, non-doxastic faith. These desiderata are based on general considerations regarding epistemic rationality and on major themes from (...)
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  23.  25
    Special Issue: Approaches to Faith: Guest Editorial Preface.Rebekah L. H. Rice, Daniel McKaughan & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):1-6.
    According to many accounts of faith—where faith is thought of as something psychological, e.g., an attitude, state, or trait—one cannot have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. According to other accounts of faith, one can have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. Call the first sort of account doxasticism since it insists that faith requires belief; call the second nondoxasticism since it allows faith without belief. The New Testament may seem to favor doxasticism over nondoxasticism. For (...)
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  24.  68
    Philip Gerrans The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional Thought. [REVIEW]Lisa Bortolotti & Rachel Gunn - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axv032.
    Review of Phil Gerrans' book on delusions, The Measure of Madness.
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  25.  88
    Planning on a Prior Intention.Facundo Alonso - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3):229-265.
    Intention plays a central role in coordinating action. It does so, it is commonly thought, by allowing one to plan further actions for the future on the basis of the belief that it will be executed. Doxasticists about intention (Harman, Velleman) conclude from this that accounting for this role of intention requires accepting the thesis that intention involves belief. Conativists (Bratman, Brunero, Mele) reject that conclusion. I argue that Doxasticists are right in calling attention to the existence of a cognitive (...)
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  26. Double Bookkeeping in Delusions: Explaining the Gap Between Saying and Doing.Lisa Bortolotti - 2010 - In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 237--256.
    In this chapter I defend the doxastic account of delusions and offer some reasons to believe that the double-bookkeeping argument against doxasticism (delusions are not beliefs because they do not drive action) should be resisted.
     
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  27.  28
    Folk and Philosophical Epistemologies: A Double Bookkeeping of Sorts by Delusion’s Theoreticians?Clarissa de Rosalmeida Dantas - 2019 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 26 (2):121-123.
    Delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, both by psychiatrists and by lay people. In “Double Bookkeeping and Doxasticism about Delusion,” Porcher formulates and assesses two kinds of arguments against doxasticism about delusions, the theoretical stance according to which delusions are a kind of belief. Those arguments, which Porcher calls “the argument from action guidance and the argument from phenomenology” are motivated by a phenomenon sometimes associated with delusions: double bookkeeping, a kind of ambivalence of (...)
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  28.  44
    A Faith for the Future.Carl-Johan Palmqvist - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):95-122.
    . In the philosophy of J. L. Schellenberg, “evolutionary religion” is a religious stance oriented towards the deep future. According to Schellenberg, the best form of evolutionary religion is non-doxastic faith in ultimism. I reject Schellenberg’s arguments for preferring ultimism and suggest that committing non-doxastically to traditional religion makes more sense from an evolutionary perspective. I argue that the alignment argument for traditional religion remains sound even when the deep future is considered. Furthermore, I assess Schellenberg’s claim that humanity is (...)
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