Search results for 'endurantism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mauro Dorato (2012). Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second. Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):25-41.
    The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have (...)
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  2. Paul Richard Daniels (2014). Occupy Wall: A Mereological Puzzle and the Burdens of Endurantism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):91-101.
    Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...)
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  3. Maureen Donnelly (2011). Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):27 - 51.
    In this paper, I focus on three issues intertwined in current debates between endurantists and perdurantists—(i) the dimension of persisting objects, (ii) whether persisting objects have timeless, or only time-relative, parts, and (iii) whether persisting objects have proper temporal parts. I argue that one standard endurantist position on the first issue is compatible with standard perdurantist positions on parthood and temporal parts. I further argue that different accounts of persistence depend on the claims about objects' dimensions and not on the (...)
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  4. Paul Richard Daniels (2013). Endurantism and Paradox. Philosophia 41 (4):1173-1179.
    Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by (...)
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  5. Achille C. Varzi (2007). Promiscuous Endurantism and Diachronic Vagueness. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):181-189.
    According to a popular line of reasoning, diachronic vagueness creates a problem for the endurantist conception of persistence. Some authors have replied that this line of reasoning is inconclusive, since the endurantist can subscribe to a principle of Diachronic Unrestricted Composition (DUC) that is perfectly parallel to the principle required by the perdurantist’s semantic account. I object that the endurantist should better avoid DUC. And I argue that even DUC, if accepted, would fail to provide the endurantist with the necessary (...)
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  6. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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  7. Jiri Benovsky (2009). On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248.
    Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are (...)
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  8.  76
    Jiri Benovsky (2013). New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism. Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
    In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (...)
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  9. Paul R. Daniels (forthcoming). Sweeping Endurantism is a Mischaracterization of Endurantism. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    One way endurantism is commonly characterized is as a sweeping thesis, according to which enduring objects persist by sweeping or moving through time. I argue that the endurantist should resist this characterization as it makes her view incompatible with eternalism, the moving spotlight theory, and the growing block theory. Moreover, even the presentist endurantist should resist this characterization as it undermines the modal analogy. As a result, those who argue against endurantism should avoid characterizing endurantism in this (...)
     
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  10.  84
    Greg Janzen (2011). On Three Arguments Against Endurantism. Metaphysica 12 (2):101-115.
    Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic or relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail in a rather obvious way--they beg the question--and so even though there may be arguments that provide (...)
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  11.  97
    Ofra Magidor (2016). Endurantism Vs. Perdurantism?: A Debate Reconsidered. Noûs 50 (3):509-532.
    One of the central debates in contemporary metaphysics has been the debate between endurantism and perdurantism about persistence. In this paper I argue that much of this debate has been misconstrued: most of the arguments in the debate crucially rely on theses which are strictly orthogonal to the endurantism/perdurantism debate. To show this, I note that the arguments in the endurantism/perdurantism debate typically take the following form: one presents a challenge that endurantists allegedly have some trouble addressing, (...)
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  12. Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson (2007). A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):633 – 640.
    In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is (...)
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  13.  99
    Steven D. Hales & Timothy A. Johnson (2003). Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):524–539.
    There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity, and can accommodate (...)
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  14.  46
    Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242-253.
    A plausible desideratum for an account of the nature of objects, at, and across time, is that it accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness without locating vagueness in the world. A series of arguments have attempted to show that while universalist perdurantism -- which combines a perdurantist account of persistence with an unrestricted mereological account of composition -- meets this desideratum, endurantist accounts do not. If endurantists reject unrestricted composition then they must hold that vagueness is ontological. But if they embrace (...)
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  15.  97
    By Kristie Miller (2008). Endurantism, Diachronic Vagueness and the Problem of the Many. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):242–253.
    A plausible desideratum for an account of the nature of objects, at, and across time, is that it accommodate the phenomenon of vagueness without locating vagueness in the world. A series of arguments have attempted to show that while universalist perdurantism – which combines a perdurantist account of persistence with an unrestricted mereological account of composition – meets this desideratum, endurantist accounts do not. If endurantists reject unrestricted composition then they must hold that vagueness is ontological. But if they embrace (...)
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  16. Alexander Pruss, Special Relativity and Endurantism.
    I identify a fallacy in Hales and Johnson ’s argument that endurantism is incompatible with special relativity and argue that an improvement on their argument also does not succeed.
     
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  17. J. E. Brower (2010). Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Mind 119 (476):883-905.
    It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally (...)
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  18. N. Effingham & J. Melia (2007). Endurantism and Timeless Worlds. Analysis 67 (294):140–147.
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  19.  9
    Daniel Giberman (forthcoming). Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist Endurantism. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    One premise in David Lewis’s well-known argument from temporary intrinsic properties in favor of temporal parts is the intuition that material objects exemplify such properties simpliciter, that is, without qualification. The argument has spawned a large critical literature, with commentators questioning the simpliciter premise’s motivation, content, dialectical force, and status as an intuition. The present essay has two chief goals: to provide a novel framework for clarifying Lewis’s simpliciter premise and to explain how the resulting clarification upends a wide range (...)
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  20.  66
    Daniel Giberman (2014). Passing Through: Why Intrinsic‐to‐a‐Time Endurantism Should Not Persist. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):89-101.
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  21. Nikk Effingham (2012). Endurantism and Perdurantism. In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. pp. 170.
     
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  22. Khalid Saeed (forthcoming). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria.
     
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  23.  58
    E. Jonathan Lowe (2009). Serious Endurantism and the Strong Unity of Human Persons. In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 67.
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  24.  43
    Frank Hofmann (2009). An Alternative to Endurantism and Perdurantism: Doing Without Occupants. In Ludger Honnefelder, Benedikt Schick & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 134.
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  25.  56
    Andrew W. Lamb (2001). Temporal Dynamics: A Phenomenologically Based Alternative to Four-Dimensionalist and “Point-Endurantist” Views of Time. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):235-259.
  26.  5
    N. Effingham & J. Melia (2007). Endurantism and Timeless Worlds. Analysis 67 (2):140-147.
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  27. Schick Benedikt, Runggaldier Edmund & Honnefelder Ludger (2009). An Alternative to Endurantism and Perdurantism: Doing Without Occupants. In Benedikt Schick, Edmund Runggaldier & Ludger Honnefelder (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter.
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  28. Schick Benedikt, Runggaldier Edmund & Honnefelder Ludger (2009). Serious Endurantism and the Strong Unity of Human Persons. In Benedikt Schick, Edmund Runggaldier & Ludger Honnefelder (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter.
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  29. Alessandro Giordani & Damiano Costa (2013). From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):210-220.
    Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding (...)
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  30. Ryan Wasserman (2016). Theories of Persistence. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):243-250.
    The debate over persistence is often cast as a disagreement between two rival theories—the perdurantist theory that objects persist through time by having different temporal parts at different times, and the endurantist theory that objects persist through time by being wholly present at different times. This way of framing the debate over persistence involves both an important insight and an important error. Unfortunately, the error is often embraced and the insight is often ignored. This paper aims to correct both of (...)
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  31. Jiri Benovsky (2009). Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie. Axiomathes 19 (1):51-71.
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are (...)
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  32.  89
    Simon Langford (2014). Is Personal Identity Analysable? Acta Analytica 29 (3):309-316.
    Trenton Merricks has argued that given endurantism personal identity is unanalysable in terms of psychological continuity, while Anthony Brueckner has argued against this claim. This article shows that neither philosopher has made a compelling case and also shows what it would take to settle the issue either way. It is then argued that whether personal identity is analysable or not may not be of crucial importance to those wanting to defend a psychological continuity approach to personal identity.
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  33. Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance, Perdurance, and Metaontology. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy (2):159-177.
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
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  34.  8
    Jesse M. Mulder (forthcoming). Two Fundamentally Different Perspectives on Time. Axiomathes:1-26.
    Frege taught us how to understand one form of predication: an atemporal one. There is also a different, temporal form of predication, which I briefly introduce. Accordingly, there are two fundamentally different approaches to time: a reductive one, aiming to account for time in terms of Frege’s atemporal predication, and a non-reductive one, insisting that the temporal form of predication is sui generis, and that time is to be understood in its terms. I do not directly argue for or against (...)
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  35. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are (...)
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  36.  61
    Katherine Hawley (forthcoming). David Lewis on Persistence. In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 237-49.
    This paper provides an overview on David Lewis's writings about persistence. I focus on two issues. First, what is the relationship between the doctrine of Humean Supervenience and the rejection of endurantism? Second, why did Lewis not adopt a stage theory of persistence, given that he advocated a counterpart theory of modality?
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  37.  7
    Mario Alai (2016). Lewis, Change and Temporary Intrinsics. Axiomathes 26 (4):467-487.
    This is an attempt to sort out what is it that makes many of us uncomfortable with the perdurantist solution to the problem of change. Lewis argues that only perdurantism can reconcile change with persistence over time, while neither presentism nor endurantism can. So, first, I defend the endurantist solution to the problem of change, by arguing that what is relative to time are not properties, but their possession. Second, I explore the anti-perdurantist strategy of arguing that Lewis cannot (...)
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  38.  7
    Irem Kurtsal Steen (2010). Three-Dimensionalist’s Semantic Solution to Diachronic Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):79-96.
    A standard response to the problem of diachronic vagueness is ‘the semantic solution’, which demands an abundant ontology. Although it is known that the abundant ontology does not logically preclude endurantism, their combination is rejected because it necessitates massive coincidence between countless objects. In this paper, I establish that the semantic solution is available not only to perdurantists but also to endurantists by showing that there is no problem with such ubiquitous and principled coincidence.
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  39.  83
    Pablo Rychter (2011). How Coincidence Bears on Persistence. Philosophia 39 (4):759-770.
    The ‘paradoxes of coincidence’ are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’). However, the recent work of Gilmore ( 2007 ) and McGrath ( 2007 ) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain (...)
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  40.  91
    Katherine Hawley (2008). Persistence and Determination. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):197-212.
    Roughly speaking, perdurantism is the view that ordinary objects persist through time by having temporal parts, whilst endurantism is the view that they persist by being wholly present at different times. (Speaking less roughly will be important later.) It is often thought that perdurantists have an advantage over endurantists when dealing with objects which appear to coincide temporarily: lumps, statues, cats, tail-complements, bisected brains, repaired ships, and the like. Some cases – personal fission, for example – seem to involve (...)
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  41.  9
    Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology. SATS 12 (2).
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
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  42.  32
    Robert Francescotti (2008). Endurance and Discernibility. Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204.
    How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a (...)
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  43.  8
    Florian Fischer (2012). On the Asymmetry of Endurantistic and Perdurantistic Coexistence in Special Relativity. Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):43-61.
    The paper reviews Balashov’s Asymmetry Thesis concerning co-existing (point-sized) enduring objects, on the one hand, and perduring ones, on the other. In this regard, it becomes crucial to investigate whether, at a given spacetime point p, it is located only the respective temporal part of a perdur- ing whole, or that whole as well. Two alternatives ought to be distinguished and, then, I will argue as follows: If the perduring whole is located where its parts are, the original asymmetry- thesis (...)
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  44.  33
    Martin A. Lipman (forthcoming). A Passage Theory of Time. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper proposes a view of time that takes passage to be the most basic temporal notion, instead of the usual A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions, and explores how we should think of a world that exhibits such a genuine temporal passage. It will be argued that an objective passage of time can only be made sense of from an atemporal point of view and only when it is able to constitute a genuine change of objects across time. This requires that (...)
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  45.  75
    Tuomas E. Tahko (2016). Meta-Metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice. By Jiri Benovsky. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 723.
    Review of Meta-Metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice (Springer, Synthese Library, 2016). By Jiri Benovsky.
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  46.  19
    Katherine Hawley (2004/2010). Temporal Parts. Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
    Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.
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  47. Matteo Morganti (2009). Are the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory Really Twin Brothers? Axiomathes 19 (1):73--85.
    In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject them.
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  48.  37
    Jiri Benovsky (2011). Endurance and Time Travel. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):65-72.
    Suppose that you travel back in time to talk to your younger self in order to tell her that she (you) should have done some things in her (your) life differently. Of course, you will not be able to make this plan work, we know that from the many versions of 'the grandfather paradox' that populate the philosophical literature about time travel. What will be my centre of interest in this paper is the conversation between you and ... you – (...)
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  49. Damiano Costa (forthcoming). The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence. Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...)
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  50. Ben Caplan & Bob Bright (2005). Fusions and Ordinary Physical Objects. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):61-83.
    In “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Kris McDaniel argues that ordinary physical objects are fusions of monadic and polyadic tropes. McDaniel calls his view “TOPO”—for “Theory of Ordinary Physical Objects”. He argues that we should accept TOPO because of the philosophical work that it allows us to do. Among other things, TOPO is supposed to allow endurantists to reply to Mark Heller’s argument for perdurantism. But, we argue in this paper, TOPO does not help endurantists do that; indeed, we argue (...)
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