This chapter uses Uskali Mäki’s (2009) concepts of “good” and “bad” imperialism to investigate the “economics imperialism” thesis. If science expands by offering (a) consilience, and (b) epistemological and ontological unity – that is, it explains more phenomena with greater parsimony – then this is good scientific expansion. Economics imperialism is only bad if the methodology of economics expands outside its domain without increasing understanding in the above manners.

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and (...) a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism is reviewed. Game theory is shown at work in discussions about epistemological dependence, liberalism and efficiency, Hume’s concept of convention, morality and rationality, and distributive justice and egalitarianism. A guide to the literature provides hints at applications in collective intentionality, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders whether rational choice and game theory represent cases of economics imperialism. It follows the work of Uskali Maki who analyzes the significance and characteristics of disciplinary imperialism in natural science and social science. "Economics Imperialism" is a term often used to describe the increasing impact and reach of economics with respect to its encroachment on other disciplines including political science and psychology. Maki provides a framework for assessing whether the influence of (...) one discipline on another could be a case of "good imperialism" consistent with unification and greater explanatory power. The paper examines whether in the case of economics, "rational choice imperialism" is a better understanding of the question of contention. Rational choice has been used to model addiction, sex, marriage, sleep, and suicide. Applying tools offered by Maki, this paper argues that although the imperialism of rational choice over multiple disciplines provides a unified means of modeling human action, it does not demonstrably achieve deeper understanding of either individual or collective action. Furthermore, rational choice modeling may alter the human practices it analyzes if it is used in public policy. Thus although rational choice offers a means to check for deductive consistency within and among its models, it has elements suggestive of the "bad disciplinary imperialism" that Uskali provides a means to critique. (shrink)

Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is (...) an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. I prove new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and explore in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. I argue that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, I argue, has been rather successful in achieving this aim. "The 'epistemic' approach to game theory has emerged over the past twenty-five years. What is this approach? How does it differ from the conventional equilibrium-based approach to game theory? What have been its strengths and weaknesses to date? To find out, read this comprehensive and excellently written account". Adam Brandenburger, J. P. Valles Professor of Business Economics and Strategy, Stern School of Business, New York University "Reading Boudewijn de Bruin's book should be rewarding both for game theorists interested in the conceptual foundations of their discipline and for philosophers who want to learn more about formal analysis of strategic interaction. It provides an in-depth logical study of the currently dominant epistemic approaches to non-cooperative games, with an eye both to the attractions and to the serious challenges facing the Epistemic Programme". Wlodek Rabinowicz, Professor of Practical Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Lund University . (shrink)

The most common argument against the use of rational choice models outside economics is that they make unrealistic assumptions about individual behavior. We argue that whether the falsity of assumptions matters in a given model depends on which factors are explanatorily relevant. Since the explanatory factors may vary from application to application, effective criticism of economic model building should be based on model-specific arguments showing how the result really depends on the false assumptions. However, some modeling results in (...) imperialistic applications are relatively robust with respect to unrealistic assumptions. Key Words: unrealistic assumptions • economics imperialism • rational choice • as if • robustness. (shrink)

This paper attempts to construct a short epistemology of economic models by using as a benchmark a comparison between the methodological issues of contemporary physics and of economics. In particular, the paper focuses on the role of indeterminacy in either sciences. Herein the general claim is that the models of economics fail at dealing with uncertainty as effectively as the models of natural sciences because economists did not manage to overcome the identification problem that is peculiar to (...) class='Hi'>economics. In this respect, the paper shows that the models of economics assume an untenable determinism that derives from the notion of rationality of agents. The paper is divided in three sections: the first section deals with the issues related to assumptions in the models of physics and economics; the second section deals with the problem of uncertainty in quantum mechanics and in economics; the third section deals with the problem of causality in both sciences. Eventually, the paper concludes that several methodological problems affect the efficiency of economic models. Most importantly, the paper finds that economic models abstract too much from the reality and, thus, do not provide deep investigations of agents’ discrete choices. This is shown to affect the consistency of models and their explanatory power. Keywords: economics; philosophy of science, epistemology, rationality, uncertainty,. (shrink)

The descriptive viewpoint in rational choice has generated an important Standard Rational Choice Theory revision. This viewpoint has meant the introduction of relevant psychological considerations that Rational Choice Theory tied to the neoclassical economics is unable to heed In this paper I suggest a way to expand the descriptive viewpoint by theorizing how some factors, coming from the social and cultural environment, operate within rational choice. That troublesome issue concerning the overall validity of (...) economic laws is also a question here; specifically, if these descriptive proposals expand the explanation of the disturbing causes of economic laws, or if they actually call into question their fundamental principles, encouraging consideration of some economic issues in a quite new, different manner. (shrink)

The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive (...) game theory gives bad advice in some cases, is reducible to rational choice theory in other cases, while it makes no sense in yet other cases. (shrink)

The dissertation involves an examination of recent work in Social Epistemology. In particular, I am concerned with the question of how one's social position could affect judgments regarding evidence and confirmation. To answer this question I undertake an investigation of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. Feminist epistemologists have raised criticisms of the traditional analysis of knowledge by arguing against the primacy of the individual and for a more thorough-going analysis of the community in accounts of knowledge. This shift, (...) in my view, is an important contribution toward a more complete theory of knowledge. Yet feminist epistemology is a controversial contributor to the area of social epistemology generally construed. Thus, in the first chapter I offer a defense of the contributions of feminist epistemology to analytic philosophy, against its various critics. ;In Chapters Two and Three I examine feminists' reliance on Naturalistic models of theory-choice such as Quinean Holism or the later Wittgenstein's Social Constructivism. I argue that the reliance on these models is a tactical mistake for feminists since these models are based on problematic accounts of meaning and truth. Alternatively, I advocate the adoption of a realist meaning theory along the lines proposed by Katz, as well as a rationalized epistemology in the service of explaining deductive and inductive inference. My argument involves showing how realism and rationalism entail the kind of strong program of justification and rational censure which is required if feminists want to successfully condemn existing biased practices. ;Consequently, I propose a reformulation of the distinction between a context of discovery and context of justification. My reformulation differs from the past positivist distinction in that "discovery" rather than being wholly random and subjective, is instead reflective of patterns of social experience. "Justification" is conceived of as more sensitive to the epistemic privilege of varying social standpoints. However, a separation is still maintained between how one comes to arrive at a belief and the methods for justifying that belief. My conclusion is that a partnership between rationalized epistemology and feminist theory can provide rich possibilities for both disciplines. (shrink)

The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme. The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains (...) this in terms of unjustified degrees of mathematisation in Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme. While this programme’s mathematical models were often inspired by purely mathematical concerns rather than the economic phenomena they were intended to model, the Epistemic Programme’s models were developed with a keen eye to the role beliefs and desires play in strategic interaction between rational economic agents playing games; that is, their interactive epistemology. The Epistemic Programme succeeded in developing mathematical models formalising aspects of strategic interaction that remained implicit in the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme owing to an unjustified degree of mathematisation. As a result, the Epistemic Programme is the more successful theory.Keywords: Epistemic Programme; Game theory; Interactive epistemology; Mathematisation; Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

The philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that examines the profound philosophical questions that arise from scientific research and theories. A sub-discipline of philosophy that emerged in the twentieth century, the philosophy of science is largely a product of the British and Austrian schools of thought and traditions. The first in-depth reference in the field that combines scientific knowledge with philosophical inquiry, The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia is a two-volume set that brings (...) together an international team of leading scholars to provide over 130 entries on the essential concepts in the philosophy of science. The areas covered include biology, chemistry, epistemology and metaphysics, physics, psychology and mind, the social sciences, and key figures in the combined studies of science and philosophy. Essays range in length from 3,000 to 7,500 words and represent the most up-to-date philosophical thinking on timeless scientific topics such as determinism, explanation, laws of nature, perception, individuality, time, and economics as well as timely topics like adaptation, conservation biology, quantum logic, consciousness, evolutionary psychology, and game theory. Offering thorough explorations and destined to become the most authoritative presentation of the field available, this Encyclopedia is a unique and groundbreaking guide to this fascinating field. (shrink)

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group (...) identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality. (shrink)

Political science and economic science . . . make use of the same language, the same mode of abstraction, the same instruments of thought and the same method of reasoning. (Black 1998, 354) Proponents as well as opponents of economics imperialism agree that imperialism is a matter of unification; providing a unified framework for social scientific analysis. Uskali Mäki distinguishes between derivational and ontological unification and argues that the latter should serve as a constraint for the former. We explore (...) whether, in the case of rational-choice political science, self-interested behavior can be seen as a common causal element and solution concepts as the common derivational element, and whether the former constraints the use of the latter. We find that this is not the case. Instead, what is common to economics and rational-choice political science is a set of research heuristics and a focus on institutions with similar structures and forms of organization. (shrink)

An epistemological analysis of the decision, this book includes a critical analysis through the continuous reference to an interdisciplinary approach including a synthesis of philosophical approaches, biology and neuroscience.

This paper attempts to construct a short epistemology of economic models by using as a benchmark a comparison between the methodological issues of contemporary physics and of economics. In particular, the paper focuses on the role of indeterminacy in either sciences. Herein the general claim is that the models of economics fail at dealing with uncertainty as effectively as the models of natural sciences because economists did not manage to overcome the identification problem that is peculiar to (...) class='Hi'>economics. In this respect, the paper shows that the models of economics assume an untenable determinism that derives from the notion of rationality of agents. The paper is divided in three sections: the first section deals with the issues related to assumptions in the models of physics and economics; the second section deals with the problem of uncertainty in quantum mechanics and in economics; the third section deals with the problem of causality in both sciences. Eventually, the paper concludes that several methodological problems affect the efficiency of economic models. Most importantly, the paper finds that economic models abstract too much from the reality and, thus, do not provide deep investigations of agents’ discrete choices. This is shown to affect the consistency of models and their explanatory power. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Economics and Philosophy of Economics Six Central Methodological Problems Inexactness, Ceteris Paribus Clauses, and “Unrealistic Assumptions” Contemporary Directions in Economic Methodology Conclusion References.

In this paper, I review the literature on rational choice theory to scrutinize a number of criticisms that philosophers have voiced against its usefulness in economics. The paper has three goals: first, I argue that the debates about RCT have been characterized by disunity and confusion about the object under scrutiny, which calls into question the effectiveness of those criticisms. Second, I argue that RCT is not a single and unified choice theory—let alone an empirical (...) class='Hi'>theory of human behavior—as some critics seem to suppose. Rather, there are several variants of RCT used in economics. Third, I propose that we think of RCT as a set of distinct research strategies to appreciate its diversity. This account implies that the effectiveness of any criticism depends on the variant of RCT we are considering. (shrink)

What structure of scientific communication and cooperation, between what kinds of investigators, is best positioned to lead us to the truth? Against an outline of standard philosophical characteristics and a recent turn to social epistemology, this paper surveys highlights within two strands of computational philosophy of science that attempt to work toward an answer to this question. Both strands emerge from abstract rational choice theory and the analytic tradition in philosophy of science rather than postmodern sociology (...) of science. The first strand of computational research models the effect of communicative networks within groups, with conclusions regarding the potential benefit of limited communication. The second strand models the potential benefits of cognitive diversity within groups. Examples from each strand of research are used in analyzing what makes modeling of this sort both promising and distinctly philosophical, but are also used to emphasize possibilities for failure and inherent limitations as well. (shrink)

This article analyzes the problem of preference imputation in rational choice political science. I argue against the well-established practice in political science of assuming selfish preferences for purely methodological reasons, regardless of its empirical plausibility (this I call a preference for selfish preferences). Real motivations are overlooked due to difficulties of imputing preferences to agents in a non-arbitrary way in the political realm. I compare the problem of preference imputation in economic and political markets, and I show the harmful (...) consequences of the preference for selfish preferences in the field of collective action. Key Words: rational choice theory • preference • functionalism • collective action. (shrink)

The article investigates what happens when philosophy meets and begins to establish connections with two formal research methods such as game theory and network science. We use citation analysis to identify, among the articles published in Synthese and Philosophy of Science between 1985 and 2021, those that cite the specialistic literature in game theory and network science. Then, we investigate the structure of the two corpora thus identified by bibliographic coupling and divide them into (...) clusters of related papers by automatic community detection. Lastly, we construct by the same bibliometric techniques a reference map of philosophy, on which we overlay our corpora to map the diffusion of game theory and network science in the various sub-areas of recent philosophy. Three main results derive from this study. Philosophers are interested not only in using and investigating game theory as a formal method belonging to applied mathematics and sharing many relevant features with social choice theory, but also in considering its applications in more empirically oriented disciplines such as social psychology, cognitive science, or biology. Philosophers focus on networks in two research contexts and in two different ways: in the debate on causality and scientific explanation, they consider the results of network science; in social epistemology, they employ network science as a formal tool. In the reference map, logic—whose use in philosophy dates back to a much earlier period—is distributed in a more uniform way than recently encountered disciplines such as game theory and network science. We conclude by discussing some methodological limitations of our bibliometric approach, especially with reference to the problem of field delineation. (shrink)

The first in-depth reference in the field that combines scientific knowledge with philosophical inquiry, _The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia_ is a two-volume set that brings together an international team of leading scholars to provide over 130 entries on the essential concepts in the philosophy of science. _The areas covered include:_ biology chemistry epistemology and metaphysics physics psychology and mind the social sciences key figures in the combined studies of science and philosophy. The essays represent the most (...) up-to-date philosophical thinking on timeless scientific topics such as: determinism, explanation, laws of nature, perception, individuality, time, and economics as well as timely topics like adaptation, conservation biology, quantum logic, consciousness, evolutionary psychology, and game theory. (shrink)

This paper draws a connection between recentdevelopments in naturalized philosophyof science and the Buchanan research programin economics. Economic approaches innaturalized philosophy of science canbe combined to form an economic philosophy ofscience. After giving an overview of someof these approaches, I lay out the fundamentalsof the Buchanan research program. I arguethat its main elements are a theory of interactionsand a normative foundation in consensus whichhelp to answer some important criticismsof economic philosophy of science.

This article is another unapologetic contribution to ‘the gentle art of rational choice bashing’. The debate over rational choice theory (RCT) may appear to have tired out; yet RCT is as dominant in political sciences as ever. The reason is that critics typically take aim at the symptoms of RCT’s failings, rather than their root cause: RCT’s very ambition of being the ‘science of choice’. In this article I argue that RCT fails twice, first as a science (...) of choice and then as a science of choice. Both failures suggest that political sciences need an epistemologic (re)conversion away from the Platonic ideal of a deductive and universal science of choice toward a more inductive and pluralist paradigm. While advocates of RCT rightly insist that ‘you can’t beat something with nothing’, I take their advice, with a grain of salt: in order for alternatives to appear, the frame of references needs to be modified. I draw a few perspectives for the political sciences. (shrink)

Rational addiction theories illustrate how absurd choice theories in economics get taken seriously as possibly true explanations and tools for welfare analysis despite being poorly interpreted, empirically unfalsifiable, and based on wildly inaccurate assumptions selectively justified by ad-hoc stories. The lack of transparency introduced by poorly anchored mathematical models, the psychological persuasiveness of stories, and the way the profession neglects relevant issues are suggested as explanations for how what we perhaps should see as displays of technical skill and (...) ingenuity are allowed to blur the lines between science and games. (shrink)

When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the (...) work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory. (shrink)

Some current attempts to go beyond the narrow scope of rational choice theory (RCT) in the social sciences and the artificial reconstructions it sometimes provides focus on the arguments that people give to justify their beliefs and behaviors themselves. But the available argumentation theories are not constructed to fill this gap. This article argues that relevance theory, on the contrary, suggests interesting tracks. This provocative idea requires a rereading of Sperber and Wilson's theory. Actually, the authors (...) do not explicitly support RCT, and Sperber has even strongly criticized methodological individualism, which most of the time underlies RCT, in favor of infra-individualism. A key point of the argument presented here is to show that Sperber and Wilson do not firmly distinguish between infra-individualism and subintentionality. Only subintentionality is needed. Key Words: argumentation • rational choice • relevance theory • methodological individualism. (shrink)

The presence of intelligence and rationality in Artificial Intelligence and the Internet requires a new context of analysis in which Herbert Simon’s approach to the sciences of the artificial is surpassed in order to grasp the role of information in our contemporary setting. This new framework requires taking into account some relevant aspects. In the historical endeavor of building up AI and the Internet, minds and machines have interacted over the years and in many ways through the interrelation between scientific (...) creativity and technological innovation. Philosophically, minds and machines can have epistemological, methodological and ontological differences, which are based on the distinct configuration of human intelligence and artificial intelligence. Their comparison with rationality and its various forms is particularly relevant. Scientifically, AI and the Internet belong to the sciences of the artificial, because they work on designs that search for specific aims, following selected processes in order to achieve expected results. Technologically, AI and the Internet require the support of information and communication technologies. These have an instrumental role regarding the existence of AI and the Internet. Also ICT shape their diverse forms of configuration over the years.Within this framework, this paper offers a new context of analysis that goes beyond Simon’s and follows four main steps: the interaction between scientific creativity and technological innovation as the philosophico-methodological setting for Artificial Intelligence and the Internet; artificial intelligence and human intelligence as epistemological basis for machines and minds, where the differences between artificial intelligence and human intelligence are made explicit and the analysis of minds and machines is made from the perspective of rationality ; intention and its difference with design of machine learning are considered to distinguish human intelligence from artificial intelligence; and the internal and external aspects of artificial designs in contemporary society are considered through the perspective of rationality, which leads to the transition from intelligence to rationality in the Internet as well as to the historicity of information. (shrink)

This book offers a rigorous, concise, and nontechnical introduction to some of the fundamental insights of rational choice theory. It draws on formal theories of microeconomics, decision making, games, and social choice, and on ideas developed in philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Itzhak Gilboa argues that economic theory has provided a set of powerful models and broad insights that have changed the way we think about everyday life. He focuses on basic insights of the rational choice (...) paradigm--the general conceptualization rather than a particular theory--that survive recent critiques of economic theory's various failures. Gilboa explains the main concepts in language accessible to the nonspecialist, offering a nonmathematical guide to some of the main ideas developed in economic theory in the second half of the twentieth century. Chapters cover feasibility and desirability, utility maximization, constrained optimization, expected utility, probability and statistics, aggregation of preferences, games and equilibria, free markets, and rationality and emotions. Online appendixes offer additional material, including a survey of relevant mathematical concepts. (shrink)

Game theory is a mathematical theory of strategic interactions between rational agents. With much success, it has been widely applied in various areas of the social sciences, especially economics and sociology. However, it has been relatively and rarely used in the analyses pursued in legal theory and legal dogmatics. The present collection fills this gap and discusses game theory as a useful tool for legal scholars in solving the various problems of legal (...) philosophy or legal dogmatics. It also includes two skeptical voices regarding the applicability of game theory in legal analysis. The book will be useful for scholars in the field of legal theory, as well as for philosophers and economists. (shrink)

According to Bayesian epistemology, rational learning from experience is consistent learning, that is learning should incorporate new information consistently into one's old system of beliefs. Simon M. Huttegger argues that this core idea can be transferred to situations where the learner's informational inputs are much more limited than Bayesianism assumes, thereby significantly expanding the reach of a Bayesian type of epistemology. What results from this is a unified account of probabilistic learning in the tradition of Richard Jeffrey's 'radical probabilism'. (...) Along the way, Huttegger addresses a number of debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science, including the status of prior probabilities, whether Bayes' rule is the only legitimate form of learning from experience, and whether rational agents can have sustained disagreements. His book will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology, of game and decision theory, and of cognitive, economic, and computer sciences. (shrink)

Contents: Preface. Introduction. J. ECHEVERRIA, A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: The Long and Winding Road to the Philosophy of Science in Spain. REPRESENTATION AND MEASUREMENT. A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: Theories as Representations. J. GARRIDO GARRIDO: The Justification of Measurement. O. FERNÁNDEZ PRAT and D. QUESADA: Spatial Representations and Their Physical Content. J.A. DIEZ CALZADA: The Theory-Net of Interval Measurement Theory. TRUTH, RATIONALITY, AND METHOD. J.C. GARCÍA-BERMEJO OCHOA: Realism and Truth Approximation in Economic Theory. W.J. GONZALEZ: (...) Rationality in Economics and Scientific Predictions: A Critical Reconstruction of Bounded Rationality and Its Role in Economic Predictions. J.P. ZAMORA BONILLA: An Invitation to Methodonomics. LOGICS, SEMANTICS, AND THEORETICAL STRUCTURES. J.L. FALGUERA: A Basis for a Formal Semantics of Linguistic Formulations of Science. A. SOBRINO and E. TRILLAS: Can Fuzzy Logic Help to Pose Some Problems in the Philosophy of Science? J. de LORENZO: Demonstrative Ways in Mathematical Doing. M. CASANUEVA: Genetics and Fertilization: A Good Marriage. C.U. MOULINES: The Concept of Universe from a Metatheoretical Point of View. List of Contributors. Index of Names. (shrink)

In their survey of empirical research based on rational choice theory, Don Green and Ian Shapiro point to a list of methodological deficiencies or ?pathologies.? The main problem with Green and Shapiro's list lies in the standards they use to evaluate the achievements of rational choice theory. These standards are derived from a view of empirical research that is deeply questionable and, in the stated form, inconsistent with both standard insights in contemporary philosophy of science (...) and the established practice in the most successful empirical sciences. (shrink)

In this paper, I address a question in social epistemology about the unity of a scientic community to- wards its inner groups (teams, labs...). I investigate the reasons why these groups might want to \go it alone", working among themselves and hiding their discoveries from other groups. I concentrate on the intermediate results of a longer project, where the first steps can help to achieve a more advanced result. I study to what extent the isolation of research groups might be (...) damaging to the epistemic progress of the whole community. In order to get an idea of the reason why scientists might not share their intermediate results with others, consider for example Schawlow and Townes in the summer of 1958 (the historical material is drawn from Broberg, 1991, chap. 3): together they had just designed the principle of functioning of what would be known as the laser, with the intention of constructing the rst laser, relying on their theoretical ideas. Should they have published their theoretical discovery, or rather taken advantage of their advance on possible oppo- nents and start the experimental work? They chose to publish their theoretical ideas in a scientic journal, and they also led a patent application. On the one hand, it was a valuable choice: the patent was granted and their paper was published, making them soon famous. Further- more, another scientist called Gould was to le a simi- lar patent application a few months later, in March 1959; it was refused, because of the priority of Schawlow and Townes. If the latter had not submitted their idea in 1958, the patent would certainly have been acknowl- edged to Gould. In this sense, publishing their intermediate result was a worthy strategy. On the other hand, history showed that their publication had also some drawbacks for them. Schawlow and Townes' publication triggered a race among many American laboratories for the rst experimental construction of the laser. In addition to bringing them competitors, their publication helped these competitors in crucial ways; so much so that it was another scientist, Maiman, and not Schawlow and Townes, who was able to build the rst working laser, in May 1960, and to publish the result. If Schawlow and Townes had not published their theoretical idea, there are chances that they would have been the first ones to build a laser. Their publication of the first theoretical result certainly prevented them from getting the second experimental one. In short, the best publishing strategy about an intermediate result is no easy question for a scientist. Consider now the whole community, concerned with the results available to all and with the pace of the epistemic progress. Schawlow and Townes' publication enabled the rst laser to be built quicker, as other teams could rely on their theoretical work. More generally, being able to reuse other's works seems to be a rm basis of scientic progress. Thus, for the whole community, it seems that there are only benets if intermediate results are published. As this is not necessarily the best strategy for those who reach these intermediate results, there might be a conflict between the interests of individuals and those of the whole community. The question Schawlow and Townes faced was whether they should make their discovery publicly known, or keep it for themselves to progress alone. This alternative can also arise for an entire lab, when competing with other labs on some long-run project: should it make its discoveries known to its opponents, or only share them internally among its members? At a higher level still, this question arises for what can be called scientic schools, which are groups of labs sharing some particular approach|methodological, experimental or interpre- tational, for example. At each level within the scientic community, there are competitive groups of scientists which may decide to go it alone and to prevent their results from being accessible to others. If they had good reasons for doing so, there would be dramatic consequences for the whole community: other groups would not be able to reuse their results, labour force would be wasted in achieving them again, and the progress of the eld would be slowered. 9 The aim of this paper is to investigate this risk of division: to assess the conditions under which it may oc- cur, its damage for the community, and to draw the limit of an acceptable pluralism. The reasoning with benets and drawbacks which has been sketched for Schawlow and Townes seems to be implicitly an informal economic argument. In order to clarify and to rene such an argument, I will investigate it in a rational decision framework, supposing some utility or preferences for the groups of scientists, and I will propose a formal model, in game theory. In social epistemology of science, formal models have been proposed for various questions (for example, Kitcher 1990, 1993, Goldman 2009, Strevens 2003, 2006, Weisberg and Muldoon, forthcoming, Zollman 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), but not for the question of the division of the scientic community. I will concentrate on the normative aspect of the question, ignoring the descriptive and historical question of whether groups do go it alone or not. The model I propose is sequential: two groups are competing on a research program, which consists of several results which have to be obtained in order. The groups always carry out some research for the next result, which they reach with some probability per unit of time. When a group, say A, reaches a result, it can either make it public for the other group, or continue its research. After a result is made public, the competitor B can start from it so as to continue its own research. Thus, when A publishes it loses its lead, and its competitor will be able to compete with it in the near future. But it is also recognized as the rst to reach this step. I consider two dierent cases, one in which the number of steps is limited, another where the limit concerns the number of temporal intervals. In both cases, assuming that all steps are equally dicult and equally rewarding, it turns out that the best strategy for a group concerned with its own reward is to make public every step it takes. Thus, there is no risk that groups might separate: a scientist, whatever its group, will publish for all. Finally, I turn to more complex situations, where results have varying size or diculty: there, groups can indeed be better o going it alone. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is described and assessed how political scientists use rational choice theories to offer causal explanations. We observe that the ways in which rational choice theories are considered to be successful in political science differs, depending on the explanandum in question. Political scientists use empirical variants of rational choice theories to explain the political behavior of individual agents and analytical variants to explain the behavior of collective actors. Both variants are used for distinct explananda, (...) which ask for different modes of explanation that raise in turn different explanatory demands toward rational choice theories. We argue that when political scientists discuss the explanatory usefulness of rational choice theories, they should assess them in light of the demands they are supposed to meet. This would enable a more nuanced and problem-oriented appraisal of rational choice theories in political science. (shrink)

Most philosophers of economics are hostile towards neoclassical economics in general and general equilibrium theory in the vein of Arrow and Debreu in particular. Especially the latter’s dismissal is justified by pointing out its lack of direct relevance for an understanding of real economies. Many recommend a more pragmatic approach along the lines of Keynes instead. The criterion of scientific legitimacy underlying this approach derives from a philosophy of science developed along the lines of Popper and (...) Lakatos. They, however, neglect the importance of conceptual problems and of the choice of adequate ‘language-systems’ in science. Since these conceptual and ‘linguistic’ aspects may be able to explain and to justify the rationale of the Arrow-Debreu approach, I recommend the more balanced philosophies of Carnap and Laudan, in which conceptual as well as empirical problems are allowed for, as a framework for methodological appraisal. I explain why such a balanced view is obstructed for most philosophers of economics and advocate a moderate pluralism leaving room for different theories, methodologies and language-systems, depending on the scientific aims that are pursued. (shrink)

This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. 'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science and logicians. It (...) addresses a growing agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction - and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision and game theory. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic, computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Backed by its technological achievements, modern science appears as the de facto source of truth to the majority of our contemporaries. Its sole reliance on reason and empirical data gives it an air of objectivity that has conferred upon it an almost unquestioning authority. Against the backdrop of this pervasive scientism, Philosophy of Science in the Light of the Perennial Wisdom is a daring attempt to offer an intellectual critique of modern science in its foundation by rigorously examining the (...) intrinsic limitations of rational thought and empirical investigation. Unique of its kind, this book offers a refreshing look at the traditional doctrines of epistemology and metaphysics as an antidote to the subjective as well as objective errors of modern science, which is thus revealed as no more than a belief system that falls radically short of offering a full knowledge of reality; this, in contrast to the perennial wisdom of the world's great religions that for millennia have offered humankind not only keys to true knowledge, but also the means of attaining it, which precisely constitutes man's reason for being. (shrink)

Can social phenomena be understood by analyzing their parts? Contemporary economic theory often assumes that they can. The methodology of constructing models which trace the behavior of perfectly rational agents in idealized environments rests on the premise that such models, while restricted, help us isolate tendencies, that is, the stable separate effects of economic causes that can be used to explain and predict economic phenomena. In this paper, I question both the claim that models in economics supply (...) claims about tendencies and also the view that economics, when successful, necessarily follows this method. When economics licenses successful policy interventions, as it did in the case of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, its method is not to study tendencies but rather to study the phenomenon as a whole. Key Words: economic models • tendencies • economic experiments • policy making • John Stuart Mill. (shrink)

J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from (...) the perspective of causal world Bayesianism. The author establishes principles for distinguishing options in decision problems, and studies ways in which perfectly rational causal maximizers can be capable of resolute choices. Sobel also views critically Gauthier's revisionist ideas about maximizing rationality. This collection will be a desideratum for anyone working in the field of rational choice theory, whether in philosophy, economics, political science, psychology or statistics. Howard Sobel's work in decision theory is certainly among the most important, interesting and challenging that is being done by philosophers. (shrink)

_Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory_, a book written by Donald Green and Ian Shapiro and published in 1994, excited much controversy among political scientists and promoted a dialogue among them that was printed in a double issue of the journal Critical Review in 1995. This new book reproduces thirteen essays from the journal written by senior scholars in the field, along with an introduction by the editor of the journal, Jeffrey Friedman, and a rejoinder to the essays by Green (...) and Shapiro. The scholars—who include John Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Stanley Kelley, Jr., Robert E. Lane, Peter C. Ordeshook, Norman Schofield, and Kenneth A. Shepsle—criticize, agree with, or build on the issues raised by Green and Shapiros critique. Together the essays provide an interesting and accessible way of focusing on competing approaches to the study of politics and the social sciences. (shrink)

This article reexamines the rational choice or economic approach to human studies. Its adherents claim that its extension beyond its original domain to all human behavior can finally lead to integration of the human studies, especially social theory, and thus their elevation from what they see as a chaotic state. Specifically, they propose grounding human studies on the premise that humans are rational egoists or self-interested utility maximizers. Although this premise has been the conceptual foundation of orthodox (...) economic theory, it has been questioned, and even in part discredited in its heterodox versions. This reexamination casts serious doubts on such claims. (shrink)

This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social (...) norms in the theory of choice, and in a very recent article [BS07] Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura develop Sen's proposal, offering an extension of the classical theory of choice that is capable of dealing with social norms. The first part of this article offers an alternative functional characterization of the extended notion of rationality employed by Bossert and Suzumura in [BS07]. This characterization, unlike the one offered in [BS07], represents a norm-sensitive notion of rationality in terms of a pure functional constraint unmediated by a notion of revealed preference (something that is crucial for the application developed in the second part of this article). This functional characterization is formulated for general domains (as is Bossert and Suzumura's characterization) and is therefore empirically more applicable than usual characterizations of rationality. Interestingly, the functional constraint we propose is a variant of a condition first entertained in [AGM85] by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson in the area of belief change. The second part of this article applies the theory developed in the first part to the realm of belief change. We first point out that social norms can be invoked to concoct counterexamples against some postulates of belief change (like postulate (*7)) that are necessary for belief change to be relational. These examples constitute the epistemological counterpart of Sen's counterexamples against condition α in rational choice (as a matter of fact, Rott has showed in [Rot01] that condition and postulate (*7) are mutually mappable). These examples are variants of examples Rott has recently presented in [Rot04]. One of our main goals in this article consists in applying the theory developed in the first part to develop a theory of norm-inclusive belief change that circumvents the counterexamples. We offer a new axiomatization for belief change and we furnish correspondence results relating constraints of rational choice to postulates of belief change. (shrink)

Following Amartya Sen’s insistence to expand the framework of rational choice theory by taking into account ‘non-utility information,’ economists, political scientists and philosophers have recently concentrated their efforts in analysing the issues related to rights, freedom, diversity intentions and equality. Thomas Boylan and Ruvin Gekker have gathered essays that reflect this trend. The particular themes addressed in this volume include: the measurement of diversity and freedom, formal analysis of individual rights and intentions, judgment aggregation under constraints and strategic (...) manipulation in fuzzy environments. Some papers in the volume also deal with philosophical aspects of normative social choice. (shrink)

Following Amartya Sen’s insistence to expand the framework of rational choice theory by taking into account ‘non-utility information,’ economists, political scientists and philosophers have recently concentrated their efforts in analysing the issues related to rights, freedom, diversity intentions and equality. Thomas Boylan and Ruvin Gekker have gathered essays that reflect this trend. The particular themes addressed in this volume include: the measurement of diversity and freedom, formal analysis of individual rights and intentions, judgment aggregation under constraints and strategic (...) manipulation in fuzzy environments. Some papers in the volume also deal with philosophical aspects of normative social choice. (shrink)

The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division (...) over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of pre sentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foun dational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodol ogy and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

It is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived (...) from the interaction and aggregation of individual choices. However, we must abandon the notion that rationality implies self-regarding behavior and the assumption that contracts are costlessly enforced by third parties. (shrink)