The fate of the half a million or so free-ranging elephants in Africa depends on the choices people will make. What ‘moral standing’ do elephants deserve, and thus what constraints should we impose on our behaviour towards them? To assess the state of our knowledge about ethics and elephants is no easy affair. Different views on the moral standing of elephants and thus the obligations humans owe elephants, are not really a matter of scientific knowledge, although such knowledge might deeply (...) influence our chosen ethics. At stake are human value choices that are developed through argument and discussion into ethical positions that suggest, prescribe, or legislate acceptable behaviour, and proscribe or discourage unacceptable treatment of elephants. The point of this assessment is thus to determine which ethical positions have been developed on various matters concerning the management of elephants and have been justified through reasoning. This chapter portrays the different ethical views relevant to the management of elephants that are present in some or other form in the public domain. The aim is to make readers aware of the multiplicity of ethical issues involved in elephant management, as seen from a variety of ethical viewpoints. The complexity of the benefits and harm that accompany different management options will be clarified. The chapter is divided into five sections: (1) our human responsibility towards elephants, (2) the accountability of elephant custodians, (3) the moral standing of elephants, (4) ethical theories, and (5) ethics and management options. (shrink)
In Elephant , director Gus Van Sant dramatises a massacre at a suburban American high school in order to examine narrative cinema's ethical capacity to respond to that which resists being framed as a meaningful event. In the film, this stubborn stuff is experience shot through with contingency. Van Sant depicts acts of violence that are indiscriminate and, at best, ambiguously motivated, as well as school-day activities that appear coincidental and insignificant. This essay argues that the director aims to (...) screen contingency to mount a critique of conventional narrative film's terror of contingency, its anxious drive to convert all cinematic time to good, signifying use. It also argues that Van Sant complicates or crosses up this aim by constructing a self-reflexive text attuned to the inherent irresponsibility in assuming that radical contingency's dead time could be fully and faithfully animated on screen. While the film camera and a still camera used by a student photographer in the film shoot people with the ostensible aim of capturing contingency in all its otherness, both projects are, at the same time, linked, in complex ways, to the student killers who shoot people with the aim of eliminating all otherness. The film's recognition of its own drive to plot in a deadly fashion thus illustrates Van Sant's profound sensitivity to the challenges of responding responsibly to a time of terror and, more broadly, to the terrors of time. (shrink)
In debates about criteria for human death, several camps have emerged, the main two focusing on either loss of the "organism as a whole" (the mainstream view) or loss of consciousness or "personhood." Controversies also rage over the proper definition of "irreversible" in criteria for death. The situation is reminiscent of the proverbial blind men palpating an elephant; each describes the creature according to the part he can touch. Similarly, each camp grasps some aspect of the complex reality of (...) death. The personhood camp, in contrast to the mainstream "organism" camp, recognizes that a human organism can still be a biological living whole even without brain function. The mainstream camp, in contrast to the personhood camp, recognizes that a person can be permanently, even irreversibly unconscious, and still be a living person so long as his/her body is alive. The author proposes that hylomorphic dualism incorporates both these key insights. But to complete the picture of the entire "death elephant," a fundamental paradigm shift is needed to make sense of other seemingly conflicting insights. The author proposes a "semantic bisection" of the concept of death, analogous to the traditional distinction at the beginning of life between "conception" and "birth." To avoid the semantic baggage associated with the term "death," the two new death-related concepts are referred to as "passing away" (or "deceased") and "deanimation," corresponding, respectively, to sociolegal ceasing-to-be (mirror image of birth) and ontological/theological ceasing-to-be of the bodily organism (mirror image of conception). Regarding criteria, the distinguishing feature is whether the cessation of function is permanent (passing away) or irreversible (deanimation). If the "dead donor rule" were renamed the "deceased donor rule" (both acronyms felicitously being "DDR"), the ethics of organ transplantation from non–heart-beating donors could, in principle, be validly governed by the DDR, even though the donors are not yet ontologically "deanimated." Thus, the paradigm shift satisfies both those who insist on maintaining the DDR and those who claim that it has all along been receiving only lip service and should be explicitly loosened to include those who are "as good as dead." Even so, a number of practical caveats remain to be worked out for non–heart-beating protocols. (shrink)
Dennis Gabor devised a new concept for optical imaging in 1947 that went by a variety of names over the following decade: holoscopy, wavefront reconstruction, interference microscopy, diffraction microscopy and Gaboroscopy. A well-connected and creative research engineer, Gabor worked actively to publicize and exploit his concept, but the scheme failed to capture the interest of many researchers. Gabor’s theory was repeatedly deemed unintuitive and baffling; the technique was appraised by his contemporaries to be of dubious practicality and, at best, constrained (...) to a narrow branch of science. By the late 1950s, Gabor’s subject had been assessed by its handful of practitioners to be a white elephant. Nevertheless, the concept was later rehabilitated by the research of Emmett Leith and Juris Upatnieks at the University of Michigan, and Yury Denisyuk at the Vavilov Institute in Leningrad. What had been judged a failure was recast as a success: evaluations of Gabor’s work were transformed during the 1960s, when it was represented as the foundation on which to construct the new and distinctly different subject of holography, a re-evaluation that gained the Nobel Prize for Physics for Gabor alone in 1971. This paper focuses on the difficulties experienced in constructing a meaningful subject, a practical application and a viable technical community from Gabor’s ideas during the decade 1947-1957. (shrink)
Cumulative technological culture refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because cumulative technological culture is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension, thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed to see the elephant in the (...) room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not the sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of cumulative technological culture? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that cumulative technological culture originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost cumulative technological culture. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archaeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)
In an article1 entitled Lucrèce et les éléphants, Professor Ernout has referred to recent archaeological evidence that in palaeolithic times the skeletons of mammoths were used in the construction of primitive habitations, and observes that the well-known lines of Lucretius. 532 ff. about India being so prolific inelephants that the whole land ‘milibus e multis vallo munitur eburno’ mayrefer not to anything legendary , nor to themilitary use of elephants in large numbers for frontier defence, but to a recognitionof the (...) fact that even in later times ‘les Indiens avaient pu conserver leurmode de vie et utiliser avec ses défenses d'éléphant le système de protectioninvente par leurs ancêtres, ou simplement conserver ces gigantesques os demammouths’, etc. (shrink)
South Africa remains a divided community on many levels: socially, racially and socioeconomically. This is no more evident than in the recent protests - most notably waged on university campuses and on the streets in the past year. This, the article argues, is closely related to the need to reclaim the notion of power by those who feel they remain relegated to the social and economic peripheries after over 20 years of democracy. While 'theology and development' praxis has been most (...) closely associated in a post-apartheid era with welfare and charity approaches or pragmatic interaction with state and civil society, what has not been sufficiently addressed is the notion of power which once dominated ecclesiastical discourses. This is the proverbial 'elephant in the room', which the article argues must once again be revisited and re-engaged - both within scholarly reflection and within church practice - in order to address these divides. (shrink)
The fable of the Emperor's New Clothes is a classic example of a conspiracy of silence, a situation where everyone refuses to acknowledge an obvious truth. But the denial of social realities--whether incest, alcoholism, corruption, or even genocide--is no fairy tale. In The Elephant in the Room, Eviatar Zerubavel sheds new light on the social and political underpinnings of silence and denial--the keeping of "open secrets." The author shows that conspiracies of silence exist at every level of society, ranging (...) from small groups to large corporations, from personal friendships to politics. Drawing on examples from newspapers and comedy shows to novels, children's stories, and film, the book travels back and forth across different levels of social life, and from everyday moments to large-scale historical events. At its core, The Elephant in the Room helps us understand why we ignore truths that are known to all of us. Zerubavel shows how such conspiracies evolve, illuminating the social pressures that cause people to deny what is right before their eyes. We see how each conspirator's denial is symbiotically complemented by the others', and we learn that silence is usually more intense when there are more people conspiring--and especially when there are significant power differences among them. He concludes by showing that the longer we ignore "elephants," the larger they loom in our minds, as each avoidance triggers an even greater spiral of denial. Social life in families, organizations, communities and even entire nations is full of situations where the emperor has no clothes. The Elephant in the Room illuminates the dynamics behind these situations, revealing why we ignore obvious and alarming realities. (shrink)
Like many humans in the wake of genocide and war, most wildlife today has sustained trauma. High rates of mortality, habitat destruction, and social breakdown precipitated by human actions are unprecedented in history. Elephants are one of many species dramatically affected by violence. Although elephant communities have processes, rituals, and social structures for responding to trauma—grieving, mourning, and socialization—the scale, nature, and magnitude of human violence have disrupted their ability to use these practices. Absent the cultural, carrier groups who (...) traditionally lead and teach these healing practices, humans must assume the role. Trauma theory has brought attention to victims' severe, sustained psychological damage. Looking through the lens of trauma theory provides a better understanding of how systematic violence has affected individuals and groups and how the pervasive nature of traumatic events affects human-nonhuman animal relationships. The framing of recent trauma theory compels conservationists to create new relationships—neither anthropocentric nor powerbased—with nonhuman animals. The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust, Kenya, shows how humans, taking on the role of interspecies witness, bring orphan elephants back to health and help re-build elephant communities shattered by genocide. (shrink)
The term futility has been widely used in medical ethics and clinical medicine for more than twenty years now. At first glance it appears to offer a clear-cut categorical characterisation of medical treatments at the end of life, and an apparently objective way of making decisions that are seen to be emotionally painful for those close to the patient, and ethically, and also potentially legally hazardous for clinicians. It also appears to deal with causation, because omission of a futile treatment (...) cannot surely be a cause of death. The problem is that futility can be argued to be a false friend , in that it gives an appearance of representing a reliable conceptual basis, in ethics, for limitation of medical treatment—usually in the context of dying—without actually doing so. In fact, the concept of futility is a conflation of clinical judgement about outcomes of treatment and the quality or even value of life, and has really failed to contribute much to the advancement of decision-making and hence care at the end-of-life. It also has the capacity to medicalise the personal space. Deliberations about the likely outcomes of medical treatment are necessary, and medical expertise is pivotal. However, futility is argued to have a better future in partnership with a broad social action agenda about the process of dying, such as that articulated in health promoting palliative care, as a basis for better death-ways in the 21st century (Kellehear 2005). Medicine needs to more honest and upfront about its limits, as death is, after all, the elephant in everybody's room. (shrink)
It is widely believed that there must be a conflict between food production and conservation, and that development must be related to economics. Both these beliefs are questioned. It is suggested that ecological agriculture, which includes ethologically and ecologically sound animal management can reduce conflicts between conservation and food production. African elephants are taken as an example illustrating different attitudes to conservation. It is proposed that, rather than developing further the present common conservation attitude of ' wildlife apartheid', the future (...) of elephants in many parts of Africa may rest on bringing them closer to the voters where the welfare of neither the human nor elephant is compromised. Here, they can act as both as workers, and as ' wildlife ambassadors'. This approach needs further research and development, but preliminary results show significant possibilities for reducing these apparently conflicting land use interests in some geographical areas. (shrink)
In “The Origin of Species,” Darwin describes a hypothetical example illustrating that large, slowly reproducing mammals such as the elephant can reach very large numbers if population growth is not affected by regulating factors. The elephant example has since been cited in various forms in a wide variety of books, ranging from educational material to encyclopedias. However, Darwin’s text was changed over the six editions of the book, although some errors in the mathematics persisted throughout. In addition, full (...) details of the problem remained hidden in his correspondence with readers of the Origin. As a result, Darwin’s example is very often misinterpreted, misunderstood or presented as if it were a fact. We show that the population growth of Darwin’s elephant population can be modeled by the Leslie matrix method, which we generalize here to males as well. Darwin’s most often cited figure, about 19 million elephants after 750 years is not a typical outcome, actually a very unlikely result under more realistic, although still hypothetical situations. We provide a recursion formula suggesting that Darwin’s original model corresponds to a tribonacci series, a proof showing that sex ratio is constant over all age classes, and a derivation of a generating function of the sequence. (shrink)
The ABA has adopted four model policies that address, in one way or another, the issue of foreign lawyer mobility. These policies are the ABA Model Foreign Legal Consultant Rule, which is commonly known as the FLC rule, the ABA Model Rule for Temporary Practice by Foreign Lawyers, which is commonly known as the FIFO rule, ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, which permits foreign lawyers to serve as in-house counsel, and the ABA Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice (...) Admission. All four of the ABA's foreign lawyer mobility recommendations include a requirement that the mobile foreign lawyer is “ subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority .” In other words, these rules set forth requirements regarding the nature of the regulatory system in the foreign lawyer's home jurisdiction. A number of US states have included this requirement in their foreign lawyer mobility provisions, but a number have not. Although the ABA model rules and a number of state rules include this requirement, neither the ABA Model Rules nor any of the state rules have defined what it means for a foreign lawyer to come from a system with “effective regulation and discipline.” Nor is there any evidence that this requirement has been enforced in those states that have included this requirement. This article suggests that the “effective regulation and discipline” requirement has been an elephant in the room that no one has been willing to talk about. The article argues that the time has come to confront this issue head-on. It asserts that either efforts should be undertaken to define and enforce this requirement or that the requirement should be abandoned. The article reviews two “threshold” issues that jurisdictions might want to consider when deciding whether to adopt or retain an “effective regulation and discipline” requirement. It also identifies cross-cultural and cross-professional resources that might be consulted for “benchmarking” purposes if and when US regulators decide to add “meat to the bones” by defining and enforcing the “effective regulation and discipline” requirement found in foreign lawyer mobility provisions. (shrink)
Elephant fish and GPS is an attempt to reflect on data flux, and artistic practice considered as a way to implement an experience specific to a flux. Sonification is particularly well suited to this type of implementation. As such, it leads us to question the nature of this type of experience, the position of the person who is faced with the artistic object, and the position and function of the artist. It allows us to query the status of devices (...) produced by such an artistic practice and the status of what is, traditionally, called a “work of art”. The approach is derived from neither the study of specific artistic projects that could be considered as examples from which a general model could be extrapolated, nor, conversely, that of the enunciation of models illustrated by concrete references. The intention is not to categorize practice or behavior. It is rather an approach that seeks to shift concepts and ways of thinking through progressive analogies aimed at critically questioning the notion of experience in a transition from “object” based logic to “flux” or “field”, based logic, coming from an aesthetic perspective. (shrink)
Locke reports, in his discussion of substance and with some amusement, on the Indian philosopher who, when asked what the earth rests on, postulated an elephant and then, when asked in turn about the elephant, decided to go with a tortoise. Locke's amusement, of course, is justified. But it is also tempered if not downright equivocal. For he sees that at some point a very special elephant or—if we stick to the Indian's story—a very special tortoise will (...) have to be invoked. Locke's own tortoise, or elephant, substratum or substance, has some very peculiar properties or, alternatively, an equally alarming lack of them—so much so that, as he is painfully aware, it might well seem totally implausible. Enough of Locke though. Wittgenstein's problem, unlike Locke's, lies in epistemology. His elephant consists of an indefinitely large and varied set of bench-marks or paradigms—Moore's examples, in fact, along with some additions—that function as an epistemological ‘foundation’, ‘river bed’, ‘bedrock’, ‘rock bottom’, a ‘substratum’, no less. Where is the tortoise? Wittgenstein's answer to this is that there is no tortoise, none at all. A non-existent tortoise, however, is as unacceptable here as a regular common-or-garden one. Even the Indian realized that an elephant is no good without a tortoise. (shrink)
Elephant 2000 is a proposed programming language good for writing and verifying programs that interact with people (eg. transaction processing) or interact with programs belonging to other organizations (eg. electronic data interchange) 1. Communication inputs and outputs are in an I-O language whose sentences are meaningful speech acts identified in the language as questions, answers, offers, acceptances, declinations, requests, permissions and promises. 2. The correctness of programs is partly defined in terms of proper performance of the speech acts. Answers (...) should be truthful and responsive, and promises should be kept. Sentences of logic expressing these forms of correctness can be generated automatically from the form of the program. 3. Elephant aource programs may not need data structures, because they can refer directly to the past. Thus a program can say that an airline passenger has a reservation if he has made one and hasn't cancelled it. 4. Elephant programs themselves can be represented as sentences of logic. Their extensional properties follow from this representation without an intervening theory of programming or anything like Hoare axioms. 5. Elephant programs that interact non-trivially with the outside world can have both input-output specification, relating the programs inputs and outputs, and accomplishment specifications concerning what the program accomplishes in the world. These concepts are respectively generalizations of the philosophers' illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. 6. Programs that engage in commercial transactions assume obligations on behalf of their owners in exchange for obligations assumed by other entities. It may be part of the specification of an Elephant 2000 program that these obligations are exchanged as intended, and this too can be expressed by a logical sentence. 7. Human speech acts involve intelligence. Elephant 2000 is on the borderline of AI, but the article emphasizes the Elephant usages that do not require AI. (shrink)
Using multi–sources: archeaology, history, geography, anthropology, wildlife, zoology, biology, oral tradition and archival material, the article examines the history of the elephant in Ghana, highlighting the various methods employed in hunting as well as the cultural and economic use values of the elephant in Ghana.
This paper responds to Kelly Oliver's “See Topsy ‘Ride the Lightning’: The Scopic Machinery of Death” by questioning the presuppositions and implications of her discussion of the spectacle of elephant executions and their relation to Derrida's writings about animals and the death penalty. This paper proposes to reframe the approach to Derrida's reflections on the death penalty and its problematic relation to the category of the human by focusing on the double function of the concept of the scaffold in (...) his writings. Rather than looking at it as a spectacle or as an object for visual studies, I show that the scaffold is a paradoxical concept and has a double (and duplicitous) function in the conceptual founding of human law and human rights, as it is both the architectonic philosophical principle of the rational executive function of the law and the name for the purely mechanical technological machine that carries out the death penalty. In either case, however, the scaffold serves as a nonhuman prosthetic without which the concept of a just and humane and properly “human” law is shown to be untenable. (shrink)
Using multi–sources: archeaology, history, geography, anthropology, wildlife, zoology, biology, oral tradition and archival material, the article examines the history of the elephant in Ghana, highlighting the various methods employed in hunting as well as the cultural and economic use values of the elephant in Ghana.
Despite broad agreement that the vulnerable have a claim to special protection, defining vulnerable persons or populations has proved more difficult than we would like. This is a theoretical as well as a practical problem, as it hinders both convincing justifications for this claim and the practical application of required protections. In this paper, I review consent-based, harm-based, and comprehensive definitions of vulnerability in healthcare and research with human subjects. Although current definitions are subject to critique, their underlying assumptions may (...) be complementary. I propose that we should define vulnerability in research and healthcare as an identifiably increased likelihood of incurring additional or greater wrong. In order to identify the vulnerable, as well as the type of protection that they need, this definition requires that we start from the sorts of wrongs likely to occur and from identifiable increments in the likelihood, or to the likely degree, that these wrongs will occur. It is limited but appropriately so, as it only applies to special protection, not to any protection to which we have a valid claim. Using this definition would clarify that the normative force of claims for special protection does not rest with vulnerability itself, but with pre-existing claims when these are more likely to be denied. Such a clarification could help those who carry responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations, such as Institutional Review Boards, to define the sort of protection required in a more targeted and effective manner. (shrink)
An influential strand of neo-Aristotelianism, represented by writers such as Philippa Foot, holds that moral virtue is a form of natural goodness in human beings, analogous to deep roots in oak trees or keen vision in hawks. Critics, however, have argued that such a view cannot get off the ground, because the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity is untenable in light of a Darwinian account of living things. This criticism has been developed most fully by William Fitzpatrick in his book (...) Teleology and the Norms of Nature . In this paper, I defend the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity, focusing on Fitzpatrick's arguments. I argue that a natural goodness view is not impugned by an evolutionary account. Nor can neo-Aristotelian life form judgments be replaced by an evolutionary view of living things. (shrink)
Whilst continuing racism is often invoked as evidence of the urgent need for Philosophy for Children, there is little in the current literature that addresses the topic. Drawing on Critical Race Theory and the related field of Critical Whiteness Studies , I argue that racism is deeply ingrained culturally in society, and best understood in the context of ‘Whiteness’. Following a CRT-informed analysis of two picturebooks that have been recommended as starting points for philosophical enquiry into multiculturalism, racism and diversity (...) – ‘Elmer’ and ‘Tusk Tusk’ by David McKee, I argue that whilst the use of stories with animals is commonly regarded as offering children the comfort of distance from emotionally challenging topics, this has the effect of separating racism from its temporal and spatial realities, which limits rather than enhances opportunities for engaging philosophically with it. I argue in favour of the practice of ‘reading against the text’ and consider the epistemological and practical obstacles to this practice drawing on my own experiences discussing race with P4C practitioners in the UK. I attempt to illustrate how the selection of recommended materials, combined with commonly held principles of P4C, make for a climate where a philosophical engagement with race and racism that considers the discourse of ‘Whiteness’ is highly unlikely to occur. This leads me to posit the idea of The Gated Community of Enquiry. (shrink)
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that execution by a commonly used protocol of drug administration does not represent cruel or unusual punishment. Various medical journals have editorialized on this drug protocol, the death penalty in general and the role that physicians play. Many physicians, and societies of physicians, express the opinion that it is unethical for doctors to participate in executions. This Target Article explores the harm that occurs to murder victims' relatives when an execution is delayed or (...) indefinitely postponed. By using established principles in psychiatry and the science of the brain, it is shown that victims' relatives can suffer brain damage when justice is not done. Conversely, adequate justice can reverse some of those changes in the brain. Thus, physician opposition to capital punishment may be contributing to significant harm. In this context, the ethics of physician involvement in lethal injection is complex. (shrink)
we present a number of findings concerning galileo's major discoveries which question both the methods and the results of dating his achievements by common historiographic criteria. the dating of galileo's discoveries is, however, not our primary concern. this paper is intended to contribute to a critical reexamination of the notion of discovery from the point of view of historical epistemology. we claim that the puzzling course of galileo's discoveries is not an exceptional comedy of errors but rather illustrates the normal (...) way in which scientific progress is achieved. we argue that scientific knowledge generally develops not as a sequence of independent discoveries accumulating to a new body of knowledge but rather as a network of interdependent activities which only as a whole makes the individual steps understandable as meaningful “discoveries.”. (shrink)
According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol.
The idea that we human beings have souls that can continue to have conscious experiences after the deaths of our bodies is controversial in contemporary academic bioethics; this idea is obviously present whenever questions about harm at the end of life are discussed, but this idea is often ignored or avoided because it is more comfortable to do so. After briefly discussing certain types of experiences that lead some people to believe in souls that can survive the deaths of their (...) bodies, I begin to answer the question, "If personal postmortem survival of some sort is real, then how should this alter the way we approach our bioethical discussions about death, the harm of death, and harming the dead?" The bioethics issues I briefly discuss in the remaining two sections are the debate about defining death and the decision whether to forego life-prolonging treatments. (shrink)
Some of the basic terminology of Yogācāra philosophy needs reevaluation. Whereas commentaries almost universally gloss the term dvaya ('duality') with some version of the phrase grāhya grāhaka ca (lit. 'grasped and grasper', but usually translated as 'subject and object'), in fact this gloss is absent from the earliest strata. The term and its gloss are derived from separate streams of Yogācāra reasoning - one from discussions of linguistic conceptualization and the other from discussions of perception. Once we see that these (...) two are distinct, it becomes clear that the commentarial literature asserts their identity in order to philosophically unify Yogācāra thought. One upshot of this is that even in this later assertion 'duality' refers not to the distinction between internal and external reality (as in 'textbook' Yogācāra), but to the falsely projected distinction between mental subjects and mental objects. (shrink)
Multinational companies commonly and increasingly undertake their research in low and middle-income countries through commercial clinical research organizations (CROs). The involvement of these scientific middle men complicates the application of the theories of justice. We examine those complexities, and conclude that while the difficulties are not immune to analysis in terms of these theories, the theories have to be deployed in new ways in order to be useful in the new commercial world.
This Article is a response to thoughtful commentaries by Jennifer Radden (2013) and Louis A. Sass and Elizabeth Pienkos (2013) on my paper, which investigates the continuity between melancholia and depression. In the following, I address the challenges presented by the commentators and attempt to clarify and deepen my position. In my paper, I have explored the history of melancholia and depression with special emphasis on the question of their possible continuity—with the knowledge that any such attempt inevitably brings with (...) it a whole cluster of theoretical challenges. Therefore, I tried to remain modest in my conclusions, but I also wanted to contribute to the debate by showing that there might be .. (shrink)
Moral Foundations research offers rich promise, opening up key questions about how affect and cognition are integrated in moral response, and exploring how different moral discourses may supply meaning and valence to moral experience. Haidt and his colleagues also associate different discourses with different political positions. However I address three problematic areas. First to what extent Haidt has succeeded in transcending the traditional dichotomy of affect and cognition, and created an integrative model of how moral intuitions actually work. Second, the (...) analysis of cultural processes is too limited; moral responses are discursive, contextualized and constructed. Third, the political spectrum is complex and diverse; to be truly useful, the research on Moral Foundations must avoid parochial US political concerns and models. (shrink)
In the Critique of Judgment, Kantattempts to unravel the problem of Übergang that threatens his CopernicanRevolution. Having opened up a ``chasm'' betweensensible and supersensible, betweenepistemological and ontological, Kant facesboth the specter of empirical chaos in whichthe noumenal refuses to conform to theunderstanding's attempts to legislate over themanifold of intuition, and the problem offinding a place for freedom to have effectswithin the seamless phenomenal realm ofefficient causality. Central to Kant's attemptto overcome these problems is his notion of theheautonomy of reflective judging, (...) in whichjudgment subjectively legislates its ownactivity. The net effect of this strategy isto preserve the integrity of the architectonicby permitting judgment use of ontologicalprinciples in regulating its own activity, butalways placing these ontological principlesunder an epistemological ``as if'' that cannot becarried over into the noumenal realm (e.g.,judgment can subjectively operate under theprinciple that the world appears ``as if'' it haspurpose, but this cannot be thought to apply tothe noumenal). Kant shields his architectonicby allowing it to encounter onlyepistemologically neutered noumena. This paperargues that Hick faces an analogousÜbergang problem, explores his``heautonomous'' attempt to blunt the problem,and concludes that the attempt fails, leavingHick with an unresolved problem of``onto-ethical discontinuity.''. (shrink)